Judges: Laro
Attorneys: Joseph Falcone , for petitioners. Laurie B. Schmidt and John W. Stevens , for respondent.
Filed: Dec. 07, 2006
Latest Update: Dec. 05, 2020
Summary: T.C. Memo. 2006-261 UNITED STATES TAX COURT FRANK M. SETTIMO AND SALLYN M. SETTIMO, Petitioners v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent Docket No. 5153-05. Filed December 7, 2006. Joseph Falcone, for petitioners. Laurie B. Schmidt and John W. Stevens, for respondent. MEMORANDUM FINDINGS OF FACT AND OPINION LARO, Judge: Petitioners petitioned the Court to redetermine respondent’s determination of deficiencies of $18,243 and $19,917 in their 2001 and 2002 Federal income taxes, respectively
Summary: T.C. Memo. 2006-261 UNITED STATES TAX COURT FRANK M. SETTIMO AND SALLYN M. SETTIMO, Petitioners v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent Docket No. 5153-05. Filed December 7, 2006. Joseph Falcone, for petitioners. Laurie B. Schmidt and John W. Stevens, for respondent. MEMORANDUM FINDINGS OF FACT AND OPINION LARO, Judge: Petitioners petitioned the Court to redetermine respondent’s determination of deficiencies of $18,243 and $19,917 in their 2001 and 2002 Federal income taxes, respectively,..
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T.C. Memo. 2006-261
UNITED STATES TAX COURT
FRANK M. SETTIMO AND SALLYN M. SETTIMO, Petitioners v.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent
Docket No. 5153-05. Filed December 7, 2006.
Joseph Falcone, for petitioners.
Laurie B. Schmidt and John W. Stevens, for respondent.
MEMORANDUM FINDINGS OF FACT AND OPINION
LARO, Judge: Petitioners petitioned the Court to
redetermine respondent’s determination of deficiencies of $18,243
and $19,917 in their 2001 and 2002 Federal income taxes,
respectively, and section 6662 accuracy-related penalties of
$3,648.60 and $3,983.40, respectively. Following the parties’
concessions, we are left to decide whether two S corporations
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(collectively, S corporations) wholly owned by Frank Settimo
(petitioner) may deduct child care expenses incurred with respect
to petitioners’ children. We hold they may not. Section
references are to the Internal Revenue Code applicable to the
subject years. Rule references are to the Tax Court Rules of
Practice and Procedure.
FINDINGS OF FACT
Some facts are stipulated. We incorporate herein by this
reference the parties’ stipulations of fact and the exhibits
submitted therewith. We find the stipulated facts accordingly.
Petitioners are husband and wife, and they filed joint 2001 and
2002 Federal income tax returns. They resided in Linden,
Michigan, at all relevant times.
Petitioner started a window washing business (business) in
March 1994. His wife began working in that business 2 years
later. In June 1997, petitioner began hiring other individuals
to work in the business. In 2001, petitioner conducted the
business through his wholly owned S corporation, Professional
Window Cleaning, Inc. (PWC). Petitioner terminated PWC as of the
start of 2002 and began conducting the business through a second
wholly owned S corporation, Algimarso Glass Cleaners, Inc. (AGC).
For Federal income tax purposes, petitioner reported the income
and expenses of the S corporations using the cash receipts and
disbursements method.
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During the respective subject years, approximately 24 and 31
individuals worked in the business. Petitioner’s wife was
employed by the S corporations to wash windows one or two days a
week and to provide clerical services to the S corporations for
approximately 10 to 15 hours per week. The S corporations did
not formally pay her any wages during either year; she actually
received wages from the S corporations of $4,480 and $5,000
during the respective years. Petitioner was employed by the S
corporations essentially as their general and operations manager.
As to the business, petitioner solicited professional advice and
new customers; established a sales division; recruited, hired,
evaluated, and dealt with each of the other workers in the
business; assigned specific jobs to the window washers and
monitored customer satisfaction as to those jobs; negotiated each
window washer’s compensation; and made daily business decisions,
handled the business’s finances, and assisted in clerical work.
He also washed windows for the S corporations 5 or 6 days a week.
PWC formally paid petitioner no wages during 2001, and AGC
formally paid petitioner $6,800 in wages during 2002.
Petitioners had four children the ages of whom in 2001 were
10, 8, 4, and 2. When petitioner wife was washing windows for
the S corporations, petitioners left their children with either a
daycare service or a neighbor. Petitioners paid their neighbor
in cash to watch their children, and petitioners paid the daycare
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service with a check drawn on the bank account of PWC or AGC.
For the subject years, PWC and AGC claimed deductions of $1,288
and $4,800, respectively, for the daycare expense of petitioners’
children.
OPINION
We decide the single issue mentioned above. In that we find
that the facts underlying our decision of that issue are not in
dispute, we decide that issue without regard to which party bears
the burden of proof. The parties dispute two other issues in
addition to the one that we decide. The first other issue
concerns the amount of wages that petitioner failed to report for
2001 and 2002. The second other issue concerns whether all of
the S corporations’ workers are their employees. We do not
decide either of those two other issues in that our decision of
those issues is unnecessary to our redetermination of
petitioners’ Federal income tax deficiencies for the subject
years. As to the first other issue, petitioner is the sole
shareholder of the S corporations, and any amount of wages that
he failed to report on his 2001 and 2002 Federal income tax
returns will be offset entirely by the corresponding increase in
the deduction that passes through to him from the S corporations.
See Griffin v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1995-246. As to the
second other issue, that issue also does not affect our
redetermination of petitioners’ deficiencies.
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As to the issue that we do decide, petitioners assert that
the S corporations are entitled to deduct the daycare expenses of
petitioners’ children. Petitioners’ entire argument in brief is
as follows:
Pursuant to Rev. Rul. 73-348, 1973-2 C.B. 31, the
Respondent permits a corporation’s payments to a day
care center to provide care for the preschool children
of its employees while they are at work to be deducted
under IRC 162. Petitioner Sallyn Settimo could not
have worked unless day care was provided to her
preschool children. The Subchapter S Corporations paid
for that day care.
We are unpersuaded by this argument. While section 162 allows a
corporate taxpayer to deduct the ordinary and necessary expenses
of its business, the mere fact that petitioner’s wife may have
been unable to work for the S corporations unless daycare was
provided to her children does not necessarily mean that the
payment of petitioners’ daycare expenses is an ordinary and
necessary expense of the S corporations. While respondent ruled
in Rev. Rul.
73-348, supra, that a taxpayer was able to deduct
the daycare expenses related to the children of its employees,
the ruling notes that the expenses were “directly related” to the
taxpayer’s business. On the basis of the record at hand, we are
unable to find that petitioners’ daycare expenses were directly
related to the business of the S corporations or, in other words,
that those expenses are an ordinary and necessary expense of the
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S corporations.1 Indeed, the only individuals whose children’s
daycare expenses were paid by the S corporations were the sole
owner of the S corporations and his wife.
We hold for respondent. We have considered all arguments in
this case and consider those arguments not discussed above to be
without merit. To reflect issues settled by the parties,
Decision will be entered
under Rule 155.
1
Nor have petitioners shown that the primary beneficiary of
the payments was either S corporation. See Hood v. Commissioner,
115 T.C. 172, 179 (2000).