Supreme Court of United States.
*534 It was argued by Mr. Nelson and Mr. Dulany, for the plaintiff in error, and Mr. Johnson and Mr. Campbell, for the defendants in error.
*545 Mr. Justice GRIER delivered the opinion of the court.
If this court can take jurisdiction of this case under the twenty-fifth section of the Judiciary Act, it must be under either the first or third clause, as the second is admitted to be wholly inapplicable to it.
1. The first is, "where is drawn in question the validity of a treaty or statute of, or an authority exercised under the United States, and the decision is against their validity."
2. The third is, "where is drawn in question the construction of any clause of the Constitution, or of a treaty or statute of, or commission held under the United States, and the decision is against the title, right, privilege, or exemption specially set up or claimed by either party under such clause," &c.
1. We have sought in vain through the record of this case to find any question raised directly by the pleadings, or "by clear and necessary intendment therefrom," touching the validity of any treaty, statute, or authority exercised under the United States.
Both parties claim certain moneys in court as assignees of Lyde Goodwin, who was a member of the "Baltimore Mexican Company," and entitled to a certain proportion of the money awarded to said company as a just claim on the Mexican government. The validity of the award, or the treaty under which it was made, is not called in question by either party, as both claim under them. In order to ascertain the effect of certain previous assignments made by Lyde Goodwin, the history of the origin of his claim necessarily makes a part of the case.
The treaty and award are introduced as a part of this history, as facts not disputed by either party. The money being in court, both the treaty and the award were functi officio, and no decision of the rights of the claimants inter se can, in the nature of the case, involve the validity of either.
The decision of the Court of Appeals, that the original contract with Mina in 1816 did not create such a debt as would *546 pass by the insolvent laws of Maryland, neither directly nor by implication questions the validity of any treaty, statute, or authority under the United States.
That the Baltimore Mexican Company set on foot and prepared the means of a military expedition against the territories and dominions of the king of Spain, a foreign prince with whom the United States were at peace, is a fact in the history of the case not disputed, and which if wrongly found by the court would not give us jurisdiction of the case. That such conduct of the company in making their contract with General Mina was a high misdemeanor, punishable with fine and imprisonment by the fifth section of the act of the 5th of June, 1794, chap. 51, cannot be disputed by any one who will read the statute; and the conclusion drawn therefrom by the court below, that the contract of the company with Mina in 1816, being founded on an illegal transaction, was void by the law of Maryland, where it was made, and passed no equity, right, or title whatsoever to an insolvent assignee in 1817, involved no question of "the validity of any treaty or statute of, or an authority exercised under the United States."
The validity or binding effect of the original contract with Mina is neither directly nor indirectly affirmed, either in the convention with Mexico or in the award of the commissioners under it.
The fact that the "Baltimore Mexican Company" exposed not only their property to capture by the Spanish vessels of war, but their own persons to fine and imprisonment by the authorities of the United States, only enhanced the justice and equity of their claims against the new government of Mexico.
The original contract with General Mina was a Maryland contract, and its validity and construction are questions of Maryland law, which this court is not authorized to decide in the present action.
2. We are equally at a loss to discover in this record where or how "the construction of any clause of the Constitution, or of a treaty or statute of, or commission held under the United States," is drawn in question in this case.
As we have already said, both parties claim money in court; and, in order to test the value of their respective assignments from Lyde Goodwin, introduce the history of the claim from its origin.
The treaty and award are facts in that history. They were before the court but as facts, and not for construction. If A hold land under a patent from the United States or a Spanish grant ratified by treaty, and his heirs, devisees, or assignees dispute as to which has the best title under him; this does not *547 make a case for the jurisdiction of this court under the twenty-fifth section of the Judiciary Act. If neither the validity nor construction of the patent or title under the treaty is contested, if both parties claim under it, and the contest arises from some question without or dehors the patent or the treaty, it is plainly no case for our interference under this section.
That the title originated in such a patent or treaty is a fact in the history of the case incidental to it, but the essential controversy between the parties is without and beyond it. So in this case, both claim the money in court. It is a fact that the money has been paid by the republic of Mexico, on a claim which has been pronounced just and equitable by commissioners under the convention of 1839. It is a fact, also, that the origin of this claim was for arms and ammunition furnished for an expedition under General Mina, for the purpose of insurrection against the Spanish government. It is a fact, that the Baltimore Mexican Company, or the individuals composing it, exposed themselves to punishment under the neutrality act. It is a fact, also, that afterwards, when Mexico had succeeded in establishing her independence; when her rebellion had become a successful revolution; that she very justly and honorably made herself debtor to those who perilled their property and persons in her service at the commencement of her struggle. It is a fact that, though this claim was acknowledged as a just debt by Mexico as early as 1825, payment was never obtained till after the award of the commissioners under the convention with Mexico in 1839, "for the adjustment of claims of citizens of the United States on the Mexican republic." It is a fact, that this claim thus recognized by the Mexican Congress was pronounced a just debt in favor of citizens of the United States against the republic of Mexico.
But whether this debt of the Mexican government, first acknowledged and made tangible as such in 1825, did previously exist as an equity, a right, or a chose in action capable of passing by assignment under the insolvent laws of Maryland in 1817, is a question not settled in the treaty or award, nor involving any question as to the construction of either, but arising wholly from without, and entirely independent of either the one or the other. The treaty was, that "all claims of citizens of the United States found to be just and equitable should be paid." The award was, that this claim of the "Baltimore Mexican Company," which had been acknowledged in 1825 as a valid claim by Mexico, was a just debt, not a false or feigned one, and ought to be paid. The money is awarded to be paid to Glenn and Perrine "in trust for whom it may concern." The award does not undertake to settle the equities or rights of *548 the different persons claiming to be legal or equitable assignees or transferees of the interests of the several members of the company. That is left to the tribunal of the State where the members of the company resided and the assignments were made. In deciding this question, the courts of Maryland have put no construction on the treaty or award, asserted by one party to be the true one and denied by the other. It was before them as a fact only, and not for the purpose of construction. Whether this money paid into court, under the award and first acknowledged by Mexico as a debt in 1825, existed as a debt transferable by the Maryland insolvent laws in 1817, or whether it, for the first time, assumed the nature of a chose in action transferable by assignment after 1825, when acknowledged of record by Mexico, and passed by the assignment of Lyde Goodwin to Robert Oliver, was a question wholly dehors the treaty and award, and involving the construction of the laws of Maryland only, and not of any treaty or statute or commission under the United States.
It is a conclusive test of the question of jurisdiction of this court in the present case, that, if we assume jurisdiction, and proceed to consider the merits of the case, we find it to involve no question either of validity or construction of treaties or statutes of the United States.
But the only questions in the case will be found to be, what was the effect of the appointment of George M. Gill in 1837 as permanent trustee, under the insolvent laws of Maryland of 1805? Was the void and illegal contract with Mina, made in 1816, such a chose in action as would pass by such insolvent law in 1817? Or did it first become an assignable claim after it was acknowledged by Mexico in 1825, and, as a new acquisition of Lyde Goodwin after his insolvency, pass by his assignment to Oliver. A resolution of these questions, by or through any thing to be found on the face of the treaty or award, or any necessary intendment or even possible inference therefrom, is palpably impossible.
The whole case evidently turns on the construction of the laws of Maryland, and on facts connected with the previous history of the claim, which are not disputed, and which are incidental to the treaty and award, but which raise no question either as to their validity or construction.
This case is therefore dismissed for want of jurisdiction.
Mr. Chief Justice TANEY, Mr. Justice McLEAN, Mr. Justice WAYNE, and Mr. Justice WOODBURY dissented.
Chief Justice TANEY stated that, in his opinion, this court *549 had jurisdiction of the question upon which the case was decided in the Court of Appeals of Maryland, and that their decision was erroneous, and ought to be reversed.
Mr. Justice McLEAN concurred in opinion with the Chief Justice.
Mr. Justice WOODBURY.
I object to the form of the judgment to be entered in this case, rather than to the results of it to the parties. By dismissing the writ of error for want of jurisdiction, as is done here, the judgment in the State court is left in full force; whereas, in my view, this court has jurisdiction, and should affirm the judgment in the State court, thus leaving it, as the other course does, in full force, but on different grounds. The consequence to the parties, by pursuing either course, differs so little, that it does not seem necessary to go into any elaborate exposition of the reasons for this dissent, and I shall therefore content myself with stating only the general grounds for it.
All that seems indispensable to give jurisdiction to us in this class of cases is, that the plaintiff in error should have set up, in support of his claim in the State court, some right or title under a treaty or doings by authority from Congress, and that it should be overruled by the State court. See the twenty-fifth section of the act of 1789 (1 Stat. at Large, 85), and various decisions under it, including Owings v. Northwood's Lessee, 5 Cranch, 348, and Smith v. Maryland, 6 Cranch, 304; 2 Howard, 372. Here the appellant set up in his bill a claim to money under a treaty with Mexico, and an award under it by commissioners appointed by an act of Congress, and the State court, in his opinion, overruled his claim. This, in my view, gives jurisdiction to us, whether the State court decided right or wrong. See Armstrong v. Athens County, 16 Peters, 285; Miller v. Nichols, 4 Wheat. 311. The very object of the writ of error is to ascertain whether they did decide right or wrong, and the jurisdiction to make this revision of their opinion arises not from its error, but its subject-matter; the latter being a claim set up under some United States authority. Neilson v. Lagow, 7 Howard, 775.
The next and only remaining inquiry for me, supposing that we have jurisdiction, is, whether the State court formed a right conclusion in overruling the claim set up by the appellant. I think they did. So far as it rested on authority under the United States, it is by no means clear that they overruled it improperly. The claim, so far as regards the enforcement of the treaty with Mexico, does not seem to have been overruled *550 in terms by the State court. That court did not decide that the treaty was corrupt or illegal, or in any way a nullity, when they held that the original contract violated the laws of neutrality. So far, too, as regards the award made by the commissioners, that the Baltimore Mexican Company and their legal representatives had a just claim under the treaty for the amount awarded, it was not overruled at all.
It is not manifest, then, that any thing really in the treaty or in the award, set up by Gill, the plaintiff, was actually decided against, but only something he claimed to be there; that when the appellants claimed that he, rather than others, was legally entitled to one ninth of the sum awarded to the Baltimore Mexican Company, the State court seems to have overruled that. But in doing this, they must still have held the treaty itself to be valid, and the award of the commissioners under it to be valid, or they could not have decreed this share of the fund to Oliver's executors, as they appear to have done expressly by the record.
All must concede, that the State court speaks in its language against the Mina "contract" alone as illegal, and in terms do not impugn either the treaty or the award; and it is merely a matter of inference or argument that either of these was assailed, or any right properly claimed under them overruled. But it is true the court held that Oliver's executors, rather than the appellant, were entitled to the fund furnished by Mexico, and long subsequent to Mina's contract; but in coming to that conclusion, they seem to have been governed by their views as to their own laws and the principles of general jurisprudence. The treaty or award contained nothing as to the point whether Gill or Oliver's executors had the better right to this share, but only that the Mexican Company and their legal representatives should receive the fund. This last the court did not question.
But who was the legal representative of Lyde Goodwin's share? Who, by insolvencies, sales, or otherwise, had become entitled to it?
That was the question before the court, and the one they settled; and in deciding that, they overruled the claim of Gill to be so, by virtue of any authority in the treaty or award; and in saying that the fund should go to Oliver's executors, as best entitled, rather than Gill, they did it under their own State laws.
It is a general rule for the State tribunals, and not the commissioners, to settle any conflict between different claimants; and the usage, when disputes exist, is not for commissioners to go further than act on the validity of the claim, and decide *551 besides the superior rights of one of the claimants. Frevall v. Bache et al., 14 Peters, 95; Comegys v. Vasse, 1 Peters, 212; Sheppard v. Taylor et al., 5 Peters, 710.
It is true, that the opinion given in the State court in support of its judgment is not entirely free from some grounds for misconception, yet the judgment itself appears right, and, if erroneous, resting as it does wholly on the State laws, it is not competent for us, under this writ of error, to reverse it. We can reverse it only when wrong, and wrong, too, for deciding improperly against some claim under a United States law or treaty.
This, I think, it has not done. In short, the whole real truth appears to be, that the State court considered the Mina contract in 1817 as a violation of the neutrality act of 1794; and therefore, when Lyde Goodwin failed in the same year, and went into insolvency, that his share in the contract, being illegal and void, could not then pass to his creditors, or his trustee in their behalf. But when the Mexican government, about 1825, adopted the contract, and acknowledged its liability to pay those entitled, the court seems to have thought that their obligation was virtually a new one. It occurred after the insolvency, and hence seems supposed not to have passed to the creditors, any more than did new property subsequently acquired. (See Insolvent Act of 1805, ch. 110, § 2.) Consequently, the commissioners held that the creditors and their trustee were not entitled to its benefits. Goodwin could and did legally assign to Oliver his new rights and new guarantees, for his share from Mexico. These last, though growing out of the original Mina purchase, were not a violation of the act of 1794, were honorable, though not compellable, and were not deemed illegal either by Mexico or the government of the United States, or the commissioners, or the State court.
Again, under the State laws doubts seemed to arise, (in deciding on which was the proper claimant,) whether the original trustee was not duly appointed in 1817, and could not legally assign this claim, if it passed to him then or afterwards, as he attempted to pass it to Oliver, rather than considering it as belonging to, or vesting in, Gill, the appellant, who was not appointed trustee till 1825, and then in a manner somewhat questionable. (4 Gill & Johns. 392.) That, however, was likewise a point arising exclusively under the State laws, and which we are not authorized to decide in this writ of error.
It is for reasons like these, that, in my opinion, the judgment in the State court, so far as it related to any claim set up and supposed to be overruled under any authority derived from the United States, is within our jurisdiction; but that the State *552 court did not improperly overrule any such claim so set up, and hence that the judgment in the State court ought to be affirmed.
This cause came on to be heard on the transcript of the record from the Court of Appeals for the Western Shore of Maryland, and was argued by counsel. On consideration whereof, it is now here ordered, adjudged, and decreed by this court, that this cause be, and the same is hereby, dismissed, for the want of jurisdiction.
