ROBERTO A. LANGE, District Judge.
A grand jury issued an amended indictment charging Elton Lone Eagle Sr. and Zachary Brown Thunder (collectively "Defendants") with two counts of assault with a dangerous weapon and two counts of assault resulting in serious bodily injury. Counts I and III of the amended indictment alleged that Defendants assaulted A.H., while Counts II and IV alleged that Defendants assaulted Miles Condon. The amended indictment alleged that the assaults occurred on January 29, 2015, near Dupree, South Dakota. The government contended that Lone Eagle held down A.H. while Brown Thunder used the flat side of a heated-up knife to brand a gang symbol on A.H.'s arm and that Condon was similarly assaulted. The Defendants denied having done so.
The joint trial against the Defendants commenced on October 20, 2015. Doc. 99. A.H. and Condon both testified on the second day of trial. Doc. 111 at 104-173; 174-193. A.H., who took the stand first, testified that on January 29, 2015, he, Lone Eagle, Brown Thunder, and Condon were in an upstairs room at a house in Dupree, South Dakota. Doc. 111 at 117-121. According to A.H., Lone Eagle, Brown Thunder, and Condon were drinking vodka; at some point they left A.H. and went downstairs. Doc. 111 at 121-22. Shortly thereafter, A.H. heard someone yell out in apparent pain. Doc. 111 at 122. In A.H.'s account, Lone Eagle then returned to the room and told him that they were leaving; however, when A.H. got downstairs, Lone Eagle shoved him to the ground and held him down while Brown Thunder branded two letters on the upper arm of A.H. with a hot butter knife. Doc. 111 at 123-28.
Condon testified on direct examination that he was too intoxicated on January 29, 2015, to remember the events of that day, including how he got a similar bum mark on his arm and who put it there. Doc. 111 at 175-79. Lone Eagle's attorney Edward Albright cross-examined Condon about his lack of memory and his statements to an investigator that he had burned and cut himself in the past. Doc. 111 at 179-188. Albright also elicited testimony from Condon that Condon's brother, Clinton Buckman, was at the house on January 29, 2015. Doc. 111 at 185.
David Siebrasse, Brown Thunder's attorney, cross-examined Condon next. Doc. 111 at 188-191. Siebrasse asked Condon a few questions about his family and living arrangements before engaging in the following exchange:
Doc. 111 at 190. Siebrasse then surprised everyone (except perhaps himself and his client) in the courtroom by continuing:
Doc. 111 at 190-91.
The redirect examination by the government's attorney Jay Miller went as follows:
Doc. 111 at 191-92.
The government then moved for a mistrial, arguing that Siebrasse had violated Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 16
The parties went back on the record approximately one hour later. Tellingly, Lone Eagle, who had moved for a mistrial right before Condon testified, opposed the government's motion for a mistrial. Doc. 111 at 199. When given an opportunity to explain the change of heart, Lone Eagle's attorney declined to do so. Doc. 111 at 205-06. After hearing additional argument from Siebrasse
As this Court explained, Buckman's claimed out-of-court statement that he had burned Condon and A.H. was inadmissible hearsay. Doc. 111 at 200-07. Buckman is the declarant, did not make the statement under oath, and was not available to testify and be subject to cross-examination. Buckman purportedly made the statement to Condon who then repeated what he recalls to have heard from Buckman. It was Buckman's inadmissible hearsay, rather than Condon's own firsthand knowledge, which was the basis for Condon's statement to Pesicka that Buckman was responsible for the brandings. Doc. 111 at 190-92. The statement that Condon made to Pesicka was entirely based on Buckman's hearsay statement and thus is inadmissible if offered to prove that Buckman had committed the brandings.
Siebrasse asserted, and Lone Eagle now argues, that Siebrasse was impeaching Condon and not introducing a hearsay statement. Condon however was consistent throughout that he was too drunk to have any memory at all of how he was burned on his arm. Impeachment must be a witness's prior statement inconsistent with his testimony, and there was no statement here of Condon that Condon recalls who branded him.
The inadmissible hearsay concerning Buckman's statement to Condon was extremely prejudicial to the government's case; it directly suggested that someone other than the Defendants burned not only Condon but also A.H. Doc. 111 at 199, 206-07. Lone Eagle's sudden choice to no longer seek a mistrial demonstrates how impactful the hearsay statement was. Further, because Siebrasse failed to disclose Buckman's statement to the government, the government was not prepared to object to admission of the hearsay evidence or speak with Condon about it before calling him as a witness. Doc. 111 at 201. Although this Court considered alternatives to granting a mistrial, such as instructing the jury to disregard the inadmissible hearsay, it ultimately concluded that there were no alternatives that could effectively ameliorate the prejudice to the government's case. Doc. 111 at 206-208. Given all of these circumstances, this Court concluded that there was manifest necessity for a mistrial. Doc. 111 at 200-09.
Both Defendants then moved for dismissal of the charges against them on the ground that retrying them after the jury was sworn would violate the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Doc. 111 at 208-09;
The Fifth Amendment's Double Jeopardy Clause protects a criminal defendant against multiple prosecutions for the same offense.
Lone Eagle makes several arguments in support of his contention that there was no manifest necessity for a mistrial, but none of them are persuasive. Lone Eagle argues first that there was no manifest necessity because the government not only failed to object to Siebrasse's questions to Condon, but also elicited Condon's testimony that Buckman told him he was responsible for the branding. As this Court explained during the trial, however, Buckman's admission and Condon's statements to Pesicka were a complete surprise to the government; without knowing anything about these statements, the government could hardly be expected to make a proper objection to Siebrasse's questions. Doc. 111 at 201. The manner in which Siebrasse framed his questions did not reveal that the statement was hearsay from Buckman and instead implied an admission by Condon.
Second, Lone Eagle argues that there was no manifest necessity for a mistrial because "Brown Thunder's questions to Condon appear to be an attempt to impeach him by a prior inconsistent statement, that is, to impeach his testimony that he did not remember what happened on the night of the alleged branding by introducing his statements to David Pesicka that he in fact knew that his brother Clinton had done it." Doc. 114 at 6. If that is what Siebrasse had been doing, the approach would have been different. Siebrasse did not introduce the topic to explore what Condon in fact recalled of the night in question and had reported as his recollection to Pesicka, but introduced the hearsay-based statement and ended his cross-examination. Doc. 111 at 191-92. Condon's statements to Pesicka were based on what Buckman told him rather than what Condon himself remembered. Doc. 111 at 191-92. Condon's telling Pesicka what he heard from Buckman is not an inconsistent statement that could be used to impeach him.
Lone Eagle argues third that before this Court granted a mistrial, Brown Thunder "should have been given an opportunity" to demonstrate that Buckman's out of court statement was admissible under Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b)(3). "For a statement to qualify under the Rule 804(b)(3) hearsay exception, the declarant must be unavailable, the statement must so far tend to subject the declarant to criminal liability that a reasonable person would not have made the statement unless he or she believed it to be true, and corroborating circumstances must clearly indicate the trustworthiness of the statement."
Fourth, Lone Eagle argues that because he was not responsible for eliciting the inadmissible hearsay, a mistrial should not have been granted with respect to him. Lone Eagle cites two cases-
Fifth, Lone Eagle argues that there was no manifest necessity because the government requested a mistrial so that it could strengthen its case.
Finally, Lone Eagle argues that a limiting instruction would have eliminated any need for a mistrial. For the reasons this Court explained during the trial, a limiting instruction would not have been sufficient to alleviate the prejudice to the government caused by the inadmissible hearsay.
In sum, the inadmissible hearsay was extremely prejudicial to the government's case against both defendants and there was no viable alternative to a mistrial. There were multiple possibilities unexplored because of the hearsay statement and lack of disclosure, including: 1) Buckman burned A.H. and Condon and would admit doing so, in which case an acquittal of these Defendants would be warranted; 2) Buckman made the statement, but has some explanation for it such as protecting the Defendants; 3) Condon misheard what Buckman said; 4) Buckman, contrary to Condon's testimony, did not make any such statement to Condon; 5) Buckman was not present and perhaps has some alibi for being elsewhere at the time A.H. and Condon sustained the bums; or 6) some other combination of these possibilities. Not knowing about the statement until it was sprung in mid-trial by Siebrasse left the government unable to properly explore and address these possibilities. There was a manifest necessity for a mistrial. Given these circumstances, Lone Eagle's rights under the Double Jeopardy Clause must "be subordinated to the public's interest in fair trials designed to end in just judgments."
For the reasons stated above, it is hereby
ORDERED that Lone Eagle's Motion to Dismiss Indictment, Doc. 113, is denied.