Since 1925, the Bladensburg Peace Cross (Cross) has stood as a tribute to 49 area soldiers who gave their lives in the First World War. Eighty-nine years after the dedication of the Cross, respondents filed this lawsuit, claiming that they are offended by the sight of the memorial on public land and that its presence there and the expenditure of public funds to maintain it violate the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. To remedy this violation, they asked a federal court to order the relocation or demolition of the Cross or at least the removal of its arms. The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit agreed that the memorial is unconstitutional and remanded for a determination of the proper remedy. We now reverse.
Although the cross has long been a preeminent Christian symbol, its use in the Bladensburg memorial has a special significance. After the First World War, the picture of row after row of plain white crosses marking the overseas graves of soldiers who had lost their lives in that horrible conflict was emblazoned on the minds of Americans at home, and the adoption of the cross as the Bladensburg memorial must be viewed in that historical context. For nearly a century, the Bladensburg Cross has expressed the community's grief at the loss of the young men who perished, its thanks for their sacrifice, and its dedication to the ideals for which they fought. It has become a prominent community landmark, and its removal or radical alteration at this date would be seen by many not as a neutral act but as the manifestation of "a hostility toward religion that has no place in our Establishment Clause traditions." Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 704, 125 S.Ct. 2854, 162 L.Ed.2d 607 (2005) (BREYER, J., concurring in judgment). And contrary to respondents' intimations, there is no evidence of discriminatory intent in the selection of the design of the memorial or the decision of a Maryland commission to maintain it. The Religion Clauses of the Constitution aim to foster a society in which people of all beliefs can live together harmoniously, and the presence of the Bladensburg Cross on the land where it has stood for so many years is fully consistent with that aim.
The cross came into widespread use as a symbol of Christianity by the fourth century,
A cross appears as part of many registered trademarks held by businesses and secular organizations, including Blue Cross Blue Shield, the Bayer Group, and some Johnson & Johnson products.
The familiar symbol of the Red Cross— a red cross on a white background—shows how the meaning of a symbol that was originally religious can be transformed. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) selected that symbol in 1863 because it was thought to call to mind the flag of Switzerland, a country widely known for its neutrality.
The image used in the Bladensburg memorial —a plain Latin cross
After the 1918 armistice, the War Department announced plans to replace the wooden crosses and Stars of David with uniform marble slabs like those previously used in American military cemeteries. App. 1146. But the public outcry against that proposal was swift and fierce. Many organizations, including the American War Mothers, a nonsectarian group founded in 1917, urged the Department to retain the design of the temporary markers. Id., at 1146-1147. When the American Battle Monuments Commission took over the project of designing the headstones, it responded to this public sentiment by opting to replace the wooden crosses and Stars of David with marble versions of those symbols. Id., at 1144. A Member of Congress likewise introduced a resolution noting that "these wooden symbols have, during and since the World War, been regarded as emblematic of the great sacrifices which that war entailed, have been so treated by poets and artists and have become peculiarly and inseparably associated in the thought of surviving relatives and comrades and of the Nation with these World War graves." H. Res. 15, 68th Cong., 1 (1924), App. 1163-1164. This national debate and its outcome confirmed the cross's widespread resonance as a symbol of sacrifice in the war.
Recognition of the cross's symbolism extended to local communities across the country. In late 1918, residents of Prince George's County, Maryland, formed a committee for the purpose of erecting a memorial for the county's fallen soldiers. App. 988-989, 1014. Among the committee's members were the mothers of 10 deceased soldiers. Id., at 989. The committee decided that the memorial should be a cross and hired sculptor and architect John Joseph Earley to design it. Although we do not know precisely why the committee chose the cross, it is unsurprising that the committee —and many others commemorating World War I
After selecting the design, the committee turned to the task of financing the project. The committee held fundraising events in the community and invited donations, no matter the size, with a form that read:
Many of those who responded were local residents who gave small amounts: Donations of 25 cents to 1 dollar were the most common. Id., at 1014. Local businesses and political leaders assisted in this effort. Id., at 1014, 1243. In writing to thank United States Senator John Walter Smith for his donation, committee treasurer Mrs. Martin Redman explained that "[t]he chief reason I feel as deeply in this matter [is that], my son, [Wm.] F. Redman, lost his life in France and because of that I feel that our memorial cross is, in a way, his grave stone." Id., at 1244.
The Cross was to stand at the terminus of another World War I memorial—the National Defense Highway, which connects Washington to Annapolis. The community gathered for a joint groundbreaking ceremony for both memorials on September 28, 1919; the mother of the first Prince George's County resident killed in France broke ground for the Cross. Id., at 910. By 1922, however, the committee had run out of funds, and progress on the Cross had stalled. The local post of the American Legion took over the project, and the monument was finished in 1925.
The completed monument is a 32-foot tall Latin cross that sits on a large pedestal. The American Legion's emblem is displayed at its center, and the words "Valor," "Endurance," "Courage," and "Devotion" are inscribed at its base, one on each of the four faces. The pedestal also features a 9- by 2.5-foot bronze plaque explaining that the monument is "Dedicated to the heroes of Prince George's County, Maryland who lost their lives in the Great War for the liberty of the world." Id., at 915 (capitalization omitted). The plaque lists the names of 49 local men, both Black and White, who died in the war. It identifies the dates of American involvement, and quotes President Woodrow Wilson's request for a declaration of war: "The right is more precious than peace. We shall fight for the things we have always carried nearest our hearts. To such a task we dedicate our lives." Ibid.
At the dedication ceremony, a local Catholic priest offered an invocation. Id., at 217-218. United States Representative Stephen W. Gambrill delivered the keynote address, honoring the "`men of Prince George's County'" who "`fought for the sacred right of all to live in peace and security.'" Id., at 1372. He encouraged the community to look to the "`token of this cross, symbolic of Calvary,'" to "`keep fresh the memory of our boys who died for a righteous cause.'" Ibid. The ceremony closed with a benediction offered by a Baptist pastor.
Since its dedication, the Cross has served as the site of patriotic events honoring veterans, including gatherings on Veterans Day, Memorial Day, and Independence Day. Like the dedication itself, these events have typically included an invocation, a keynote speaker, and a benediction. Id., at 182, 319-323. Over the years, memorials honoring the veterans of other conflicts have been added to the surrounding area, which is now known as Veterans Memorial Park. These include a World War II Honor Scroll; a Pearl Harbor memorial; a Korea-Vietnam veterans memorial; a September 11 garden; a War of 1812 memorial; and two recently added 38-foot-tall markers depicting British and American soldiers in the Battle of Bladensburg.
As the area around the Cross developed, the monument came to be at the center of a busy intersection. In 1961, the Maryland-National Capital Park and Planning Commission (Commission) acquired the Cross and the land on which it sits in order to preserve the monument and address traffic-safety concerns.
In 2012, nearly 90 years after the Cross was dedicated and more than 50 years after the Commission acquired it, the American Humanist Association (AHA) lodged a complaint with the Commission. The complaint alleged that the Cross's presence on public land and the Commission's maintenance of the memorial violate the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. Id., at 1443-1451. The AHA, along with three residents of Washington, D. C., and Maryland, also sued the Commission in the District Court for the District of Maryland, making the same claim. The AHA sought declaratory and injunctive relief requiring "removal or demolition of the Cross, or removal of the arms from the Cross to form a non-religious slab or obelisk." 874 F.3d 195, 202, n. 7 (C.A.4 2017) (internal quotation marks omitted). The American Legion intervened to defend the Cross.
The District Court granted summary judgment for the Commission and the American Legion. The Cross, the District Court held, satisfies both the three-pronged test announced in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 91 S.Ct. 2105, 29 L.Ed.2d 745 (1971), and the analysis applied by Justice BREYER in upholding the Ten Commandments monument at issue in Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 125 S.Ct. 2854, 162 L.Ed.2d 607. Under the Lemon test, a court must ask whether a
A divided panel of the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed. The majority relied primarily on the Lemon test but also took cognizance of Justice BREYER's Van Orden concurrence. While recognizing that the Commission acted for a secular purpose, the court held that the Bladensburg Cross failed Lemon's "effects" prong because a reasonable observer would view the Commission's ownership and maintenance of the monument as an endorsement of Christianity. The court emphasized the cross's "inherent religious meaning" as the "`preeminent symbol of Christianity.'" 874 F.3d at 206-207. Although conceding that the monument had several "secular elements," the court asserted that they were "overshadow[ed]" by the Cross's size and Christian connection —especially because the Cross's location and condition would make it difficult for "passers-by" to "read" or otherwise "examine" the plaque and American Legion emblem. Id., at 209-210. The court rejected as "too simplistic" an argument defending the Cross's constitutionality on the basis of its 90-year history, suggesting that "[p]erhaps the longer a violation persists, the greater the affront to those offended." Id., at 208. In the alternative, the court concluded, the Commission had become excessively entangled with religion by keeping a display that "aggrandizes the Latin cross" and by spending more than de minimis public funds to maintain it. Id., at 211-212.
Chief Judge Gregory dissented in relevant part, contending that the majority misapplied the "effects" test by failing to give adequate consideration to the Cross's "physical setting, history, and usage." Id., at 218 (opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part). He also disputed the majority's excessive-entanglement analysis, noting that the Commission's maintenance of the Cross was not the kind of "comprehensive, discriminating, and continuing state surveillance" of religion that Lemon was concerned to rule out. 874 F.3d at 221 (internal quotation marks omitted).
The Fourth Circuit denied rehearing en banc over dissents by Chief Judge Gregory, Judge Wilkinson, and Judge Niemeyer. 891 F.3d 117 (2018). The Commission and the American Legion each petitioned for certiorari. We granted the petitions and consolidated them for argument. 586 U. S. ___ (2016).
The Establishment Clause of the First Amendment provides that "Congress shall
If the Lemon Court thought that its test would provide a framework for all future Establishment Clause decisions, its expectation has not been met. In many cases, this Court has either expressly declined to apply the test or has simply ignored it. See Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills School Dist., 509 U.S. 1, 113 S.Ct. 2462, 125 L.Ed.2d 1 (1993); Board of Ed. of Kiryas Joel Village School Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 114 S.Ct. 2481, 129 L.Ed.2d 546 (1994); Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 115 S.Ct. 2510, 132 L.Ed.2d 700 (1995); Capitol Square Review and Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 115 S.Ct. 2440, 132 L.Ed.2d 650 (1995); Good News Club v. Milford Central School, 533 U.S. 98, 121 S.Ct. 2093, 150 L.Ed.2d 151 (2001); Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 122 S.Ct. 2460, 153 L.Ed.2d 604 (2002); Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 125 S.Ct. 2113, 161 L.Ed.2d 1020 (2005); Van Orden, 545 U.S. 677, 125 S.Ct. 2854, 162 L.Ed.2d 607; Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School v. EEOC, 565 U.S. 171, 132 S.Ct. 694, 181 L.Ed.2d 650 (2012); Town of Greece v. Galloway, 572 U.S. 565, 134 S.Ct. 1811, 188 L.Ed.2d 835 (2014); Trump v. Hawaii, 585 U. S. ___, 138 S.Ct. 2392, 201 L.Ed.2d 775(2018).
This pattern is a testament to the Lemon test's shortcomings. As Establishment Clause cases involving a great array of laws and practices came to the Court, it became more and more apparent that the Lemon test could not resolve them. It could not "explain the Establishment Clause's tolerance, for example, of the prayers that open legislative meetings, ... certain references to, and invocations of, the Deity in the public words of public officials; the public references to God on coins, decrees, and buildings; or the attention
For at least four reasons, the Lemon test presents particularly daunting problems in cases, including the one now before us, that involve the use, for ceremonial, celebratory, or commemorative purposes, of words or symbols with religious associations.
First, these cases often concern monuments, symbols, or practices that were first established long ago, and in such cases, identifying their original purpose or purposes may be especially difficult. In Salazar v. Buono, 559 U.S. 700, 130 S.Ct. 1803, 176 L.Ed.2d 634 (2010), for example, we dealt with a cross that a small group of World War I veterans had put up at a remote spot in the Mojave Desert more than seven decades earlier. The record contained virtually no direct evidence regarding the specific motivations of these men. We knew that they had selected a plain white cross, and there was some evidence that the man who looked after the monument for many years—"a miner who had served as a medic and had thus presumably witnessed the carnage of the war firsthand"—was said not to have been "particularly religious." Id., at 724, 130 S.Ct. 1803 (ALITO, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment).
Without better evidence about the purpose of the monument, different Justices drew different inferences. The plurality thought that this particular cross was meant "to commemorate American servicemen who had died in World War I" and was not intended "to promote a Christian message." Id., at 715, 130 S.Ct. 1803. The dissent, by contrast, "presume[d]" that the cross's purpose "was a Christian one, at least in part, for the simple reason that those who erected the cross chose to commemorate American veterans in an explicitly Christian manner." Id., at 752, 130 S.Ct. 1803 (opinion of Stevens, J.). The truth is that 70 years after the fact, there was no way to be certain about the motivations of the men who were responsible for the creation of the monument. And this is often the case with old monuments, symbols, and practices. Yet it would be inappropriate for courts to compel their removal or termination based on supposition.
Second, as time goes by, the purposes associated with an established monument, symbol, or practice often multiply. Take the example of Ten Commandments monuments, the subject we addressed in Van Orden, 545 U.S. 677, 125 S.Ct. 2854, 162 L.Ed.2d 607, and McCreary County v.
Just as depictions of the Ten Commandments in these public buildings were intended to serve secular purposes, the litigation in Van Orden and McCreary showed that secular motivations played a part in the proliferation of Ten Commandments monuments in the 1950s. In 1946, Minnesota Judge E. J. Ruegemer proposed that the Ten Commandments be widely disseminated as a way of combating juvenile delinquency.
The existence of multiple purposes is not exclusive to longstanding monuments, symbols, or practices, but this phenomenon is more likely to occur in such cases. Even if the original purpose of a monument was infused with religion, the passage of time may obscure that sentiment. As our society becomes more and more religiously diverse, a community may preserve such monuments, symbols, and practices for the sake of their historical significance or their place in a common cultural heritage. Cf. Schempp, 374 U.S. at 264-265, 83 S.Ct. 1560 (Brennan, J., concurring) ("[The] government may originally have decreed a Sunday day of rest for the impermissible purpose of supporting religion but abandoned that purpose and retained the laws for the permissible purpose of furthering overwhelmingly secular ends").
With sufficient time, religiously expressive monuments, symbols, and practices can become embedded features of a community's landscape and identity. The community may come to value them without necessarily embracing their religious roots. The recent tragic fire at Notre Dame in Paris provides a striking example. Although the French Republic rigorously enforces a secular public square,
In the same way, consider the many cities and towns across the United States that bear religious names. Religion undoubtedly motivated those who named Bethlehem, Pennsylvania; Las Cruces, New Mexico; Providence, Rhode Island; Corpus Christi, Texas; Nephi, Utah, and the countless other places in our country with names that are rooted in religion. Yet few would argue that this history requires that these names be erased from the map. Or take a motto like Arizona's, "Ditat Deus" ("God enriches"), which was adopted in 1864,
Fourth, when time's passage imbues a religiously expressive monument, symbol, or practice with this kind of familiarity and historical significance, removing it may no longer appear neutral, especially to the local community for which it has taken on particular meaning. A government that roams the land, tearing down monuments with religious symbolism and scrubbing
These four considerations show that retaining established, religiously expressive monuments, symbols, and practices is quite different from erecting or adopting new ones. The passage of time gives rise to a strong presumption of constitutionality.
The role of the cross in World War I memorials is illustrative of each of the four preceding considerations. Immediately following the war, "[c]ommunities across America built memorials to commemorate those who had served the nation in the struggle to make the world safe for democracy." G. Piehler, The American Memory of War, App. 1124. Although not all of these communities included a cross in their memorials, the cross had become a symbol closely linked to the war. "[T]he First World War witnessed a dramatic change in... the symbols used to commemorate th[e] service" of the fallen soldiers. Id., at 1123. In the wake of the war, the United States adopted the cross as part of its military honors, establishing the Distinguished Service Cross and the Navy Cross in 1918 and 1919, respectively. See id., at 147-148. And as already noted, the fallen soldiers' final resting places abroad were marked by white crosses or Stars of David. The solemn image of endless rows of white crosses became inextricably linked with and symbolic of the ultimate price paid by 116,000 soldiers. And this relationship between the cross and the war undoubtedly influenced the design of the many war memorials that sprang up across the Nation.
This is not to say that the cross's association with the war was the sole or dominant motivation for the inclusion of the symbol in every World War I memorial that features it. But today, it is all but impossible to tell whether that was so. The passage of time means that testimony from those actually involved in the decisionmaking process is generally unavailable, and attempting to uncover their motivations invites rampant speculation. And no matter what the original purposes for the erection of a monument, a community may wish to preserve it for very different reasons, such as the historic preservation and traffic-safety concerns the Commission has pressed here.
In addition, the passage of time may have altered the area surrounding a monument in ways that change its meaning and provide new reasons for its preservation. Such changes are relevant here, since the Bladensburg Cross now sits at a busy traffic
Even the AHA recognizes that there are instances in which a war memorial in the form of a cross is unobjectionable. The AHA is not offended by the sight of the Argonne Cross or the Canadian Cross of Sacrifice, both Latin crosses commemorating World War I that rest on public grounds in Arlington National Cemetery. The difference, according to the AHA, is that their location in a cemetery gives them a closer association with individual gravestones and interred soldiers. See Brief for Respondents 96; Tr. of Oral Arg. 52.
But a memorial's placement in a cemetery is not necessary to create such a connection. The parents and other relatives of many of the war dead lacked the means to travel to Europe to visit their graves, and the bodies of approximately 4,400 American soldiers were either never found or never identified.
Similar reasoning applies to other memorials and monuments honoring important figures in our Nation's history. When faith was important to the person whose life is commemorated, it is natural to include a symbolic reference to faith in the design of the memorial. For example, many memorials for Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., make reference to his faith. Take the Martin Luther King, Jr. Civil Rights Memorial Park in Seattle, which contains a sculpture in three segments representing "both the Christian Trinity and the union of the family."
Finally, as World War I monuments have endured through the years and become a familiar part of the physical and cultural landscape, requiring their removal would not be viewed by many as a neutral act. And an alteration like the one entertained by the Fourth Circuit—amputating the arms of the Cross, see 874 F.3d at 202, n. 7—would be seen by many as profoundly disrespectful. One member of the majority below viewed this objection as inconsistent with the claim that the Bladensburg Cross serves secular purposes, see 891 F.3d at 121 (Wynn, J., concurring in denial of en banc), but this argument misunderstands
For example, few would say that the State of California is attempting to convey a religious message by retaining the names given to many of the State's cities by their original Spanish settlers—San Diego, Los Angeles, Santa Barbara, San Jose, San Francisco, etc. But it would be something else entirely if the State undertook to change all those names. Much the same is true about monuments to soldiers who sacrificed their lives for this country more than a century ago.
While the Lemon Court ambitiously attempted to find a grand unified theory of the Establishment Clause, in later cases, we have taken a more modest approach that focuses on the particular issue at hand and looks to history for guidance. Our cases involving prayer before a legislative session are an example.
In Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 103 S.Ct. 3330, 77 L.Ed.2d 1019 (1983), the Court upheld the Nebraska Legislature's practice of beginning each session with a prayer by an official chaplain, and in so holding, the Court conspicuously ignored Lemon and did not respond to Justice Brennan's argument in dissent that the legislature's practice could not satisfy the Lemon test. Id., at 797-801, 103 S.Ct. 3330. Instead, the Court found it highly persuasive that Congress for more than 200 years had opened its sessions with a prayer and that many state legislatures had followed suit. Id., at 787-788, 103 S.Ct. 3330. We took a similar approach more recently in Town of Greece, 572 U.S. at 577, 134 S.Ct. 1811.
We reached these results even though it was clear, as stressed by the Marsh dissent, that prayer is by definition religious. See Marsh, supra, at 797-798, 103 S.Ct. 3330 (opinion of Brennan, J.). As the Court put it in Town of Greece: "Marsh must not be understood as permitting a practice that would amount to a constitutional violation if not for its historical foundation." 572 U.S. at 576, 134 S.Ct. 1811. "The case teaches instead that the Establishment Clause must be interpreted `by reference to historical practices and understandings'" and that the decision of the First Congress to "provid[e] for the appointment of chaplains only days after approving language for the First Amendment demonstrates that the Framers considered legislative prayer a benign acknowledgment of religion's role in society." Ibid.
The prevalence of this philosophy at the time of the founding is reflected in other prominent actions taken by the First Congress. It requested—and President Washington proclaimed—a national day of prayer, see 1 J. Richardson, Messages and Papers of the Presidents, 1789-1897, p. 64 (1897) (President Washington's Thanksgiving Proclamation), and it reenacted the Northwest Territory Ordinance, which provided that "[r]eligion, morality, and knowledge, being necessary to good government and the happiness of mankind, schools and the means of education shall forever be encouraged," 1 Stat. 52, n. (a). President Washington echoed this sentiment in his Farewell Address, calling religion and morality "indispensable supports" to "political prosperity." Farewell Address (1796), in 35 The Writings of George
To achieve that purpose, legislative prayer needed to be inclusive rather than divisive, and that required a determined effort even in a society that was much more religiously homogeneous than ours today. Although the United States at the time was overwhelmingly Christian and Protestant,
Over time, the members of the clergy invited to offer prayers at the opening of a session grew more and more diverse. For example, an 1856 study of Senate and House Chaplains since 1789 tallied 22 Methodists, 20 Presbyterians, 19 Episcopalians, 13 Baptists, 4 Congregationalists, 2 Roman Catholics, and 3 that were characterized as "miscellaneous."
In Town of Greece, which concerned prayer before a town council meeting, there was disagreement about the inclusiveness of the town's practice. Compare 572 U.S. at 585, 134 S.Ct. 1811 (opinion of the Court) ("The town made reasonable efforts to identify all of the congregations located within its borders and represented that it would welcome a prayer by any minister or layman who wished to give one"), with id., at 616, 134 S.Ct. 1811 (KAGAN, J., dissenting) ("Greece's Board did nothing to recognize religious diversity"). But there was no disagreement that the Establishment Clause permits a nondiscriminatory practice of prayer at the beginning of a town council session. See ibid. ("I believe that pluralism and inclusion [in legislative prayer] in a town hall can satisfy the constitutional requirement of neutrality"). Of course, the specific practice challenged in Town of Greece lacked the very direct connection, via the First Congress, to the thinking of those who were responsible for framing the First Amendment. But what mattered was that the town's practice "fi[t] within the tradition long followed in Congress and the state
The practice begun by the First Congress stands out as an example of respect and tolerance for differing views, an honest endeavor to achieve inclusivity and nondiscrimination, and a recognition of the important role that religion plays in the lives of many Americans. Where categories of monuments, symbols, and practices with a longstanding history follow in that tradition, they are likewise constitutional.
Applying these principles, we conclude that the Bladensburg Cross does not violate the Establishment Clause.
As we have explained, the Bladensburg Cross carries special significance in commemorating World War I. Due in large part to the image of the simple wooden crosses that originally marked the graves of American soldiers killed in the war, the cross became a symbol of their sacrifice, and the design of the Bladensburg Cross must be understood in light of that background. That the cross originated as a Christian symbol and retains that meaning in many contexts does not change the fact that the symbol took on an added secular meaning when used in World War I memorials.
Not only did the Bladensburg Cross begin with this meaning, but with the passage of time, it has acquired historical importance. It reminds the people of Bladensburg and surrounding areas of the deeds of their predecessors and of the sacrifices they made in a war fought in the name of democracy. As long as it is retained in its original place and form, it speaks as well of the community that erected the monument nearly a century ago and has maintained it ever since. The memorial represents what the relatives, friends, and neighbors of the fallen soldiers felt at the time and how they chose to express their sentiments. And the monument has acquired additional layers of historical meaning in subsequent years. The Cross now stands among memorials to veterans of later wars. It has become part of the community.
The monument would not serve that role if its design had deliberately disrespected area soldiers who perished in World War I. More than 3,500 Jewish soldiers gave their lives for the United States in that conflict,
The AHA's brief strains to connect the Bladensburg Cross and even the American Legion with anti-Semitism and the Ku Klux Klan, see Brief for Respondents 5-7, but the AHA's disparaging intimations have no evidentiary support. And when the events surrounding the erection of the Cross are viewed in historical context, a very different picture may perhaps be discerned. The monument was dedicated on July 12, 1925, during a period when the country was experiencing heightened racial and religious animosity. Membership in the Ku Klux Klan, which preached hatred of Blacks, Catholics, and Jews, was at its height.
Finally, it is surely relevant that the monument commemorates the death of particular individuals. It is natural and appropriate for those seeking to honor the deceased to invoke the symbols that signify what death meant for those who are memorialized. In some circumstances, the exclusion of any such recognition would make a memorial incomplete. This well explains why Holocaust memorials invariably include Stars of David or other symbols of Judaism.
The cross is undoubtedly a Christian symbol, but that fact should not blind us to everything else that the Bladensburg Cross has come to represent. For some, that monument is a symbolic resting place for ancestors who never returned home. For others, it is a place for the community to gather and honor all veterans and their sacrifices for our Nation. For others still, it is a historical landmark. For many of these people, destroying or defacing the Cross that has stood undisturbed for nearly a century would not be neutral and would not further the ideals of respect and tolerance embodied in the First Amendment. For all these reasons, the Cross does not offend the Constitution.
We reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit and remand the cases for further proceedings.
It is so ordered.
Justice BREYER, with whom Justice KAGAN joins, concurring.
I have long maintained that there is no single formula for resolving Establishment Clause challenges. See Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 698, 125 S.Ct. 2854, 162 L.Ed.2d 607 (2005) (opinion concurring in judgment). The Court must instead consider each case in light of the basic purposes
I agree with the Court that allowing the State of Maryland to display and maintain the Peace Cross poses no threat to those ends. The Court's opinion eloquently explains why that is so: The Latin cross is uniquely associated with the fallen soldiers of World War I; the organizers of the Peace Cross acted with the undeniably secular motive of commemorating local soldiers; no evidence suggests that they sought to disparage or exclude any religious group; the secular values inscribed on the Cross and its place among other memorials strengthen its message of patriotism and commemoration; and, finally, the Cross has stood on the same land for 94 years, generating no controversy in the community until this lawsuit was filed. Nothing in the record suggests that the lack of public outcry "was due to a climate of intimidation." Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 702, 125 S.Ct. 2854 (BREYER, J., concurring in judgment). In light of all these circumstances, the Peace Cross cannot reasonably be understood as "a government effort to favor a particular religious sect" or to "promote religion over nonreligion." Ibid. And, as the Court explains, ordering its removal or alteration at this late date would signal "a hostility toward religion that has no place in our Establishment Clause traditions." Id., at 704, 125 S.Ct. 2854.
The case would be different, in my view, if there were evidence that the organizers had "deliberately disrespected" members of minority faiths or if the Cross had been erected only recently, rather than in the aftermath of World War I. See ante, at 2089 - 2090; see also Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 703, 125 S.Ct. 2854 (opinion of BREYER, J.) (explaining that, in light of the greater religious diversity today, "a more contemporary state effort" to put up a religious display is "likely to prove divisive in a way that [a] longstanding, pre-existing monument [would] not"). But those are not the circumstances presented to us here, and I see no reason to order this cross torn down simply because other crosses would raise constitutional concerns.
Nor do I understand the Court's opinion today to adopt a "history and tradition test" that would permit any newly constructed religious memorial on public land. See post, at 2092, 2093-2094 (KAVANAUGH, J., concurring); cf. post, at 2101-2102 (GORSUCH, J., concurring in judgment). The Court appropriately "looks to history for guidance," ante, at 2087 (plurality opinion), but it upholds the constitutionality of the Peace Cross only after considering its particular historical context and its long-held place in the community, see ante, at 2089-2090 (majority opinion). A newer memorial, erected under different circumstances, would not necessarily be permissible under this approach. Cf. ante, at 2085.
As I have previously explained, "where the Establishment Clause is at issue," the Court must "`distinguish between real threat and mere shadow.'" Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 704, 125 S.Ct. 2854 (opinion concurring in judgment) (quoting School Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 308, 83 S.Ct. 1560, 10 L.Ed.2d 844 (1963) (Goldberg, J., concurring)). In light of all the circumstances here, I agree with the Court that the Peace Cross poses no real threat to the values that the Establishment Clause serves.
I join the Court's eloquent and persuasive opinion in full. I write separately to emphasize two points.
Consistent with the Court's case law, the Court today applies a history and tradition test in examining and upholding the constitutionality of the Bladensburg Cross. See Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 787-792, 795, 103 S.Ct. 3330, 77 L.Ed.2d 1019 (1983); Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 686-690, 125 S.Ct. 2854, 162 L.Ed.2d 607 (2005) (plurality opinion); Town of Greece v. Galloway, 572 U.S. 565, 575-578, 134 S.Ct. 1811, 188 L.Ed.2d 835 (2014).
As this case again demonstrates, this Court no longer applies the old test articulated in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 91 S.Ct. 2105, 29 L.Ed.2d 745 (1971). The Lemon test examined, among other things, whether the challenged government action had a primary effect of advancing or endorsing religion. If Lemon guided this Court's understanding of the Establishment Clause, then many of the Court's Establishment Clause cases over the last 48 years would have been decided differently, as I will explain.
The opinion identifies five relevant categories of Establishment Clause cases: (1) religious symbols on government property and religious speech at government events; (2) religious accommodations and exemptions from generally applicable laws; (3) government benefits and tax exemptions for religious organizations; (4) religious expression in public schools; and (5) regulation of private religious speech in public forums. See ante, at 2081-2082, n. 16.
The Lemon test does not explain the Court's decisions in any of those five categories.
In the first category of cases, the Court has relied on history and tradition and upheld various religious symbols on government property and religious speech at government events. See, e.g., Marsh, 463 U.S. at 787-792, 795, 103 S.Ct. 3330; Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 686-690, 125 S.Ct. 2854 (plurality opinion); Town of Greece, 572 U.S. at 575-578, 134 S.Ct. 1811. The Court does so again today. Lemon does not account for the results in these cases.
In the second category of cases, this Court has allowed legislative accommodations for religious activity and upheld legislatively granted religious exemptions from generally applicable laws. See, e.g., Corporation of Presiding Bishop of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 107 S.Ct. 2862, 97 L.Ed.2d 273 (1987); Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 125 S.Ct. 2113, 161 L.Ed.2d 1020 (2005). But accommodations and exemptions "by definition" have the effect of advancing or endorsing religion to some extent. Amos, 483 U.S. at 347, 107 S.Ct. 2862 (O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment) (quotation altered). Lemon, fairly applied, does not justify those decisions.
In the third category of cases, the Court likewise has upheld government benefits and tax exemptions that go to religious organizations, even though those policies have the effect of advancing or endorsing religion. See, e.g., Walz v. Tax Comm'n of City of New York, 397 U.S. 664, 90 S.Ct. 1409, 25 L.Ed.2d 697 (1970); Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 103 S.Ct. 3062, 77 L.Ed.2d 721 (1983); Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 120 S.Ct. 2530, 147 L.Ed.2d 660 (2000) (plurality opinion); Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 122 S.Ct. 2460, 153 L.Ed.2d 604 (2002); Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Comer, 582 U. S. ___, 137 S.Ct. 2012, 198 L.Ed.2d 551
In the fourth category of cases, the Court has proscribed government-sponsored prayer in public schools. The Court has done so not because of Lemon, but because the Court concluded that government-sponsored prayer in public schools posed a risk of coercion of students. The Court's most prominent modern case on that subject, Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 112 S.Ct. 2649, 120 L.Ed.2d 467 (1992), did not rely on Lemon. In short, Lemon was not necessary to the Court's decisions holding government-sponsored school prayers unconstitutional.
In the fifth category, the Court has allowed private religious speech in public forums on an equal basis with secular speech. See, e.g., Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free School Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 113 S.Ct. 2141, 124 L.Ed.2d 352 (1993); Capitol Square Review and Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 115 S.Ct. 2440, 132 L.Ed.2d 650 (1995); Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 115 S.Ct. 2510, 132 L.Ed.2d 700 (1995); Good News Club v. Milford Central School, 533 U.S. 98, 121 S.Ct. 2093, 150 L.Ed.2d 151 (2001). That practice does not violate the Establishment Clause, the Court has ruled. Lemon does not explain those cases.
Today, the Court declines to apply Lemon in a case in the religious symbols and religious speech category, just as the Court declined to apply Lemon in Town of Greece v. Galloway, Van Orden v. Perry, and Marsh v. Chambers. The Court's decision in this case again makes clear that the Lemon test does not apply to Establishment Clause cases in that category. And the Court's decisions over the span of several decades demonstrate that the Lemon test is not good law and does not apply to Establishment Clause cases in any of the five categories.
On the contrary, each category of Establishment Clause cases has its own principles based on history, tradition, and precedent. And the cases together lead to an overarching set of principles: If the challenged government practice is not coercive and if it (i) is rooted in history and tradition; or (ii) treats religious people, organizations, speech, or activity equally to comparable secular people, organizations, speech, or activity; or (iii) represents a permissible legislative accommodation or exemption from a generally applicable law, then there ordinarily is no Establishment Clause violation.
The practice of displaying religious memorials, particularly religious war memorials, on public land is not coercive and is rooted in history and tradition. The Bladensburg Cross does not violate the Establishment Clause. Cf. Town of Greece, 572 U.S. 565, 134 S.Ct. 1811, 188 L.Ed.2d 835.
The Bladensburg Cross commemorates soldiers who gave their lives for America in World War I. I agree with the Court that the Bladensburg Cross is constitutional. At the same time, I have deep respect for the plaintiffs' sincere objections to seeing the cross on public land. I have great respect for the Jewish war veterans who in an amicus brief say that the cross on public land sends a message of exclusion. I recognize their sense of distress and alienation. Moreover, I fully understand the deeply religious nature of the cross. It
The conclusion that the cross does not violate the Establishment Clause does not necessarily mean that those who object to it have no other recourse. The Court's ruling allows the State to maintain the cross on public land. The Court's ruling does not require the State to maintain the cross on public land. The Maryland Legislature could enact new laws requiring removal of the cross or transfer of the land. The Maryland Governor or other state or local executive officers may have authority to do so under current Maryland law. And if not, the legislature could enact new laws to authorize such executive action. The Maryland Constitution, as interpreted by the Maryland Court of Appeals, may speak to this question. And if not, the people of Maryland can amend the State Constitution.
Those alternative avenues of relief illustrate a fundamental feature of our constitutional structure: This Court is not the only guardian of individual rights in America. This Court fiercely protects the individual rights secured by the U. S. Constitution. See, e.g., West Virginia Bd. of Ed. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 63 S.Ct. 1178, 87 S.Ct. 1628 (1943); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 92 S.Ct. 1526, 32 L.Ed.2d 15 (1972). But the Constitution sets a floor for the protection of individual rights. The constitutional floor is sturdy and often high, but it is a floor. Other federal, state, and local government entities generally possess authority to safeguard individual rights above and beyond the rights secured by the U. S. Constitution. See generally J. Sutton, 51 Imperfect Solutions (2018); Brennan, State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 Harv. L. Rev. 489 (1977).
Justice KAGAN, concurring in part.
I fully agree with the Court's reasons for allowing the Bladensburg Peace Cross to remain as it is, and so join Parts I, II-B, II-C, III, and IV of its opinion, as well as Justice BREYER's concurrence. Although I agree that rigid application of the Lemon test does not solve every Establishment Clause problem, I think that test's focus on purposes and effects is crucial in evaluating government action in this sphere—as this very suit shows. I therefore do not join Part II-A. I do not join Part II-D out of perhaps an excess of caution. Although I too "look[ ] to history for guidance," ante, at 2087 (plurality opinion), I prefer at least for now to do so case-by-case, rather than to sign on to any broader statements about history's role in Establishment Clause analysis. But I find much to admire in this section of the opinion —particularly, its emphasis on whether longstanding monuments, symbols, and practices reflect "respect and tolerance for differing views, an honest endeavor to achieve inclusivity and nondiscrimination, and a recognition of the important role that religion plays in the lives of many Americans." Ante, at 2089. Here, as elsewhere, the opinion shows sensitivity to and respect for this Nation's pluralism, and the values of neutrality and inclusion that the First Amendment demands.
Justice THOMAS, concurring in the judgment.
The Establishment Clause states that "Congress shall make no law respecting
As I have explained elsewhere, the Establishment Clause resists incorporation against the States. Town of Greece v. Galloway, 572 U.S. 565, 604-607, 134 S.Ct. 1811, 188 L.Ed.2d 835 (2014) (opinion concurring in part and concurring in judgment); Elk Grove Unified School Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 49-51, 124 S.Ct. 2301, 159 L.Ed.2d 98 (2004) (opinion concurring in judgment); Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 692-693, 125 S.Ct. 2854, 162 L.Ed.2d 607 (2005) (concurring opinion); Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 677-680, 122 S.Ct. 2460, 153 L.Ed.2d 604 (2002) (same). In Everson v. Board of Ed. of Ewing, 330 U.S. 1, 15, 67 S.Ct. 504, 91 S.Ct. 711 (1947), the Court "casually" incorporated the Clause with a declaration that because the Free Exercise Clause had been incorporated, "`[t]here is every reason to give the same application and broad interpretation to the "establishment of religion" clause.'" Town of Greece, 572 U.S. at 607, n. 1, 134 S.Ct. 1811 (opinion of THOMAS, J.). The Court apparently did not consider that an incorporated Establishment Clause would prohibit exactly what the text of the Clause seeks to protect: state establishments of religion. See id., at 605-606, 134 S.Ct. 1811.
The Court's "inattention" to the significant question of incorporation "might be explained, although not excused, by the rise of popular conceptions about `separation of church and state' as an `American' constitutional right." Id., at 608, n. 1, 134 S.Ct. 1811; see P. Hamburger, Separation of Church and State 454-463 (2002); see also id., at 391-454, 113 S.Ct. 2141 (tracing the role of nativist sentiment in the rise of "the modern myth of separation" as an American ideal). But an ahistorical generalization is no substitute for careful constitutional analysis. We should consider whether any longstanding right of citizenship restrains the States in the establishment context. See generally McDonald v. Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 805-858, and n. 20, 130 S.Ct. 3020, 177 L.Ed.2d 894 (2010) (THOMAS, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment).
Further confounding the incorporation question is the fact that the First Amendment by its terms applies only to "law[s]" enacted by "Congress." Obviously, a memorial is not a law. And respondents have not identified any specific law they challenge as unconstitutional, either on its face or as applied. Thus, respondents could prevail on their establishment claim only if the prohibition embodied in the Establishment Clause was understood to be an individual right of citizenship that applied to more than just "law[s]" "ma[de]" by "Congress."
Even if the Clause applied to state and local governments in some fashion, "[t]he mere presence of the monument along [respondents'] path involves no coercion and thus does not violate the Establishment Clause." Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 694, 125 S.Ct. 2854 (opinion of THOMAS, J.). The sine qua non of an establishment of religion is "`actual legal coercion.'" Id., at 693, 125 S.Ct. 2854. At the founding, "[t]he coercion that was a hallmark of historical establishments of religion was coercion of religious orthodoxy and of financial support by force of law and threat of penalty." Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 640, 112 S.Ct. 2649, 120 L.Ed.2d 467 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis deleted). "In a typical case, attendance at the established church was mandatory, and taxes were levied to generate church revenue. Dissenting ministers were barred from preaching, and political participation was limited to members of the established church." Town of Greece, supra, at 608, 134 S.Ct. 1811 (opinion of THOMAS, J.) (citation omitted). In an action claiming an unconstitutional establishment of religion, the plaintiff must demonstrate that he was actually coerced by government conduct that shares the characteristics of an establishment as understood at the founding.
Here, respondents briefly suggest that the government's spending their tax dollars on maintaining the Bladensburg Cross represents coercion, but they have not demonstrated that maintaining a religious display on public property shares any of the historical characteristics of an establishment of religion. The local commission has not attempted to control religious doctrine or personnel, compel religious observance, single out a particular religious denomination for exclusive state subsidization, or punish dissenting worship. Instead, the commission has done something that the founding generation, as well as the generation that ratified the Fourteenth Amendment, would have found commonplace: displaying a religious symbol on government property. See Brief for Becket Fund for Religious Liberty as Amicus Curiae 14-22. Lacking any characteristics of "the coercive state establishments that existed at the founding," Town of Greece, 572 U.S. at 608, 134 S.Ct. 1811 (opinion of THOMAS, J.), the Bladensburg Cross is constitutional.
The Bladensburg Cross is constitutional even though the cross has religious significance as a central symbol of Christianity. Respondents' primary contention is that this characteristic of the Cross makes it "sectarian"—a word used in respondents' brief more than 40 times. Putting aside the fact that Christianity is not a "sect," religious displays or speech need not be limited to that which a "judge considers to be nonsectarian." Id., at 582, 134 S.Ct. 1811 (majority opinion). As the Court has explained, "[a]n insistence on nonsectarian" religious speech is inconsistent with our Nation's history and traditions. Id., at 578-580, 134 S.Ct. 1811; see id., at 595, 134 S.Ct. 1811 (ALITO, J., concurring). Moreover, requiring that religious expressions be nonsectarian would force the courts "to act as supervisors and censors of religious speech." Id., at 581, 134 S.Ct. 1811 (majority opinion). Any such effort would find courts "trolling through ... religious beliefs"
As to the long-discredited test set forth in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-613, 91 S.Ct. 2105, 29 L.Ed.2d 745 (1971), and reiterated in County of Allegheny v. American Civil Liberties Union, Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573, 592-594, 109 S.Ct. 3086, 106 L.Ed.2d 472 (1989), the plurality rightly rejects its relevance to claims, like this one, involving "religious references or imagery in public monuments, symbols, mottos, displays, and ceremonies." Ante, at 2081-2082, and n. 16. I agree with that aspect of its opinion. I would take the logical next step and overrule the Lemon test in all contexts. First, that test has no basis in the original meaning of the Constitution. Second, "since its inception," it has "been manipulated to fit whatever result the Court aimed to achieve." McCreary County v. American Civil Liberties Union of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 900, 125 S.Ct. 2722, 162 L.Ed.2d 729 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting); see Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free School Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 398-399, 113 S.Ct. 2141, 124 L.Ed.2d 352 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment). Third, it continues to cause enormous confusion in the States and the lower courts. See generally Utah Highway Patrol Assn. v. American Atheists, Inc., 565 U.S. 994, 132 S.Ct. 12,
Regrettably, I cannot join the Court's opinion because it does not adequately clarify the appropriate standard for Establishment Clause cases. Therefore, I concur only in the judgment.
Justice GORSUCH, with whom Justice THOMAS joins, concurring in the judgment.
The American Humanist Association wants a federal court to order the destruction of a 94 year-old war memorial because its members are offended. Today, the Court explains that the plaintiffs are not entitled to demand the destruction of longstanding monuments, and I find much of its opinion compelling. In my judgment, however, it follows from the Court's analysis that suits like this one should be dismissed for lack of standing. Accordingly, while I concur in the judgment to reverse and remand the court of appeals' decision, I would do so with additional instructions to dismiss the case.
The Association claims that its members "regularly" come into "unwelcome direct contact" with a World War I memorial cross in Bladensburg, Maryland "while driving in the area." 874 F.3d 195, 203 (C.A.4 2017). And this, the Association suggests, is enough to allow it to insist on a federal judicial decree ordering the memorial's removal. Maybe, the Association concedes, others who are less offended lack standing to sue. Maybe others still who are equally affected but who come into contact with the memorial too infrequently lack standing as well. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 48-49. But, the Association assures us, its members are offended enough—and with sufficient frequency—that they may sue.
This "offended observer" theory of standing has no basis in law. Federal courts may decide only those cases and controversies that the Constitution and Congress have authorized them to hear. And to establish standing to sue consistent with the Constitution, a plaintiff must show: (1) injury-in-fact, (2) causation, and (3) redressability. The injury-in-fact test requires a plaintiff to prove "an invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized ... and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical." Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Unsurprisingly, this Court has already rejected the notion that offense alone qualifies as a "concrete and particularized" injury sufficient to confer standing. We could hardly have been clearer: "The presence of a disagreement, however sharp and acrimonious it may be, is insufficient by itself to meet Art. III's requirements." Diamond v. Charles, 476 U.S. 54, 62, 106 S.Ct. 1697, 90 L.Ed.2d 48 (1986). Imagine if a bystander disturbed by a police stop tried to sue under the Fourth Amendment. Suppose an advocacy organization whose members were distressed by a State's decision to deny someone else a civil jury trial sought to complain under the Seventh
It's not hard to see why this Court has refused suits like these. If individuals and groups could invoke the authority of a federal court to forbid what they dislike for no more reason than they dislike it, we would risk exceeding the judiciary's limited constitutional mandate and infringing on powers committed to other branches of government. Courts would start to look more like legislatures, responding to social pressures rather than remedying concrete harms, in the process supplanting the right of the people and their elected representatives to govern themselves. See, e.g., Clapper v. Amnesty Int'l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 408, 133 S.Ct. 1138, 185 L.Ed.2d 264 (2013) ("The law of Article III standing, which is built on separation-of-powers principles, serves to prevent the judicial process from being used to usurp the powers of the political branches"); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 500, 95 S.Ct. 2197, 45 L.Ed.2d 343 (1975) (without standing requirements "courts would be called upon to decide abstract questions of wide public significance even though other governmental institutions may be more competent to address the questions"); Hein v. Freedom From Religion Foundation, Inc., 551 U.S. 587, 635-636, 127 S.Ct. 2553, 168 L.Ed.2d 424 (2007) (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment) ("`To permit a complainant who has no concrete injury to require a court to rule on important constitutional issues in the abstract would create the potential for abuse of the judicial process, distort the role of the Judiciary in its relationship to the Executive and the Legislature and open the Judiciary to an arguable charge of providing "government by injunction"'").
Proceeding on these principles, this Court has held offense alone insufficient to convey standing in analogous—and arguably more sympathetic—circumstances. Take Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 104 S.Ct. 3315, 82 L.Ed.2d 556 (1984), where the parents of African-American schoolchildren sued to compel the Internal Revenue Service to deny tax-exempt status to schools that discriminated on the basis of race. The parents claimed that their children suffered a "stigmatic injury, or denigration" when the government supported racially discriminatory institutions. Id., at 754, 104 S.Ct. 3315. But this Court refused to entertain the case, reasoning that standing extends "only to those persons who are personally denied equal treatment by the challenged discriminatory conduct." Id., at 755, 104 S.Ct. 3315 (internal quotation marks omitted). Now put the teachings there alongside the Association's standing theory here and you get this utterly unjustifiable result: An African-American offended by a Confederate flag atop a state capitol would lack standing to sue under the Equal Protection Clause, but an atheist who is offended by the cross on the same flag could sue under the Establishment Clause. Who really thinks that could be the law? See Brief for Becket Fund for Religious Liberty as Amicus Curiae 34-35.
Consider, as well, the Free Exercise Clause. In Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 100 S.Ct. 2671, 65 L.Ed.2d 784 (1980), this Court denied standing to a religious group that raised a free exercise challenge to federal restrictions on abortion funding because "the plaintiffs had `not contended that the [statute in question] in any way
In fact, this Court has already expressly rejected "offended observer" standing under the Establishment Clause itself. In Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 102 S.Ct. 752, 70 L.Ed.2d 700 (1982), the plaintiffs objected to a transfer of property from the federal government to a religious college, an action they had learned about through a news release. This Court had little trouble concluding that the plaintiffs lacked standing to challenge the transfer, explaining that "the psychological consequence presumably produced by observation of conduct with which one disagrees" is not an injury-in-fact "sufficient to confer standing under Art. III." Id., at 485, 102 S.Ct. 752. To be sure, this Court has sometimes resolved Establishment Clause challenges to religious displays on the merits without first addressing standing. But as this Court has held, its own failure to consider standing cannot be mistaken as an endorsement of it: "[D]rive-by jurisdictional rulings of this sort" carry "no precedential effect." Steel Co. v. Citizens for Better Environment, 523 U.S. 83, 91, 118 S.Ct. 1003, 140 L.Ed.2d 210 (1998).
Offended observer standing is deeply inconsistent, too, with many other longstanding principles and precedents. For example, this Court has consistently ruled that "`generalized grievances' about the conduct of Government" are insufficient to confer standing to sue. Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 217, 94 S.Ct. 2925, 41 L.Ed.2d 706 (1974). But if offended observers could bring suit, this rule would be rendered meaningless: Who, after all, would have trouble recasting a generalized grievance about governmental action into an "I-take-offense" argument for standing? Similarly, this Court has long "adhered to the rule that a party `generally must assert his own legal rights and interests, and cannot rest his claim to relief on the legal rights or interests of third parties.'" Kowalski v. Tesmer, 543 U.S. 125, 129, 125 S.Ct. 564, 160 L.Ed.2d 519 (2004). We depart from this rule only where the party seeking to invoke the judicial power "has a `close' relationship with the person who possesses the right" and "there is a `hindrance' to the possessor's ability to protect his own interests." Id., at 130, 125 S.Ct. 564. Applying these principles in Kowalski, this Court held that attorneys lacked standing to assert the rights of indigent defendants. Id., at 127, 125 S.Ct. 564. And in Whitmore, we rejected a third party's effort to appeal another person's death sentence. 495 U.S. at 151, 110 S.Ct. 1717. But if offended observers could sue, the attorneys in Kowalski might have simply claimed they were "offended" by Michigan's procedure for appointing appellate counsel, and the third party in Whitmore could have just said he was offended (as he surely was) by the impending execution. None of this Court's limits on third-party standing would really matter.
Offended observer standing cannot be squared with this Court's longstanding teachings about the limits of Article III.
The truth is, the fault lies here. Lower courts invented offended observer standing for Establishment Clause cases in the 1970s in response to this Court's decision in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 91 S.Ct. 2105, 29 L.Ed.2d 745 (1971). Lemon held that whether governmental action violates the Establishment Clause depends on its (1) purpose, (2) effect, and (3) potential to "`excessive[ly] ... entangl[e]'" church and state, id., at 613, 91 S.Ct. 2105, a standard this Court came to understand as prohibiting the government from doing anything that a "`reasonable observer'" might perceive as "endorsing" religion, County of Allegheny v. American Civil Liberties Union, Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573, 620-621, 109 S.Ct. 3086, 106 L.Ed.2d 472 (1989) (opinion of Blackmun, J.); id., at 631, 109 S.Ct. 3086 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment). And lower courts reasoned that, if the Establishment Clause forbids anything a reasonable observer would view as an endorsement of religion, then such an observer must be able to sue. Moore v. Bryant, 853 F.3d 245, 250 (C.A.5 2017). Here alone, lower courts concluded, though never with this Court's approval, an observer's offense must "suffice to make an Establishment Clause claim justiciable." Suhre v. Haywood Cty., 131 F.3d 1083, 1086 (C.A.4 1997).
As today's plurality rightly indicates in Part II-A, however, Lemon was a misadventure. It sought a "grand unified theory" of the Establishment Clause but left us only a mess. See ante, at 2086-2087 (plurality opinion). How much "purpose" to promote religion is too much (are Sunday closing laws that bear multiple purposes, religious and secular, problematic)? How much "effect" of advancing religion is tolerable (are even incidental effects disallowed)? What does the "entanglement" test add to these inquiries? Even beyond all that, how "reasonable" must our "reasonable observer" be, and what exactly qualifies as impermissible "endorsement" of religion in a country where "In God We Trust" appears on the coinage, the eye of God appears in its Great Seal, and we celebrate Thanksgiving as a national holiday ("to Whom are thanks being given")? Harris v. Zion, 927 F.2d 1401, 1423 (C.A.7 1991) (Easterbrook, J., dissenting). Nearly half a century after Lemon and, the truth is, no one has any idea about the answers to these questions. As the plurality documents, our "doctrine [is] in such chaos" that lower courts have been "free to reach almost any result in almost any case." McConnell, Religious Participation in Public Programs: Religious Freedom at a Crossroads, 59 U. Chi. L. Rev. 115, 119 (1992). Scores of judges have pleaded with us to retire Lemon, scholars of all stripes have criticized the doctrine, and a majority of this Court has long done the same. Ante, at 2081 (plurality opinion). Today, not a single Member of the Court even tries to defend Lemon against these criticisms —and they don't because they can't. As Justice Kennedy explained, Lemon is "flawed in its fundamentals," has proved "unworkable in practice," and is "inconsistent with our history and our precedents." County of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 655, 669, 109 S.Ct. 3086 (opinion concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part).
In place of Lemon, Part II-D of the plurality opinion relies on a more modest, historically sensitive approach, recognizing that "the Establishment Clause must be interpreted by reference to historical practices and understandings." Ante, at 2087
I agree with all this and don't doubt that the monument before us is constitutional in light of the nation's traditions. But then the plurality continues on to suggest that "longstanding monuments, symbols, and practices" are "presumpt[ively]" constitutional. Ante, at 2082. And about that, it's hard not to wonder: How old must a monument, symbol, or practice be to qualify for this new presumption? It seems 94 years is enough, but what about the Star of David monument erected in South Carolina in 2001 to commemorate victims of the Holocaust, or the cross that marines in California placed in 2004 to honor their comrades who fell during the War on Terror? And where exactly in the Constitution does this presumption come from? The plurality does not say, nor does it even explain what work its presumption does. To the contrary, the plurality proceeds to analyze the "presumptively" constitutional memorial in this case for its consistency with "`historical practices and understandings'" under Marsh and Town of Greece—exactly the same approach that the plurality, quoting Town of Greece, recognizes "`must be'" used whenever we interpret the Establishment Clause. Ante, at 2087; see also ante, at 2092-2094 (KAVANAUGH, J., concurring). Though the plurality does not say so in as many words, the message for our lower court colleagues seems unmistakable: Whether a monument, symbol, or practice is old or new, apply Town of Greece, not Lemon. Indeed, some of our colleagues recognize this implication and blanch at its prospect. See ante, at 2091 (BREYER, J., concurring); ante, at 2094 (KAGAN, J., concurring in part) (declining to join Parts II-A & II-D); post, at 2104, n. 2 (GINSBURG, J., dissenting). But if that's the real message of the plurality's opinion, it seems to me exactly right— because what matters when it comes to assessing a monument, symbol, or practice isn't its age but its compliance with ageless principles. The Constitution's meaning is fixed, not some good-for-this-day-only coupon, and a practice consistent with our nation's traditions is just as permissible whether undertaken today or 94 years ago.
With Lemon now shelved, little excuse will remain for the anomaly of offended observer standing, and the gaping hole it tore in standing doctrine in the courts of appeals should now begin to close. Nor does this development mean colorable Establishment Clause violations will lack for proper plaintiffs. By way of example only, a public school student compelled to recite a prayer will still have standing to sue. See School Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 224, n. 9, 83 S.Ct. 1560, 10 L.Ed.2d 844 (1963). So will persons denied public office because of their religious affiliations or lack of them. And
Abandoning offended observer standing will mean only a return to the usual demands of Article III, requiring a real controversy with real impact on real persons to make a federal case out of it. Along the way, this will bring with it the welcome side effect of rescuing the federal judiciary from the sordid business of having to pass aesthetic judgment, one by one, on every public display in this country for its perceived capacity to give offense. It's a business that has consumed volumes of the federal reports, invited erratic results, frustrated generations of judges, and fomented "the very kind of religiously based divisiveness that the Establishment Clause seeks to avoid." Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 704, 125 S.Ct. 2854, 162 L.Ed.2d 607 (2005) (BREYER, J., concurring in judgment). Courts applying Lemon's test have upheld Ten Commandment displays and demanded their removal; they have allowed memorial crosses and insisted that they be razed; they have permitted Christmas displays and pulled the plug on them; and they have pondered seemingly endlessly the inclusion of "In God We Trust" on currency or similar language in our Pledge of Allegiance. No one can predict the rulings—but one thing is certain: Between the challenged practices and the judicial decisions, just about everyone will wind up offended.
Nor have we yet come close to exhausting the potential sources of offense and federal litigation Lemon invited, for what about the display of the Ten Commandments on the frieze in our own courtroom or on the doors leading into it? Or the statues of Moses and the Apostle Paul next door in the Library of Congress? Or the depictions of the Ten Commandments found in the Justice Department and the National Archives? Or the crosses that can be found in the U. S. Capitol building? And all that just takes us mere steps from where we sit. In light of today's decision, we should be done with this business, and our lower court colleagues may dispose of cases like these on a motion to dismiss rather than enmeshing themselves for years in intractable disputes sure to generate more heat than light.
In a large and diverse country, offense can be easily found. Really, most every governmental action probably offends somebody. No doubt, too, that offense can be sincere, sometimes well taken, even wise. But recourse for disagreement and offense does not lie in federal litigation. Instead, in a society that holds among its most cherished ambitions mutual respect, tolerance, self-rule, and democratic responsibility, an "offended viewer" may "avert his eyes," Erznoznik v. Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 212, 95 S.Ct. 2268, 45 L.Ed.2d 125 (1975), or pursue a political solution. Today's decision represents a welcome step toward restoring this Court's recognition of these truths, and I respectfully concur in the judgment.
Justice GINSBURG, with whom Justice SOTOMAYOR joins, dissenting.
An immense Latin cross stands on a traffic island at the center of a busy three-way intersection in Bladensburg, Maryland.
Decades ago, this Court recognized that the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment to the Constitution demands governmental neutrality among religious faiths, and between religion and nonreligion. See Everson v. Board of Ed. of Ewing, 330 U.S. 1, 15, 67 S.Ct. 504, 91 S.Ct. 711 (1947). Numerous times since, the Court has reaffirmed the Constitution's commitment to neutrality. Today the Court erodes that neutrality commitment, diminishing precedent designed to preserve individual liberty and civic harmony in favor of a "presumption of constitutionality for longstanding monuments, symbols, and practices." Ante, at 2082 (plurality opinion).
The Latin cross is the foremost symbol of the Christian faith, embodying the "central theological claim of Christianity: that the son of God died on the cross, that he rose from the dead, and that his death and resurrection offer the possibility of eternal life." Brief for Baptist Joint Committee for Religious Liberty et al. as Amici Curiae 7 (Brief for Amici Christian and Jewish Organizations). Precisely because the cross symbolizes these sectarian beliefs, it is a common marker for the graves of Christian soldiers. For the same reason, using the cross as a war memorial does not transform it into a secular symbol, as the Courts of Appeals have uniformly recognized. See infra, at 2108-2109, n. 10. Just as a Star of David is not suitable to honor Christians who died serving their country, so a cross is not suitable to honor those of other faiths who died defending their nation. Soldiers of all faiths "are united by their love of country, but they are not united by the cross." Brief for Jewish War Veterans of the United States of America, Inc., as Amicus Curiae 3 (Brief for Amicus Jewish War Veterans).
By maintaining the Peace Cross on a public highway, the Commission elevates Christianity over other faiths, and religion over nonreligion. Memorializing the service of American soldiers is an "admirable and unquestionably secular" objective. Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 715, 125 S.Ct. 2854, 162 L.Ed.2d 607 (2005) (Stevens, J., dissenting). But the Commission does not serve that objective by displaying a symbol that bears "a starkly sectarian message." Salazar v. Buono, 559 U.S. 700, 736, 130 S.Ct. 1803,
The First Amendment commands that the government "shall make no law" either "respecting an establishment of religion" or "prohibiting the free exercise thereof." See Everson, 330 U.S. at 15, 67 S.Ct. 504. Adoption of these complementary provisions followed centuries of "turmoil, civil strife, and persecutio[n], generated in large part by established sects determined to maintain their absolute political and religious supremacy." Id., at 8-9, 67 S.Ct. 504. Mindful of that history, the fledgling Republic ratified the Establishment Clause, in the words of Thomas Jefferson, to "buil[d] a wall of separation between church and state." Draft Reply to the Danbury Baptist Association, in 36 Papers of Thomas Jefferson 254, 255 (B. Oberg ed. 2009) (footnote omitted).
This barrier "protect[s] the integrity of individual conscience in religious matters." McCreary County v. American Civil Liberties Union of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 876, 125 S.Ct. 2722, 162 L.Ed.2d 729 (2005). It guards against the "anguish, hardship and bitter strife," Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 429, 82 S.Ct. 1261, 8 L.Ed.2d 601 (1962), that can occur when "the government weighs in on one side of religious debate," McCreary County, 545 U.S. at 876, 125 S.Ct. 2722. And while the "union of government and religion tends to destroy government and to degrade religion," separating the two preserves the legitimacy of each. Engel, 370 U.S. at 431, 82 S.Ct. 1261.
The Establishment Clause essentially instructs: "[T]he government may not favor one religion over another, or religion over irreligion." McCreary County, 545 U.S. at 875, 125 S.Ct. 2722. For, as James Madison observed, the government is not "a competent Judge of Religious Truth." Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments, 8 Papers of James Madison 295, 301 (R. Rutland, W. Rachal, B. Ripel, & F. Teute eds. 1973) (Memorial and Remonstrance). When the government places its "power, prestige [or] financial support ... behind a particular religious belief," Engel, 370 U.S. at 431, 82 S.Ct. 1261, the government's imprimatur "mak[es] adherence to [that] religion relevant... to a person's standing in the political community," County of Allegheny v. American Civil Liberties Union, Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573, 594, 109 S.Ct. 3086, 106 L.Ed.2d 472 (1989) (internal quotation marks omitted). Correspondingly, "the indirect coercive pressure upon religious minorities to conform to the prevailing officially approved religion is plain." Engel, 370 U.S. at 431, 82 S.Ct. 1261. And by demanding neutrality between religious faith and the absence thereof, the Establishment Clause shores up an individual's "right to select any religious faith or none at all." Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 53, 105 S.Ct. 2479, 86 L.Ed.2d 29 (1985).
In cases challenging the government's display of a religious symbol, the Court has tested fidelity to the principle of neutrality by asking whether the display has the "effect of `endorsing' religion." County of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 592, 109 S.Ct. 3086. The display fails this requirement if it objectively "convey[s] a message that religion or a particular religious belief is favored or preferred." Id., at 593, 109 S.Ct. 3086 (internal quotation marks omitted; emphasis deleted).
As I see it, when a cross is displayed on public property, the government may be presumed to endorse its religious content. The venue is surely associated with the State; the symbol and its meaning are just as surely associated exclusively with Christianity. "It certainly is not common for property owners to open up their property [to] monuments that convey a message with which they do not wish to be associated." Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 471, 129 S.Ct. 1125, 172 L.Ed.2d 853 (2009). To non-Christians, nearly 30% of the population of the United States, Pew Research Center, America's Changing Religious Landscape 4 (2015), the State's choice to display the cross on public buildings or spaces conveys a message of exclusion: It tells them they "are outsiders, not full members of the political community," County of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 625, 109 S.Ct. 3086 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment) (internal quotation marks omitted). Cf. Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 708, 125 S.Ct. 2854 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("The adornment of our public spaces with displays of religious symbols" risks "`offend[ing] nonmembers of the faith being advertised as well as adherents who consider the particular advertisement disrespectful.'" (quoting County of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 651, 109 S.Ct. 3086 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part))).
A presumption of endorsement, of course, may be overcome. See Buono, 559 U.S. at 718, 130 S.Ct. 1803 (plurality opinion) ("The goal of avoiding governmental endorsement does not require eradication of all religious symbols in the public realm."). A display does not run afoul of the neutrality principle if its "setting ... plausibly indicates" that the government has not sought "either to adopt [a] religious message or to urge its acceptance by others." Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 737, 125 S.Ct. 2854 (Souter, J., dissenting). The "typical museum setting," for example,
"For nearly two millennia," the Latin cross has been the "defining symbol" of Christianity, R. Jensen, The Cross: History, Art, and Controversy ix (2017), evoking the foundational claims of that faith. Christianity teaches that Jesus Christ was "a divine Savior" who "illuminate[d] a path toward salvation and redemption." Lynch, 465 U.S. at 708, 104 S.Ct. 1355 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Central to the religion are the beliefs that "the son of God," Jesus Christ, "died on the cross," that "he rose from the dead," and that "his death and resurrection offer the possibility of eternal life." Brief for AmiciChristian and Jewish Organizations 7.
An exclusively Christian symbol, the Latin cross is not emblematic of any other faith. Buono, 559 U.S. at 747, 130 S.Ct. 1803 (Stevens, J., dissenting); Viladesau, supra, at 7 ("[T]he cross and its meaning... set Christianity apart from other world religions.").
The Commission urges in defense of its monument that the Latin cross "is not merely a reaffirmation of Christian beliefs"; rather, "when used in the context of a war memorial," the cross becomes "a universal symbol of the sacrifices of those who fought and died." Brief for Petitioner Maryland-National Capital Park and Planning Commission 34-35 (Brief for Planning Commission) (internal quotation marks omitted). See also Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 25 (The Latin cross is "a Christian symbol ... [b]ut it is also `a symbol often used to honor and respect [soldiers'] heroic acts.'" (quoting Buono, 559 U.S. at 721, 130 S.Ct. 1803 (plurality opinion); some internal quotation marks omitted)).
The Commission's "[a]ttempts to secularize what is unquestionably a sacred [symbol] defy credibility and disserve people of faith." Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 717, 125 S.Ct. 2854 (Stevens, J., dissenting). See, e.g., Brief for Amici Christian and Jewish Organizations 7 ("For Christians who think seriously about the events and
Because of its sacred meaning, the Latin cross has been used to mark Christian deaths since at least the fourth century. See Jensen, supra, at 68-69. The cross on a grave "says that a Christian is buried here," Brief for Amici Christian and Jewish Organizations 8, and "commemorates [that person's death] by evoking a conception of salvation and eternal life reserved for Christians," Brief for Amicus Jewish War Veterans 7. As a commemorative symbol, the Latin cross simply "makes no sense apart from the crucifixion, the resurrection, and Christianity's promise of eternal life." Brief for AmiciChristian and Jewish Organizations 8.
The cross affirms that, thanks to the soldier's embrace of Christianity, he will be rewarded with eternal life. Id., at 8-9. "To say that the cross honors the Christian war dead does not identify a secular meaning of the cross; it merely identifies a common application of the religious meaning." Id., at 8. Scarcely "a universal symbol of sacrifice," the cross is "the symbol of one particular sacrifice." Buono, 559 U.S. at 748, n. 8, 130 S.Ct. 1803 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Every Court of Appeals to confront the question has held that "[m]aking a ... Latin cross a war memorial does not make the cross secular," it "makes the war memorial sectarian." Id., at 747, 130 S.Ct. 1803.
The Peace Cross is no exception. That was evident from the start. At the dedication ceremony, the keynote speaker analogized the sacrifice of the honored soldiers to that of Jesus Christ, calling the Peace Cross "symbolic of Calvary," App. 449, where Jesus was crucified. Local reporters variously described the monument as "[a] mammoth cross, a likeness of the Cross of Calvary, as described in the Bible," id., at 428; "a monster [C]alvary cross," id., at 431; and "a huge sacrifice cross," id., at 439. The character of the monument has not changed with the passage of time.
The Commission nonetheless urges that the Latin cross is a "well-established" secular symbol commemorating, in particular, "military valor and sacrifice [in] World War I." Brief for Planning Commission 21. Calling up images of United States cemeteries overseas showing row upon row of cross-shaped gravemarkers, id., at 4-8; see ante, at 4-5, 21-22; Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 26, the Commission overlooks this reality: The cross was never perceived as an appropriate headstone or memorial for Jewish soldiers and others who did not adhere to Christianity.
A page of history is worth retelling. On November 11, 1918, the Great War ended. Bereaved families of American soldiers killed in the war sought to locate the bodies of their loved ones, and then to decide what to do with their remains. Once a soldier's body was identified, families could choose to have the remains repatriated to the United States or buried overseas in one of several American military cemeteries, yet to be established. Eventually, the remains of 46,000 soldiers were repatriated, and those of 30,000 soldiers were laid to rest in Europe. American Battle Monuments Commission, Annual Report to the President of the United States Fiscal Year 1925, p. 5 (1926) (ABMC Report).
When the War Department began preparing designs for permanent headstones in 1919, "no topic managed to stir more controversy than the use of religious symbolism." Id., at 121-122. Everyone involved in the dispute, however, saw the Latin cross as a Christian symbol, not as a universal or secular one. To achieve uniformity, the War Department initially recommended replacing the temporary sectarian markers with plain marble slabs resembling "those designed for the national cemeteries in the United States." Van Duyne, Erection of Permanent Headstones in the American Military Cemeteries in Europe, The Quartermaster Review (1930) (Quartermaster Report).
The War Department's recommendation angered prominent civil organizations, including the American Legion and the Gold Star associations: the United States, they urged, ought to retain both the cross and Star of David. See ibid.; Budreau, supra, at 123. In supporting sectarian markers, these groups were joined by the American Battle Monuments Commission (ABMC), a newly created independent agency charged with supervising the establishment of overseas cemeteries. ABMC Report 57. Congress weighed in by directing the War Department to erect headstones "of such design and material as may be agreed upon by the Secretary of War and the American Battle Monuments Commission." Ibid. (internal quotation marks omitted). In 1924, the War Department approved the ABMC's "designs for a Cross and Star of David." Quartermaster Report; ABMC Report 57.
Throughout the headstone debate, no one doubted that the Latin cross and the Star of David were sectarian gravemarkers, and therefore appropriate only for soldiers who adhered to those faiths. A committee convened by the War Department composed of representatives from "seven prominent war-time organizations" as well as "religious bodies, Protestant, Jewish, [and] Catholic" agreed "unanimous[ly]... that marble crosses be placed on the graves of all Christian American dead buried abroad, and that the graves of the Jewish American dead be marked by the six-pointed star." Durable Markers in the Form of Crosses for Graves of American Soldiers in Europe, Hearings before the Committee on Military Affairs of the House of Representatives, 68th Cong., 1st Sess., 24 (1924) (emphasis added). The Executive Director of the Jewish Welfare Board stated that "if any religious symbol is erected over the graves, then Judaism should have its symbol over the graves of its dead." Id., at 19. Others expressing
Far more crosses than Stars of David, as one would expect, line the grounds of American cemeteries overseas, for Jews composed only 3% of the United States population in 1917. J. Fredman & L. Falk, Jews in American Wars 100 (5th ed. 1954). Jews accounted for nearly 6% of U. S. forces in World War I (in numbers, 250,000), and 3,500 Jewish soldiers died in that war. Ibid. Even in Flanders Field, with its "`crosses, row on row,'" ante, at 2076 (quoting J. McCrae, In Flanders Fields, In Flanders Fields and Other Poems 3 (G. P. Putnam's Sons ed. 1919)), "Stars of David mark the graves of [eight American soldiers] of Jewish faith," American Battle Monuments Commission, Flanders Field American Cemetery and Memorial Visitor Booklet 11.
Reiterating its argument that the Latin cross is a "universal symbol" of World War I sacrifice, the Commission states that "40 World War I monuments ... built in the United States ... bear the shape of a cross." Brief for Planning Commission 8 (citing App. 1130). This figure includes memorials that merely "incorporat[e]" a cross. App. 1130.
In fact, the "most popular and enduring memorial of the [post-World War I] decade" was "[t]he mass-produced Spirit of the American Doughboy statue." Budreau, Bodies of War, at 139. That statue, depicting a U. S. infantryman, "met with widespread approval throughout American communities." Ibid. Indeed, the first memorial to World War I erected in Prince George's County "depict[s] a doughboy." App. 110-111. The Peace Cross, as Plaintiffs' expert historian observed, was an "aberration ... even in the era [in which] it was built and dedicated." Id., at 123.
Like cities and towns across the country, the United States military comprehended the importance of "pay[ing] equal respect to all members of the Armed Forces who perished in the service of our country," Buono, 559 U.S. at 759, 130 S.Ct. 1803 (Stevens, J., dissenting), and therefore
Holding the Commission's display of the Peace Cross unconstitutional would not, as the Commission fears, "inevitably require the destruction of other cross-shaped memorials throughout the country." Brief for Planning Commission 52. When a religious symbol appears in a public cemetery—on a headstone, or as the headstone itself, or perhaps integrated into a larger memorial —the setting counters the inference that the government seeks "either to adopt the religious message or to urge its acceptance by others." Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 737, 125 S.Ct. 2854 (Souter, J., dissenting). In a cemetery, the "privately selected religious symbols on individual graves are best understood as the private speech of each veteran." Laycock, Government-Sponsored Religious Displays: Transparent Rationalizations and Expedient Post-Modernism, 61 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 1211, 1242 (2011). See also Summum, 555 U.S. at 487, 129 S.Ct. 1125 (Souter, J., concurring in judgment) ("[T]here are circumstances in which government maintenance of monuments does not look like government speech at all. Sectarian identifications on markers in Arlington Cemetery come to mind."). Such displays are "linked to, and sho[w] respect for, the individual honoree's faith and beliefs." Buono, 559 U.S. at 749, n. 8, 130 S.Ct. 1803 (Stevens, J., dissenting). They do not suggest governmental endorsement of those faith and beliefs.
Recognizing that a Latin cross does not belong on a public highway or building does not mean the monument must be "torn down." Ante, at 2091 (BREYER, J., concurring); ante, at 2098 (GORSUCH, J., concurring in judgment).
In 1790, President Washington visited Newport, Rhode Island, "a longtime bastion of religious liberty and the home of one of the first communities of American Jews." Town of Greece v. Galloway, 572 U.S. 565, 636, 134 S.Ct. 1811, 188 L.Ed.2d 835 (2014) (KAGAN, J., dissenting). In a letter thanking the congregation
The Courts of Appeals have similarly concluded that the Latin cross remains a Christian symbol when used for other purposes. See, e.g., Robinson v. Edmond, 68 F.3d 1226, 1232 (C.A.10 1995) (city seal depicting the cross) ("The religious significance and meaning of the Latin or Christian cross are unmistakable."); Carpenter v. City and County of San Francisco, 93 F.3d 627, 630 (C.A.9 1996) (103-foot cross in public park) ("The Latin cross ... [`]represents with relative clarity and simplicity the Christian message of the crucifixion and resurrection of Jesus Christ, a doctrine at the heart of Christianity.'"); American Civil Liberties Union of Ill. v. St. Charles, 794 F.2d 265, 272-273 (C.A.7 1986) (35-foot cross displayed atop a fire house during the Christmas season) ("The cross ... is `the principal symbol of the Christian religion, recalling the crucifixion of Jesus Christ and the redeeming benefits of his passion and death.'"); Friedman v. Board of Cty. Comm'rs of Bernalillo Cty., 781 F.2d 777, 782 (C.A.10 1985) (county seal depicting Latin cross) ("[T]he seal ... conveys a strong impression to the average observer that Christianity is being endorsed.").
