Supreme Court of United States.
*455 The cause was argued by Mr. Magenis.
*456 Mr. Justice CATRON delivered the opinion of the court.
This case comes up by a writ of error to the Circuit Court of the District of Missouri. It is an action of ejectment for two hundred and eight acres of land, lying within the commons of St. Louis, and confirmed to the plaintiff by the act of Congress of July 4, 1836; and was surveyed by the authority of the United States, in September, 1838. The act of 1836, and the survey, make out a good primâ facie title for the plaintiff.
The defendant claims title under the city of St. Louis; and the title of the city depends on its grant of the commons by the acts of 1812 and 1831. The evidence of identity and boundary of neither claim being disputed, the plaintiff moved the court to instruct the jury, that the survey offered by the inhabitants of St. Louis in support of their claim, upon which survey was laid down, at the request of the claimants; the concession and survey of Marie Nicolle Les Bois, excludes and protects from the confirmatory operation of the acts of Congress of 13th June, 1812, and act of Congress of 27th June, 1831, the title of said Marie Nicolle Les Bois to the tract granted to her; which instruction was refused. The survey referred to was one made of the commons in *457 1806, by James Mackay; and on a plat of the survey, filed with a notice of claim before the board of commissioners organized by virtue of the act of 1805, to examine and report on French and Spanish claims, this of Les Bois was laid down, with six others. Mackay's survey was a private one, made at the instance of the inhabitants of St. Louis, and was not binding on the rights of any one; nor did it profess to exclude the pretensions laid down on the plat, as not being part of the town common, but the reverse. For our further views on the question presented by the instruction, we refer to what is said on it in the case of Mackay's heirs v. Dillon, submitted to us at the same time with the present.
The court then instructed the jury as follows:
1. That the inhabitants of the town of St. Louis were confirmed in their claim to commons by the acts of Congress of 1812 and 1831.
2. That the notice of claim of said inhabitants, as filed with the recorder of land titles, and exhibited before the board of commissioners, read here to the jury, is evidence of the extent of the said claim to said commons.
3. If the claim of the plaintiff is included within the boundary of the lands confirmed to the town of St. Louis by the acts of 1812 and 1831, then the jury must find for the defendant; because those acts passed the title to the land in controversy to the inhabitants of said town.
These were excepted to.
As to the first instruction given, it may be remarked, that by the act of June 13, 1812, Congress provided, that the rights, titles, and claims to town or village lots, out lots, common field lots, "and commons," in, adjoining, and belonging to St. Louis (and other towns) should be, and the same were, thereby confirmed to the inhabitants, & c.
That this was a general confirmation of the common to the town as a community no one has ever doubted, so far as the confirmation operated on the lands of the United States; and to which no individual claim or pretension was set up; and the question arising on the instruction is, whether the plaintiff's claim was excepted directly, or by reason of a prior right vested in the plaintiff. The only direct exception in the act is the proviso, "That nothing herein contained shall be construed to affect the rights of any persons claiming the same lands, or any part thereof, whose claims have been confirmed by the `board of commissioners' for adjusting and settling claims to land in the said territory."
The board referred to was organized according to the act of March 2, 1805, with powers to examine such claims as that of the plaintiff, and to decide on their validity; and although, by the act, no power was given to make a conclusive adjudication without the sanction of Congress, yet if any claim was declared good and *458 valid, and recommended for confirmation, it was of the class mentioned in the foregoing proviso, as we suppose, even when acted on under the act of 1805; but by the act of March 3, 1807, § 41, the powers of the commissioners were extended, and confirmations of various classes of claims were authorized to be made by the board conclusively, without the intervention of Congress; and for which patents were to issue, on surveys made by officers of the United States.
The foregoing were the only description of titles excepted from the act of 1812; and as the plaintiff's was not one of them, the act did not apply to it in the saving clause.
The next inquiry on the first instruction given is, as to the operation of the act of 1831 on the plaintiff's claim.
The act of May 26, 1824, gave jurisdiction to the District Court of the United States for the Missouri District, to hear and adjudge, in a mode of proceeding according to the rules governing courts of equity, on all claims of the description, and that were in the situation, of the plaintiff's, the United States being defendants; and either party having the right of appeal to the Supreme Court.
The fifth section of the act declares, "That any claim not brought before the District Court within two years from the passing thereof shall be for ever barred, both in law and equity; and that no other action at common law, or proceeding in equity, shall ever thereafter be sustained in any court whatever, in relation to said claim."
An act for the relief of Phineas Underwood, and for other purposes, passed the 22d May, 1836, § 2 (1 United States Land Laws, 924), declares, that the time for filing petitions under the act of 1824 shall be and is hereby extended to the 26th day of May, 1828.
The act of May 24th, 1828 (4 Lit. & Brown's ed., ch. 90, 298), declares, that the District Courts shall be open for the receiving petitions of claimants, under the act of 1834, until the 26th day of May, 1829, and that the act shall continue in force for the purpose of enabling claimants to obtain a final decision on their claims until the 26th day of May, 1830, and no longer.
The plaintiff instituted no proceedings before the District Court under the act of 1824; and on the 26th day of May, 1829, her claim stood and was barred. For further views of this court on the character of the bar, we refer to the cases of Barry v. Gamble, 3 Howard, 55, and Chouteau v. Eckhart, 2 Howard, 352.
In January, 1831, the city of St. Louis, and other towns, applied to have their rights of common further confirmed and regulated; and an act of Congress was passed, declaring "That the United States do hereby relinquish to the inhabitants of the several towns of St. Louis, & c., all the right, title, and interest in and to *459 the town or village lots, out lots, common field lots, and commons, to be held by the inhabitants of the said towns in `full property,' and to be regulated, or disposed of, for the use of the inhabitants, according to the laws of the State of Missouri." This law vested in the city corporation the town common, in fee simple, and gave full power to the legislature of Missouri to incorporate it into the city, by extending the city charter over it. The importance of the act will be understood, when we examine the plats and other evidences in the record; from which it will be seen, that the city is spreading over the eastern lines of the common, and that it is in part sold out in lots by the corporation already, and fast becoming part of the city.
Les Bois standing barred when the act of 1831 was passed, in November, 1832, the city caused the common to be officially surveyed, under instructions from the surveyor-general of Illinois and Missouri, according to the act of 26th May, 1834, § 2 (1 United States Land Laws, ch. 311). This survey was a public one, binding on the United States and the city corporation; and was duly recorded by the surveyor-general in his office. A copy of the plat is in the record, with a detailed description of landmarks, courses, and distances; and these were given in evidence to the jury in the Circuit Court. Thus stood the defendant's title. On July 9th, 1832, a law was passed by Congress, authorizing commissioners to be appointed to act on claims not confirmed previously; and on the 5th of November, 1833, the board organized under the act declared Les Bois's claim valid; and Congress confirmed it, July 4th, 1836.
To avoid the bar, under these circumstances, and to show that neither the act of 1812, or that of 1831, could deprive the plaintiff of her right, it is insisted, she had a vested interest to the land confirmed, when the United States acquired Louisiana, which is protected by treaty stipulation, and that such right no act of Congress could defeat; that by the third article of the treaty of 1803, with France, the inhabitants of the ceded territory were to be incorporated into the Union, to be admitted to the rights, advantages, and immunities of citizens of the United States, and in the mean time they were to be maintained and protected in the free enjoyment of their liberty, property, and religion. And this implied, that after their admission they should be equally protected, and that such would have been the measure of justice applicable to their rights of property by the laws of nations, had the treaty been silent on the subject. On this assumption the plaintiff mainly relies; that it is true in the abstract is not doubted, but it involves several opposing considerations applicable to her title: 1. Whether such a vested property in the soil existed in Les Bois, before the date of the treaty, as bound the government of Spain to perfect, by the execution of a complete title, the first incipient step. 2. Whether *460 the judicial power has any jurisdiction to interfere and enforce such right, supposing it to exist.
That this government had imposed on it the same duty to perfect the title that rested on Spain before the country was ceded is not open to question; but this was all the United States were bound to perform. How, then, did the plaintiff's claim stand previous to the cession. Her first decree and order of survey bear date in May, 1802, and the survey was made in August, 1803; but there is no evidence that any part of the land was either occupied or cultivated. The lieutenant-governor's decree is in the usual style, and concludes, "that it is given to serve the interested party to obtain the concession and title in form, from the intendant-general, to whom alone corresponds, by royal order, the distributing and granting of all classes of the royal domain."
On the 22d of October, 1798, the king of Spain appointed Morales intendant-general and sub-delegate; he kept his office at New Orleans, and was charged with the superintendence and granting of the public domain in the provinces of Upper and Lower Louisiana, "to the conclusion of all other authority." On July 17th, 1799, Morales published his regulations to the inferior officers and the people of the provinces, so that (in his own language) "all persons who wish to obtain lands may know in what manner they ought to ask for them, and on what conditions lands can be granted and sold; that those who are in possession without the necessary titles may know the steps they ought to take to come to an adjustment; that the commandants and sub-delegates of the intendancy may be informed of what they ought to observe," & c. 2 White's Recopilacion, 234.
By article eighteen, it is declared, "Experience proves, that a great number of those who have asked for land think themselves the legal owners of it; those who have obtained the first decree, by which the surveyor is ordered to measure and put them in possession, others after a survey has been made, have neglected to ask the title for the property, and as like abuses continuing for a longer time will augment the confusion and disorder which will necessarily result, We declare that no one of those who have obtained said decrees, notwithstanding in virtue of them the survey has taken place, and that they have been put in possession, can be regarded as owners of land until their real titles are delivered completed, with all the formalities before recited."
The formalities recited are found in the three preceding sections, which give precise instructions how the title is to be made out, and where it is to be recorded, by the officers of the general intendancy. The nineteenth article declares, "All those who `possess' lands in virtue of formal titles made by the governors [such as Delassus was] shall be protected and maintained in their possessions." And by article twenty, "Those who, without the title or possession *461 mentioned in the nineteenth article, are found occupying lands, shall be driven therefrom, as from property belonging to the crown," unless they have occupied the same more than ten years.
The board of commissioners who confirmed Les Bois's claim acted on the principle, that the regulations of Morales were not in force in Upper Louisiana, more than those of the royal governors, O'Reilly and Gayoso. But as the Lieutenant-Governor, Delassus, referred the claimant in this case, and in all others so far as we know, to the general intendant for a title, and the instructions point out the terms on which a complete title can be had, and the formalities with which it must be clothed, it is difficult to say on what grounds the commissioners come to the conclusion that Morales's regulations were not in force. The rules of proceeding of the board will be found in 5 D. Green's State Papers, 707, and the instructions to which they refer in 2 White's Recopilacion, 228-244.
In an affidavit found in the public documents, and furnished by the same board (5 D. Green's State Papers, 708), Delassus states his practice to have been, that, when a petition was presented for land, if he considered the petitioner possessed merits to entitle him to the concession it was granted, subject to the confirmation of the intendant-general, and that he made an order of survey; these he delivered to the petitioner; but that he kept no books, nor did he make any registry of the decree or order of survey; and that whether the surveyor did so or not was no concern of his, the lieutenant-governor's, nor did he deem it material when the survey was made; as to this, there was no time limited.
From this loose mode of proceeding, it is manifest the whole matter of perfecting the title was referred to the intendant-general; and he, and those acting subordinate to him in this respect, were undoubtedly governed by the intendant's regulations. As the king's representative and deputy, he was to judge whether the considerations moving the lieutenant-governor were such as warranted the grant; next, whether conditions had been performed, &c. The granting power was in a great degree political, and altogether the exercise of royal authority, and of course subject to no supervision but by the same high authority itself. By the treaty, the United States assumed the same exclusive right to deal with the title in their political and sovereign capacity, nor could the courts of justice be permitted to interfere; if they could, and by their decrees complete the title, all power over the subject might have been defeated, not by the courts of the Union only, but by the State courts also. And therefore the contemporary construction and practical understanding of the treaty for forty years has been, that claims like the plaintiff's had no standing in a court of justice until confirmed by Congress, or by its authority.
Next, it is insisted that the confirmation of 1836 established the *462 original validity of Les Bois's title; that this stands as an adjudged and concluded fact, which a court of justice cannot controvert; and the confirmation having operated on the concession of 1802, therefore, by relation, it overreaches the confirmations of the town common of 1812 and 1831.
The doctrine of relation in an action of ejectment, by which the legal title by patent is made to take date from the entry or inception of title, is familiar in some of the States, and has been acted on in this court. It applies where both the litigant parties have a grant; the case of Ross v. Barland, 1 Peters, 655, was of this description. There the younger patent was founded on the best right in equity, standing in advance of either patent, and the equities were tried at law. But if the elder or better entry had not been carried into a grant, a court of equity might have administered the same measure of justice, and decreed the land from the patentee, whose legal title was founded on the inferior equity. This is the constant practice in the State courts in similar cases. But when courts of law go behind conflicting patents, and contest the equities on which they are founded, it has never been held that the patent aided the equitable title; it must come in support of the grant, and stand on its own merits. So in this case; the plaintiff admits her grant, of itself, is insufficient to authorize a recovery, and that she must go behind it; and there she is met by the objection, that her claim had no standing in a court of equity or of law, up to the date of its confirmation, and depended on the political power. The plaintiff's assumption comes only to this, that the United States erred in granting the common first, in prejudice of her better right to have the first grant. To this assumption, the answer is, that if the sovereign power wronged her, she is without remedy in a municipal court.
The second instruction given by the Circuit Court was, that the notice of claim filed with the recorder and exhibited to the board was evidence of the extent of said claim to commons. The competency of the evidence was not objected to on part of the plaintiff; it was such as she herself resorted to, for the establishment of the extent and boundary of her own claim, and, aside from the legal and official survey of the commons made in 1832, is the only evidence of boundary that is likely to exist at no distant future day, and was the usual evidence introduced to prove the fact before the survey of 1832 was made. The court gave no opinion on its effect, but properly left it to the jury.
The third instruction is, that if the jury believed the land in dispute to lie within the bounds of the common confirmed by the acts of 1812 and 1831, then they should find for the defendant.
The first consideration on this instruction arises on the act of July 4th, 1836, by which the plaintiff's claim was confirmed. The fact, that claims embraced by the act interfered with lands *463 previously granted or sold by the United States, was well known to the commissioners, and in their report of 27th November, 1833 (5 D. Green's State Papers, 702), they state for the information of Congress, that "there are numerous cases of lands lying within these French and Spanish claims belonging to individuals whose right or claim originated under the government of the United States; some depend on purchases; some on the law allowing preemptions; some others on New Madrid locations; and some again upon settlement rights which have been confirmed; that most of these persons have been for a long time settled on their lands; their claims being of a bonâ fide character, derived from the government of the United States, they went on to improve their lands, making for themselves and families comfortable homes, without any belief that they would ever be interrupted in their possessions; that should the claims reported by the board be confirmed by Congress, in whole or in part, Congress will, in their wisdom, no doubt notice the suggestions here made, and carve out such a course as will quiet the uneasiness and anxiety which are felt, by doing every thing which even the most scrupulous demands of justice could require."
In view of this report, Congress passed the aforesaid confirmatory act, which declares, "That if it shall be found that any tract or tracts confirmed as aforesaid, or any part thereof, had been previously located by any other person or persons, under any law of the United States, or had been surveyed and sold by the United States, this act shall confer no title to such lands in opposition to the rights acquired by such location or purchase; but the individual or individuals whose claims are hereby confirmed shall be permitted to locate so much thereof as interferes with such location or purchase on other lands of the United States," &c.
The officers of the government administering the land department had to construe this law with its exceptions; the matter was referred to the Attorney-General, and in September, 1842, he gave it as his opinion, that the confirmations must yield to prior confirmations; school sections, ordinary sales prior to the act of July 4th, 1836, &c.
A confirmation of a Spanish or French claim, either by a board of commissioners under the act of 1807, or by Congress directly, or by the District Courts by force of the act of 1824, is a location of land by a law of the United States; surveys have been made and patents issued for such land in the great majority of instances, and it cannot be questioned, as we think, that a title thus protected by patent was intended to be carved out of the act of 1836; nor is it perceived how the St. Louis common can be in a worse condition, as the acts of 1812 and 1831 did not contemplate any further grant than the acts themselves import, and this conclusion is greatly strengthened by the following considerations.
The plaintiff's claim, and all others of a similar character within *464 the St. Louis common, that is, such as the board of commissioners from 1806 to 1812 had examined and rejected, were well known to Congress when the act of that year, confirming the common, was passed; the report of the board had just then been returned to Congress, and Mr. Penrose, one of its members, and Mr. Reddick, the clerk, were at Washington, as appears by their letters. The two of Mr. Penrose were communicated to the House of Representatives, and that of Mr. Reddick to the chairman of the committee of public lands (2 American State Papers, 447 - 451); they gave the information on which Congress proceeded in acting on the report, as the letters plainly show. The same information was part of the public and printed documents of Congress when the second confirming act of 1831 was passed; and when it was known, Spanish and French pretensions to claim conflicting with the common stood barred. In 1832, the common was officially and legally surveyed, pursuant to the act of May 26th, 1824, and the survey stood recorded in due form in 1836, when the plaintiff got her title. These laws, and the acts done by the United States in pursuance of them, we suppose, made and located the common's title as effectually as a patent could have done, and brought it within the exception of the act of 1836; and that the plaintiff Les Bois's confirmation was intended to give her land elsewhere, without disturbing the opposing title.
For another reason, we think the instruction was proper. When the country was acquired, the title to the land in dispute passed from France to the United States; on this government was imposed the duty by the treaty to satisfy individual and unperfected claims. This was to be done in a due exercise of the political power, to whose justice alone the claimant could appeal, and to whose decision she was compelled to submit; and there being two adverse claims to the same land, equally inchoate, and the government, being unable to confirm both, was under the necessity of determining between them; and, having granted the land to one, necessarily rejected the pretension of the other to the same land; and therefore the first grantee took the legal and exclusive title. But where there is a second confirmation, as in the instance before us, then the justice of the government must be relied on by the second grantee for compensation; and this compensation the act of 1836 has provided. The last ground is the one on which the decision in the case of Chouteau v. Eckhart proceeded, in regard to the St. Charles common; and which doctrine, we think, applies equally to the present controversy.
For the several reasons above stated, it is ordered, that the judgment of the Circuit Court be affirmed.
