1987 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 173">*173
P is the tax matters person of B, an S corporation which, during its 1983 taxable year, had only one shareholder. R examined B's Federal income tax return pursuant to the S corporation audit and litigation procedures,
89 T.C. 1169">*1170 OPINION
This case is before us on petitioner's motions to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction and for litigation costs. The Commissioner determined adjustments to Blanco Investments & Land, Ltd.'s (Blanco) S corporation return for its 1983 taxable year as set forth in a Notice of Final S Corporation Administrative Adjustment.
Petitioner contends that Blanco was exempt from the S corporation audit and litigation procedures of subchapter D of chapter 63 of subtitle F,
A hearing was held on petitioner's motions on October 21, 1987, at Washington, D.C. Petitioner filed a statement in lieu of appearance pursuant to Rule 50(c) on October 19, 1987. The relevant facts are not in dispute.
Petitioner Jack M. Little is the tax matters person of Blanco, a corporation organized under the laws of the State of California and having its principal place of business at Laguna Hills, California. Blanco elected to be taxed as a subchapter S corporation during the year in issue. See sec. 1362(a).
In 1983, Blanco had only one shareholder, William T. White III. White's 19831987 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 173">*176 income tax return consistently reports the information obtained from the Schedule K-1 issued by Blanco. On August 9, 1985, respondent commenced an examination of Blanco's 1983 S corporation return pursuant to the S corporation audit and litigation procedures,
Petitioner timely filed a petition with this Court on May 19, 1987, seeking readjustment of respondent's determinations set forth in the FSAA. On May 22, 1987, petitioner filed a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction on the ground that Blanco was exempt from the S corporation audit and litigation procedures as a small S corporation. Petitioner concurrently filed a motion for litigation costs. On September 4, 1987, respondent filed his notice of objection to petitioner's motion to dismiss and memorandum in support thereof. Respondent also filed a notice of objection to petitioner's motion for litigation costs on the ground that the motion was premature under Rule 231(a)(2) 2 because the Court had not ruled on petitioner's1987 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 173">*177 motion to dismiss.
The S corporation audit and litigation procedures,
The Subchapter S Revision Act of 1982,
1987 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 173">*179 On January 30, 1987, respondent issued temporary regulations 4 providing special rules for the treatment of certain small S corporations. The regulations are effective for "any taxable year of an S corporation the due date of the return for which (determined without regard to extensions) is on or 89 T.C. 1169">*1173 after January 30, 1987."
1987 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 173">*180 Petitioner argues that
Respondent contends that the small partnership exception does not relate sufficiently to partnership items to be incorporated into the S corporation audit and litigation procedures. Moreover, 1987 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 173">*182 respondent argues that because S 89 T.C. 1169">*1174 corporations are by definition small (see sec. 1361(b)(1)(A)), Congress did not intend for the small partnership exception to be incorporated via
We believe that the small partnership exception does, by definition, "relate" to partnership items. Eligibility for small partnership status turns, in part, on how the partners share partnership items.
The partnership litigation provisions were, in effect, grafted onto the subchapter S litigation provisions. No specific expression of congressional approval or disapproval of a small subchapter S exception can be found; nevertheless because a very detailed statute was being grafted onto the subchapter S litigation provisions, we presume that Congress was aware of that statute's reach and application. The small partnership exception is part of that detail, and because it relates to partnership items, we believe the statute incorporates a small S corporation exception in the subchapter S procedures.
Respondent argues that a small S corporation exception, if one exists, must necessarily be set at 10 shareholders to parallel the partnership provisions. Respondent correctly points out that while partnerships may have 100 or more partners, S corporations are statutorily limited to 35 shareholders. Thus, while 10 is a small exception for partnerships, it is not for S corporations. By exempting S corporations with 10 or fewer shareholders, respondent's counsel has represented that we would exempt 90 percent of 89 T.C. 1169">*1175 S corporations1987 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 173">*184 from the entity level audit and litigation procedures. We agree with respondent that Congress could not have intended such a result, but we do not agree that the statute necessarily contemplates a small S corporation exception set at 10 shareholders in the absence of regulations.
Congress gave respondent broad regulatory authority in interpreting the S corporation litigation provisions to modify or make inapplicable provisions of the partnership litigation procedures. Respondent has the authority to modify the small partnership exception to take into account the differences between S corporations and partnerships. See S. Rept. 97-640, at 25 (1982),
Prior to the effective date of the regulations, respondent had taken no action to modify the small partnership exception. Respondent argues that until the regulations took effect, 1987 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 173">*185 there was no small S corporation exception. Nevertheless, the statute mandates that some exception exists, at least in the absence of regulations to the contrary. A small subchapter S exception is not triggered by respondent's promulgation of regulations. It is created by the statute. The regulations set the limit within which the exception operates. In other words, we will not read the exception out of the statute because of respondent's failure to issue timely regulations.
If we were to set the number of shareholders an S corporation may have and still qualify for a small S corporation exception, we would be acting as the tax administrator. That is not our position and we will not usurp it. 6 Notwithstanding our refraining from choosing the 89 T.C. 1169">*1176 right number, we believe that there is a statutory minimum number.
1987 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 173">*186 We believe the statutory minimum exception for small S corporations is an S corporation with only one shareholder. While administrative discretion is necessary to set the required number of shareholders higher than one, it is clear that interpreting the S corporation litigation procedures to apply to an S corporation with one shareholder would lead to a result contrary to the intent of the statute. The procedures were intended to conserve time and resources by disposing of all issues relating to an S corporation in a single proceeding. There is no need for a separate entity level proceeding for an S corporation with only one shareholder. It is impossible to have conflicting shareholder positions with a single shareholder. The judicial and administrative problems that prompted Congress to enact the entity level audit and litigation procedures do not exist in the case of the single shareholder. Moreover, applying the entity level procedures to a single shareholder S corporation creates additional litigation rather than conserving time and resources.
We are not required to ignore commonsense in interpreting a statute. Congress enacted the entity level audit and litigation procedures1987 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 173">*187 to provide a unified proceeding to determine the tax treatment of entity items, thus ensuring consistent results for all shareholders. Where an S corporation is owned by one shareholder a "unified" proceeding is a useless bifurcation of a one-person examination. Although respondent has broad discretion under the S corporation audit and litigation procedures, that discretion is not unfettered. Respondent cannot nullify the statute by failing to promulgate regulations.
We, therefore, hold that Blanco was exempt from the small S corporation audit and litigation procedures in 1983, as a small S corporation. The Notice of Final S Corporation Administrative Adjustment is thus invalid and we lack jurisdiction. 7
89 T.C. 1169">*1177 To reflect the foregoing,
1. All section references are to the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 as amended and in effect during the year in issue.↩
2. All Rule references are to the Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure.↩
3.
The provisions of -- (1) subchapter C which relate to -- (A) assessing deficiencies, and filing claims for credit or refund, with respect to partnership items, and (B) judicial determination of partnership items, and (2) so much of the other provisions of this subtitle as relate to partnership items,↩
4. The text of the temporary regulations also serves as the text of the proposed regulations.
A small S corporation, however, may elect to have the corporate level audit and litigation procedures apply.
5.
(1) Partnership. -- * * * * (B) Exception for small partnerships. -- (i) In general. -- The term "partnership" shall not include any partnership if -- (I) such partnership has 10 or fewer partners each of whom is a natural person (other than a nonresident alien) or an estate, and (II) each partner's share of each partnership item is the same as his share of every other item.↩
6. We doubt, however, that respondent could exempt S corporations with more than 10 shareholders from the S corporation audit and litigation procedures. This is the maximum number of partners a partnership may have to qualify for the small partnership exception, and there is no indication that Congress intended to create a larger exception for S corporations. In addition, as we have previously noted, an exception for S corporations with 10 or fewer shareholders exempts 90 percent of S corporations from the entity level proceedings. If respondent set an upper limit on the size of S corporations exempt from the entity level proceedings at a number larger than 10, he would exempt virtually all S corporations from the reach of the S corporation audit and litigation procedures. Such an action could constitute an abuse of discretion.↩
7. Petitioner's motion for litigation costs is premature and we, therefore, express no opinion on it. Rule 231(a)(2).↩