Supreme Court of United States.
*385 Mr. D.T. Bomar, with whom Mr. Sam. J. Hunter was on the brief, for plaintiffs in error, submitted.
Mr. M.A. Low for defendant in error.
*388 MR. JUSTICE DAY, after making the foregoing statement, delivered the opinion of the court.
This case presents a question of jurisdiction to be determined as one of fact. It may be divided into two propositions: First. Was the Pacific Company doing business in the State of Texas? Secondly. If so, were the alleged agents served with process in the State of Texas duly authorized as such and competent to be thus served, in such wise as to give jurisdiction of the Pacific Company?
The statutes which concern service on corporations in the State of Texas are as follows (Sayles' Texas Civil Statutes):
*389 "Art. 1194, Sec. 25. Foreign, private or public corporations, etc. Foreign, private or public corporations, joint stock companies or associations, not incorporated by the laws of this State, and doing business within this State, may be sued in any court within this State having jurisdiction over the subject matter, in any county where the cause of action or a part thereof accrued, or in any county where such company may have an agency or representative, or in the county in which the principal office of such company may be situated; or when the defendant corporation has no agent or representative in the State, then in the county where the plaintiffs or either of them reside."
"Art. 1223. Foreign corporations, how served. In any suit against a foreign, private or public corporation, joint stock company or association, or acting corporation or association, citation or other process may be served on the president, vice president, secretary or treasurer, or general manager, or upon any local agent within this State, of such corporation, joint stock company or association, or acting corporation or association."
By the act of March 13, 1905, General Laws of Texas, 1905, p. 30, an additional method of serving foreign corporations was provided as follows:
"SEC. 2. That service may be had on foreign corporations having agents in this State in addition to the means now provided by law by serving citation upon any train conductor who is engaged in handling trains for two or more railway corporations, whether said railroad corporations are foreign or domestic corporations, if said conductor handles trains over foreign or domestic corporations' tracks across the state line of Texas, and on the track of a domestic railway corporation within the State of Texas, or upon any agent who has an office in Texas, and who sells tickets or makes contracts for the transportation of passengers or property over any line of railway or part thereof, or steamship or steamboat of any such foreign corporation or company.
*390 "SEC. 3. For the purpose of obtaining service of citation on foreign railway corporations, conductors who are engaged in handling trains and agents engaged in the sale of tickets or the making of contracts for the transportation of property as described in sec. 2 of this act, are hereby designated as agents of said foreign corporations or companies upon whom citation may be served."
It is settled by the decisions of this court that foreign corporations can be served with process within the State only when doing business therein, and such service must be upon an agent who represents the corporation in its business. St. Clair v. Cox, 106 U.S. 350; Goldey v. Morning News, 156 U.S. 518, 521, 522; Conley v. Mathieson Alkali Works, 190 U.S. 406.
It is contended upon the part of the plaintiffs in error that the Pacific Company was doing business in the State of Texas, because of a partnership arrangement with the Gulf Company, or because the latter company was the agent of the Pacific Company, or, as it is sometimes said, the representative of the Pacific Company in the State of Texas. As to the question of partnership, we do not think this record presents a question of that sort. The suit is not for a partnership liability. It is an action upon a single cause of action for the tort of the Pacific Company. Service is not had by serving one partner. The real contention is that the service reaches the Pacific Company because of the agency or representative character of the Gulf Company.
Is it true that the Gulf Company was the agent of the Pacific Company or its mere creature in such a sense that to serve it is equivalent to serving the controlling company? It is a fact that both companies had common agents and employes to a certain extent, but the record shows that such employes were paid in proportion to the business done for each company. And that while in the service of the companies respectively they were under the exclusive management and control of the company in whose service they were engaged, with no *391 power to discharge or employ, the one company for the other; and that, although the service was in a sense common, it was kept distinct and separate in the control and payment of the employes while in the separate service of the respective companies.
It is true that the Pacific Company practically owns the controlling stock in the Gulf Company, and that both companies constitute elements of the Rock Island System. But the holding of the majority interest in the stock does not mean the control of the active officers and agents of the local company doing business in Texas. That fact gave the Pacific Company the power to control the road by the election of the directors of the Gulf Company, who could in turn elect officers or remove them from the places already held; but this power does not make it the company transacting the local business.
This record discloses that the officers and agents of the Gulf Company control its management. The fact that the Pacific Company owns the controlling amounts of the stock of the Gulf Company and has thus the power to change the management does not give it present control of the corporate property and business. Pullman Palace Car Company v. Missouri Pacific Co., 115 U.S. 587, 597.
In Conley v. Mathieson Alkali Works, 190 U.S. 406, suit was brought upon a contract with the Mathieson Alkali Works. The defendant had designated no agent upon whom summons could be served, and service was made upon two members of the board of directors resident of the city of New York. Upon motion made to set aside the service of summons a reference was directed to ascertain whether the defendant corporation was doing business in the State of New York. The master reported, among other things, that the defendant had operated a plant at Niagara Falls, but had conveyed all its property to another corporation organized under the laws of Virginia. That the consideration expressed for the conveyance was $1.00 and other valuable consideration, but the substantial consideration was the entire capital stock of the *392 grantee, the Castner Electrolytic Alkali Company. That the business of the defendant since said transfer was carried on in Providence, where it had its principal place of business. The master found that the company at the time of attempted service was not doing business in New York. Of the effect of the transfer of the entire stock of the new company to the defendant the master found: "The fact that it held the entire capital stock of the Castner Electrolytic Alkali Company, and that the operations of that company were carried on under the same management as before December 31, 1900, is not material. The new corporation was a separate legal entity, and, whatever may have been the motives leading to its creation, it can only be regarded as such for the purpose of legal proceedings. It was that corporation alone which transacted any business in this State, notwithstanding it may have been for all practical purposes merely the instrument of the defendant corporation. People v. American Bell Telephone Co., 117 N.Y. 241; United States v. American Bell Telephone Co., 29 Fed. Rep. 17."
Upon exceptions the master's report and conclusions were affirmed and the service set aside. That judgment was affirmed in this court. In the course of the opinion, Mr. Justice McKenna, speaking for the court, coming to deal with the effect of the transfer to the Castner Company, said: "The defendant was competent to convey its property to the Castner Electrolytic Alkali Company and afterwards make the locality of its own business Providence and Saltville. Whether the transfer to the latter company was fraudulent we certainly cannot decide from this record, and the by-law which provided for a monthly meeting in New York could not of itself keep the corporation in New York. The testimony is positive that no business of the corporation was done in New York city after the transfer of the Niagara Falls plant; that all of the business of the corporation was conducted at Providence, except of a purely manufacturing character, which was conducted at Saltville."
*393 So, in the case at bar, notwithstanding the ownership of the stock in the Gulf Company by the Pacific Company, the former company transacts the business in Texas, and is a separate legal entity, authorized under the laws of Texas and legitimately carrying on business there.
There is no evidence that the Pacific Company may not lawfully hold the stock of the Gulf Company, and under the statute of Illinois it seems to be authorized so to do. Starr & Curtis, Ill. Stat. vol 3, p. 3229. It is true that the Pacific Company loaned the money to build the road of the Texas Company, predecessor of the Gulf Company. But as was well observed by Judge (afterwards Justice) Jackson in United States v. American Bell Telephone Company, 29 Fed. Rep. 17: "For one person to supply means for another to do business on is not the doing of that business by the former."
The conduct and control of the business in Texas was entrusted to the Gulf Company. As the largest stockholder the Pacific Company had an interest in that business, but a separate corporation had been legally created in Texas, with authority to make contracts and control its own affairs and carry on its own business. This separate corporation had its own officers, a large amount of its own property, was responsible for its contracts and to persons with whom it dealt.
Nor do we think that the persons served with process are agents of the Pacific Company doing the business of the company in Texas. Section 2 of the act of March 13, 1905, Laws of Texas, 1905, p. 30, is very broad, and would seem to comprehend conductors who handle trains for two or more corporations over foreign or domestic roads across the state lines of Texas and on the track of a domestic railroad within the State of Texas, or upon any agent who has an office in Texas and who sells tickets or makes contracts for the transportation of passengers or property over any line of railroad or part thereof, of any such foreign corporation or company; and such companies and agents by section 3 of the act are made agents of the foreign corporation or company, upon whom the citation *394 may be served. But it is essential to the validity of such service that the corporation shall be doing business within the State, and that the service be upon an agent representing the corporation with respect to such business. Goldie v. Morning News, 156 U.S. ubi sup.; Conley v. Mathieson Alkali Co., 190 U.S. ubi sup.
The conductors, one of whom was served, when he crossed the Texas line, this record shows, became the servant and agent of the Gulf Company. The ticket agent sold tickets for the Gulf Company, in whose employment he was. He would also sell tickets good upon its line, and over the lines of the Pacific Company, but he transacted this business as the agent of the Gulf Company. As to Hovey, the record fails to show that he was agent of the Pacific Company; on the contrary, it shows that he had no connection with the company, and that his duties were confined to the affairs of the Gulf Company. The same is true of Merrell; and as to Sebree, the record shows that for the services rendered as trainmaster he was paid by each company for the service performed for it and had no charge as agent of the business of the Pacific Company in the State of Texas.
We reach the conclusion that the Pacific Company was not doing business in the State of Texas and that the attempted service was not upon agents of that company transacting its business in that State in such a sense as to give jurisdiction by service of citation upon them. The judgment of the Circuit Court is
Affirmed.
Dissenting: The CHIEF JUSTICE and MR. JUSTICE MOODY.
