GILBERTSON, Chief Justice.
[¶ 1.] Lyndon Hart appeals an order denying his petition to extend time to file a creditor's claim against the Estate of Blair Hamilton.
[¶ 2.] On the night of October 10, 2009, Blair Hamilton was drinking in his home with his friend Lyndon Hart and another person. Hamilton put a gun to his head in a simulated game of Russian roulette and accidentally killed himself. Hart witnessed Hamilton's death. Hamilton owned a large ranch in Harding County, South Dakota. Hart lived on the ranch in separate housing and worked for Hamilton.
[¶ 3.] Hart alleges that he was diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder in February 2011 from witnessing this event. Hart consulted with an attorney. On May 12, 2011, an intern in the attorney's office sent a letter to the attorney for Hamilton's estate ("the Estate"), requesting information about the Estate and the incident in order to assess a potential claim against the Estate.
[¶ 4.] In August 2011, Hart filed a petition to extend time to file a creditor's claim against the Estate under SDCL 29A-3-804(c). Specifically, Hart wanted to file an "unliquidated claim against the Estate of Blair Hamilton for the negligent and intentional infliction of emotional distress caused by the actions of Blair Hamilton on the night of October [10], 2009." After a hearing, the circuit court denied the petition.
[¶ 5.] After appellate briefing, the Estate submitted a motion to dismiss and a supplemental brief asserting that the Court lacks jurisdiction under Estate of Geier, 2012 S.D. 2, 809 N.W.2d 355. The Estate argues that Geier requires service of notice of appeal on all heirs and because not all heirs were served in this case, service was not completed. Hart served his notice of appeal only on the Estate's attorney. Hart argues Geier does not apply because he has not been permitted to
[¶ 6.] On appeal, we address the following issues:
[¶ 7.] In cases of statutory construction:
Martinmaas v. Engelmann, 2000 S.D. 85, ¶ 49, 612 N.W.2d 600, 611.
[¶ 9.] After appellate briefing, the Estate filed a motion to dismiss the appeal. The Estate alleges that Hart failed to serve his notice of appeal on all of Hamilton's heirs. Hart only served notice on counsel for the Estate.
[¶ 10.] The Estate relies on Geier, 2012 S.D. 2, 809 N.W.2d 355, decided on January 11, 2012. In Geier, the appellant was an heir who petitioned the probate court for supervised administration of the estate and removal of the personal representative. The circuit court denied appellant's petition. The appellant served notice of appeal only on the estate. This Court held: "Under SDCL 15-26A-4(3), notice of appeal must be served on the heirs. Because failure to serve notice of appeal to all parties is jurisdictionally fatal, this appeal must be dismissed." Id. ¶ 23, 809 N.W.2d at 361. SDCL 15-26A-4(3) provides in pertinent part: "The appellant, or his or her counsel, shall serve the notice of appeal and docketing statement on counsel of record of each party other than appellant, or, if a party is not represented by counsel, on the party at his or her last known address."
[¶ 11.] The appellant in Geier made the petition as an heir and as a party to the probate proceedings. Here, Hart petitioned to file a claim as a creditor of the Estate. Hart is in a different position than the appellant in Geier. As a potential creditor, Hart's petition is controlled by SDCL 29A-3-804(a)(1), which provides in part: "Claims against a decedent's estate may be presented by either of the following methods ... [t]he claimant may deliver or mail to the personal representative a written statement of the claim...." A personal representative addresses claims
[¶ 12.] "[T]he rules of statutory construction dictate that `statutes of specific application take precedence over statutes of general application.'" Schafer v. Deuel Cnty. Bd. of Comm'rs, 2006 S.D. 106, ¶ 10, 725 N.W.2d 241, 245 (quoting Coop. Agronomy Servs. v. S.D. Dep't of Revenue, 2003 S.D. 104, ¶ 19, 668 N.W.2d 718, 723). SDCL 29A-1-401 is a general provision governing notice in estate litigation. SDCL 29A-1-401(a) provides:
(Emphasis added.) Neither SDCL 29A-1-401(a) nor SDCL 15-26A-4(3) applies because SDCL 29A-3-804 is more specific in this instance. Even if those statutes did apply, who would be an "interested person" is not the same in every proceeding. See Estate of Flaws, 2012 S.D. 3, ¶ 11, 811 N.W.2d 749. SDCL 29A-1-201(23) defines "interested person" to include:
(Emphasis added.) Moreover, "the law on service of the notice of appeal requires service on `each' party, not just `adverse' parties...." Flaws, 2012 S.D. 3, ¶ 11, 811 N.W.2d at 751. In this case, the heirs are not parties in a creditor's claim against an estate. Accordingly, the Estate's motion to dismiss for failure to serve notice of appeal on all the heirs is denied.
[¶ 14.] Hart wants to present a claim against the Estate based on Hamilton's actions on October 10, 2009. Possibly relying on the Estate's response to its inquiry that all claims were barred by SDCL 29A-3-803, no claim was presented or filed. Instead, Hart petitioned the circuit court to extend time to file a creditor's claim under SDCL 29A-3-804(c). SDCL 29A-3-804(c) provides:
(Emphasis added.) The court held a hearing and denied the petition by order. No
[¶ 15.] The problem presented in this appeal is that no claim has ever been presented. By its plain language, SDCL 29A-3-804(c) only applies to claims that have been presented in a manner described by SDCL 29A-3-804(a)(1)
[¶ 16.] SDCL 29A-3-803 is a nonclaim statute, and sets limitations on presentation of claims. We identify Hart's argument that SDCL 29A-3-803 cannot control the potential claim because South Dakota does not have a provision controlling claims that "arose at or after death."
[¶ 17.] The order is affirmed. SDCL 29A-3-804(c) only applies to claims that have been presented. That is not the case here.
[¶ 18.] KONENKAMP, ZINTER, SEVERSON, and WILBUR, Justices, concur.
(Emphasis added.) Hart argues that SDCL 29A-3-803(a) does not bar his claim because, under a plain reading of the statute, Hart's claim did not arise before Hamilton's death. Instead, Hart asserts that the claim he would file against the Estate originated at or after Hamilton's death. Hart correctly notes that in adopting from the Uniform Probate Code, the Legislature did not adopt § 3-803(c):
(Emphasis added.) The South Dakota Probate Code does not have a statute equivalent or similar to UPC § 3-803(c), i.e., a statute to control claims against an estate that arise at or after the death of a decedent.