Supreme Court of United States.
*134 Mr. Edwin B. Smith for the plaintiff in error.
Mr. Solicitor General for the defendant.
*135 MR. JUSTICE MATTHEWS delivered the opinion of the court.
After reciting the facts as above stated, he continued:
The provisions of the law which govern the case are contained in section 2504 Revised Statutes, being schedule A, cotton and cotton goods, and are as follows:
"1. SEC. 2504. On all manufactures of cotton (except jeans, denims, drillings, bed-tickings, ginghams, plaids, cottonades, pantaloon stuff, and goods of like description), not bleached, colored, stained, painted, or printed, and not exceeding one hundred threads to the square inch, counting the warp and filling, and exceeding in weight five ounces per square yard, five cents per square yard; if bleached, five cents and a half per square yard; if colored, stained, painted, or printed five cents and a half per square yard, and, in addition thereto ten per centum ad valorem.
"2. On finer and lighter goods of like description not exceeding two hundred threads to the square inch, counting the warp and filling, unbleached, five cents per square yard; if bleached, five and a half cents per square yard; if colored, stained, painted, or printed, five and a half cents per square yard, and, in addition thereto, twenty per centum ad valorem.
*136 "3. On goods of like description, exceeding two hundred threads to the square inch, counting the warp and filling, unbleached, five cents per square yard; if bleached, five and a half cents per square yard; if colored, stained, painted, or printed, five and a half cents per square yard, and, in addition thereto, twenty per centum ad valorem.
"4. On cotton jeans, denims, drillings, bed-tickings, ginghams, plaids, cottonades, pantaloon stuffs, and goods of like description, or for similar use, if unbleached, and not exceeding one hundred threads to the square inch, counting the warp and filling, and exceeding five ounces to the square yard, six cents per square yard; if bleached, six cents and a half per square yard; if colored, stained, painted, or printed, six cents and a half per square yard, and, in addition thereto, ten per centum ad valorem.
"5. On finer or lighter goods of like description, not exceeding two hundred threads to the square inch, counting the warp and filling, if unbleached, six cents per square yard; if bleached, six and a half cents per square yard; if colored, stained, painted, or printed, six and a half cents per square yard, and in addition thereto, fifteen per centum ad valorem.
"6. On goods of lighter description, exceeding two hundred threads to the square inch, counting the warp and filling, if unbleached, seven cents per square yard; if bleached, seven and a half cents per square yard; if colored, stained, painted, or printed, seven and a half cents per square yard, and in addition thereto, fifteen per centum ad valorem: Provided, That upon all plain woven cotton goods, not included in the foregoing schedule, unbleached, valued at over sixteen cents per square yard; bleached, valued at over twenty cents per square yard; colored, valued at over twenty-five cents per square yard, and cotton jeans, denims, and drillings, unbleached, valued at over twenty cents per square yard, and all other cotton goods of every description, the value of which shall exceed twenty-five cents per square yard, there shall be levied, collected, and paid a duty of thirty-five per centum ad valorem: And provided further, That no cotton goods having more than two hundred threads to the square inch, counting the warp and filling, shall be admitted to a less rate of duty than is provided for goods which are of that number of threads."
*137 "12... . and all other manufactures of cotton, not otherwise provided for, thirty-five per centum ad valorem."
The contention of the plaintiff in error now relied on is, in substance, that the goods in question are not embraced in the provisions of the statute applicable to "manufactures of cotton," described and classed by the number of threads to the square inch, because that description had reference only to goods so described and classed by mercantile usage in dealings between buyers and sellers, where the threads could be counted by the aid of a glass, whereas, the goods in question, as it must be assumed from the offers of proof which were rejected, were not dealt in by manufacturers and merchants according to any such usage, and could not be, because the threads in a square inch could not be counted, except by unravelling the fabric for that purpose; and it is therefore argued, that as the goods in question were of a new manufacture, not known at the date of the passage of the act, they cannot be considered as within the specified enumeration of the statute, and the appropriate duty must be determined by the final clause, embracing "all other manufactures of cotton not otherwise provided for." The claim is, in the language of counsel making it, that:
"Congress did not mean to subject to this `countable' clause every article of cotton manufacture of which, by cutting out a square inch, the number of threads constituting the warp and woof of that area could be counted; but only those articles in which the threads were counted in ordinary mercantile transactions therein, and which could be counted by methods practised by the trade."
It is sought to support this argument by invoking the rule of construing the statute applied in Arthur v. Morrison, 96 U.S. 108, and the numerous cases there cited, that where words are used in an act imposing duties upon imports, which have acquired, by commercial use, a meaning different from their ordinary meaning, the latter may be controlled by the former if such be the apparent intent of the statute; but the application fails in the present instance because the language used is unequivocal. *138 There is no reference in the statute, either expressly or by implication, to any commercial usage, and there is no language in it which requires for its interpretation the aid of any extrinsic circumstances. The rejected proof of the custom of merchants to rate certain descriptions of goods, as to values, by the number of threads to the square inch, as ascertained by inspection by means of a glass, throws no light whatever on the meaning of the law, because the law fixes the rate of duty by a classification based on the number of the threads in a square inch, without reference to the mode in which the count is to be made. It might be quite convenient for dealers not to count the threads, except when they could do so without unravelling, but it is pure conjecture that Congress intended to stop the count by collectors at the same limit. There appears to be no difficulty in counting threads, no matter how fine the fabric, as long as the goods are plain woven; and the necessity of unravelling for the purpose of counting seems to exist only in case of twilled goods; and yet, this very act requires a count of threads in the case of jeans, denims, drillings, bed-tickings, etc., which are twilled, and bases a difference of duty upon them according to the number of threads to the square inch so ascertained.
The fact that at the date of the passage of the act goods of the kind in question had not been manufactured, cannot withdraw them from the class to which they belong, as described in the statute, where, as in the present case, the language fairly and clearly includes them.
There is no error in the record, and the judgment is accordingly
Affirmed.
