LAWRENCE L. PIERSOL, District Judge.
Plaintiff, Andrew Gregory Spotted Elk, filed this pro se lawsuit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Defendant Taylor Yost filed a motion for summary judgment (Docket 14) arguing that summary judgment should be granted based on qualified immunity. Spotted Elk did not respond to the defendant's motion for summary judgment. Having considered the written record in this case and for the reasons set forth below, the defendant's motion for summary judgment is granted based upon qualified immunity.
The local rules for this district require that the moving party on a motion for summary judgment submit a statement of the material facts as to which it contends there is no genuine issue to be tried. D.S.D. CIV. LR 56.1(A). The opposing party is required to respond to each numbered paragraph in the moving party's statement of material facts, and to identify any material facts as to which it contends there exists a genuine material issue to be tried. D.S.D. CIV. LR 56.1(B). All material facts set forth in the moving party's statement of material facts are deemed admitted if not controverted by the statement required to be served by the party opposing summary judgment. D.S.D. CW. LR 56.1(D); see also On Target Sporting Goods, Inc. v. Attorney General of the United States, 472 F.3d 572, 574 (8th Cir. 2007); see also Northwest Bank & Trust Co. v. First Illinois Nat'l Bank, 354 F.3d 721, 724-25 (8th Cir. 2003) (holding it was not an abuse of discretion to deem that plaintiff had admitted all of defendants' statements of material facts as a sanction for noncompliance with local summary judgment rules). Such rules are properly intended "to prevent a district court from engaging in the proverbial search for a needle in the haystack." Libel v. Adventure Lands of America, Inc., 482 F.3d 1028, 1032 (8th Cir. 2007) (discussing a similar Iowa Local Rule); see also Huckins v. Hollingsworth, 138 Fed. Appx. 860, 862 (8th Cir. 2005) (affirming district court's application of
"Although pro se pleadings are to be construed liberally, pro se litigants are not excused from failing to comply with substantive and procedural law." Burgs v. Sissel, 745 F.2d 526, 528 (8th Cir. 1984) (citing Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 834-35 n. 46 (1975)). Additionally, a district court has no obligation to "plumb the record in order to find a genuine issue of material fact" Barge v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 87 F.3d 256, 260 (8th Cir. 1996). Nor is the court "required to speculate on which portion of the record the nonmoving party relies, nor is it obligated to wade through and search the entire record for some specific facts that might support the nonmoving party's claim." Id Summary judgment could be granted without further analysis, because a party opposing summary judgment "may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but . . . must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." FED.R.CIV.P. 56(e).
Yost filed a Statement of Undisputed Facts (Docket 20) along with supporting affidavits and exhibits. The undisputed facts are recited below:
Summary judgment is appropriate if the movant "shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). The moving party can meet this burden by presenting evidence that there is, no dispute of material fact or by showing that the nonmoving party has not presented evidence to support an element of its case on which it bears the ultimate burden of proof. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). To avoid summary judgment, "Wile nonmoving party may not rest on mere allegations or denials, but must demonstrate on the record the existence of specific facts which create a genuine issue for trial." Mosley v. City of Northwoods, 415 F.3d 908, 910 (8th Cir. 2005) (quotation omitted).
The underlying substantive law identifies which facts are "material" for purposes of a motion for summary judgment. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). "Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment. Factual disputes that are irrelevant or unnecessary will not be counted." Id (citing 9A Charles Alan Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure, § 2725, at 93-95 (3d ed. 1983)). "[T]he mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will wit defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact." Id. at 247-48.
Prisoners who proceed pro se are entitled to the benefit of liberal construction at the pleading stage. Quam v. Minnehaha Cty. Jail, 821 F.2d 522, 522 (8th Cir. 1987). Nonetheless, the summary judgment standard set forth in Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure remains applicable to prisoners proceeding pro se. Id. The district court is not required to "plumb the record in order to find a genuine issue of material fact." Barge v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 87 F.3d 256, 260 (8th Cir. 1996). Courts must remain sensitive; however, "to the special problems faced by prisoners attempting to proceed pro se in vindicating their constitutional rights, and [the Eighth Circuit does] not approve summary dismissal of such pro se claims without regard for these special problems." Nickens v. White, 622 F.2d 967, 971 (8th Cir. 1980). "When dealing with summary judgment procedures the technical rigor is inappropriate where. . . uninformed prisoners are involved." Ross v. Franzen, 777 F.2d 1216, 1219 (7th Cir. 1985).
Spotted Elk sued Yost in his official capacity. As the Supreme Court has stated, "a suit. against a state official in his or her official capacity is not a suit against the official but rather is a suit against the official's office." Will v. Mich. Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989) (citing Brandon v. Holt, 469 U.S. 464, 471 (1985)). Thus, it is a suit against the state itself. While "[§] 1983 provides a federal forum to remedy many deprivations of civil liberties . . . it does not provide a federal forum for litigants who seek a remedy against a State for alleged deprivations of civil liberties." Id. at 66. The Eleventh Amendment generally acts as a bar to suits against a state for money damages unless the state has waived its sovereign immunity. Id Because Spotted Elk has sued Yost in his official capacity, Spotted. Elk has asserted a claim for money damages against the state of South Dakota. The state of South Dakota has not waived its sovereign immunity. Thus, to the extent Spotted Elk seeks to hold Yost liable in his official capacity for money damages, the court would find that Yost is protected by sovereign immunity and would be entitled to judgment on this issue as a matter of law.
Yost moves for summary judgment on Spotted Elk's excessive force claim. Under the Eighth Amendment, prisoners are protected "from the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain by correctional officers[.]" Treats v. Morgan, 308 F.3d 868, 870 (8th Cir. 2002) (citing Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319 (1986)). This, is true, "regardless of whether an inmate suffers serious injury as a result." Id. (citing Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 9 (1992)). Correctional officers may "use force reasonably `in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline,' but force [may] not to be used `maliciously and sadistically to cause harm.'" Id. (quoting Hudson, 503 U.S. at 7).
"In an Eighth Amendment excessive force case, `the core judicial inquiry is whether force was applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and sadistically to cause harm.'" Smith v. Conway Cty., Ark, 759 F.3d 853, 858 (8th Cir. 2014) (quoting Santiago v. Blair, 707 F.3d 984, 990 (8th Cir. 2013)). In deciding an Eighth Amendment claim, the court considers "whether there was an objective need for force, the relationship between any such need and the amount of force used, the threat reasonably perceived by the correctional officers, any efforts by the officers to temper the severity of their forceful response, and the extent of the inmate's injury." Treats, 308 F.3d at 870 (citing Hudson, 503 U.S. at 7). Because "the use of force is sometimes required in prison settings," Irving v. Dormire, 519 F.3d 441, 446 (8th Cir. 2008), courts frequently uphold officers' ability to use, physical force to restrain noncompliant inmates. See, e.g., Johnson v. Hamilton, 452 F.3d 967, 972 (8th Cir. 2006); Jasper v. Thalacker, 999 F.2d 353, 354 (8th Cir. 1993) (use of a stun gun to subdue a combative prisoner, even when four guards were present, was not excessive force).
The material facts are not disputed. Spotted Elk refused to comply with orders to stop kicking the holding cell door. Docket 17 ¶ 14; Docket 18 ¶ 12. When officers entered the holding cell to move Spotted Elk, Spotted Elk "became combative" and "attempted to kick at SCO Boysen." Docket 17 ¶ 19; Docket 18 ¶ 9; Docket 19 ¶ 7; Exhibits 4-5. The use of force by Yost was applied for the purpose of gaining control of a recalcitrant inmate and prevent attempts to assault staff. Docket 17 ¶ 21; Docket 18 ¶ 9; Docket 19 ¶ 7; Exhibits 4-5.
Spotted Elk's own conduct made it necessary for prison officials to forcefully restrain him. As a matter of law, there is nothing inhumane or wanton about enforcing reasonable prison regulations. Stenzel v. Ellis, 916 F.2d 423, 428 (8th Cir. 1990). As was aptly stated by the Seventh Circuit:
Lewis v. Downey, 581 F.3d 467, 476 (7th Cir. 2009); see also Burns v. Eaton, 752 F.3d 1136, 1140 (8th Cir. 2014) (pepper-spraying an inmate who disobeyed orders and engaged in aggressive acts of defiance was not a case where "a complete absence of a penological purpose" raised "the reasonable inference that the officers acted maliciously in an effort to cause harm").
There is also no material question of fact as to whether the force was excessive when Yost kneed Spotted Elk. Spotted Elk suffered only minor injuries: See Docket 16 ¶¶ 5-8, Exhibit 6. Spotted Elk fails to demonstrate any sadistic or malicious action on the part of Yost. As such, Yost is entitled to qualified immunity on Spotted Elk's claim of excessive force. Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that Yost's motion for summary judgment (Docket)) is granted.