Supreme Court of United States.
*295 Mr. Matt. H. Carpenter and Mr. N.A. Cowdrey for the appellant.
Mr. George F. Edmunds, Mr. James O. Broadhead, and Mr. Melville C. Day, contra.
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE WAITE, after stating the facts, delivered the opinion of the court.
The first question with which we are met is one of jurisdiction. It is contended on the part of the appellees that a consent decree in the Circuit Court cannot be appealed from, but we do not so understand the law. Sect. 692 of the Revised Statutes provides that an appeal shall be allowed from all final decrees in the circuit courts, &c., when the matter in dispute exceeds $5,000, and that this court "shall receive, hear, and determine such appeals." This makes appeals to this court, within the prescribed limits, a matter of right, and requires us, when they are taken, to hear and decide them. If, when the case gets here, it appears that the decree appealed from was assented to by the appellant, we cannot consider any errors that may be assigned which were in law waived by the consent, but we must still receive and decide the case. If all the errors complained of come within the waiver, the decree below will be affirmed, but only after hearing. We have, therefore, jurisdiction of this appeal.
This brings us at once to the inquiry whether the appellant, the Pacific Railroad, did consent to the rendition of the decree appealed from. It is stated affirmatively on the record that all parties, through their solicitors, did consent; but the appellant insists that its solicitor had no authority in that behalf. Early in the progress of the cause the company filed an answer *296 under its corporate seal, and signed with its authority by its secretary and solicitor of record, in which every material allegation in the bill was confessed, and it was, moreover, positively stated that the bonds sued for were in all respects valid obligations of the company and the mortgage a subsisting lien. In every instance in which the stockholders attempted to get into the case as parties, so that they might defend for the corporation, it was asserted that the directors of the company were false to their trust, and that they had either consented to, or would not resist, a decree. A solicitor may certainly consent to whatever his client authorizes, and in this case it distinctly appears of record that the company assented through its solicitor. This is equivalent to a direct finding by the court as a fact that the solicitor had authority to do what he did, and binds us on an appeal so far as the question is one of fact only. The remedy for the fraud or unauthorized conduct of a solicitor, or the officers of the corporation, in such a matter, is by an appropriate proceeding in the court where the consent was received and acted on, and in which proof may be taken and the facts ascertained. We take a case on appeal as it comes to us in the record, and receive no new evidence. Here the record states in terms that the company assented to all that has been done. This is equivalent to an admission by the company on the record that the facts exist on which the decree rests. On an appeal, therefore, we must take all the facts as admitted, and consider only whether the case is one in which, under any state of facts, the decree could be entered. The record showing as it does affirmatively that the company gave its consent to the decree, we need not inquire what we would do if the case depended alone on the consent of the solicitor. It may be true also that under the peculiar provisions of this charter the stockholders have a sort of supervisory power over the doings of the directors; but they cannot avoid what has been done by the directors in a suit pending in a court against the company, except by the employment of such remedies as are consistent with the orderly course of judicial proceedings. They cannot correct errors arising from what has thus been done by appeal any more than the company can. If they have been defrauded, they must apply for relief in *297 the first instance to the court in which the fraud was perpetrated.
This disposes of all mere errors in form which are alleged against the decree. Parties to a suit have the right to agree to any thing they please in reference to the subject-matter of their litigation, and the court, when applied to, will ordinarily give effect to their agreement, if it comes within the general scope of the case made by the pleadings. It was within the power of the parties to this suit to agree that a decree might be entered for a sale of the mortgaged property without any specific finding of the amount due on account of the mortgage debt, or without giving a day of payment. It was also competent for them to agree that if the property was bought at the sale by or for the bondholders, payment of the purchase-money might be made by a surrender of the bonds. And so of all the other provisions of the decree which are complained of. All these were matters about which the parties might properly agree; and having agreed, it does not lie with them to complain of what the court has done to give effect to their agreement. Although this appeal may have been instigated by the stockholders in opposition to the wishes of the directors, it is still the appeal of the company which was one of the parties to the agreement, and must be treated accordingly.
This leaves for our consideration under the appeal from the decree of sale only the question which was most strenuously pressed in the argument, that is to say, whether the court below had jurisdiction of the cause so as to authorize it to enter any decree. The objection is, that as Vail, Fish, Joseph Seligman, Punnett, Clark, Morgan, Murdock, and Jesse Seligman were all citizens of the same State with Ketchum and the several parties who in the progress of the cause were admitted as co-complainants with him, the suit was not between citizens of different States, and therefore not within the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court.
The first section of the act of March 3, 1875 (18 Stat., part 3, 470), provides "that the circuit courts of the United States shall have original cognizance ... of all suits of a civil nature at common law or in equity, where the matter in dispute *298 exceeds, exclusive of costs, the sum or value of $500, ... in which there shall be a controversy between citizens of different States... ."
The same general language is used in the second section of the same act in respect to the removal of suits from the State courts, and in Removal Cases (100 U.S. 457) we held it to mean that when the controversy about which the suit was brought was between citizens of different States, the courts of the United States might take jurisdiction without regard to the position the parties occupied in the pleadings as plaintiffs or defendants. For the purposes of jurisdiction, the court had power to ascertain the real matter in dispute, and arrange the parties on one side or the other of that dispute. If in such arrangement it appeared that those on one side were all citizens of different States from those on the other, jurisdiction might be entertained and the cause proceeded with. That ruling, we think, applies as well to the first section as to the second.
For the purposes of this appeal we need not inquire when the Circuit Court first got jurisdiction of this suit. It is sufficient if it had jurisdiction when the decree appealed from was rendered. As no objections were made by the parties in the progress of the cause to the right of the court to proceed, and the decree when rendered was consented to, it is enough for the purposes of this appeal if the record shows that when the consent was acted on by the court jurisdiction was complete. Consent cannot give the courts of the United States jurisdiction, but it may bind the parties and waive previous errors, if when the court acts jurisdiction has been obtained.
The subject-matter of this action was the foreclosure of the third, or Vail and Fish, mortgage. As the case was made by the bill there could be no controversy, that is to say, no dispute, with any of the trustees of the earlier mortgages, because their liens were admitted and their interest had been paid in full as it matured. No relief was asked against them. All that Ketchum wanted was a foreclosure of the mortgage in which he was interested, subject to their admitted prior claims. In no possible way could their interests be injuriously affected if the facts set forth in the bill were true. To *299 the bill as filed and the case as afterwards made, these trustees were but nominal parties. They would be bound by what might be done, but all they could by any possibility claim was conceded.
This leaves only to consider the position occupied by Vail and Fish. When the suit was begun, as well as when the decree was rendered, they were trustees of the mortgage under which Ketchum and his co-complainants claimed. No allegations were made against them. All that was said about them was that they doubted their right to proceed. There was no antagonism between them and Ketchum and his associates. He wanted them to proceed; they did not know that they had the legal right to do so. In the mean time he, thinking his own rights, as well as those of his associate bondholders, would be injuriously affected by delay, commenced the suit to get done just what the trustees, if they had been willing to proceed, might have done. Whatever he did was for the trustees and in their behalf, and he really had no power to do more than they might have done if they had been so inclined. It is needless to inquire what might have been the result if they had seen fit to dispute the right of the complainant bondholders to go on. They did not do so, but, on the contrary, before the decree was rendered, came in and substantially availed themselves of the suit which had been begun, so that in the end the suit, in legal effect, became their suit. Although nominally defendants according to the pleadings, they voluntarily, in the course of the proceedings, arranged themselves on the same side of the subject-matter of the action with the complainants. This they had the legal right to do. After that, clearly the controversy was between citizens of one or more States on one side and citizens of other States on the other side, and when the decree was rendered the only thing to be done was to foreclose the mortgage sued on, as between the trustees of the mortgage acting with their beneficiaries and the railroad. Of such a suit the Circuit Court had jurisdiction, and its decree is, consequently, binding on the parties until set aside in the regular course of judicial proceedings.
This leaves only the question arising on the confirmation of the sale. The only objection here insisted on is that Baker, *300 the purchaser, was the solicitor of the appellant company. His purchase, although nominally in his own name, was actually by and for the bondholders. He was used to hold the title until the bondholders could organize and take it. While purchases at judicial sales in the name of the solicitors and attorneys of parties whose property is sold will be scrutinized with jealous care, they will be sustained if no injustice is thereby done to the parties they represent. Here the company, whom Baker represented as solicitor, confessed its inability to pay the debt it owed, and consented that the property held as security be sold. In the decree which it assented to, special provision was made for a purchase by or for the bondholders. We can see no harm which will result from permitting the solicitor of the company to take the title for the bondholders under such a purchase. No complaint was made below of actual wrong. The only objection was that such a purchase was inconsistent with the duties of the solicitor. There was no speculation by the solicitor in the purchase. All he did was to hold the title until the real purchasers were in a condition to take it themselves. If there had been any proof of collusion or improper conduct on the part of the solicitor, resulting in wrong to the company, the case would be different. As it is, we are called upon to decide whether a purchase in the name of the solicitor of one whose property is sold is necessarily in and of itself invalid. We think it is not. It will be scrutinized closely, but until impeached must stand. Slight circumstances may impeach it, but it is not under all circumstances invalid.
After a careful consideration of the whole case, we are unable to discover any error that can be corrected by appeal.
Decree affirmed.
