Supreme Court of United States.
*279 Mr. Noah Allen and Mr. Frederick S. Tyler for plaintiff in error.
Mr. Robert Vance Davidson, Attorney General of the State of Texas, and Mr. James DuBose Walthall, for defendant in error.
*280 MR. CHIEF JUSTICE FULLER, after making the foregoing statement, delivered the opinion of the court.
It is not contended that the laws of Texas, under which grand and petit juries are selected, are in themselves discriminating and in violation of the Constitution of the United States. It is admitted by plaintiff in error that neither the constitution nor statutes of Texas prescribed any rule for, or mode of procedure *281 in, the trial of criminal cases which is not equally applicable to all citizens of the United States and to all persons within the jurisdiction of the State without regard to race, color, or previous condition of servitude. Nor is it contended that the constitution and laws of the State had, at the time this prosecution was instituted, been so interpreted by the courts of Texas as to prevent the enforcement of rights secured equally to all citizens of the United States without regard to race or color. The only contention was that the jury commissioners in the selection of the grand and petit juries who returned the indictment and tried plaintiff in error did in fact exclude therefrom negroes or persons of African descent, because of their race and color. This was a question of fact, and the ordinary rule is that questions of fact will not be reviewed by this court on writs of error to state courts.
In the case of In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 449, it was intimated that if the highest court of a State "had committed an error so gross as to amount in law to a denial by the State of due process of law to one accused of crime, or of some right secured to him by the Constitution of the United States," this court might take jurisdiction, but the occurrence of such an instance was not suggested as probable.
In Barrington v. Missouri, 205 U.S. 483, 484, the plaintiff in error, before the trial of the cause commenced, applied for a change of venue on the ground of local prejudice. Upon the hearing of the application many witnesses were examined and testified, and the trial court decided that prejudice justifying a change of venue had not been made out and denied the application. In dismissing the writ of error in the above case we said:
"It is now contended that the refusal to grant the change of venue deprived plaintiff in error of a fair and impartial trial, to which, under the Federal Constitution, he was entitled. The state Supreme Court held it to be a well-settled rule of law in Missouri that the granting of a change of venue in a criminal case rested largely in the discretion of the trial court, and `that *282 where the trial court has heard the evidence in favor of and against the application, and a conclusion reached adversely to granting the change, such ruling will not be disturbed by this court, and should not be unless there are circumstances of such a nature as to indicate an abuse of the discretion lodged in such court.' And the Supreme Court, after a full review of all the testimony, decided that the trial court had acted properly in overruling the application for a change of venue. In our judgment no Federal question was involved. Were this otherwise it would follow that we could decide in any case that the trial court had abused its discretion under the laws of the State of Missouri, although the Supreme Court of that State had held to the contrary."
It was ruled in Martin v. Texas, 200 U.S. 316, as in other cases, that discrimination in organizing a grand jury and impanelling a petit jury cannot be established by merely proving that no one of the defendant's race was on either of the juries, and that an accused person cannot of right demand a mixed jury, some of which shall be of his race, nor is a jury of that kind guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment to any race. And it was said "What an accused is entitled to demand, under the Constitution of the United States, is that in organizing the grand jury as well as in the impanelling of the petit jury, there shall be no exclusion of his race, and no discrimination against them, because of their race or color."
As before remarked, whether such discrimination was practiced in this case was a question of fact, and the determination of that question adversely to plaintiff in error by the trial court and by the Court of Criminal Appeals was decisive, so far as this court is concerned, unless it could be held that these decisions constitute such abuse as amounted to an infraction of the Federal Constitution, which cannot be presumed, and which there is no reason to hold on the record before us. On the contrary, the careful opinion of the Court of Criminal Appeals, setting forth the evidence, justifies the conclusion of that court that the negro race was not intentionally or otherwise discriminated *283 against in the selection of the grand and petit jurors. Indeed, there was a negro juror on the grand jury which indicted plaintiff in error, and there were negroes on the venire from which the jury which tried the case was drawn, although it happened that none of them were drawn out of the jury box. The court said:
"It may be that the jury commissioners did not give the negro race a full pro rata with the white race in the selection of the grand and petit jurors in this case, still this would not be evidence of discrimination. If they fairly and honestly endeavored to discharge their duty, and did not in fact discriminate against the negro race in the selection of the jury lists, then the Constitution of the United States has not been violated. We understand the rule to be that mere error in administering the criminal law of the State, or in the conduct of a criminal trial, no Federal right being invaded or denied, is beyond the revisory power of the Supreme Court of the United States under the Constitution and the statutes regulating its jurisdiction."
No other point requiring consideration, the result is
Judgment affirmed.
