MARY GORDON BAKER, Magistrate Judge.
Plaintiff, proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, brought this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Dkt. No. 1.) This matter is before the Court upon the parties' Motions for Summary Judgment. (Dkt. Nos. 36; 37; 47.) Pursuant to the provisions of Title 28, United States Code, Section 636(b)(1) and Local Rule 73.02(B)(2)(e), D.S.C., all pretrial matters in cases involving pro se litigants are referred to a United States Magistrate Judge for consideration. For the reasons set forth herein, the undersigned recommends that Defendants' Motions for Summary Judgment be granted (Dkt. Nos. 36; 37), Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment be denied (Dkt. No. 47), and Plaintiff's claims be dismissed with prejudice.
In this civil action, Plaintiff alleges he suffered various violations of his constitutional rights while housed at the Sumter Detention Center (the "Detention Center") in Sumter, South Carolina. The record shows Plaintiff was housed at the Detention Center from November 27, 2016 through March 2, 2018.
Plaintiff filed this action on January 30, 2018. (Dkt. No. 1.) Defendants Anthony Dennis, R Gailard, C Kelley, Simon Major, Jr, D McGhaney (the "Detention Center Defendants") filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on June 6, 2019. (Dkt. No. 36.) That same day, Defendants Michael Stephan, Bryan Sterling (the "SCDC Defendants") filed a separate Motion for Summary Judgment.
Plaintiff filed a response to the SCDC Defendants' Motion on August 7, 2019. (Dkt. No. 47.) In his response, he also moved for summary judgment. (Id. at 2.) Plaintiff also claimed he had not received "any correspondence" from the Detention Center Defendants "since February-March 2019." (Id.) Both sets of Defendants filed replies to their Motions. (Dkt. Nos. 49; 50.) On October 18, 2019, the Court issued a Text Order noting that Defendants failed to file the certificate of service ordered in the Amended Roseboro Order and instructed Defendants to file with the Court the requisite proof of service of their Motions on Plaintiff at the Clarendon County Jail. (Dkt. No. 51.) The Court found Plaintiff could file a supplemental response brief by November 15, 2019. Defendants filed Status Reports on October 18, 2019. The SCDC Defendants stated they served their Motion on Plaintiff at the Clarendon County Jail on July 31, 2019. (Dkt. No. 52.) The Detention Center Defendants stated they served their Motion on Plaintiff at the Clarendon County Jail on October 18, 2019. (Dkt. No. 53.)
On October 24, 2019, Plaintiff called the Court Clerk's Office and stated he would be sending an updated address to the Court. (Dkt. No. 56.) Plaintiff has not submitted a Change of Address Form, and the mailing of the Court's October 18, 2019 Text Order to Plaintiff at the Clarendon County Jail has been returned as undeliverable. (Dkt. No. 57.) The Court does not have a current address for Plaintiff at this time, despite repeated warnings to Plaintiff of the importance of keeping the Court informed in writing of his address changes. Plaintiff has failed to provide his current address, and the deadline for his response to the Detention Center Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment has passed. Accordingly, the undersigned issues a recommendation on the evidence in the record and the briefings submitted by the parties to this point.
Plaintiff brought this action pro se, which requires the Court to liberally construe her pleadings. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972) (per curiam); Loe v. Armistead, 582 F.2d 1291, 1295 (4th Cir. 1978); Gordon v. Leeke, 574 F.2d 1147, 1151 (4th Cir. 1978). Pro se pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by attorneys. Haines, 404 U.S. at 520. The mandated liberal construction means that only if the court can reasonably read the pleadings to state a valid claim on which the complainant could prevail, it should do so. Barnett v. Hargett, 174 F.3d 1128, 1133 (10th Cir. 1999). A court may not construct the complainant's legal arguments for her. Small v. Endicott, 998 F.2d 411, 417-18 (7th Cir. 1993). Nor should a court "conjure up questions never squarely presented." Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985).
Pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, summary judgment "shall" be granted "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). "Facts are `material' when they might affect the outcome of the case, and a `genuine issue' exists when the evidence would allow a reasonable jury to return a verdict for the nonmoving party." The News & Observer Publ'g Co. v. Raleigh-Durham Airport Auth., 597 F.3d 570, 576 (4th Cir. 2010) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)). In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, "`the nonmoving party's evidence is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in that party's favor.'" Id. (quoting Hunt v. Cromartie, 526 U.S. 541, 552 (1999)); see also Perini Corp. v. Perini Constr., Inc., 915 F.2d 121, 123-24 (4th Cir. 1990).
Defendants present several arguments in support of their Motions for Summary Judgment. (Dkt. Nos. 36-1; 37-1.) They argue, inter alia, that: (1) Plaintiff's claims are barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity to the extent he sues Defendants in their official capacity; and (2) Plaintiff has failed to establish a violation of his constitutional rights. In support of their motion, the Detention Center Defendants have submitted affidavits from Defendants Kelley and McGhaney, as well as Chanae Lumpkin and John Shirah, both Lieutenants with the Detention Center. (Dkt. Nos. 36-2 through 36-5.) The SCDC Defendants have submitted an affidavit from Blake Taylor, the Division Director for SCDC.
Defendants assert that to the extent Plaintiff brings claims against them in their official capacities, they are immune from such claims under the Eleventh Amendment. (Dkt. Nos. 36-1 at 6; 37-1 at 3.) The Eleventh Amendment provides that "the judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by citizens of another State or by citizens or subjects of any foreign state." U.S. Constitution, Am. 11. See Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 101-02 (1984) (holding that the Eleventh Amendment bars suits against a state filed by its own citizens).
In enacting 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Congress did not intend to override the doctrine of States' sovereign immunity found in the Eleventh Amendment. Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 66-67 (1989) ("Section 1983 provides a federal forum to remedy many deprivations of civil liberties, but it does not provide a federal forum for litigants who seek a remedy against a State for alleged deprivations of civil liberties. The Eleventh Amendment bars such suits . . .").
The Sumter Detention Center is administered by, and under the control of, the Sheriff of Sumter County. See Williams v. Dorchester Cty. Det. Ctr., 987 F.Supp.2d 690, 695 (D.S.C. 2013) (finding that Dorchester County Detention Center is controlled by the Dorchester County Sheriff's Office, and thus a state agency). The Sheriff's Office is considered a state agency for the purposes of Plaintiff's claims. See Gulledge v. Smart, 691 F.Supp. 947, 954-55 (D.S.C. 1988) (explaining that a Sheriff's Office is considered a state agency in South Carolina). In addition, "[t]he SCDC is an arm of the State of South Carolina, and is therefore immune from suit under the Eleventh Amendment." McFadden v. Stirling, No. 2:15-cv-4144-JMC-MGB, 2016 WL 11220472, at *3 (D.S.C. Feb. 23, 2016), adopted by, 2017 WL 4875575 (D.S.C. Oct. 30, 2017). Accordingly, to the extent Defendants are sued in their official capacities, they are immune from suit. See LaLone v. Thompson, No. 2:18-cv-03232-HMH-MGB, 2019 WL 3326243, at *3 (D.S.C. July 2, 2019), adopted by, 22019 WL 3323059 (D.S.C. July 24, 2019) (finding employees of county detention center are state officials "entitled to the protection of sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment"); see also Hutto v. S.C. Retirement Sys., 773 F.3d 536, 549 (4th Cir. 2014) ("State officials sued in their official capacities for . . . money damages have the same sovereign immunity accorded to the State."); Cash v. Thomas, No. 6:12-cv-1278-MGL, 2013 WL 3804375, at *7 (D.S.C. July 19, 2013) ("It is well settled, both in South Carolina and federal law, that a Sheriff in South Carolina is an arm of the State and not a County employee and therefore is entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity in his or her official capacity from suit in Federal Court"); Jamison v. Bamberg, No. 0:11-cv-2245-DCN-PJG, 2012 WL 7656426, *3 (D.S.C. Nov. 28, 2012) ("the Detention Center defendants [sued in their official capacities] are entitled to sovereign immunity"), adopted by, 2013 WL 819193 (D.S.C. Mar. 5, 2013)
Based on the foregoing, the undersigned recommends that Defendants may only be sued in their individual capacities and analyzes Plaintiff's claims, below.
In his Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants "deprived [him] of [his] right to have access to a law library," and that he lacked "adequate assistance from persons trained in the law." (Dkt. No. 1 at 4.) According to Plaintiff, Defendants knew this deprivation "hurt[]" Plaintiff's "case" because Plaintiff cannot "study and prepare for any case, civil or criminal." (Id. at 6.) He later alleges that the Detention Center "does give what is needed in order to handle legal work, such as stamps, paper, and envelopes." (Dkt. No. 1-1 at 2.) He alleges that "pretrial detainees are charged for legal information, copies, and that can't be constitutional." (Id. at 4.) Plaintiff also alleges that he had court-appointed counsel throughout the time period at issue. (Dkt. No. 1-1 at 2.) Plaintiff further states that "a law firm" represents him in "a disability case," and that he has "legal representation" in a "class action law suit." (Id. at 2-3.)
The Detention Center Defendants have submitted affidavits from Defendants McGhaney and Kelley, and Lieutenant Lumpkin on this issue. McGhaney avers that at the time Plaintiff was a pre-trial detainee, "an inmate could complete a request for legal research and forward it to the correctional officer any time he wanted legal assistance." (Dkt. No. 36-4 at 6.) According to McGhaney,
(Id.) McGhaney avers that his review of Plaintiff's file shows "at least seven occasions where this inmate made requests for legal resources and Detention Center staff members searched for, printed, or provided legal resources to this inmate, even though he had counsel." (Id.) He avers that "[o]n another occasion, when the staff could not find the information requested, they set up a telephone call with his legal counsel." (Id. at 7.) McGhaney has attached as exhibits Plaintiff's legal-related grievances and the responses to those grievances from Detention Center employees. (Id. at 10-18.) The exhibits indicate that Plaintiff was provided legal materials when requested and allowed to call his attorney when materials were not available. (Id.)
Related to Plaintiff's allegations about being denied photocopies, envelopes, and stamps, McGhaney avers,
(Id.)
Defendant Kelley's affidavit testimony largely echoes that of Defendant McGhaney regarding Plaintiff's access to legal materials and office supplies. (Dkt. No. 36-2 at 3.) She has attached to her affidavit exhibits of Plaintiff's legal-related grievances to which she responded. The exhibits show Kelley allowed Plaintiff to speak with his attorney to obtain the information he sought when the Detention Center was unable to provide the requested information. (Id. at 6-7.)
Lieutenant Lumpkin's affidavit also comports with that of Defendants McGhaney and Kelley. (Dkt. No. 36-3 at 2.) Lumpkin avers that she tried to assist Plaintiff when he made a request and that she made copies for him. (Id.) She has attached to her affidavit exhibits of Plaintiff's legal-related grievances to which she responded. (Id. at 6-8.) The exhibits show that in response to a request from Plaintiff, Lumpkin provided Plaintiff with copies of 86 pages of the South Carolina Criminal Rules. (Id. at 6.)
As noted, Plaintiff's allegations stem from his time as a pre-trial detainee. In Strickler v. Waters, 989 F.2d 1375, 1383 (4th Cir. 1993), the Fourth Circuit addressed whether or not there exists a requirement on "local jails" to provide a "law library." The Strickler court found that "`[t]he fundamental constitutional right of access to the courts requires prison authorities to assist inmates in the preparation and filing of meaningful legal papers by providing prisoners with adequate law libraries or adequate assistance from persons trained in the law.'" Id. at 1383 (quoting Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817 (1977)). The court continued:
Strickler, 989 F.2d at 1386. The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals has ruled that the Constitution does not require that every local jail facility have a law library. Magee v. Waters, 810 F.2d 451, 452-53 (4th Cir. 1987).
Notably, an inmate must allege a specific injury resulting from the alleged denial of court access to state a cognizable constitutional claim. See Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 349 (1996) (holding that an inmate alleging denial of access to the courts must be able to demonstrate "actual injury" caused by the policy or procedure in effect at the place of incarceration in that his nonfrivolous legal claim had been frustrated or was being impeded). Also, "[l]ongstanding case law in this circuit provides that if a pre-trial detainee has an attorney—or is offered counsel but waives his or her right to counsel—he or she has no constitutional right of access to a law library or to legal materials when he or she is a pre-trial detainee." Straws v. Metts, No. 4:07-00805-HFF-TER, 2007 WL 5289766, at *3 (D.S.C. Apr. 23, 2007), aff'd, 269 F. App'x 316 (4th Cir. 2008) (citing United States v. Chatman, 584 F.2d 1358, 1360 (4th Cir. 1978)).
Here, Plaintiff admits he had court-appointed counsel throughout the time period at issue. (Dkt. No. 1-1 at 2.) Because Plaintiff was represented by counsel during his time as a pre-trial detainee, he was not constitutionally entitled to access to a law library or to legal materials. See Straws, 2007 WL 5289766, at *3; see also Jones v. Lexington Cty. Det. Ctr., 586 F.Supp.2d 444, 452 (D.S.C. 2008) ("Since the plaintiff is, presumably, represented by a Public Defender or a court-appointed attorney in his pending criminal case, the plaintiff is not constitutionally entitled to access to a law library as a pre-trial detainee.").
Moreover, there is no evidence of any actual injury or prejudice resulting from Plaintiff's alleged denial of access to courts. See, e.g., James v. Faile, No. 1:13-cv-211-DCN, 2015 WL 1057905, at *4 (D.S.C. March 6, 2015) (noting there is "no constitutional right to a law library or law books; the constitutional right is for meaningful access to the courts to bring challenges to sentences or conditions of confinement"); Jones v. Prison Health Services Inc., 2008 WL 4908024 (D.S.C. Oct. 3, 2008) ("A plaintiff must demonstrate, for example, that the inadequacy of the prison law library or the available legal assistance caused such actual injury as the late filing of a court document or the dismissal of an otherwise meritorious claim."). Rather, the evidence indicates Plaintiff either received the legal materials he requested or was allowed to speak with his attorney to obtain the sought information. Likewise, "[n]umerous courts have rejected any constitutional right to free and unlimited photocopying," and the evidence indicates that Plaintiff was provided with photocopies when requested. Sands v. Lewis, 886 F.2d 1166, 1169 (9th Cir. 1989); see also Tyler v. Byrd, No. 4:16-cv-0400-MGL-BM, 2017 WL 875859, at *3 (D.S.C. Feb. 14, 2017) (recommending denial of access to courts claim because "Plaintiff has failed to present any evidence that he has suffered any harm as a result of any failure of jail officials to provide him with notary services, copies, or allow for legal mailings"), adopted by, 2017 WL 839535 (D.S.C. Mar. 3, 2017), aff'd, 693 F. App'x 247 (4th Cir. 2017).
Because Plaintiff was represented by counsel in the legal proceedings at issue and for the other reasons highlighted above, Plaintiff has failed to establish a claim for denial of access to the courts.
In his Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that he has been improperly "isolated away from everyone" and denied exercise time. (Dkt. No. 1-1 at 2.) He further alleges that he has "had visitation restrictions for most of [his] incarceration." (Id.) More specifically, Plaintiff alleges that from December 2016 through January 2017, February 2017 through March 2017, March 2017 through September 2017, and October 2017 through "present day," he has been housed in an isolation cell in "SLRDC's B-Pod or Lock up." (Id. at 3.) Here, Plaintiff alleges that while housed in isolation, he is
(Id. at 3.) Plaintiff alleges, "I love exercise and due to the lack thereof my body is aging and aching all over; my mind is in shambles. Pain has become a part of my day." (Id. at 4.) Under injuries, Plaintiff alleges, inter alia, "back pain, joint pain, loss of concentration, . . . in order to know the real injuries I'd have to be seen by doctors which is very hard in here. I need to be seen by doctors for a thorough check up please." (Dkt. No. 1 at 6.)
The Detention Center Defendants have submitted affidavits from Defendant McGhaney and Lieutenant John Shirah as evidence of Plaintiff's housing history. McGhaney avers that he did not deal directly with Plaintiff, but that he has reviewed Plaintiff's inmate file and finds that Plaintiff "has at all times been treated according to Detention Center policies and procedures and constitutional mandates." (Dkt. No. 36-4 at 2.) More specifically, McGhaney summarizes Plaintiff's classification history as follows:
(Id. at 2-4.) McGhaney avers that the record shows Plaintiff "was a continual security threat to other inmates and staff at the Detention Center. Even though he was given opportunities to be housed in A pod in a less restrictive setting, he would not follow the rules and each time was sent back to B pod." (Id. at 4.)
Lieutenant Shirah echoes this account of Plaintiff's classification history and the reasons for Plaintiff's assignments to the B pod. (Dkt. No. 36-5 at 2-3.) Shirah avers that during the time of Plaintiff's incarceration, he
(Id. at 1.) Shirah avers that he did not deal directly with Plaintiff, but that he has reviewed Plaintiff's classification history and finds "that it was appropriate." (Id. at 2.) Shirah avers that those housed in the Detention Center's B pod are subject to certain restrictions:
(Id.)
Similarly, McGhaney avers that "[w]hen an inmate is housed in B pod, there are certain restrictions on their movement, that are in place to keep the institution, other inmates and staff safe, as indicated above when discussing this inmate attacking another inmate while on recreation. All inmates are treated the same in this regard." (Dkt. No. 36-4 at 5.) McGhaney further avers that jail standards require that inmates "have recreation three times per week. The Detention Center makes every effort to allow inmates to have at least that amount of recreation . . . ." (Id.) According to McGhaney, "the log shows that [Plaintiff] periodically refused recreation and a shower, when it was offered." (Id.) McGhaney also avers that "[t]he housing placement, recreation times and classification of this inmate was not to punish or discipline this inmate, but to maintain the safety and security of the institution and make sure all inmates follow the Detention Center rules." (Id. at 6.)
Confinement conditions of pretrial detainees are to be evaluated under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment rather than under the Eighth Amendment. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 (1979). Where a pretrial detainee complains of prison conditions, the proper inquiry is whether the conditions of his confinement amount to punishment before a proper adjudication of guilt. Hill v. Nicodemus, 979 F.2d 987, 991 (4th Cir. 1992). Not every hardship suffered during pretrial detention amounts to "punishment" in the constitutional sense. Id. (citing Bell, 441 U.S. at 53). "`[I]t is obduracy and wantonness, not inadvertence or error in good faith, that characterize the conduct prohibited by the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause, whether that conduct occurs in connection with establishing conditions of confinement, supplying medical needs, or restoring official control over a tumultuous cellblock.'" Moore v. Winebrenner, 927 F.2d 1312, 1316 (4th Cir. 1991) (quoting Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319 (1986)).
To prevail on a conditions of confinement claim, a pretrial detainee must show either (1) an expressed intent to punish, or (2) lack of a reasonable relationship to a legitimate nonpunitive governmental objective, from which a punitive intent may be inferred. Hill, 979 F.2d at 991 (citing Martin v. Gentile, 849 F.2d 863, 870 (4th Cir. 1988)). Prison officials act with the requisite culpable intent when they act with deliberate indifference to the inmates' suffering. Strickler, 989 F.2d at 1379. The test for whether a prison official acts with deliberate indifference is a subjective one: the official must "know[] of and disregard[] an excessive risk to inmate health and safety; the official must both be aware of the facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference." Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994). The plaintiff must prove that he was deprived a "basic need" and that this deprivation was attended by deliberate indifference on the part of the defendants. Strickler, 989 F.2d at 1379. Further, the plaintiff must produce evidence of serious or significant physical or emotional injury resulting from challenged conditions to withstand summary judgment on prison conditions claim. Id. at 1380-1381.
In addition, "[c]ourts in the Fourth Circuit have long recognized that the Constitution confers no protected liberty interest upon inmates from being placed in a particular prison or even in administrative segregation." Johnson v. Ozmint, 456 F.Supp.2d 688, 695 (D.S.C. 2006); see also Neal v. Shimoda, 131 F.3d 818, 828 (9th Cir. 1997) ("[A] prisoner does not have a constitutional right to be housed at a particular institution, . . ., [or] to receive a particular security classification . . . ."); Neals v. Norwood, 59 F.3d 530, 533 (5th Cir. 1995) ("[A] prison inmate does not have a protectable liberty or property interest in his custodial classification and an inmate's disagreement with a classification is insufficient to establish a constitutional violation.").
Construing the evidence in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the undersigned finds that Plaintiff has failed to establish a genuine issue of material fact that the restrictions he was subjected to in the B pod were (1) imposed with an express intent to punish or (2) not reasonably related to a legitimate nonpunitive governmental objective. See Hill, 979 F.2d at 991. Defendants have presented evidence which shows a legitimate penological interest in Plaintiff's classification decisions and the related restrictions, which were apparently uniformly enforced for B pod detainees. Defendants have also produced evidence that Plaintiff refused offers of recreation. (Dkt. No. 36-4 at 5.) See, e.g., Hazel v. Sanders, No. 1:09-cv-2543-RMG, 2011 WL 2413128, at *2 (D.S.C. June 13, 2011) (denying conditions of confinement claim because "Petitioner was never singled out as the only inmate denied showers and recreation; to the contrary, most, if not all inmates in A-Pod were subjected to the same restrictions," and "Petitioner fails to show the defendant's actions were not reasonably related to a legitimate nonpunitive governmental interest"). Further, Plaintiff has failed to show that Defendants acted with a sufficiently culpable state of mind and he has not produced any evidence that he sustained any serious or significant physical or emotional injury as a result of the alleged deprivations. Nelson v. Jones, No. 2:17-cv-00815-RBH, 2018 WL 3633897, at *4 (D.S.C. July 31, 2018) ("The Court recognizes the alleged lack of out-of-cell exercise could rise to the level of a constitutional violation if proven true, but again, Plaintiff has not produced any evidence that he sustained any serious or significant physical or emotional injury as a result of this alleged deprivation.").
For these reasons, Plaintiff has failed to establish any constitutional violations based on his housing assignments and the related restrictions.
It is therefore RECOMMENDED, for the foregoing reasons, that Defendants' Motions for Summary Judgment (Dkt. Nos. 36; 37) be GRANTED, Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt. N. 47) be DENIED, and that Plaintiff's Complaint be dismissed with prejudice.
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge.
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
