Judges: Beghe
Attorneys: Ella Louise Wooten, pro se. John F. Driscoll, for respondent.
Filed: Apr. 21, 2003
Latest Update: Nov. 21, 2020
Summary: T.C. Memo. 2003-113 UNITED STATES TAX COURT ELLA LOUISE WOOTEN, Petitioner v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent Docket No. 7128-02L. Filed April 21, 2003. Ella Louise Wooten, pro se. John F. Driscoll, for respondent. MEMORANDUM OPINION BEGHE, Judge: Respondent has moved pursuant to Rule 1211 for summary judgment that respondent may proceed to collect petitioner’s outstanding liabilities for Federal income taxes and interest for tax years 1995 through 1997. 1 Unless otherwise indicated
Summary: T.C. Memo. 2003-113 UNITED STATES TAX COURT ELLA LOUISE WOOTEN, Petitioner v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent Docket No. 7128-02L. Filed April 21, 2003. Ella Louise Wooten, pro se. John F. Driscoll, for respondent. MEMORANDUM OPINION BEGHE, Judge: Respondent has moved pursuant to Rule 1211 for summary judgment that respondent may proceed to collect petitioner’s outstanding liabilities for Federal income taxes and interest for tax years 1995 through 1997. 1 Unless otherwise indicated,..
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T.C. Memo. 2003-113
UNITED STATES TAX COURT
ELLA LOUISE WOOTEN, Petitioner v.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent
Docket No. 7128-02L. Filed April 21, 2003.
Ella Louise Wooten, pro se.
John F. Driscoll, for respondent.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
BEGHE, Judge: Respondent has moved pursuant to Rule 1211
for summary judgment that respondent may proceed to collect
petitioner’s outstanding liabilities for Federal income taxes and
interest for tax years 1995 through 1997.
1
Unless otherwise indicated, all Rule references are to the
Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure, and all section
references are to the Internal Revenue Code, as amended.
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Summary judgment is intended to expedite litigation and
avoid unnecessary and expensive trials. Fla. Peach Corp. v.
Commissioner,
90 T.C. 678, 681 (1988). Summary judgment may be
granted where there is no genuine issue of material fact and
decision may be rendered as a matter of law. Rule 121(a) and
(b); see Sundstrand Corp. v. Commissioner,
98 T.C. 518, 520
(1992), affd.
17 F.3d 965 (7th Cir. 1994); Zaentz v.
Commissioner,
90 T.C. 753, 754 (1988). The moving party bears
the burden of proving there is no genuine issue of material fact;
factual inferences will be made most favorably to the party
opposing summary judgment. Dahlstrom v. Commissioner,
85 T.C.
812, 821 (1985); Jacklin v. Commissioner,
79 T.C. 340, 344
(1982). When, however, a motion for summary judgment is made and
properly supported, the party opposing summary judgment may not
rely on mere allegations or on denials of the movant's pleadings
but must set forth specific facts in dispute and show that there
is a genuine issue for trial. Rule 121(d).
As discussed below, we conclude that no material fact is in
dispute and that respondent is entitled to summary judgment as a
matter of law. Accordingly, we shall grant respondent’s motion.
Background
For each of her taxable years 1995, 1996, and 1997,
petitioner timely filed a Federal income tax return claiming
head-of-household filing status, dependency deductions under
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section 151(c) for her two children, and the earned income credit
under section 32(a). On each return petitioner claimed she was
entitled to a refund.
In accordance with sections 6402(c) and (d), respondent
transferred the refund claimed by petitioner on her 1995 Federal
income tax return to the Mississippi Department of Human Services
and to the U.S. Department of Agriculture in partial satisfaction
of petitioner’s respective unpaid child support and food stamp
obligations. In accordance with section 6402(c), respondent also
transferred the refunds claimed by petitioner on her 1996 and
1997 Federal income tax returns to the Mississippi Department of
Human Services in partial satisfaction of unpaid child support
obligations.
Respondent thereafter examined petitioner's returns for the
3 years in issue and determined that she was not entitled to
head-of-household filing status or the dependency deductions,
that the earned income credit for 1995 and 1996 should be
disallowed, and that the earned income credit petitioner claimed
for 1997 should be reduced to reflect that she was not entitled
to treat the children as her dependents. Respondent issued a
deficiency notice to those effects, petitioner timely petitioned
this Court for a redetermination, and respondent filed an answer.
Respondent and petitioner lodged pretrial memoranda with the
Court, and there was a trial on the merits in which petitioner
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participated meaningfully, as confirmed by our examination of the
transcript of the trial proceedings. This Court sustained the
deficiencies determined by respondent–-which exceeded the refunds
petitioner had claimed-–and entered decision for respondent.
Wooten v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2000-54, appeal dismissed (5th
Cir. 2000). In so doing, this Court did not adjudicate
petitioner's complaints that she had never agreed to the transfer
of her refunds to the Department of Human Services and the
Department of Agriculture, nor did the Court adjudicate her
dispute over the existence and amounts of her obligations to
those agencies. This, the Court explained, was because it lacked
jurisdiction to restrain or review any credit or reduction by the
Commissioner under section 6402 (citing section 6512(b)(4) and
Savage v. Commissioner,
112 T.C. 46 (1999)).
On or about April 5, 2000, respondent assessed the
deficiencies and related interest against petitioner in the
following amounts:
Tax Year 1995 1996 1997 Totals
Deficiency $3,759.00 $4,208.00 $1,919.00 $9,886.00
Interest 1,471.77 1,555.67 317.44 3,344.88
Totals 5,230.77 5,763.67 2,236.44 13,230.88
On or about April 15, 2001, respondent applied a $3,478
refund claimed by petitioner on her taxable year 2000 tax return
to the balance then due on her 1995 tax year account.
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On or about May 15, 2001, respondent prepared a notice of
Federal tax lien to assist in the collection of the cumulative
unpaid balance then accrued on petitioner’s 1995 through 1997 tax
liabilities. On May 21, 2001, respondent sent petitioner an IRS
“Letter LT-11 - FINAL NOTICE: NOTICE OF INTENT TO LEVY AND
NOTICE OF YOUR RIGHT TO A HEARING”. On May 24, 2001, respondent
sent petitioner an IRS “Letter 3172(DO) - NOTICE OF FEDERAL TAX
LIEN FILING AND YOUR RIGHT TO A HEARING UNDER IRC 6320”. On May
30, 2001, the notice of Federal tax lien prepared by respondent
on May 15, 2001, was filed with the Chancery Court Clerk, Hinds
County - District 1, Jackson, Mississippi.2
On June 18, 2001, petitioner mailed respondent IRS “Form
12153 - Request for a Collection Due Process Hearing” in response
to both the May 21, 2001, IRS “Letter LT-11” and the May 24,
2001, IRS “Letter 3172(DO)” referred to above. The Form 12153
was received by respondent on June 26, 2001. In the Form 12153
petitioner alleged that respondent, without petitioner’s prior
consent, acted improperly in transferring overpayment credits in
her 1995 through 1997 tax accounts to the Department of Human
2
Respondent's lien notice in the amount of $12,830.88
appears to be incorrect in two respects: It contains a
typographical error in the statement of the 1996 deficiency and
accrued interest, which causes the lien amount set forth in the
notice to be $400 less than the total assessed liabilities
summarized in the table above, and it fails to give petitioner
credit for the application of her refund for the tax year 2000
against the balance due on her 1995 tax year account.
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Services in partial satisfaction of outstanding child support
obligations, and that respondent also acted improperly in
transferring an overpayment credit in her 1995 tax account to the
Department of Agriculture.
During respondent’s consideration of the Form 12153
described above, respondent’s Appeals officer obtained an IRS
“TXMODA - Transcript of Account” in regard to each of
petitioner’s 1995, 1996, and 1997 tax years. From those
transcripts the Appeals officer verified that all applicable laws
and administrative procedures were satisfied. In no document
relevant to this case and at no hearing relevant to this case did
petitioner, with the exception of the disputed issue described
above, allege either that respondent failed to meet all
applicable law and administrative procedures or that respondent’s
Appeals officer failed to verify that respondent satisfied all
applicable laws and administrative procedures as required by
section 6330(c)(1). Nor did petitioner raise any spousal
defenses, any challenges to the appropriateness of collection
actions, or any offers of collection alternatives to respondent’s
Appeals officer.
Respondent held a hearing in regard to the Form 12153 filed
by petitioner. After that hearing, respondent sent petitioner an
IRS Form 3193 - NOTICE OF DETERMINATION CONCERNING COLLECTION
ACTION(S) UNDER SECTION 6320 and/or 6330, dated March 21, 2002,
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sustaining the filing of the notice of Federal tax lien and the
determination to levy thereunder.
On March 27, 2002, petitioner timely mailed this Court a
letter that, on April 8, 2002, the Court filed as her imperfect
petition for lien or levy action under Code Section 6320(c) or
6330(d) initiating the present action under section 6330(d).
In the amended petition to perfect her case, which the Court
filed on May 9, 2002, petitioner again alleged that, in the
absence of a judicial determination or petitioner’s express
consent, respondent acted improperly in transferring overpayment
credits in her 1995 through 1997 tax accounts to the Department
of Human Services and the Department of Agriculture.
At the times of filing her petition and amended petition,
petitioner was a resident of Jackson, Mississippi.
In her written objections to respondent’s motion, petitioner
amplifies her allegations by casting aspersions on the continued
existence of the chancery courts in Mississippi and of their
power to grant divorces and of the validity or existence of her
divorce under Mississippi law, as well as the existence and
amounts of her child support and food stamp obligations.
Petitioner's objections do not dispute any of the allegations in
the affidavit of respondent's Appeals officer in support of
respondent's motion.
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Discussion
In her petition and amended petition in this case and in her
objections to respondent's motion, petitioner attempts to
challenge the existence or amounts of her underlying tax
liabilities for the years in issue by bringing up again and
elaborating on allegations and arguments she made in the prior
case in this Court that upheld the deficiencies determined by
respondent. Wooten v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2000-54, appeal
dismissed (5th Cir. 2000).
In an effort to give this pro se petitioner the benefit of
the doubt, we broadly interpret petitioner's Form 12153 request
for a hearing, her petition to this Court, and her objections to
respondent's motion as embodying both (1) an effort to dispute
the deficiencies determined by respondent and upheld by this
Court in Wooten v.
Commissioner, supra, and (2) objections to
respondent's actions pursuant to section 6402 in paying the
refunds claimed on her returns to the Mississippi Department of
Human Services and the U.S. Department of Agriculture.
Issue 1: Petitioner's Tax Liabilities
Petitioner's tax liabilities cannot be put in issue in this
case because they were decided in the prior case in this Court
that redetermined petitioner's tax liabilities for the years in
issue. Section 6330(c)(4) provides in relevant part:
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CERTAIN ISSUES PRECLUDED.–-An issue may not be
raised at the hearing if--
(A) the issue was raised and considered at
a previous hearing under section 6320 or in any other
previous administrative or judicial proceeding; and
(B) the person seeking to raise the issue
participated meaningfully in such hearing or
proceeding.
As we observed in Magana v. Commissioner,
118 T.C. 488, 492
(2002):
Section 6330(c)(4) expressly provides that
taxpayers, at collection hearings before respondent's
Appeals Office, may not raise issues that were
previously raised by taxpayers and considered in any
other administrative or judicial proceeding in which
the taxpayers meaningfully participated. See secs.
301.6320-1(e)(1), 301.6330-1(e)(1), Proced. & Admin.
Regs. * * *
We take judicial notice of the opinion and record in Wooten
v.
Commissioner, supra, that the claims petitioner wishes to make
in this case were raised by her in that prior case and that she
participated meaningfully in that case.
Section 6330(c)(4) in effect codifies the legal doctrines of
res judicata and collateral estoppel in their application to
collection proceedings. Even in the absence of section
6330(c)(4), this situation would be governed by the legal
doctrine of res judicata, which means “a matter adjudged”; under
this doctrine, a final judgment rendered by a court of competent
jurisdiction on the merits is conclusive as to the rights of the
same parties, and, as to them, constitutes an absolute bar to a
subsequent action involving the same claim, demand, or cause of
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action. See Black's Law Dictionary 1312 (7th ed. 1999) (citing
Restatement (Second) of Judgments, secs. 17, 24 (1982)); Wright,
Law of Federal Courts, sec. 100A at 722-723 (5th ed. 1994). In
application to the case before us, this means that the party (Ms.
Wooten) who lost the prior case (Wooten v.
Commissioner, supra)
is precluded in this later collection case from making the same
claim the Court rejected in the prior case.
Finally, insofar as petitioner seeks to put her tax
liabilities in issue, she is also precluded from doing so by
section 6330(c)(2)(B), which provides:
Underlying liability.-–The person may also raise
at the hearing challenges to the existence or amount of
the underlying tax liability for any tax period if the
person did not receive any statutory notice of
deficiency for such tax liability or did not otherwise
have an opportunity to dispute such tax liability.
Of course, petitioner did receive a statutory notice of
deficiency for the liabilities in issue, and she had an
opportunity, which she took advantage of by filing a petition and
participating meaningfully in the Tax Court proceeding, to
dispute the liabilities.
Issue 2: Payments to Other Agencies
Pursuant to section 6402(c) and (d), the Commissioner is
legally required to transfer any existing Federal income tax
overpayments of a taxpayer to satisfy any obligations of the
taxpayer identified in that section, viz, amounts of past-due
support owed by that person of which the Secretary has been
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notified by a State in accordance with section 464 of the Social
Security Act and amounts owed to Federal agencies. Under section
6402(f):
No court of the United States shall have jurisdiction
to hear any action * * * brought to restrain or review
a reduction authorized by subsection (c) [or] (d)
* * *. No such reduction shall be subject to review by
the Secretary in an administrative proceeding. No
action brought against the United States to recover the
amount of any such reduction shall be considered to be
a suit for refund of tax. This subsection does not
preclude any legal, equitable, or administrative action
against the Federal agency or State to which the amount
of such reduction was paid * * *.
Petitioner's arguments that respondent's payments to the
Department of Human Services and the Department of Agriculture
were improper cannot be adjudicated in this case. Section
6402(f) forbids her to sue the Commissioner in any Court to
recover the payments. The Tax Court has no jurisdiction to
entertain any such suit. Section 6402(f) makes it clear that if
petitioner has any claim to recover the payments, petitioner is
required to make her claims directly against the recipient
agencies.3
Issue 3: Respondent's Administrative Determinations
Where, as in this case, the taxpayer's underlying tax
liabilities are not in issue, we review the Commissioner's
3
In making this observation, we do not wish to mislead
petitioner into thinking we are holding she has valid claims
against the agencies, even if the statutory time periods for
making any such claims against the agencies have not already
expired.
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determination for abuse of discretion. Sego v. Commissioner,
114
T.C. 604, 610 (2000); Goza v. Commissioner,
114 T.C. 176, 181
(2000). With exception of the issues identified and disposed of
above by the application of sections 6330(c)(4), 6330(c)(2)(B),
and 6402(f), petitioner has raised no other issue in this case.
Respondent's Appeals officer verified that respondent met
all applicable laws and administrative procedures, thereby
satisfying the requirements of section 6330(c)(1). Petitioner
has not challenged that determination except for the above-
mentioned claims we have already disposed of.
All the other requirements of section 6330(c)(3)(B) were
satisfied because petitioner did not raise any issue described in
section 6330(c)(2)(A)(i) (spousal defenses) or (ii) (challenges
to the appropriateness of collection actions).
The requirements of section 6330(c)(3)(C) are satisfied in
this case inasmuch as petitioner failed to offer any specific
collection alternatives, as described in section
6330(c)(2)(A)(iii). Respondent's Appeals officer determined that
the disputed actions of respondent properly balanced the need for
the efficient collection of taxes with the legitimate concern
that any collection be no more intrusive than necessary.
Petitioner has failed to assert specifically that the Appeals
officer's balancing determination was erroneous or to allege any
specific facts in support of any assertion to that effect. We
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conclude as a matter of law that respondent did not abuse his
discretion in determining to sustain the notice of lien and to
proceed with collection of the tax liabilities and interest
assessed against petitioner.
There are no genuine issues of material fact. Summary
judgment is appropriate, see Rule 121(b), and we shall therefore
grant respondent's motion for summary judgment.
An appropriate order and
decision will be entered.