Therefore, for a deduction to be allowed under section 280A(c)(1), the provision petitioners rely upon, the taxpayer must establish that a portion of his dwelling unit is (1) exclusively used, (2) on a regular basis, (3) for the purposes enumerated in subparagraphs (A), (B), or (C) of section 280A(c)(1), and (4) if the taxpayer is an employee, the office 94 T.C. 348">*354 is maintained for the convenience of the employer. ² In the present case, 1990 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 21">*31 the parties disagree on whether petitioner satisfied any of these four requirements. We first consider whether petitioner's use of his home office satisfies the exclusivity requirement. We will address the remaining requirements of section 280A(c)(1) as is necessary.

The parties agree that petitioner regularly used his home office in connection with two separate and independent business activities during 1983 and 1984. Petitioner was both an independent contract actor and a salaried employee of the Alliance Theatre, responsible for administering its acting school.

Because petitioner used his home office for two business uses, this case presents a unique question: When a taxpayer uses one home1990 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 21">*32 office for two separate and distinct business activities, whether both business uses must be of the types described in section 280A(c)(1) in order to satisfy the exclusive use requirement of that section. This is a fundamental question and one of first impression.

In resolving this issue we are assisted by the legislative history of section 280A. Section 280A was added to the Internal Revenue Code by the Tax Reform Act of 1976 ³ to provide "definitive rules relating to deductions for expenses attributable to the business use of homes." S. Rept. 94-1236 (1976), 1976-3 C.B. (Vol. 3) 807, 839. Congress was responding to cases (particularly those decided by this Court) in which a more liberal standard than that applied by the Internal Revenue Service for the deduction of home office expenses was held to be appropriate. Under these decisions, expenses connected to a home office were held deductible on the grounds that the maintenance of such office was "appropriate and helpful" to the taxpayer's business under the circumstances. See Bodzin v. Commissioner, 60 T.C. 820">60 T.C. 820 (1973), revd. 509 F.2d 679">509 F.2d 679 (4th Cir. 1975);1990 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 21">*33 Newi v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1969-131, affd. 432 F.2d 998">432 F.2d 998 (2d Cir. 1970); Gill v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1975-3. As reflected in the Senate Report, Congress was concerned that 94 T.C. 348">*355 under this "appropriate and helpful" standard, expenses which were otherwise personal in nature would be allowed as business deductions:

In many cases the application of the appropriate and helpful test would appear to result in treating personal living, and family expenses which are directly attributable to the home (and therefore not deductible) as ordinary and necessary business expenses, even though those expenses did not result in additional or incremental costs incurred as a result of the business use of the home. Thus, expenses otherwise considered nondeductible personal, living, and family expenses might be converted into deductible business expenses simply because, under the facts of the particular case, it was appropriate and helpful to perform some portion of the taxpayer's business in his personal residence. * * * [S. Rept. 94-938 (1976), 1976-3 C.B. (Vol. 3) 49, 185.]

1990 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 21">*34

Section 280A, therefore, was enacted to preclude the deduction of expenses attributable to the business use of a home office except under certain limited conditions, which are provided in section 280A(c). ⁴Congress intended that only expenses which were clearly ordinary and necessary business expenses would be deductible.

Congress, in 1981, amended section 280A(c)⁵ to liberalize the home office rules, particularly as they were being interpreted by the Internal Revenue Service, to permit a business expense deduction for taxpayers having more than one trade or business. Prior to the amendment, the Internal Revenue Service allowed home office deductions only if the taxpayer was using his residence as the principal place of business of his main business activity. See Senate discussion1990 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 21">*35 on H.R. 5159 (The Black Lung Benefits Revenue Act of 1981), 97th Cong., 1st Sess., 127 Cong. Rec. 31966, 31968 (1981) (statement of Sen. Dole). By adding the words "for any trade or business of the taxpayer" to the end of subparagraph (A) of section 280A(c)(1), Congress made it "clear that a taxpayer can have a principal place of business for each separate trade or business of the taxpayer and if the regular and exclusive use tests are met, can deduct the expenses attributable to using his residence as the principal place of business for one or more such 94 T.C. 348">*356 businesses." (Emphasis added.) See Staff of the J. Comm. on Taxation, Summary of H.R. 5159, The Black Lung Benefits Revenue Act of 1981, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., at 11 (J. Comm. Print 1981).

In light of the above statutory framework and legislative history, we conclude that expenses attributable to the use of a home office in conducting two or more separate business activities may1990 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 21">*36 be deductible. Section 280A was not intended to compel a taxpayer to physically segregate his different business activities when it would otherwise be unnecessary, cf. Soliman v. Commissioner, 94 T.C. 20">94 T.C. 20 (1990), or to discourage an industrious individual from conducting more than one business activity out of his home. See Senate discussion H.R. 5159, supra, 127 Cong. Rec. at 31968. Therefore, the exclusive use requirement of section 280A(c)(1) does not demand that a home office be used exclusively in connection with only one business or only one of the types of uses enumerated in subparagraphs (A), (B), and (C). Thus, the fact that petitioner used his home office in conducting two business activities does not, in and of itself, violate the exclusive use requirement or destroy the applicability of section 280A(c)(1).

We also conclude, however, that when a taxpayer utilizes one home office in conducting numerous business activities, each and every business use must be of the type(s) described in section 280A(c)(1). Otherwise, the exclusive use requirement of that section will not be satisfied and the general nondeductibility provision of section1990 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 21">*37 280A(a) will apply. Therefore, if only one of a number of uses qualifies under subparagraph (A), (B), or (C) of section 280A(c)(1), the expenses attributable to the business use of a home office will not be allowable as deductions even if the other uses are business related. ⁶ For example, if the taxpayer uses his home office in conducting two business activities, one which qualifies under section 280A(c)(1)(A), (B), or (C) and one which does not, the expenses attributable to the business use of the home office are not allowable as deductions. The taxpayer in this situation does not use the home office 94 T.C. 348">*357 exclusively for one or more of the purposes described in section 280A(c)(1) and the expenses are not deductible to any extent. For purposes of sec. 280A(c)(1), where a home office is put to both qualified and nonqualified uses, we are precluded from allocating expenses between those uses for purposes of their deductibility. The exclusive use requirement of sec. 280A(c)(1) is an all-or-nothing standard which was specifically imposed by Congress to put an end to any previous rules containing allocation methods. S. Rept. 94-938 (1976), 1976-3 C.B. (Vol. 3) 49, 184-186.1990 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 21">*38 Compare sec. 280A(c)(4)(C) where an allocation formula is specifically provided for purposes of sec. 280A(c)(4)(A) (when a portion of the taxpayer's residence is used in providing day-care services).

In enacting section 280A, Congress intended to preclude expenses "otherwise considered nondeductible personal, living, and family expenses" from being "converted into deductible business expenses" merely because they have some connection to a business activity. S. Rept. 94-938 (1976), 1976-3 C.B. (Vol. 3) 49, 185. There was congressional concern that taxpayers who experienced minor incremental expenses could claim deductions, and that some could deduct personal expenses under the guise of business use of the home. Green v. Commissioner, 707 F.2d 404">707 F.2d 404, 707 F.2d 404">407 (9th Cir. 1983), revg. 78 T.C. 428">78 T.C. 428 (1982). 1990 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 21">*39 ⁷ Accordingly, a use that fails to qualify under section 280A(c) is to be treated as personal in nature for purposes of deducting any related expenses. This would be the case irrespective of whether the use has some relation to the taxpayer's business activity. Therefore, unless the taxpayer can satisfy each and every requirement enumerated in section 280A(c)(1), no deduction allocable to the business use of a home shall be allowed. One of those requirements is that the home office be used exclusively for the types of business purposes described in paragraph (1) of subsection (c). Therefore, we hold that where the taxpayer regularly uses his home office in connection with more than one business or activity, section 280A(c)(1) may apply, provided that each business use is of the type enumerated in section 280A(c)(1) and the home 94 T.C. 348">*358 office is so used exclusively. Accordingly, petitioners here must establish that each business use of their home office qualifies under section 280A(c)(1).

1990 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 21">*40 In the present case, petitioner used his home office in connection with his acting business and his employment with the Alliance Theatre as administrator of its acting school. We first address whether petitioner's use of his home office as administrator of the acting school satisfies section 280A(c)(1). If it does not, petitioner cannot satisfy the exclusive use requirement of section 280A(c)(1) under our above analysis. Our consideration of this issue would, therefore, be completed. The general nondeductibility rule of section 280A(a) would govern, the exception provided in section 280A(c)(1) being inapplicable.

Petitioner argues that, as administrator, he satisfies section 280A(c)(1)(A) because his home office was his "principal place of business" and his use of the home office for that purpose was "for the convenience of his employer." Respondent argues to the contrary. We agree with respondent.

In the case of an employee, section 280A(c)(1) will apply only if the home office is used "for the convenience of his employer." Sec. 280A(c)(1). Neither the statute nor the proposed regulations provide us with any guidance as to when an office will be considered used for the convenience1990 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 21">*41 of the employer. See sec. 1.280A-2(g)(2), Proposed Income Tax Regs., 45 Fed. Reg. 52399 (Aug. 7, 1980). Such use, however, has been found where the employee must maintain the office as a condition of his employment, Green v. Commissioner, 78 T.C. 428">78 T.C. 428, 78 T.C. 428">430 (1982), revd. on other grounds 707 F.2d 404">707 F.2d 404 (9th Cir. 1983), or when the home office was necessary for the functioning of the employer's business, or necessary to allow the employee to perform his duties properly. See Frankel v. Commissioner, 82 T.C. 318">82 T.C. 318, 82 T.C. 318">325-326 (1984); Drucker v. Commissioner, 715 F.2d 67">715 F.2d 67, 715 F.2d 67">70 (2d Cir. 1983), revg. 79 T.C. 605">79 T.C. 605 (1982). However, the home office cannot be "purely a matter of personal convenience, comfort, or economy" with respect to the employee. See Sharon v. Commissioner, 66 T.C. 515">66 T.C. 515, 66 T.C. 515">523 (1976), affd. 591 F.2d 1273">591 F.2d 1273 (9th Cir. 1978).

94 T.C. 348">*359 The record in this case does not support petitioners' contention that the home office was used for the convenience of the Alliance1990 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 21">*42 Theatre acting school. It is apparent from the facts in this case that petitioner's Alliance Theatre home office use was for his own convenience, comfort, or economy. His employer did not require or expect him to do any of his work at his home. To the contrary, petitioner's employer provided him with a suitable office which was accessible to petitioner at all times, including during nonbusiness hours, the same hours petitioner used his home office. See 715 F.2d 67">Drucker v. Commissioner, supra at 70. In addition, petitioners presented no evidence that in 1983 and 1984, petitioner's employer had any knowledge of the existence of the home office or that it was being used by petitioner in doing school related work. The fact that other theater employees regularly used petitioner's theater office does not improve his position because his office was used by others only when he was out. Many people engaged in businesses and professions may find it helpful to take work home with them, but that does not automatically establish that the home office is maintained for the convenience of their employer.

Accordingly, we find that petitioner's use of his home office in1990 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 21">*43 connection with his employment as administrator of the acting school was not for the convenience of the Alliance Theatre, but is instead to be treated as a personal use. Consequently, petitioner's use of his home office does not comply with section 280A(c)(1). Thus, petitioner has not satisfied the exclusivity requirement of section 280A(c)(1), and, pursuant to section 280A(a), petitioner's home office deductions are not allowed except as provided in section 280A(b). It is clear from the wording of the statute and legislative history that this restrictive approach was intended and is not for us to alter.

The final issue we must decide is whether petitioners are entitled to deductions for automobile expenses in excess of those allowed by respondent. Pursuant to petitioners' concession, we find that, because the automobile expenses were incurred in commuting to and from a home office which does not qualify under section 280A(c)(1), the automobile expenses are not deductible.

94 T.C. 348">*360 To reflect the foregoing and concessions of the parties,

Decision will be entered under Rule 155.