Footnotes

• 1. Petitioner requested to have this case decided under the small tax case procedures provided in sec. 7463. However, because the issue we decide in this Opinion is an issue of first impression, we removed the small tax case designation and will proceed under the normal procedural Rules of the Tax Court. See Rule 171(c), Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure.↩

• 2. Unless otherwise indicated, all section references are to the Internal Revenue Code for the year at issue, and all Rule references are to the Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure.↩

• 3. There is a question as to the timeliness of Mr. Kovitch's notice of intervention. Pursuant to Rule 325(b), a notice of intervention should be filed "not later than 60 days after service of the notice by the Commissioner of the filing of the petition, unless the Court directs otherwise." Mr. Kovitch suggests that any delay may be due to his change of address, and we note that he originally sent the notice of intervention to respondent, who apparently forwarded it to the Court. Respondent has not objected to the notice of intervention, and any delay in filing the notice of intervention does not appear to have caused harm to any of the parties. In any event, we would use our discretion, as provided in Rule 325(b)↩, to allow the notice of intervention to be filed.

• 4. Mr. Kovitch's bankruptcy case was initially a ch. 7 proceeding; however, on May 1, 2006, the case was converted to a ch. 13 proceeding.↩

• 5. Pars. (1)-(7) of 11 U.S.C. sec. 362(a) (2000) generally operate to temporarily bar actions "against" the debtor or property of the debtor or the bankruptcy estate. People Place Auto Hand Carwash, LLC v. Commissioner, 126 T.C. 359">126 T.C. 359, 126 T.C. 359">361-362 (2006). Par. (8) of 11 U.S.C. sec. 362(a), as in effect here, specifically stays Tax Court proceedings "concerning the debtor." 126 T.C. 359">Id. at 362↩.

• 6. The Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub. L. 109-8, sec. 709, 119 Stat. 127, amended sec. 362(a)(8) of the Bankruptcy Code by striking out "the debtor" and inserting "a corporate debtor's tax liability for a taxable period the bankruptcy court may determine or concerning the tax liability of a debtor who is an individual for a taxable period ending before the date of the order for relief under this title". This provision became effective with respect to petitions for relief under the Bankruptcy Code filed on or after Oct. 17, 2005. See id. sec. 1501, 119 Stat. 216↩. Because Mr. Kovitch commenced his bankruptcy case on Oct. 14, 2005, this amendment does not apply here.

• 7. This construction is consistent with the recently amended language of 11 U.S.C. sec. 362(a)(8). 126 T.C. 359">People Place Auto Hand Carwash, LLC v. Commissioner, supra at 364; see also Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 sec. 709. There is no indication in the legislative history that the change from "concerning the debtor" to "concerning the tax liability of the debtor" should alter the way the statute is interpreted with regard to the debtor. Rather, this amendment clarifies how the statute had been interpreted by the courts before the amendment. The legislative history describes the purpose of this amendment as follows:

  "Under current law, the filing of a petition for relief under the Bankruptcy Code activates an automatic stay that enjoins the commencement or continuation of a case in the United States Tax Court. This rule was arguably extended in Halpern v. Commissioner [96 T.C. 895">96 T.C. 895 (1991)], which held that the tax court did not have jurisdiction to hear a case involving a postpetition year. To address this issue, section 709 of the Act amends section 362(a)(8) of the Bankruptcy Code to specify that the automatic stay is limited to an individual debtor's prepetition taxes (taxes incurred before entering bankruptcy). The amendment clarifies that the automatic stay does not apply to an individual debtor's postpetition taxes. In addition, section 709 provides that the stay applies to both prepetition and postpetition tax liabilities of a corporation so long as it is a liability that the bankruptcy court may determine. [H. Rept. 109-31 (Pt. 1), at 102 (2005).]"

  126 T.C. 359">People Place Auto Hand Carwash, LLC v. Commissioner, supra at 362 n.6↩.

• 8. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit decided that an intervening former spouse lacked standing to appeal the Tax Court's determination regarding sec. 6015 relief. Baranowicz v. Commissioner, 432 F.3d 972">432 F.3d 972 (9th Cir. 2005). In Baranowicz, the intervenor argued that, although the deficiencies determined by the Tax Court or the Court of Appeals would not change his obligation to pay, the determination granting spousal relief to the requesting spouse constituted actual injury. The Court of Appeals disagreed, holding that "Absent a showing of some concrete harm, we must reject * * * [the intervenor's] argument that the mere grant of participation rights in the Tax Court under section 6015(e)(4) is sufficient to confer on him standing to appeal." 432 F.3d 972">Id. at 976↩.

• 9. We recognize that a decision granting petitioner's request for relief could conceivably have a financial impact on Mr. Kovitch in the future. For example, if petitioner's request for relief were denied, respondent might collect the joint liability from petitioner as opposed to Mr. Kovitch. We do not believe that such speculative possibilities are sufficient to make this a proceeding concerning the tax liability of the debtor in bankruptcy. Our decision in this case will not alter Mr. Kovitch's tax liability.↩