Supreme Court of United States.
*233 Mr. Edwards, for the claimants, appellants in the case; Mr. Assistant Attorney-General Ashton, and Mr. Coffey, special counsel, contra.
Mr. Justice FIELD delivered the opinion of the court.
The facts established by the evidence in this case justify the condemnation, we think, of the cargo as enemy's property. No principle is more firmly settled than that the property of a commercial house, established in the enemy's country, is subject to seizure and condemnation as prize without regard to the domicile of the partners. The trade of a house of this kind is essentially a hostile trade, and the property employed in its prosecution is therefore treated as enemy's property, though some of the partners may have a neutral domicile.[*] Such trade tends directly to add to the resources and revenues of the enemy, and, as observed by Mr. Justice Story, "there is no reason why he who thus enjoys the protection and benefits of the enemy's country should not, in reference to such a trade, share its dangers and losses. It would be too much to hold him entitled, by a mere neutral residence, to carry on a substantially hostile commerce, and at the same time possess all the advantages of a neutral character."[]
In this view it is unimportant whether the cargo was to be delivered to agents at Nassau, subject to the order of the house at Savannah, or be delivered directly from the Cheshire in the port of Savannah. In either case there was the trade with the house situated in the enemy's country.
The evidence in the case also establishes, we think, with equal clearness, the fact that the ship was attempting to break the blockade when captured. She was loaded for *234 Savannah; her cargo was intended for the branch-house of the shippers; she sailed directly for that port; the owners and officers of the ship were informed of the existence of the blockade before leaving Liverpool; and there was no act of our government, nor any act of the British government, nor had any event occurred in the progress of the war, from which any inference could be drawn that the blockade had ceased. The instructions to call off Savannah merely for the purpose of inquiry, and to proceed thence to Nassau upon ascertaining that the blockade was in force, have, under these circumstances, the appearance of a device to cover up a settled purpose to elude the blockade. They create a strong impression to that effect, and this impression is strengthened by an examination of the ship's papers. These papers contain no intimation of an intention to enter the port of Savannah upon any contingency. They show the destination of the ship to be either Nassau or Halifax; they indicate no contingent intention of going anywhere else. This concealment of the truth is itself a circumstance calculated to awaken strong suspicion as to the real designs of the ship; it is, in fact, prima facie evidence of fraudulent intention.
In the case of The Carolina,[*] where a cargo was taken on a voyage from Bayonne, ostensibly to Altona, but, in fact, to Ostend, the ship's papers represented that the cargo was to be delivered at Altona and Hamburgh; and the court said, that if there had been any fair contingent, deliberative intention of going to Ostend, that ought to have appeared on the bills of lading; for it ought not to be an absolute destination to Hamburgh if it was at all a question whether the ship might not go to Ostend, a port of the enemy, and that there was in this a fraudulent concealment of an important circumstance which ought to have been disclosed. Of the same purport are all the authorities.[]
*235 Aside from these considerations the intention to break the blockade is to be presumed from the position of the ship when captured. As already stated, she knew of the blockade when she sailed from Liverpool; she had no just reason to suppose it had been discontinued; her approach, under these circumstances, to the mouth of the blockaded port for inquiry was itself a breach of the blockade, and subjected both vessel and cargo to seizure and condemnation. The rule on this point is well settled, and is founded in obvious reasons of policy. If approach for inquiry were permissible it will be readily seen that the greatest facilities would be afforded to elude the blockade; the liberty of inquiry would be a license to attempt to enter the blockaded port; and that information was sought would be the plea in every case of seizure. With a liberty of this kind the difficulty of enforcing an efficient blockade would be greatly augmented. If information be honestly desired, it must be sought from other quarters. In the case of the James Cooke,[*] the ship was captured at the entrance of the Texel, and the court applied this rule, observing that the approach of the ship to the mouth of a blockaded port, even to make inquiry, was, in itself, a consummation of the offence, and amounted to an actual breach of the blockade.
In every view, therefore, in which this case can be considered, we are of opinion that the ship and cargo were rightly condemned; and we, therefore, affirm the
DECREE OF CONDEMNATION.
[See, as to the second point of this case inquiry at a blockaded port supra, p. 84, The Josephine. REP.]
[*] The Friendschaft, 4 Wheaton, 107.
[] The San Jose Indiano and Cargo, 2 Gallison, 284.
[*] 3 Robinson, 75.
[] See The Margaretta Charlotte, Id. 78, note 1; The America, Id. 36; The Neptunus, Id. 80; The Nancy, Id. 82; The Phnix, Id. 186.
[*] Edwards, 263.
