MARY GORDON BAKER, Magistrate Judge.
This matter is before the Court upon Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt. No. 36). Pursuant to the provisions of Title 28, United States Code, Section 636(b)(1) and Local Rule 73.02(B)(2)(g), D.S.C., all pretrial matters in employment discrimination cases are referred to a United States Magistrate Judge for consideration. For the reasons set forth herein, the undersigned recommends that Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt. No. 36) be granted in part and denied in part.
Plaintiff was hired as a front desk clerk at the Airport Inn in North Charleston on December 27, 2013. (Dkt. No. 40 at 3; Dkt. No. 36-3 at 40:21-25.) The Airport Inn is owned and operated by Defendant Palmetto Heights Management, LLC ("Palmetto Heights"), a South Carolina limited liability company owned by Defendant Kamlesh Shah ("Shah"). (Dkt. No. 40 at 3; see also Dkt. No. 36-2 at 26:3-29:10.) Shah is the sole member of Palmetto Heights. (Id.) Additionally, he is the sole owner and member of Defendant Archdale Development, LLC ("Archdale"), which owns and operates a neighboring hotel called the Clarion Inn & Suites ("Clarion"). (Dkt. No. 36-1 at 2; Dkt. No. 36-2 at 26:3-29:10.)
During the course of her employment at the Airport Inn, Plaintiff contends that she was "subjected to ongoing sexual harassment" by Shah. (Dkt. No. 40 at 3; Dkt. No. 1-1 at 6.) Specifically, Plaintiff claims that Shah told her that her "butt and tits were big," (Dkt. No. 36-3 at 45:1-47:13; Dkt. No. 40 at 3; Dkt. No. 1-1 at 6); commented that women's private parts "had to be wet," (Dkt. No. 36-3 at 72:3-12); told Plaintiff on several occasions that his two favorite things in life are "money and good pussy," (Dkt. No. 40 at 3; Dkt. No. 40-1 at 141:16-142:6; Dkt. No. 1-1 at 6); told Plaintiff, "you better know the two things that Kam likes," referring again to money and sex (Dkt. No. 40-1 at 141:16-24; Dkt. No. 1-1 at 6); directed Plaintiff to flirt with customers and "sell" herself, including leaning over the counter to reveal her breasts (Dkt. No. 40-1 at 141:2-12; Dkt. No. 40 at 3; Dkt. No. 1-1 at 6); grazed his body against Plaintiff's backside
Plaintiff claims that Shah's conduct made her feel uncomfortable, threatened and intimidated, and despite repeatedly asking him to stop, Shah continued to make inappropriate comments to Plaintiff. (Dkt. No. 40-1 at 143:14-144:7.) Plaintiff complained about Shah's ongoing conduct to her supervisor, Vivian Faulk ("Faulk"), General Manager Ms. Slawson, and Regional Manager Thomas Slawson ("Mr. Slawson").
In late February/early March 2014, Plaintiff claims that she, Ms. Slawson, and several other female employees held a meeting at the Airport Inn to discuss their individual experiences with Shah's harassment and possible recourse for his behavior. (Dkt. No. 40 at 4-5; Dkt. No. 40-1 at 86:14-87:18; Dkt. No. 1-1 at 6.) Shortly after this meeting, on or around March 8, 2014, Plaintiff's employment was terminated for allegedly mishandling guestrooms and stealing money from the Airport Inn. (Dkt. No. 40-2 at 53:20-54:10; Dkt. No. 40-1 at 105:2-106:25; Dkt. No. 40-8.) Plaintiff contends, however, that she has "never stolen a dime from [Shah's] business," (Dkt. No. 40-1 at 106:21-22), and, in actuality, her employment was terminated in retaliation for participating in the meeting regarding Shah's inappropriate behavior towards female employees. (Dkt. No. 40 at 4-5; Dkt. No. 40-1 at 102:17-103:7; Dkt. No. 1-1 at 6; Dkt. No. 40-2 at 52:1-4.)
Plaintiff filed a charge of discrimination ("Charge") with the South Carolina Human Affairs Commission ("SCHAC") and Equal Employment Opportunity Committee ("EEOC") on or around June 20, 2014, alleging claims of sex and age discrimination. (Dkt. No. 40-3.) Notably, Plaintiff did not allege a claim of retaliation in her Charge. (Id.) Plaintiff provided the following narrative in support of her discrimination claims:
(Id. at 1.)
On August 30, 2017, the EEOC issued its determination on the merits of Plaintiff's Charge ("Final Determination") and found that while the evidence presented was insufficient to establish wage disparity, it was sufficient to show that Plaintiff "was subjected to severe and pervasive unwelcome sexual comments by [Shah]." (Dkt. No. 40-7.) The EEOC therefore determined that there was "reasonable cause to conclude that [Plaintiff] was discriminated against because of sex (female/sexual harassment), in violation of Title VII." (Id.)
After receiving notice of her right to sue, Plaintiff filed this action in the South Carolina Court of Common Pleas, Charleston County, on or around December 27, 2017, (Dkt. No. 1-1), and Defendants removed the case to the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina on January 25, 2018 (Dkt. No. 1). Plaintiff's Complaint alleges two causes of action against Defendants: retaliation and sexual harassment in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. ("Title VII"). (Dkt. No. 1-1.) On March 29, 2019, Defendants filed a Motion for Summary Judgment seeking dismissal of all of Plaintiff's claims. (Dkt. No. 36.) Plaintiff filed her Response in Opposition to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment on April 24, 2019, (Dkt. No. 40), and Defendants filed their Reply on May 13, 2019, (Dkt. No. 44).
In addition to the instant action, two now former employees of Shah—Ms. Slawson and Penny Sambrano ("Sambrano")—have filed companion cases alleging similar claims of sexual harassment and retaliation against those same Defendants named in Plaintiff's Complaint. See Slawson v. Palmetto Heights Management LLC et al, No. 2:18-CV-00217-RMG-MGB and Sambrano v. Palmetto Heights Management LLC et al, No. 2:18-CV-00216-RMG-MGB. The instant action was consolidated with these companion cases for discovery purposes only. (Dkt. No. 40 at 1 n.1.)
Pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, summary judgment "shall" be granted "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). "Facts are `material' when they might affect the outcome of the case, and a `genuine issue' exists when the evidence would allow a reasonable jury to return a verdict for the nonmoving party." The News & Observer Publ'g Co. v. Raleigh-Durham Airport Auth., 597 F.3d 570, 576 (4th Cir. 2010) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)). In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, "the nonmoving party's evidence is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in that party's favor." See id. (quoting Hunt v. Cromartie, 526 U.S. 541, 552 (1999)); see also Perini Corp. v. Perini Constr., Inc., 915 F.2d 121, 123-24 (4th Cir. 1990). However, "the nonmoving party must rely on more than conclusory allegations, mere speculation, the building of one inference upon another, or the mere existence of a scintilla of evidence." Dash v. Mayweather, 731 F.3d 303, 311 (4th Cir. 2013).
Title VII makes it unlawful for an employer to discriminate against an employee because she opposed any unlawful employment practice, or has made a charge or has participated in an investigation. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). However, before filing an action for retaliation under Title VII, the claimant must first exhaust her administrative remedies by filing an administrative charge of discrimination with the EEOC:
Chacko v. Patuxent Inst., 429 F.3d 505, 510 (4th Cir. 2005) (internal citations omitted); see also 42 USC § 2000e-5(f)(1). Accordingly, after a charge has been filed, the EEOC will investigate the alleged unlawful acts and provide notice of the charge to the employer. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1).
If the EEOC finds a violation of Title VII and is unable to secure a resolution or settlement among the parties, the agency may issue notice of a right to sue to the claimant. 29 C.F.R. § 1601.28(b). As a general rule, the scope of the subsequent lawsuit "is defined by the scope of the administrative charge from which it arises and from any findings that arise out of the investigation of the charge." EEOC v. General Elec. Co., 532 F.2d 359, 365 (4th Cir. 1976). "Only those claims stated in the initial charge, those reasonably related to the original complaint, and those developed by reasonable investigation of the original complaint may be maintained in a subsequent Title VII lawsuit." Evans v. Technologies Applications & Serv. Co., 80 F.3d 954, 963 (4th Cir. 1996) (dismissing sexual harassment and discriminatory pay claims because EEOC complaint alleged only failure to promote).
Although there is no bright-line rule for determining whether a plaintiff's federal claim is "reasonably related" to her original administrative charge, the Fourth Circuit generally "will bar a claim if the basis for the alleged harm claimed differs between the administrative charge and the complaint." Tonkin v. Shadow Mgmt., Inc., No. 3:12-CV-00198-JFA, 2014 WL 4063626, at *4 (D.S.C. Aug. 14, 2014), aff'd, 605 F. App'x 194, 194 (4th Cir. 2015). Thus, "when the claim raised in the district court litigation involves a different form of unlawful employment practice than the one described in the administrative charge," the judicial claim typically is not reasonably related to the allegations in the charge and cannot be expected to follow from a reasonable investigation into those administrative claims.
In Nealon v. Stone, 958 F.2d 584 (4th Cir. 1992), the Fourth Circuit carved out a limited exception to the exhaustion requirement and held that a Title VII plaintiff "may raise a retaliation claim for the first time in federal court" without exhausting her administrative remedies if the discrimination complained of is "like or related to allegations contained in the charge and growing out of such allegations during the pendency of the case before the Commission." Johnson v. Mabus, No. 2:16-CV-2073-RMG-KFM, 2017 WL 9250334, at *4 (D.S.C. June 1, 2017), adopted, No. 2:16-CV-2073-RMG, 2017 WL 3037373 (D.S.C. July 18, 2017) (referencing Nealon, 958 F.2d at 590). This exception is based in part on the reasoning that a plaintiff who has already been retaliated against for exercising her Title VII rights need not risk additional retaliation by filing a second administrative charge.
In the instant case, Plaintiff's Complaint alleges that Defendants terminated her employment at the Airport Inn in retaliation for participating in the meeting about Shah's inappropriate conduct and for "otherwise complaining to Shah about the sexual harassment." (Dkt. No. 1-1 at 6, 8.) Defendants argue that Plaintiff did not raise these facts or allege retaliation in her initial EEOC Charge and, consequently, the Court must dismiss Plaintiff's retaliation claim as it exceeds the scope of her administrative allegations. (Dkt. No. 36-1 at 8.) In response, Plaintiff asserts that the Court should construe her Charge liberally and infer a claim of retaliation from certain statements contained in a SCHAC intake questionnaire completed by Ms. Slawson in relation to her own, separate administrative charge against Defendants. (Dkt. No. 40 at 6-7.)
Specifically, Plaintiff points to a statement in which Ms. Slawson alleges that her employment was terminated because the "owner found paperwork about the sexual harassment charges that I was putting together for myself as well as other female employees." (Id. at 6.) As one of the "other female employees," Plaintiff seems to suggest that the retaliatory conduct alleged in Ms. Slawson's intake questionnaire should also be read into Plaintiff's Charge because Defendants investigated and defended against the allegations in the instant action and companion cases collectively. (Id.) In other words, Plaintiff argues that Ms. Slawson's statement put Defendants on notice of potential retaliation against Plaintiff, and satisfied Plaintiff's exhaustion requirement as to that claim. (Id.) Plaintiff's argument fails for several reasons.
At the outset, while the undersigned recognizes that EEOC charges typically are not completed by lawyers and "must be construed with utmost liberality," the Court is "not at liberty to read into administrative charges allegations they do not contain." See Balas v. Huntington Ingalls Industries., Inc., 711 F.3d 401, 408 (4th Cir. 2013) (internal citations omitted). In completing her Charge, Plaintiff did not mark the box for "Retaliation" or include any allegations of retaliation by Defendants in the narrative portion of the form. To the contrary, Plaintiff's Charge asserts that Plaintiff
Contrary to her contention, Plaintiff cannot retroactively supplement the allegations in her Charge with a statement from Ms. Slawson's SCHAC intake questionnaire. As an initial matter, the undersigned notes that the statement cited by Plaintiff is actually contained in Ms. Slawson's application for unemployment benefits with the South Carolina Department of Employment and Workforce ("SCDEW"), rather than her SCHAC intake questionnaire.
The Fourth Circuit addressed this issue in Balas v. Huntington Ingalls Industries., Inc., 711 F.3d 401 (4th Cir. 2013), in which the plaintiff attempted to rely on the contents of her own intake questionnaire and two private letters that she sent to the EEOC to raise claims in a subsequent civil action that were not included in her initial charge. The Fourth Circuit held that "it would be objectively illogical" to view any of these documents "as constructively amending a formal charge, given that one of the purposes of requiring a party to file charges with the EEOC is to put the charged party on notice of the claims raised against it." See id. at 408 (referencing Sloop v. Mem'l Mission Hosp., Inc., 198 F.3d 147, 149 (4th Cir. 1999)). Because the EEOC did not provide the defendant with copies of the plaintiff's letters or intake questionnaire, the district court properly declined to consider the allegations included only in those documents.
Based on this precedent, if a complainant's own intake questionnaire form is insufficient to put the employer on notice of a claim not included in the initial charge, an independent application for unemployment benefits completed by someone other than Plaintiff is surely insufficient to place Defendants on notice of potential retaliatory conduct not mentioned in Plaintiff's EEOC Charge.
Finally, it is also worth noting that Plaintiff cannot take advantage of the exception under Nealon because the alleged retaliation occurred prior to the filing of her Charge, rather than during the pendency of the case. See, e.g., Black v. Potter, No. 4:06-CV-899-TLW-TER, 2008 WL 509475, at *14 (D.S.C. Feb. 21, 2008), aff'd, 286 F. App'x 841 (4th Cir. 2008) (dismissing plaintiff's retaliation claim for failure to exhaust where plaintiff had opportunity to raise the retaliation allegations before the EEOC). Indeed, the EEOC could have investigated the merits of Plaintiff's retaliation claim as part of her initial Charge had she included such allegations therein. Allowing Plaintiff to add a new retaliation claim after-the-fact would therefore circumscribe the EEOC's "investigatory and conciliatory role" as intended by Congress. Horton v. Donley, No. 3:07-CV-2316-MBS, 2009 WL 2782226, at *9 (D.S.C. Aug. 27, 2009), aff'd, 367 F. App'x 400 (4th Cir. 2010).
For these reasons, the undersigned finds that Plaintiff's retaliation claim improperly exceeds the scope of her Charge and therefore recommends that the Court dismiss this claim for failure to exhaust administrative remedies.
Title VII makes it "an unlawful employment practice for an employer . . . to discriminate against any individual with respect to [her] compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. . . ." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). Sexual harassment represents a form of sex discrimination prohibited under Title VII. Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 66 (1986); see also Langley v. Dolgencorp, LLC, 972 F.Supp.2d 804, 821 (D.S.C. 2013). In order to establish a hostile work environment based on sexual harassment, the plaintiff must show that the offending conduct was (1) unwelcome, (2) based on the plaintiff's sex, (3) sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the plaintiff's employment and create an abusive work environment, and (4) that there is some basis for imposing liability on the employer. See Williams v. NHC Healthcare/Bluffton, LLC, No. 9:16-CV-2677-DCN-BM, 2017 WL 9690360, at *4 (D.S.C. Dec. 14, 2017), adopted, No. 9:16-CV-2677-DCN, 2018 WL 1175099 (D.S.C. Mar. 6, 2018).
In the instant case, Defendants argue that Plaintiff has failed to satisfy the third element of her sexual harassment claim because her allegations "do not suffice to rise to the level of either severe or pervasive actions resulting in an abusive atmosphere at work." (Dkt. No. 36-1 at 24.) To satisfy the "severe or pervasive" standard under Title VII, the plaintiff must demonstrate that she subjectively perceived the environment to be abusive, and that the conduct was such that "an objective reasonable person would perceive [the plaintiff's] work environment to be hostile or abusive." See Perkins v. Int'l Paper Co., No. 18-1507, 2019 WL 4018288, at *5 (4th Cir. Aug. 27, 2019). "Incidents that would objectively give rise to bruised or wounded feelings will not on that account satisfy the severe or pervasive standard." Evans v. Int'l Paper Co., No. 18-1448, 2019 WL 4018287, at *5 (4th Cir. Aug. 27, 2019) (internal citations omitted). Indeed, "rude treatment from coworkers, callous behavior by one's superiors, or a routine difference of opinion and personality conflict with one's supervisor are not actionable under Title VII." Id.
The objective inquiry "is not, and by its nature cannot be, a mathematically precise test." See E.E.O.C. v. Sunbelt Rentals, Inc., 521 F.3d 306, 315 (4th Cir. 2008) (referencing Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 22 (1993)).
See id. (internal citations omitted). Ultimately, "whether the harassment was sufficiently severe or pervasive to create a hostile work environment is quintessentially a question of fact for the jury." See Conner v. Schrader-Bridgeport Int'l, Inc., 227 F.3d 179, 199-200 (4th Cir. 2000) (referencing Smith v. First Union Nat. Bank, 202 F.3d 234, 243 (4th Cir. 2000)). "Thus, while summary judgment is appropriate in cases where the facts are clearly insufficient to satisfy the standard, when there is a close question and reasonable minds could differ when weighting all the facts against the law, then summary judgment is inappropriate." Walker v. Mod-U-Kraf Homes, LLC, 775 F.3d 202, 208 (4th Cir. 2014) (internal citations omitted).
Viewing the record as a whole—including all "surrounding circumstances, expectations, and relationships"—and in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the undersigned finds that a reasonable jury could conclude that Plaintiff was exposed to an objectively hostile work environment during the course of her employment at the Airport Inn. Sunbelt Rentals, 521 F.3d at 315. Specifically, Plaintiff was frequently subjected to demeaning, disparaging remarks about women (Dkt. No. 36-3 at 66:16-24, 68:12-24); was pressured to flirt with customers by "selling" her body and revealing her breasts (Dkt. No. 40-1 at 141:2-12); was subjected to offensive and humiliating comments about her body, including a remark by Shah regarding the size of Plaintiff's breasts and buttocks (Dkt. No. 36-3 at 45:1-47:13; Dkt. No. 40-1 at 141:2-12); was grazed on her backside by Shah (Dkt. No. 36-3 at 55:9-57:16, 75:1-76:5); and was subjected to other sexuallyexplicit comments by Shah (Id. at 72:3-12; Dkt. No. 40-1 at 141:16-24, 142:2-6).
Notably, as the owner of the Airport Inn, Shah "controlled" the workplace and operated as Plaintiff's boss, which likely enhanced the severity of the harassment. (Dkt. No. 40 at 10-11; Dkt. No. 1-1 at 7.) See Sanchez v. Whole Foods Market Group, Inc., No. GJH-18-3106, 2019 WL 3717771, at *5 (D. Md. Aug. 5, 2019) (explaining that comments made by a supervisor generally will be considered more severe than those made by co-equals or subordinates); Wheeler v. Virginia, No. 7:17-CV-00337, 2019 WL 758611, at *5 (W.D. Va. Feb. 20, 2019) ("The Court has also explained that `the status of the harasser may be a significant factor' in measuring the severity of harassing conduct, since harassment perpetrated by a manager or supervisor against a subordinate employee has a `particularly threatening character.'") (citing Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 763 (1998)). Indeed, Plaintiff testified that Shah's actions made her feel uncomfortable, intimidated, and threatened, to the point where Plaintiff repeatedly sought help from upper management to stop the harassment. (Dkt. No. 36-3 at 51:13-52:12, 54:16-55:5, 79:19-80:6; Dkt. No. 40-1 at 143:14-144:7.)
Plaintiff's subjective perception of Shah's behavior is corroborated by Ms. Slawson's deposition testimony and SCHAC intake questionnaire, which include similar allegations of sexual harassment against Shah and suggest that Plaintiff was subjected to the same—if not worse— harassment. (Dkt. No. 40-5; Dkt. No. 40-6 at 94:1-95:5.) See Williamson v. Carolina Power & Light Co., 754 F.Supp.2d 787, 792 (E.D.N.C. 2010) ("Other employees' notice and vocal disapproval of the harassment highlighted its objective severity.") Moreover, the fact that other female employees participated in the sexual harassment meeting to discuss their own experiences with Shah suggests, at the very least, that there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether an objective, reasonable individual in Plaintiff's position could have found the work environment abusive. See, e.g., Jennings v. Univ. of N. Carolina, 482 F.3d 686, 696 (4th Cir. 2007) (considering harassment directed at both plaintiff and her female co-workers in order to examine all relevant circumstances in the objectivity inquiry) (emphasis added); Mod-U-Kraf Homes, 775 F.3d at 209 (considering comments made to other employees for purposes of the objectivity inquiry because "the totality of the circumstances includes conduct not directed at the plaintiff") (internal citations omitted); Williamson v. Carolina Power & Light Co., 754 F.Supp.2d 787, 792 (E.D.N.C. 2010) ("Other employees' notice and vocal disapproval of the harassment highlighted its objective severity.").
The undersigned acknowledges that while some of the above factors support a finding that Shah's behavior is actionable, other factors may not. However, we are not called upon to weigh that evidence at this stage; "[i]nstead, the court's task is simply to examine whether the record contains proof from which a reasonable trier of fact could conclude `that the environment was pervaded with discriminatory conduct aimed to humiliate, ridicule, or intimidate, thereby creating an abusive atmosphere.'" Mod-U-Kraf Homes, 775 F.3d at 209. Here, in light of the sexual nature of Shah's comments to Plaintiff, the frequency of his misogynistic remarks towards Plaintiff and other female employees, and the fact that such conduct occurred while Shah was Plaintiff's boss, the undersigned finds that Plaintiff has presented enough evidence to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the harassment alleged was sufficiently severe or pervasive to create an abusive atmosphere.
Accordingly, the undersigned recommends that the Court deny Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment as to Plaintiff's sexual harassment claim so that a jury may undertake the fact-intensive inquiry of whether Shah's harassment went beyond the "ordinary tribulations of the workplace" and created a hostile work environment. Strickland v. Acevedo Restaurants, Inc., No. 2:11-CV-2566-RMG, 2014 WL 798402, at *3 (D.S.C. Feb. 27, 2014); see also Mod-U-Kraf Homes, 775 F.3d at 208 (explaining that whether the harassment was sufficiently severe or pervasive to create a hostile work environment is a question of fact for the jury when reasonable minds could differ).
Lastly, to the extent Plaintiff's Complaint survives Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, Defendants argue that Shah should be dismissed as a party to this action because Title VII does not provide causes of action against defendants in their individual capacities. (Dkt. No. 36-1 at 28-30.) In response, Plaintiff claims that Shah is the alter ego of Defendants Palmetto Heights and Archdale and therefore "should be treated as one and the same and held jointly liable on all theories of liability." (Dkt. No. 40 at 9-11.)
As stated above, Title VII provides that "[i]t shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer . . . to discriminate against any individual with respect to [her] . . . terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's . . . sex." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a). The Fourth Circuit has interpreted the word "individual" to mean the company-employer and has concluded that "supervisors are not liable in their individual capacities for Title VII violations." Lissau v. Southern Food Service, Inc., 159 F.3d 177, 180 (4th Cir. 1998). The court reasoned in Lissau that the only reasonable interpretation of Title VII is "to foreclose individual liability" because Title VII exempts small employers and "it would be incongruous to hold Title VII does not apply to the owner of a five-person company but applies with full force to a person who supervises an identical number of employees in a larger company." Id.
Contrary to Plaintiff's argument, this holding also applies where an individual is effectively the alter ego of a closely held company or corporation. See Alford v. Wang, Inc., 11 F.Supp.3d 584, 595-96 (D.S.C. 2014) (rejecting alter ego theory of individual liability in Title VII lawsuit). Indeed, this Court has found that individual liability does not exist under Title VII even if "a sole shareholder abused the corporate form and the corporate veil were pierced." Id. (internal citations omitted). Accordingly, Plaintiff may not maintain a Title VII claim against Defendant Shah in his individual capacity and the undersigned therefore recommends that he be removed from this action.
Based on the foregoing, the undersigned recommends that Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt. No. 36) be
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge.
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
