Filed: Aug. 14, 2003
Latest Update: Nov. 14, 2018
Summary: T.C. Memo. 2003-245 UNITED STATES TAX COURT DAVID B. HUBBARD AND JANIS HUBBARD, Petitioners v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent Docket No. 1764-02. Filed August 14, 2003. David B. Hubbard and Janis Hubbard, pro sese. Alan J. Tomsic, for respondent. MEMORANDUM FINDINGS OF FACT AND OPINION SWIFT, Judge: Respondent determined a deficiency in petitioners’ Federal income tax for 1997 in the amount of $5,814. Unless otherwise indicated, all section references are to the Internal Revenue Co
Summary: T.C. Memo. 2003-245 UNITED STATES TAX COURT DAVID B. HUBBARD AND JANIS HUBBARD, Petitioners v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent Docket No. 1764-02. Filed August 14, 2003. David B. Hubbard and Janis Hubbard, pro sese. Alan J. Tomsic, for respondent. MEMORANDUM FINDINGS OF FACT AND OPINION SWIFT, Judge: Respondent determined a deficiency in petitioners’ Federal income tax for 1997 in the amount of $5,814. Unless otherwise indicated, all section references are to the Internal Revenue Cod..
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T.C. Memo. 2003-245
UNITED STATES TAX COURT
DAVID B. HUBBARD AND JANIS HUBBARD, Petitioners v.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent
Docket No. 1764-02. Filed August 14, 2003.
David B. Hubbard and Janis Hubbard, pro sese.
Alan J. Tomsic, for respondent.
MEMORANDUM FINDINGS OF FACT AND OPINION
SWIFT, Judge: Respondent determined a deficiency in
petitioners’ Federal income tax for 1997 in the amount of $5,814.
Unless otherwise indicated, all section references are to
the Internal Revenue Code in effect for the year in issue, and
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all Rule references are to the Tax Court Rules of Practice and
Procedure.
The issue for decision is whether the cost of certain
equipment purchased by petitioner for use in his optometric
practice qualifies under section 44 for the “disabled access”
Federal income tax credit.
FINDINGS OF FACT
Some of the facts have been stipulated and are so found.
At the time the petition was filed, petitioners resided in
Reno, Nevada. Hereinafter, references to petitioner in the
singular are to petitioner David Hubbard.
From 1977 through 2000, petitioner, was an optometrist and
owned and operated his own optometric practice in Winnemucca,
Nevada. During those 23 years, the only optometric practice
located in a three-county area (namely, Humboldt County, Pershing
County, and Lander County, Nevada), was petitioner’s. The
optometric practice located closest to petitioner’s practice was
in Elko, Nevada, approximately 120 miles from Winnemucca.
As an optometrist, petitioner diagnosed and treated certain
eye diseases, tested vision problems, prescribed corrective
lenses, and sold eyeglasses and contact lenses.
Generally, prior to 1997, to test the vision of his patients
and to prescribe corrective lenses, petitioner determined his
patients’ “refractive error” by performing subjective refractions
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using a manual refractor. To perform subjective refractions,
petitioner would have his patients sit in an examination chair
behind a manual refractor, view various charts through lenses in
the manual refractor, and answer a series of questions that
petitioner would ask them. Subjective refractions of patients
would take approximately 5 to 10 minutes each.
On disabled patients, however, petitioner occasionally was
not able to perform subjective refractions. For example, some
mentally handicapped patients and hearing impaired patients were
unable to understand and answer questions asked during subjective
refractions, and some physically disabled patients could not be
moved from their wheelchairs into petitioner’s examination chair
behind the manual refractor.
Although petitioner and hearing impaired patients could
write notes to each other during subjective refractions, it was
difficult for hearing impaired patients to look through the
manual refractor while reading notes from and writing notes to
petitioner, thereby affecting the accuracy of the subjective
refractions.
Prior to 1997, as a result of the above difficulties in
diagnosis, petitioner was not able to treat a number of disabled
patients, and petitioner referred those disabled patients to
other optometrists located in distant communities. In 1996, due
to petitioner’s inability to treat them, approximately 30
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disabled patients were referred by petitioner to other
optometrists.
In 1997, in order to increase petitioner’s ability to treat
disabled patients, petitioner purchased for $12,950 a Humphrey
Instruments automatic refractor/keratometer (automatic
refractor).
Also in 1997, petitioner purchased for $4,495 a Rush
Ophthalmics height-adjustable rotary instrument stand on which to
place the automatic refractor. This rotary instrument stand made
the automatic refractor accessible to wheelchair patients.
Using the automatic refractor and the rotary instrument
stand together petitioner was able to perform “objective”
refractions on all of his patients in order to test their vision
and in order to prescribe corrective lenses without the patients
having to be seated in an examination chair behind a manual
refractor and without having to engage in a series of written
questions and answers.
While the patients look into the automatic refractor, the
refractor shines a light into the patients’ eyes, takes
measurements, and prints out copies of the patients’
prescriptions. Using the automatic refractor and the rotary
instrument stand, objective refractions on petitioner’s patients
took about 10 to 15 seconds.
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Using the automatic refractor, petitioner was able to test
the vision of some disabled patients whom petitioner would not
have been able to test using a manual refractor.
In 1997, petitioner’s optometric practice realized gross
receipts of $586,649.
Petitioners timely filed their 1997 joint Federal income tax
return, with a Form 8826, Disabled Access Credit, on which
petitioners claimed under section 44 a disabled access tax credit
in the amount of $5,000 relating to petitioner’s costs of
purchasing the automatic refractor and the rotary instrument
stand.
In a notice of deficiency, respondent disallowed
petitioners’ claimed $5,000 disabled access tax credit.
OPINION
The Americans With Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), Pub. L.
101-336, sec. 302(a), 104 Stat. 355, codified at 42 U.S.C. sec.
12182(a) (2000), prohibits discrimination against disabled
individuals in the full and equal enjoyment of goods, services,
facilities, privileges, advantages, and accommodations by any
“place of public accommodation”.
For purposes of ADA, professional offices of health care
providers, such as petitioner’s optometric practice, are included
within the definition of places of public accommodation.
42 U.S.C. sec. 12181(7)(F) (2000).
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With regard particularly to disabled individuals, ADA
regulations provide as follows:
A health care provider may refer an individual with a
disability to another [health care] provider, if that
individual is seeking, or requires, treatment or
services outside of the referring provider’s area of
specialization, and if the referring provider would
make a similar referral for an individual without a
disability who seeks or requires the same treatment or
services. A physician who specializes in treating only
a particular condition cannot refuse to treat an
individual with a disability for that condition * * *.
[28 C.F.R. sec. 36.302(b)(2) (2002); emphasis added.]
In order to comply with the above general ADA prohibition of
discrimination against individuals with disabilities, places of
public accommodation such as petitioner’s optometric practice
are required to make reasonable modifications to their facilities
and procedures that are necessary in order to provide services to
individuals with disabilities. 42 U.S.C. sec.
12182(b)(2)(A)(ii); 28 C.F.R. sec. 36.302(a) (2002).
Places of public accommodation are required to remove any
physical barriers including communication barriers that are
structural in nature, where such removal is “readily achievable”.
42 U.S.C. sec. 12182(b)(2)(A)(iv); 28 C.F.R. sec. 36.304(a)
(2002). “Readily achievable” is defined by ADA as being “easily
accomplishable and able to be carried out without much difficulty
or expense.” 42 U.S.C. sec. 12181(9) (2000). Factors to be
considered include the following:
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(1) The nature and cost of the action to be
taken;
(2) The financial resources of the place of public
accommodation, and the effect of the action on its
expenses and resources; and
(3) The type of operations of the place of public
accommodation, and the impact of the action on its
operations. Id.
Cases discussing ADA sec. 302, 104 Stat. 355, 42 U.S.C. sec.
12182(b)(2)(A)(ii), make it clear that determining whether
expenditures and modifications by service providers would be
reasonable constitutes a fact and case specific test. As
explained in Staron v. McDonald’s Corp.,
51 F.3d 353, 356 (2d
Cir. 1995):
the determination of whether a particular modification
is “reasonable” involves a fact-specific, case-by-case
inquiry that considers, among other factors, the
effectiveness of the modification in light of the
nature of the disability in question and the cost to
the organization that would implement it. [Citations
omitted.]
Section 44(a) provides “eligible small businesses” with a
Federal income tax credit equal to 50 percent of “eligible access
expenditures” exceeding $250 and up to $10,250 (with a maximum
credit of $5,000) which enable the businesses to comply with ADA.
“Eligible small businesses” are defined as businesses with
gross receipts less than $1 million or with less than 30
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employees (and which elect to be treated as such by filing a Form
8826). Sec. 44(b).
“Eligible access expenditures” are defined as amounts paid
or incurred by eligible small businesses for the purpose of
complying with ADA, including the following: (1) Expenditures to
remove architectural, communication, physical, or transportation
barriers preventing the business from being accessible to, or
usable by, individuals with disabilities; and (2) expenditures to
acquire or modify equipment for use by or to benefit individuals
with disabilities. Sec. 44(c)(2)(A), (D). Also, to qualify as
eligible access expenditures the expenditures must be reasonable
and necessary. Sec. 44(c)(3).
In Fan v. Commissioner,
117 T.C. 32, 34-35, 37 (2001), a
disabled access tax credit claimed by a dentist relating to the
cost of an intraoral camera system was disallowed. The intraoral
camera system included a wand-shaped oral camera that could be
inserted inside patients’ mouths, a monitor, and educational
videotapes, all of which enabled patients to watch the dentist
perform dental work and to watch videos that explained various
diagnoses and treatments. Id. at 34.
In Fan, because, prior to purchasing the intraoral camera
system, the dentist was already in compliance with ADA through
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the use of handwritten notes to communicate with hearing impaired
patients and because the dentist had always been able to treat
disabled patients, we disallowed the claimed disabled access
credit. Id. at 37-39. We also noted that the intraoral camera
system had a general applicability and usefulness to all of the
dentist’s patients. Id. at 34.
Relying on Fan, respondent argues that prior to purchasing
the automatic refractor and the instrument stand at issue in this
case petitioner already was in compliance with ADA and that
because the automatic refractor and instrument stand had general
applicability and usefulness in treating all of petitioner’s
patients, petitioner should not be entitled to the section 44
disabled access tax credit relating to the cost of purchasing the
equipment. Respondent also alleges that the automatic refractor
and the instrument stand did not represent reasonable and
necessary expenses of petitioner’s optometric practice.
Petitioner argues that because the automatic refractor and
the instrument stand enabled him to provide vision testing to
disabled patients for whom petitioner previously had not been
able to provide treatment and whom petitioner previously had
referred elsewhere, petitioner’s purchase of the automatic
refractor and the instrument stand enabled petitioner to comply
with the requirements of ADA, and he should be entitled to the
section 44 disabled access tax credit with respect to the total
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$17,445 cost of the equipment, subject to the annual credit limit
of $5,000.
In distinction to the facts involved in Fan v. Commissioner,
supra, prior to purchasing the automatic refractor and the
instrument stand, petitioner herein was not able to provide
vision testing services to some disabled patients. Petitioner’s
testimony was credible on this point. During 1997, petitioner’s
optometric practice was the only optometric practice located in a
three-county area in Nevada.
The fact that the automatic refractor was also used by
petitioner to treat nondisabled patients is not fatal to
petitioner’s entitlement to the disabled access tax credit. We
find no exclusive use or benefit test in section 44(a).
Certainly, a wheelchair ramp into a restaurant for disabled
access will be used by nondisabled customers of the restaurant,
and nothing in section 44 or the regulations would deprive the
restaurant owner of the disabled access tax credit with regard
thereto. See 28 C.F.R. sec. 36.304(b)(1) (2002).
We conclude that petitioner purchased the automatic
refractor and the instrument stand in order to treat disabled
patients and to comply with ADA’s prohibition of discrimination
against disabled individuals. We also conclude -- in light of
the size of petitioner’s practice compared to the cost of the
equipment, the benefit to his practice, and the benefit to the
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community -- that petitioner’s purchase of the automatic
refractor and of the instrument stand was reasonable and
necessary. Petitioner’s costs of the equipment constitute
eligible access expenditures. See sec. 44(c); 42 U.S.C. sec.
12182(a) and (b)(2)(A)(iii).
Petitioners are entitled to the claimed $5,000 section 44
disabled access tax credit.
Based on the foregoing,
Decision will be entered
under Rule 155.