Supreme Court of United States.
*326 Upon all these exceptions the case came up to this court, and was argued by Mr. Schley, for the plaintiffs in error, and Mr. Nelson and Mr. Johnson, for the defendant in error.
*330 Mr. Justice CURTIS delivered the opinion of the court.
Sebre Howard brought his action of covenant broken, in the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Maryland, and upon the trial, the defendants took seven bills of exception, which are here for consideration upon a writ of error. Each of them must be separately examined.
The first, raises the question, whether Howard could prove that a certain suit was pending in Cecil County Court by the testimony of the clerk of that court to the verity of a copy of the docket-entries made in that suit by him, as clerk.
*331 It is not objected that a copy of the docket-entries was produced instead of the original entries, because no court is required to permit its original entries to go out of the custody of its own officers, in the place appointed for their preservation; but the objection is, that a formal record ought to have been shown. There are two distinct answers to this objection, either of which is sufficient.
By the act of Assembly of Maryland, (1817, c. 119,) the clerk of the County Court is not required to make up a formal record. The docket-entries and files of the court stand in place of the record. When a formal record is not required by law, those entries which are permitted to stand in place of it are admissible in evidence. Several judicial decisions in England have been referred to by the counsel of the plaintiff in error, to the effect, that the finding of an indictment at the sessions cannot be proved by the production of the minute-book of the sessions, from which book the roll, containing the record of such proceedings, is subsequently made up. See 2 Phil. Ev. 194. But the distinction between those cases and a case like this is pointed out in a recent decision of the Court of King's Bench in Regina v. Yeoveley, 8 Ad. & El. 806, in which it was held, that the minute-book of the sessions was admissible to prove the fact that an order of removal had been made, it appearing that it was not the practice to make up any other record of such an order; and Lord Denman fixes on the precise ground on which the evidence was admissible in this case, when he says, "the book contains a caption, and the decision of the sessions; and their decision is the fact to be proved."
So in Arundell v. White, 14 East, 216, the plaintiff offered the minute-book of the Sheriff's Court in London, containing the entry of the plaint, and the word "withdrawn," opposite to the entry, and proved it was the usual course of the court to make such an entry when the suit was abandoned by the plaintiff; it was held to be competent evidence to prove the abandonment of the suit by the plaintiff and its final termination. In Commonwealth v. Bolkom, 3 Pick. 281, it was decided that the minute-book of the sessions, showing the grant of a license to the defendant, was legal evidence of that fact, there being no statute requiring a technical record to be made up.
And in Jones v. Randall, Cowper's R. 17, copies of the minute-book of the House of Lords were admitted in evidence of a decree, because it was not the practice to make a formal record.
The principle of all these decisions is the same. Where the law, which governs the tribunal, requires no other record than the one, a copy of which is presented, that is sufficient. In *332 Maryland, no technical record was required by law to be made up by the clerks of the county courts; and, therefore, no other record than the one produced was needful to prove the pendency of an action in such a court.
But there is another point of view in which this evidence was clearly admissible.
The fact to be proved was the pendency of an action. An action is pending when it is duly entered in court. The entry of an action in court is made, by an entry on the docket, of the title of the case, by the proper officer, in the due course of his official duty. Proof of such an entry being made by the proper officer, accompanied by the presumption which the law entertains, that he has done his duty in making it, is proof that the action was duly entertained in court, and so proof that the action was pending; and if the other party asserts that it had been disposed of, at any particular time after it was entered, he must show it. The docket-entry of the action was therefore admissible for this special purpose, because it was the very fact which, when shown, proved the pendency of the action, until the other party showed its termination.
The second bill of exceptions was taken to the ruling of the court admitting a witness to testify that he was present at the trial of the above-mentioned case in Cecil County Court, in December, 1847, in which Sebre Howard and Hiram Howard were shown by the docket-entries to have been plaintiffs, and the Wilmington and Susquehannah Railroad Corporation defendant; that the plaintiffs at that trial relied on a paper writing, shown to the witness, and set out in the bill of exceptions; that one of the counsel of the defendant had in his possession another paper writing, also shown to the witness, and being the deed declared on in this suit; and that the defendant's counsel handed this last-mentioned paper to the presiding judge, and spoke of it as the true and genuine contract between the parties.
To render the ruling, to which this bill of exceptions was taken, intelligible, it is necessary to state, that the Wilmington and Susquehannah Railroad Corporation was the defendant in that action, which was assumpsit, founded on the paper first spoken of by the witness, which did not bear the seal of the corporation; that by the act of Assembly of 1837, c. 30, the Baltimore and Susquehannah Company, the Baltimore and Port Deposit Company, and the Philadelphia, Wilmington, and Baltimore Company, were consolidated, under the name of the Philadelphia, Wilmington, and Baltimore Railroad Company, and that this action being covenant, against the Philadelphia, Wilmington, and Baltimore Railroad Company, and the plea non est factum, the plaintiff was endeavoring to prove, that the *333 paper declared on bore the corporate seal of the Wilmington and Susquehannah Railroad Company. This being the fact to be proved, evidence that the corporation, through its counsel, had treated the instrument as bearing the corporate seal, and relied upon it as a deed of the corporation, was undoubtedly admissible. It is objected that the parties to that suit were not the same as in this one; but this is wholly immaterial. The evidence does not derive its validity from any privity of parties. It tends to prove an admission by the corporation, that the instrument was sealed with its seal. It is further objected that the admission was not made by the defendants in this action, but by the Wilmington and Susquehannah Corporation. It is true the action in the trial of which the admission was made, being brought before the union of the corporations, was necessarily in the name of the original corporation; but as, by virtue of the act of union, the Wilmington and Susquehannah Company, the Baltimore and Port Deposit Company, and the Philadelphia, Wilmington, and Baltimore Company were merged in and constituted one body corporate, under the name of the Philadelphia, Wilmington, and Baltimore Railroad Company, it is very clear that at the time the trial took place in Cecil County Court, all acts and admissions of the defendant in that case, though necessarily in the name of the Wilmington and Susquehannah Company, were done and made by the same corporation which now defends this action. This exception must therefore be overruled.
The third exception is that the court permitted the deed to be read to the jury, although only vague and inconclusive evidence had been given, that it bore the corporate seal. We do not consider the evidence was vague, for it applied to this particular paper, and tended to prove it to be the deed of the company. Whether it would turn out to be conclusive, or not, depended upon the fact whether any other evidence would be offered to control it, and upon the judgment of the jury. But the deed was rightly admitted to be read as soon as any evidence of its execution, fit to be weighed by the jury, had been given by the plaintiff. It was argued that this evidence was not sufficient to change the burden of proof; and it is true that, upon the issue whether the paper bore the corporate seal, the burden of proof remained on the plaintiff throughout the trial, however the evidence might preponderate, to the one side or the other, (Powers v. Russell, 13 Pick. 69); but the court did not rule that the burden of proof was changed, but only that such primâ facie evidence had been given as enabled the plaintiff to read the deed to the jury.
The subject-matter of the fourth exception became wholly immaterial in the progress of the cause, and could not be assigned *334 for error, even if the ruling had been erroneous. Greenleaf's Lessee v. Birth, 5 Pet. 132. But we think the ruling was correct.
The fifth exception was taken to the refusal of the court to allow a question to be answered by James Canby, one of the defendant's witnesses. This witness had already testified as follows:
"Leslie and White were the first contractors, and they were induced to relinquish it at the instance of the board, and it was then let to Sebre and Hiram Howard; the terms and price, and other essentials of the contract, were entered into on the 12th July, 1836; and on that day two papers were prepared and were then signed by him, and also signed by Sebre Howard; and deponent, as president of the company, expressly directed the secretary, Mr. Brobson, that the seal of the company was not to be fixed to either paper until Hiram Howard signed and sealed both of them. The two papers, respectively marked A and B, being shown to him, he stated that they are the two papers to which he refers; that the impression of the seal on said paper A, is the seal of the Wilmington and Susquehannah Railroad Company, but that said seal was not placed there, he is very positive, at any time whilst he was president of said company, and was never placed there by his authority or by the authority of the board."
The defendant now insists he had a right to prove by this witness, that although the paper bore the corporate seal of the company, it was not its deed, because of an understanding between the witness and the plaintiff that Hiram Howard was to execute the paper. If the offer had been to prove that at the time the corporate seal was affixed, it was agreed the instrument should not be the deed of the company, unless, or until, Hiram Howard should execute it, the evidence might have been admissible. Pawling et al. v. The United States, 4 Cranch, 219; Derby Canal Company v. Wilmot, 9 East, 360; Bell v. Ingestre, 12 Ad. & El. N.S. 317. But the understanding, to which the question points, was prior to the sealing, and in no way connected with that act, of which the witness had no knowledge. It did not bear upon the question whether the instrument was the deed of the company, and was properly rejected.
The sixth exception rests on the following facts: The plaintiff offered to read the deposition of a deceased witness taken by the defendants in the case in Cecil County Court, to prove that the paper in question bore the seal of the corporation placed there by the deponent, an officer of the corporation. The defendant objected, but the court admitted the evidence. We consider the evidence was admissible upon two grounds; to *335 prove that in that case the defendant had asserted this instrument to be the deed of the corporation, and relied on it as such; and also, because the witness being dead, his deposition, regularly taken in a suit in which both the plaintiff and defendant were parties, touching the same subject-matter in issue in this case, was competent evidence on its trial. It is said the parties were not the same. But it is not necessary they should be identical, and they were the same, except that Hiram Howard was a coplaintiff in the former suit, and this diversity does not render the evidence inadmissible. 1 Greenl. Ev. 553; 1 Ad. & El. 19.
The seventh and last bill of exceptions covers nine distinct propositions given by the court to the jury as instructions. The first of the instructions excepted to, was as follows:
"If the jury find from the evidence that this instrument of writing was produced in court, and relied upon by the present defendant, as a contract under the seal of the Wilmington and Susquehannah Railroad Company, in an action of assumpsit brought by Sebre and Hiram Howard, against the last-mentioned company in Cecil County Court; and that the said suit was decided against the plaintiffs upon the ground that this instrument was duly sealed by the said corporation as its deed, then the defendant cannot be permitted in this case to deny the validity of said sealing, because such a defence would impute to the present defendant itself a fraud upon the administration of justice in Cecil County Court."
It is objected that this instruction applied the doctrine of estoppel, where the matter of the estoppel had not been relied on in pleading. The rules on this subject are well settled. If a party has opportunity to plead an estoppel and voluntarily omits to do so, and tenders or takes issue on the fact, he thus waives the estoppel and commits the matter to the jury, who are to find the truth. 1 Saund. 325 a., n. 4; 2 B. & A. 668; 2 Bing. 377; 4 Bing. N.C. 748. But if he have not opportunity to show the estoppel by pleading, he may exhibit the matter thereof in evidence, on the trial, under any issue which involves the fact, and both the court and the jury are bound thereby. 1 Salk. 276; 17 Mass. 369. Now the plea in this case was non est factum, which amounts to a denial that the instrument declared on was the defendant's deed at the time of action brought. If sealed and delivered, and subsequently altered, or erased, in a material part, or if the seal was torn off, before action brought, the plea is supported. 5 Coke, 23, 119 b.; 11 Coke, 27, 28; Co. Lit. 35 b., n. 6, 7. It follows that a replication to the effect that on some day, long before action brought, the instrument was the deed of the defendant, would be bad on demurrer, for it would not completely answer the plea.
*336 The plaintiff cannot be said to have opportunity to plead an estoppel, and voluntarily to omit to do so, when the previous pleadings are such that if he did plead it, it would be demurrable.
Besides, a plea of non est factum rightly concludes to the country, and so the plaintiff has no opportunity to reply specially, any new matter of fact. He can only join the issue tendered, and if he were prevented from having the benefit of an estoppel, because he has not pleaded it, it would follow that the plaintiff can never have the benefit of an estoppel when the defendant pleads the general issue, for in no such case can he plead it. This was clearly pointed out in Trevivan v. Lawrence, 1 Salk. 276, where the court say, "that when the plaintiffs' title is by estoppel, and the defendant pleads the general issue, the jury are bound by the estoppel." And it is in this way that the numerous cases of estoppels in pais which are in the recent books of reports, have almost always been presented.
It is further objected, that the facts supposed in the instruction did not amount in law to an estoppel. We think otherwise. Hall v. White, 3 C. & P. 137, was detinue for certain deeds. The defendant wrote to the plaintiffs' attorney, and spoke of the deed as in his possession under such circumstances as ought to have led him to understand a suit would be brought upon the faith of what he said. Best, C.J., ruled: "If the defendant said he had the deeds, and thereby induced the plaintiffs to bring their action against him, I shall hold that they may recover, though the assertion was a fraud on his part." In Doe v. Lambly, 2 Esp. 635, the defendant had informed the plaintiffs' agent that his tenancy commenced at Lady-day, and the agent gave a notice to quit on that day. This not being heeded, ejectment was brought, and the tenant set up a holding from a different day. But Lord Kenyon refused to allow him to show that he was even mistaken in his admission, for he was concluded. Mordecai v. Oliver, 3 Hawks, 479; Crocket v. Lasbrook, 5 Mon. 530; Trustees of Congregation, &c. v. Williams, 9 Wend. 147, are to the same point.
These decisions go much further than this case requires, because the defendant not only induced the plaintiff to bring this action, but defeated the action in Cecil County Court, by asserting and maintaining this paper to be the deed of the company; and this brings the defendant within the principle of the common law, that when a party asserts what he knows is false, or does not know to be true, to another's loss, and his own gain, he is guilty of a fraud; a fraud in fact, if he knows it to be false, fraud in law, if he does not know it to be true. Polhill v. Walter, 3 B. & Ad. 114; Lobdell v. Baker, 1 Met. 201.
*337 Certainly it would not mitigate the fraud, if the false assertion were made in a court of justice and a meritorious suit defeated thereby. We are clearly of opinion, that the defendant cannot be heard to say, that what was asserted on the former trial was false, even if the assertion was made by mistake. If it was a mistake, of which there is no evidence, it was one made by the defendant, of which he took the benefit, and the plaintiff the loss, and it is too late to correct it. It does not carry the estoppel beyond what is strictly equitable, to hold that the representation which defeated one action on a point of form should sustain another on a like point.
The next instruction is objected to on the ground that Hiram Howard ought to have been joined as a coplaintiff. By reference to the indenture, it will be seen that it purports to be made between Sebre Howard and Hiram Howard, of the first part, and the Wilmington and Susquehannah Railroad Company, of the second part. The covenants are not by or with these persons nominatim, but throughout the party of the one part covenants with the party of the other part. Sebre Howard alone and the corporation sealed the deed.
It is settled that if one of two covenantees does not execute the instrument, he must join in the action, because whatever may be the beneficial interest of either, their legal interest is joint, and if each were to sue, the court could not know for which to give judgment. Slingsby's case, 5 Coke, 18, b.; Petrie v. Bury, 3 B. & C. 353. And the rule has recently been carried so far as to hold, that where a joint covenantee had no beneficial interest, did not seal the deed, and expressly disclaimed under seal, the other covenantee could not sue alone. Wetherell v. Langton, 1 Wels. H. & G. 634. But this rule has no application until it is ascertained that there is a joint covenantee, and this is to be determined in each case by examining the whole instrument. Looking at this deed, it appears the covenant sued on was with "the party of the first part," and the inquiry with whom the covenant was made, resolves itself into the question, what person, or persons, constituted "the party of the first part," at the moment when the deed took effect?
The descriptive words, in the premises of the deed, declare Sebre and Hiram Howard to be the party of the first part; but, inasmuch as Hiram did not seal the deed, he never in truth became a party to the instrument. He entered into no covenant contained in it. When, in the early part of the deed, the party of the first part covenants with the party of the second part to do the work, it is impossible to maintain, that Hiram Howard is there embraced, under the words "party of the first part," as a covenantor. And when, in the next sentence, the party of the *338 second part covenants with the party of the first part to pay for the work, it would be a most strained construction to hold, that the same words do embrace him as a covenantee. There can be no sound reason for the construction, that the words party of the first part mean one thing, when that party is to do something, and a different thing, when that party is to receive compensation for doing it. The truth is, that the descriptive words are controlled by the decisive fact, that Hiram did not seal the deed, and so error demonstration is plainly appears. An examination of the numerous authorities cited by the counsel for the plaintiff in error will show that they are reconcilable with this interpretation of the covenants; for, in all the cases in which one of the persons named in the deed did not seal, he was covenanted with nominatim. Our conclusion is, that the action was rightly brought by Sebre Howard alone.
The next instruction excepted to was as follows: "The omission of the plaintiffs to finish the work within the times mentioned in the contract, is not a bar to his recovery for the price of the work he actually performed; but the defendant may set off any damage he sustained by the delay, if the delay arose from the default of the plaintiffs."
The time fixed for the completion of the contract was the first day of November, 1836. The company agreed to pay twenty-six cents per cubic yard, in monthly payments, according to the measurement and valuation of the engineer. These monthly payments were made up to December, 1837, and when the contract was determined by the company, January 18th, 1838, under a power to that effect in the instrument, which will be presently noticed, there remained due the price of the work done in December, and on eighteen days in January.
The question is, whether the covenant to pay was dependent on the covenant to finish the work by the first day of November. So far as respects each monthly instalment, earned before breach of the covenant to finish the work on the first day of November, it is clear the covenants were independent. Or, to state it more accurately, the covenant to pay at the end of each month, for the work done during that month, was dependent on the progress of the work, so far as respected the amount to be paid; but was not dependent on the covenant to finish the work by a day certain. The only doubt is, whether, after the breach of this last-mentioned covenant, the defendants were bound to pay for work done after that time.
The is an apparent, and perhaps some real conflict, in the decisions of different courts, on this point. 2 Johns. 272, 387; 10 Johns. 203; 2 H. Bl. 380; 8 Mass. 80; 15 Mass. 503; 5 Gill *339 & Johns. 254. We do not deem it needful to review the numerous authorities because we hold the general principle to be clear, that covenants are to be considered dependent, or independent, according to the intention of the parties, which is to be deduced from the whole instrument; and in this case we find no difficulty in arriving at the conclusion, that the covenants were throughout independent. There are, in this instrument, no terms which import a condition, or expressly make one of these covenants in any particular dependent on the other. There is no necessary dependency between them, as the pay for work done may be made though the work be done after the day. The failure to perform on the day does not go to the whole consideration of the contract, and there is no natural connection between the amount to be paid for work after the day, and the injury or loss inflicted by a failure to perform on the day. Still it would have been competent for the parties to agree that the contractor should not receive the monthly instalment due in November, if the work should not be then finished, and that he should receive nothing for work done after that time.
But we find no such agreement. On the contrary, the covenant to pay for what shall have been done during each preceding month is absolute and unlimited, and the parties have provided a mode of securing the performance of the work and the indemnification of the company from loss, wholly different from making these covenants in any particular dependent on each other. They have agreed, as will be presently more fully stated, that the company may declare a forfeiture of the contract in case the work should not proceed to their satisfaction, and may retain fifteen per cent. of each payment to secure themselves from loss. Without undertaking to apply to this particular case any fixed technical rule, like that held in Terry v. Duntze, 2 H. Bl. 389, we hold it was not the intention of these parties, as shown by this instrument, to make the payment of any instalment dependent on the covenant to finish the work by the first day of November; and that consequently the instruction given at the trial was correct.
The sixth instruction, which is also excepted to, must be read in connection with the fifth and the provision of the contract to which they refer. The contract contains the following clause:
"Provided, however, that in case the party of the second part shall at any time be of opinion that this contract is not duly complied with by the said party of the first part, or that it is not in due progress of execution, or that the said party of the first part is irregular or negligent, then, and in such case, he shall be authorized to declare this contract forfeited, and thereupon the same shall become null, and the party of the *340 first part shall have no appeal from the opinion and decision aforesaid, and he hereby releases all right to except to, or question the same in any place under any circumstances whatever; but the party of the first part shall still remain liable to the party of the second part for the damages occasioned by the said non-compliance, irregularity, or negligence."
The instructions thereon were:
5th. "If the defendant annulled this contract, as stated in the testimony, under the belief that the plaintiff was not prosecuting the work with proper diligence, and for the reasons assigned in the resolution of the board, they are not liable for any damage the plaintiff may have sustained thereby, even although he was in no default, and the company acted in this respect under a mistaken opinion as to his conduct."
6th. "But this annulling did not deprive him of any rights vested in him at that time, or make the covenant void ab initio, so as to deprive him of a remedy upon it for any money then due him for his work, or any damages he had then already sustained."
The law leans strongly against forfeiture, and it is incumbent on the party who seeks to enforce one, to show plainly his right to it. The language used in this contract is susceptible of two meanings. One is the literal meaning, for which the plaintiff in error contends, that the declaration of the company annulled the contract, destroying all rights which had become vested under it, so that if there was one of the monthly payments in arrear and justly due from the company to the contractor, and as to which the company was in default, yet it could not be recovered, because every obligation arising out of the contract was at an end.
Another interpretation is, that the contract, so far as it remained executory on the part of the contractor, and all obligations of the company dependent on the future execution by him of any part of the contract might be annulled. We cannot hesitate to fix on the latter as the true interpretation.
In the first place, the intent to have the obligation of the contractor, to respond for damages, continue, is clear. In the next place, though the contractor expressly releases all right to except to the forfeiture, he does not release any right already vested under the contract, by reason of its part performance, and expressio unius exclusio alterius. And finally, it is highly improbable, that the parties could have intended to put it in the power of the company, to exempt itself from paying money, honestly earned and justly due, by its own act declaring a forfeiture. The counsel for the plaintiff in error seemed to feel the pressure of this difficulty, and not to be willing to maintain that *341 vested rights were absolutely destroyed by the act of the company; and he suggested that though the covenant were destroyed, assumpsit might lie upon an implied promise. But if the intention of the parties was to put an end to all obligation on the part of the company arising from the covenant, there would remain nothing from which a promise could be implied; and if this was not their intention, then we come back to the very interpretation against which he contended; for if the obligation arising from the covenant remains, the covenant is not destroyed. We hold the instruction of the court on this point to have been correct.
The next instruction, excepted to, was in these words: "The increased work occasioned by changing the width of the road and altering the grade having been directed by the engineer of the company under its authority, was done under this covenant, and within its stipulations, and may be recovered in this action, without resorting to an action of assumpsit."
The covenant of the plaintiff was "to do, execute, and perform the work and labor in the said schedule mentioned." And the schedule mentions "all the grading of that part of section 9, &c., according to the directions of the engineer," &c. We think this instruction was correct. The plaintiff in error insists that the covenant was to do the grading precisely as shown by a profile made before the contract was entered into. If this were so, the company would have been disabled from making any change either of width or grade, without the consent of the defendant. We do not think this was the meaning of the contract, and both the company and the contractor having acted on a different interpretation of it, the company must now pay for the increased work of which they have had the benefit.
The ninth instruction was as follows:
9th. "Also, if from any cause, without the fault of the plaintiff, the earth excavated could not be used in the filling up and embankments on the road and at the river, it was the duty of the defendant to furnish a place to waste it. And if the company refused, on the application of the plaintiff to provide a convenient place for that purpose, he is entitled to recover such damages as he sustained by the refusal, if he sustained any; and he is also entitled to recover any damage he may have sustained by the delay of his work or the increase of his expense in performing it, occasioned [by] the negligence, acts, or default of the defendant."
To this the plaintiff in error objects, "that it assumes that the company was bound to provide a place on which to waste the earth." The contract says the contractor is to place earth, not wanted for embankment, "where ordered by the engineer." *342 He can rightfully place it nowhere until ordered by the engineer, and if such an order was refused, or delayed, and the contractor was thereby injured, he had a clear right to damages. It cannot be supposed such an order was to be given or obeyed, if obedience to it would be a trespass. Before giving it, the company was bound to make it a lawful order, the execution of which would not subject the parties to damages for a wrong, and therefore was bound to provide a place, and, of course, a reasonably convenient place as well as seasonably to give the order.
The plaintiff in error also excepted to the tenth instruction, which must be taken together with the clause of the contract to which it relates, to be intelligible. The contract contains the following provision:
"And provided, also, that in order to secure the faithful and punctual performance of the covenants above made by the party of the first part, and to indemnify and protect the party of the second part from loss in case of default and forfeiture of this contract, the said party of the second part shall, notwithstanding the provision in the annexed schedule, be authorized to retain in their hands, until the completion of the contract, fifteen per cent. of the money at any time due to the said party of the first part; thus covenanted and agreed by the said parties, this twelfth day of July, 1836, as witness their seals."
The instruction was:
10th. "Also, the plaintiff is entitled to recover the fifteen per cent. retained by the company, unless the jury find that the company has sustained damage by the default, negligence, or misconduct of the plaintiff. And if such damage has been sustained, but not to the amount of fifteen per cent. then the plaintiff is entitled to recover the balance, after deducting the amount of damage sustained by the company."
It is argued that here is a stipulation that the fifteen per cent. may be retained by the company until the completion of the contract by the defendant; that it never was completed by him, and so the time of payment had not arrived when this action was brought.
Now, it is manifest that one of the events contemplated in this clause was a forfeiture such as actually took place; that in that event the contract never would be completed by the defendant, and so its completion could not with any propriety be fixed on as to the limit of time during which the company might retain the money, unless it was the intention of the parties that the fifteen per cent. so retained should belong absolutely to the company in case of a forfeiture of the contract. But the parties have not only failed to provide for such forfeiture of the fifteen *343 per cent., but have plainly declared a different purpose. Their language is, that this money is retained, "to indemnify and protect the party of the second part from loss, in case of default and forfeiture of this contract."
There is a wide difference both in fact and in law, between indemnity and forfeiture; yet it is the former and not the latter which the parties had in view. Whether an express stipulation for a forfeiture of this fifteen per cent. could have been enforced, it is not necessary to decide.
But when the parties have shown an intent to provide a fund for indemnity merely, the legal, as well as the just result is, that after indemnity is made and the sole purpose of the fund fully executed, the residue of it shall go to the person to whom it equitably belongs. Rightly construed the words, "until the completion of the contract," refer to the time during which all monthly payments were to be made, and give the right to retain the fifteen per cent. out of each and every payment, rather than fix an absolute limit of time during which these sums might be retained. In neither event, contemplated by this clause, would this limit of time be strictly proper. If a forfeiture of the contract took place, it was manifestly inapplicable; and if no forfeiture did take place, but damage were suffered by the company, from default of the contractor, equal to the fifteen per cent. it cannot be supposed their right to retain was to cease with the completion of the contract. This objection, therefore, must be overruled.
The plaintiff in error also excepts to the 12th instruction. We do not deem it needful to determine whether there was evidence to go to the jury, that the company did not use reasonable diligence to obtain a dissolution of the injunction, because we consider so much of the instruction as relates to this subject, to be a proper qualification of the absolute and peremptory bar, asserted in the first part of the instruction; and if the company desired to raise any question concerning the proper tribunal to decide on the matter of diligence, or respecting the evidence competent to justify a finding thereon, some prayer for particular instructions respecting these points should have been preferred. But we consider there was some evidence bearing on this question of diligence, and that it was for the jury and not the court to pass thereon.
Two objections are made to the thirteenth instruction. The first is, that this instruction assumed the existence of evidence, competent to go to jury, to prove that the defendants fraudulently terminated the contract under the clause which enabled them to declare it forfeited. To this objection, it is a conclusive answer that the defendants themselves prayed for an instruction substantially *344 like that given. The other objection is, that the jury were instructed to allow by way of damages, such profit as they might find the plaintiff had been deprived of by the termination of the contract by the defendants, if they should find the act of termination to be fraudulent.
It is insisted that only actual damages, and not profits, were in that event to be inquired into and allowed by the jury. It must be admitted that actual damages were all that could lawfully be given in an action of covenant, even if the company had been guilty of fraud. But it by no means follows that profits are not to be allowed, understanding, as we must, the term profits in this instruction as meaning the gain which the plaintiff would have made if he had been permitted to complete his contract. Actual damages clearly include the direct and actual loss which the plaintiff sustains propter rem ipsam non habitam.
And in case of a contract like this, that loss is, among other things, the difference between the cost of doing the work and the price to be paid for it. This difference is the inducement and real consideration which causes the contractor to enter into the contract. For this he expends his time, exerts his skill, uses his capital, and assumes the risks which attend the enterprise. And to deprive him of it, when the other party has broken the contract and unlawfully put an end to the work, would be unjust. There is no rule of law which requires us to inflict this injustice. Wherever profits are spoken of as not a subject of damages, it will be found that something contingent upon future bargains, or speculations, or states of the market, are referred to, and not the difference between the agreed price of something contracted for and its ascertainable value, or cost. See Masterton v. Mayor of Brooklyn, 7 Hill's R. 61, and cases there referred to. We hold it to be a clear rule, that the gain or profit, of which the contractor was deprived, by the refusal of the company to allow him to proceed with, and complete the work, was a proper subject of damages.
We have considered all the exceptions; we find no one tenable, and the judgment of the court below is affirmed with costs.
This cause came on to be heard on the transcript of the record from the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Maryland, and was argued by counsel. On consideration whereof, it is now here ordered and adjudged by this court, that the judgment of the said Circuit Court in this cause be, and the same is hereby, affirmed with costs and damages at the rate of six per centum per annum.
