Supreme Court of United States.
*289 Lawless (in writing) and Ewing, for the plaintiffs in error.
Jones, for the defendants.
*313 Mr. Justice McLEAN delivered the opinion of the court.
This case is from the Circuit Court of Missouri, and was brought here by a writ of error.
The plaintiffs brought an action of ejectment for 350 arpens of land, situated near St. Louis. Their title was founded on a concession by Delassus, lieutenant-governor, to Mordecai Bell, the 29th of January, 1800. Bell conveyed the same to James Mackay, the 29th of May, 1804, and on the 26th September, 1805, he conveyed to Amos Stoddard. A plat and certificate of the survey were certified and recorded by Antoine Soulard, as surveyor-general, the 29th of January, 1806.
The above papers were presented to the recorder of the district of St. Louis, the 29th of June, 1808. And the claim was duly filed with the board of commissioners for their action thereon, who, on the 10th of October, 1811, rejected it. But afterwards on the 8th of June, 1835, the board decided that 350 arpens of land ought to be confirmed to the said Mordecai Bell, or his legal representatives, according to the survey. And on the 4th of July, 1836, an act of Congress was passed, confirming the decision of the commissioners. The land was surveyed as confirmed. The plaintiffs proved the death of Amos Stoddard, before the suit was commenced, and that they are his heirs-at-law. The defendant was proved to be in possession of forty-eight acres and eighty-four hundredths of the land in controversy, one acre and sixty-three hundredths of which were in the *314 location and survey of Martin Coontz, and the residue within the patent of Peltier.
The title of the defendant was founded on an entry made by Peltier of 160 acres of land, by virtue of a New Madrid certificate, on the 24th of October, 1816. A survey of the entry was made in March, 1818, and a patent to Peltier was issued the 16th of July, 1832. Possession has been held under this title since 1819. The title was conveyed to the defendant.
On the 29th of May, 1818, an entry was made, which authorized the survey of Coontz but no patent has been issued on it.
The township in which the above tract is situated was surveyed in 1817, 1818, and 1819, and was examined in 1822. Since 1804, a certain mound on the land has been called Stoddard's mound. In 1823 the proclamation of the President, published at St. Louis, directed the lands in the above township to be offered at public sale.
On the above evidence the court instructed the jury,
1. That the plaintiffs were not entitled to recover the land embraced in Peltier's patent.
2. That they were not entitled to recover the land embraced in Coontz's survey.
The decision of this controversy mainly depends on the construction of certain acts of Congress. By the act of the 2d of March, 1805, all persons residing in the territory of Orleans, who had claims to land under the French or Spanish government, were required to file their claims for record with the register of the land-office or recorder of land titles, and provision was made for confirming them.
The time limited in the above act was extended by the act of the 3d of March, 1807, as regards the filing of claims with the register or recorder, until the 1st of July, 1808. By the act of the 15th of February, 1811 the President was authorized to have the lands which had been surveyed in Louisiana offered for sale; "provided, however, that till after the decision of Congress thereon, no tract of land shall be offered for sale, the claim to which has been in due time, and according to law, presented to the recorder of land-titles in the district of Louisiana, and filed in his office, for the purpose of being investigated by the commissioners appointed for ascertaining the rights of persons claiming land in the territory of Louisiana." The same reservation was repeated in the act of the 3d of March, 1811.
The act of the 26th of May, 1824, authorized claimants "under French or Spanish grants, concessions, warrants, or orders of surveys" *315 in Missouri, issued before the 10th of March, 1804, to file their petition in the District Court of the United States for the confirmation of their claims. And every claimant was declared by the same act to be barred, who did not file his petition in two years." By the act of the 24th of May, 1828, the time for filing petitions was extended to the 26th of May, 1829. On the 9th of July, 1832, an act was passed, "for the final adjustment of land-titles in Missouri," which provided that the recorder of land-titles, with two commissioners to be appointed, should examine all the unconfirmed claims to land in Missouri, which had heretofore been filed in the office of the said recorder, according to law, prior to the 10th of March, 1804. And they were required to class the claims so as to "state in the first class what claims, in their opinion, would in fact have been confirmed, according to the laws, usages, and customs of the Spanish government and the practice of the Spanish authorities under them. And secondly, what claims in their opinion are destitute of merit, law, or equity." And by the third section it was provided, "that from and after the final report of the recorder and commissioners, the lands contained in the second class shall be subject to sale as other public lands; and the lands contained in the first class shall continue to be reserved from sale as heretofore, until the decision of Congress shall be against the claims of any of them; and the lands so decided against shall be in like manner subject to sale as other public lands."
These are the facts and statutory provisions which are material in the case. The defendant, under the entry and survey of Peltier, holds the elder legal title to the land in controversy, except the one acre and sixty-three hundredths, which is covered by the entry and survey of Coontz. Until the confirmation of the plaintiffs' title by the act of 1836, the legal title to the land claimed was not vested in the plaintiffs.
Objections are made to the intermediate conveyances under which the plaintiffs claim. And first, it is insisted, that the deed from Bell to Mackay was not proved. It is stated on the record, that there was no proof that R. Caulk, the syndic, before whom the deed was signed and acknowledged, had authority to act as such.
The deed was executed in 1804. It was attested by two witnesses, and purports to have been acknowledged in the presence of a syndic. There was no exception to the admission of this deed in evidence; and, consequently, the objections now made to its execution *316 are not before the court. But if the execution of the instrument were now open to objections, they could not be sustained. Forty years have elapsed since this deed purports to have been executed. From that time to this, a claim under it seems to have been asserted. It was presented to the commissioners in 1811, having been filed with the recorder of land-titles, in 1808. And again, it was brought before the commissioners in 1835, it having remained on file until that time. Under these circumstances, the regular proof of the instrument might well be dispensed with. Possession, under this deed, was held by Stoddard for a time, and became so notorious that a certain elevation on the land was called Stoddard's mound.
Independently of the lapse of time, the unsettled state of the country at the time this instrument was signed, the transfers of the country from one sovereignty to another, the rude and defective organization of the government the civil and military functions being blended, are facts which no court can disregard in acting upon transfers of property between individuals. If some degree of regularity and form were observed in regard to public grants, technical and legal forms cannot be required in the transmission of claims to land, among a people, the great mass of whom were ignorant of the forms of titles, and indeed, of almost every thing which pertained to civil government.
A syndic was not, in that country, an appointed officer, as he is in a regulated government; but the duties devolved upon the commandants of military ports, as occasion might require. There is nothing on the face of this deed to excite suspicion. It was attested by two witnesses, and contains the signature and certificate of the syndic. The genuineness of these attestations was not objected to on the admission of the deed as evidence, or on a motion to overrule it. The deed must, therefore, be considered as evidence to the jury, without exception. And, under all the circumstances, we think, that full effect should have been given to it, as a muniment of title. The deed from Mackay to Stoddard, the ancestor of the plaintiffs, is not objected to. Bell made the conveyance to Mackay, not having the legal title; but when, under the act of 1836, the report of the commissioners was confirmed to Bell and his legal representatives, the legal title vested in him, and enured, by way of estoppel, to his grantee, and those who claim by deed under him. A confirmation, by act of Congress, vests in the confirmee the right of the United States, and a patent, if issued, could only be evidence *317 or this. On a title by estoppel, an action of ejectment may be maintained.
If the claim of the defendant had not been interposed, no one could doubt the validity of the plaintiffs' title. It has the highest sanction of the government, an act of legislation. But the 2d section of the act of 1836, which gave this sanction, provided, "that if it should be found that any tract confirmed, or any part thereof, had been previously located by any other person or persons, under any law of the United States, or had been surveyed or sold by the United States, that act should confer no title to such lands, in opposition to the rights acquired by such location or purchase."
This provision, it is insisted, covers the case, and defeats the title of the plaintiffs. But, it must be observed, that a location, to come within the section, must have been made "under a law of the United States." Now an act under a law, means in conformity with it; and unless the location of the defendant shall have been made agreeably to law, or the patent were so issued, the reservation does not affect the title of the plaintiffs.
The holder of New Madrid certificate had a right to locate it only on "public lands which had been authorized to be sold." Peltier's location was made in 1816, and his survey in 1818. The location of Coontz was made in 1818, and his survey in 1818. At these dates there can be be no question that all lands claimed under a French or Spanish title, which claim had been filed with the recorder of land-titles as the plaintiffs' claim had been were reserved from sale by the acts of Congress above stated. This reservation was continued up to the 26th of May, 1829, when it ceased, until it was revived by the act of the 9th of July, 1832, and was continued until the final confirmation of the plaintiffs' title, by the act of 1836. The defendant's patent was issued the 16th of July, 1832. So that it appears, that when the defendant's claim was entered, surveyed, and patented, the land covered by it, so far as the location interferes with the plaintiffs' survey, was not "a part of the public land authorized to be sold."
On the above facts, the important question arises, whether the defendant's title is not void. That this is a question as well examinable at law as in chancery, will not be controverted. That the elder legal title must prevail in the action of ejectment, is undoubted. But the inquiry here is, whether the defendant has any title, as against the plaintiffs. And there seems to be no difficulty in answering *318 the question, that he has not. His location was made on lands not liable to be thus appropriated, but expressly reserved; and this was the case when his patent was issued. Had the entry been made, or the patent issued, after the 26th of May, 1829, when the reservation ceased, and before it was revived by the act of 1832, the title of the defendant could not be contested. But at no other interval of time, from the location of Bell, until its confirmation in 1836, was the land claimed by him liable to be appropriated in satisfaction of a New Madrid certificate.
No title can be held valid which has been acquired against law; and such is the character of the defendant's title, so far as it trenches on the plaintiff's. It has been argued, that the first patent appropriates the land, and extinguishes all prior claims of inferior dignity. But this view is not sustainable. The issuing of a patent is a ministerial act, which must be performed according to law. A patent is utterly void and inoperative, which is issued for land that had been previously patented to another individual. The fee having been vested in the patentee by the first patent, the record could convey no right. It is true a patent possesses the highest verity. It cannot be contradicted or explained by parol, but if it has been fraudulently obtained or issued against law it is void. It would be a most dangerous principle to hold, that a patent should carry the legal title, though obtained fraudulently or against law. Fraud vitiates all transactions. It makes void a judgment, which is a much more solemn act than the issuing of a patent. The patent of the defendant having been for land reserved from such appropriation, is void; and also the survey of Coontz, so far as either conflicts with the plaintiffs' title. For the foregoing reasons, we think the instructions of the court to the jury were erroneous; and, consequently, the judgment must be reversed at the defendant's cost, and a venire de novo is awarded.
This cause came on to be heard on the transcript of the record from the Circuit Court of the United States for the district of Missouri, and was argued by counsel. On consideration whereof, It is now here ordered and adjudged by this court, that the judgment of the said Circuit Court, in this cause be, and the same is hereby reversed with costs; and that this cause be, and the same is hereby remanded to the said Circuit Court, with directions to award a venire facias de novo.
