Judges: "Goldberg, Stanley J."
Attorneys: Jane Frances Schwind, Pro se. Michael T. Sargent , for respondent.
Filed: Sep. 09, 2008
Latest Update: Dec. 05, 2020
Summary: T.C. Summary Opinion 2008-119 UNITED STATES TAX COURT JANE FRANCES SCHWIND, f.k.a. JANE FRANCES SKOLNICK, Petitioner v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent Docket No. 12663-06S. Filed September 9, 2008. Jane Frances Schwind, pro se. Michael T. Sargent, for respondent. GOLDBERG, Special Trial Judge: This case was heard pursuant to the provisions of section 7463 of the Internal Revenue Code in effect when the petition was filed. Pursuant to section 7463(b), the decision to be entered is n
Summary: T.C. Summary Opinion 2008-119 UNITED STATES TAX COURT JANE FRANCES SCHWIND, f.k.a. JANE FRANCES SKOLNICK, Petitioner v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent Docket No. 12663-06S. Filed September 9, 2008. Jane Frances Schwind, pro se. Michael T. Sargent, for respondent. GOLDBERG, Special Trial Judge: This case was heard pursuant to the provisions of section 7463 of the Internal Revenue Code in effect when the petition was filed. Pursuant to section 7463(b), the decision to be entered is no..
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T.C. Summary Opinion 2008-119
UNITED STATES TAX COURT
JANE FRANCES SCHWIND, f.k.a. JANE FRANCES SKOLNICK, Petitioner
v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent
Docket No. 12663-06S. Filed September 9, 2008.
Jane Frances Schwind, pro se.
Michael T. Sargent, for respondent.
GOLDBERG, Special Trial Judge: This case was heard pursuant
to the provisions of section 7463 of the Internal Revenue Code in
effect when the petition was filed. Pursuant to section 7463(b),
the decision to be entered is not reviewable by any other court,
and this opinion shall not be treated as precedent for any other
case. Unless otherwise indicated, subsequent section references
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are to the Internal Revenue Code as amended, and all Rule
references are to the Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure.
This case arises from a request for relief from joint and
several liability under section 6015(f) with respect to
petitioner’s unpaid joint tax liability for 2003. No notice of
deficiency was issued. The issues for decision are whether
petitioner is entitled to relief from joint and several liability
under section 6015(f) and whether she is entitled to a refund of
amounts paid towards the liability under section 6015(g)(1).1
Background
Some of the facts have been stipulated and are so found.
The stipulation of facts and the exhibits received into evidence
are incorporated herein by reference. When the petition
was filed, petitioner resided in Maryland.
In September 2001 petitioner married David Skolnick (Mr.
Skolnick). Petitioner worked and continues to work as a
registered nurse. Mr. Skolnick was employed as an engineer by
Zeta Associates, Inc. (Zeta), until June 2003 when his employer
terminated his employment, but he found new employment by the end
of 2003.
1
Although petitioner requested relief under sec. 6015(b),
(c), or (f), her liability results from an underpayment of tax on
account of overstated withholdings, not an understatement of tax
(as defined by sec. 6662(d)(2)(A)) or a deficiency (defined by
sec. 6211). See sec. 6015(b)(3), (c)(1). Thus, petitioner is
not entitled to relief under sec. 6015(b) or (c), and the Court’s
review is limited to sec. 6015(f).
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On December 13, 2003, Mr. Skolnick sold his stock holdings
in Zeta for $99,899.91; no Federal income tax was withheld.
Around March 2004 Mr. Skolnick deposited the check for the stock
proceeds into his and petitioner’s joint checking account.
Although the joint account was used to deposit their paychecks
and to pay household bills, petitioner was not allowed to open or
to review the account statements.
Around April 2004 Mr. Skolnick prepared and electronically
filed a joint Form 1040, U.S. Individual Income Tax Return, for
2003. Petitioner’s participation in the preparation of the Form
1040 was limited to providing Mr. Skolnick with her “W-2s”. But
petitioner was allowed to review the Form 1040 after Mr. Skolnick
had filed it. Among other things, Mr. Skolnick reported the
following:
Description Amount
Taxable income (line 40) $205,171
Total tax (line 60) 41,482
Withholdings (line 61) 66,332
Excess Social Security 1,831
Overpayment 26,681
Third-party-payor records, however, showed withholdings
totaling $36,331 ($3,795 was withheld on petitioner’s wages and
$32,536 was withheld on Mr. Skolnick’s wages). Respondent
determined that the Skolnicks had overstated their withholdings
by $30,001, and he reduced their “Payments” by that amount. In
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May 2005 respondent issued a Notice CP2000, reflecting a
“Proposed Balance Due” of $31,656.
In the interim Mr. Skolnick had left the marital home in
January 2005. Petitioner left the marital home in March 2005.
Mr. Skolnick and petitioner instituted divorce proceedings in
2005; the divorce was finalized in February 2006. In January
2006 petitioner and Mr. Skolnick entered into a “Property And
Support Settlement Agreement” (property settlement). In
pertinent part, the property settlement provides:
[t]he parties agree that they have potential joint tax
liability for 2003 for at least [$31,656 * * * Mr.
Skolnick paid $31,656 to the Internal Revenue Service
(IRS), and petitioner paid half of the amount to him as
her share of the liability. If there are additional
tax liabilities for 2003, Mr. Skolnick agrees to pay
them. If the IRS determines that any part of the 2003
tax liability is not due and refunds it, the parties
agree to split it. If penalties or interest for 2003
are refunded, the parties agree that Mr. Skolnick is
entitled to it].
While the divorce was pending, petitioner submitted a Form
8857, Request for Innocent Spouse Relief (And Separation of
Liability and Equitable Relief), to the IRS in June 2005.2 In
August 2005 she submitted a Form 12510, Questionnaire for
Requesting Spouse. The IRS issued a preliminary determination in
2
Mr. Skolnick was notified that petitioner was seeking
relief from joint and several liability and that he had a right
to intervene in the matter. He did not respond to letters from
the IRS or exercise his right to intervene in petitioner’s Tax
Court case.
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November 2005. It denied relief under section 6015(b), (c), and
(f), reasoning:
Information contained in your case indicates that you
had knowledge and/or reason to know of the item that
gave rise to the tax deficiency. There was too much
withholding claimed on the return and you did not
review the return. You failed your duty of inquiry at
the time of filing.
Petitioner appealed to the Appeals Office (Appeals) in
December 2005. Appeals issued a notice of determination on March
30, 2006. It states that relief was denied because the item
“leading to the understatement was not attributable” to Mr.
Skolnick.
In the interim Mr. Skolnick had made a $31,656 payment on
behalf of himself and petitioner in January 2006. On February 6,
2006, the IRS determined that petitioner and Mr. Skolnick were
liable for a $3,000 addition to tax under section 6651(a)(2),
plus interest. According to the notice of determination, the
unpaid balance of income tax due from petitioner was $4,367.17 as
of March 30, 2006. The amount of relief of 2003 income tax
petitioner sought was $30,001.
Discussion
I. Burden of Proof
Except as otherwise provided in section 6015, petitioner
bears the burden of proof with respect to her entitlement to
relief from joint and several liability. See Rule 142(a); Alt v.
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Commissioner,
119 T.C. 306, 311 (2002), affd.
101 Fed. Appx. 34
(6th Cir. 2004).
II. Joint and Several Liability and Section 6015(f) Relief
Section 6013(d)(3) provides that if a joint return is filed,
the tax is computed on the taxpayers’ aggregate income, and
liability for the resulting tax is joint and several. See also
sec. 1.6013-4(b), Income Tax Regs. But the IRS may relieve a
taxpayer from joint and several liability under section 6015 in
certain circumstances. An individual may be relieved from joint
and several liability under section 6015(f) if, taking into
account all the facts and circumstances, it is inequitable to
hold the taxpayer liable for any unpaid tax or deficiency and he
does not qualify for relief under section 6015(b) or (c).
To guide IRS employees in exercising their discretion, the
Commissioner has issued revenue procedures that list the factors
they should consider. The Court also uses the factors when
reviewing the IRS’s denial of relief. See Washington v.
Commissioner,
120 T.C. 137, 147-152 (2003); Rev. Proc. 2003-61,
2003-2 C.B. 296, modifying and superseding Rev. Proc. 2000-15,
2000-1 C.B. 447.
III. Rev. Proc. 2003-61, Sec. 4.01: Seven Threshold Conditions
for Relief
Rev. Proc. 2003-61, sec. 4.01, 2003-2 C.B. at 297, begins
with a list of seven threshold conditions that a taxpayer must
satisfy in order to qualify for equitable relief. The Court will
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not recite them all since the only factor at issue is the so-
called attribution factor. Rev. Proc. 2003-61, sec. 4.01(7),
2003-2 C.B. at 297, provides that the tax liability from which
the requesting spouse seeks relief must be attributable to the
nonrequesting spouse unless certain exceptions apply which are
not relevant here.
Petitioner contends that the claimed $30,001 of excess
withholdings is attributable to Mr. Skolnick because he
overstated their withheld amounts when he prepared and
electronically filed their Form 1040.
Respondent contends that petitioner’s request for relief
seems to be based on the assumption that the overstated
withholding credits are directly related to Mr. Skolnick’s stock
sale. According to respondent, Appeals determined that that was
not the case: the overstated withholdings could have been a math
error, a “typo when the electronic return was computed using
whatever computer software was used[,] * * * an inflated number
pulled out of the air,” or any one of a number of explanations.
The Appeals officer’s “Case Activity Record” states that the
understatement was “caused by reporting withholding in relation
to a 1099B. There was no withholding on the 1099B.” The record
further states: “She argues it was due to the 1099b. * * * [I
told her] it had not been filed. I stated that there is nothing
on the 1099b so that is just a guess.” The record also states
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that he explained that withholding is “normally considered a
joint and several liability because it normally cannot be
allocated.” The officer’s “workpapers” state that the item was
not attributable to either spouse because they had claimed too
much withholding. Further, her arguments that the item should be
attributed to Mr. Skolnick because he claimed the withholding in
relation to a Form 1099 were “without merit and it would be
inequitable to attribute the disallowed withholding to the NRS
based upon an assumption.”
The Court is not persuaded by respondent’s arguments. In
deciding the issue of to whom inaccurate, false, or “phony”
deductions or credits are attributable, the Court has attributed
such deductions or credits to the spouse who wrongfully reported
or claimed the item (with certain exceptions not applicable
here). See Lawson v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1994-286 (spouse
who mischaracterized stock sale as an ordinary loss rather than a
capital loss was attributed the item); Gill v. Commissioner, T.C.
Memo. 1993-274 (phony Schedule A deductions were attributed to
spouse who prepared the return and claimed the items); Perry v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1992-258 (phony Schedule C deductions
were attributed to spouse who claimed the items); Davis v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1992-240 (phony Schedule A deduction was
attributed to spouse who claimed it), affd. without published
opinion
26 F.3d 130 (9th Cir. 1994); see also Belk v.
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Commissioner,
93 T.C. 434, 437 (1989) (clerical mistake, i.e.,
claiming a $15,000 deduction rather than a $1,500 loss, was
attributed to spouse who claimed the deduction).3
On the basis of the foregoing, the Court finds that the
overstated withholding credits are attributable to Mr. Skolnick--
he prepared the return and wrongfully reported the overstated
amounts.4 Therefore, the Court also finds that petitioner has
satisfied the seventh threshold condition of Rev. Proc. 2003-61,
sec. 4.01.
IV. Rev. Proc. 2003-61, Sec. 4.02: Circumstances Ordinarily
Allowing for Relief
Where the requesting spouse satisfies the threshold
conditions of Rev. Proc. 2003-61, sec. 4.01, then Rev. Proc.
2003-61, sec. 4.02, 2003-2 C.B. at 298, sets forth the
3
Although these cases arose under former sec. 6013(e), the
Court has determined that cases interpreting similar terms under
sec. 6013(e) remain instructive in its analysis. See Alt v.
Commissioner,
119 T.C. 306, 314 (2002), affd.
101 Fed. Appx. 34
(6th Cir. 2004); Juell v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2007-219;
Becherer v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2004-282. The terms
“attributable to an item of the individual with whom the
requesting spouse filed the joint return (‘the nonrequesting
spouse’)” of Rev. Proc. 2003-61, sec. 4.01(7), 2003-2 C.B. 296,
297, is similar to the terms “attributable to grossly erroneous
items of one spouse” of sec. 6013(e). The analysis for
attributing items to one spouse or the other is essentially the
same.
4
In addition, there is a strong implication that Mr.
Skolnick was the culpable person since he: (1) Accepted
responsibility for any additional liabilities in their property
settlement; and (2) has not contested petitioner’s assertions or
otherwise intervened in the matter, see supra note 2.
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circumstances in which the IRS will ordinarily grant relief under
section 6015(f) with respect to an underpayment of a properly
reported liability. To qualify for relief under Rev. Proc. 2003-
61, sec. 4.02, the requesting spouse must: (1) No longer be
married to, be legally separated from, or have not been a member
of the same household as the nonrequesting spouse at any time
during the 12-month period ending on the date of the request for
relief; (2) have had no knowledge or reason to know when she
signed the return that the nonrequesting spouse would not pay the
tax liability; and (3) suffer economic hardship if relief is not
granted.
Petitioner was not divorced or legally separated from Mr.
Skolnick when she requested relief. Additionally, petitioner and
Mr. Skolnick resided together within the 6-month period preceding
her request: she testified that he moved out in January 2005,
while her Form 8857 is dated June 11, 2005. Thus, she fails
requirement 1, and the Court need not discuss the others.
Accordingly, petitioner does not qualify for relief under Rev.
Proc. 2003-61, sec. 4.02.
V. Rev. Proc. 2003-61, Sec. 4.03: Other Factors
Where the requesting spouse fails to qualify for relief
under Rev. Proc. 2003-61, sec. 4.02, the IRS may nevertheless
grant relief under Rev. Proc. 2003-61, sec. 4.03, 2003-2 C.B. at
298. The Court’s analysis with respect to the nonexhaustive list
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of factors contained in Rev. Proc. 2003-61, sec. 4.03 is
described below.
A. Marital Status
The IRS will take into consideration whether the requesting
spouse is divorced or separated (whether legally separated or
living apart) from the nonrequesting spouse. Rev. Proc. 2003-61,
sec. 4.03(2)(a)(i), 2003-2 C.B. at 298.
Petitioner and Mr. Skolnick were separated, i.e., living
apart, when she requested relief. This factor weighs in favor of
relief. See id.; cf. Nihiser v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo.
2008-135 (living apart under Rev. Proc. 2000-15 weighs in favor
of relief); Beatty v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2007-167
(remaining married or residing together is a neutral factor under
Rev. Proc. 2003-61); Butner v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2007-136
(same under Rev. Proc. 2000-15).
B. Economic Hardship
The IRS will take into consideration whether the requesting
spouse will suffer economic hardship if relief is not granted.
Rev. Proc. 2003-61, sec. 4.03(2)(a)(ii), 2003-2 C.B. at 298.
Generally, economic hardship exists if collection of the tax
liability will cause the taxpayer to be unable to pay reasonable
basic living expenses. Butner v.
Commissioner, supra.
In determining a reasonable amount for basic living
expenses, the Court considers, among other things: (1) The
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taxpayer’s age, employment status and history, ability to earn,
and number of dependents; (2) an amount reasonably necessary for
food, clothing, housing, medical expenses, transportation,
current tax payments, and expenses necessary to the taxpayer’s
production of income; (3) the cost of living in the taxpayer’s
geographic area; (4) the amount of property available to satisfy
the taxpayer’s expenses; (5) any extraordinary circumstances;
i.e., special education expenses, a medical catastrophe, or a
natural disaster; and (6) any other factor bearing on economic
hardship. See sec. 301.6343-1(b)(4)(ii), Proced. & Admin. Regs.
The IRS has issued guidelines for allowable expenses.5
“Necessary expenses are those that meet the necessary expense
test; i.e., ‘they must provide for a taxpayer and his or her
family’s health and welfare and/or the production of income’ and
they must be reasonable.” Schulman v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo.
2002-129 n.6. There are three types of necessary expenses:
(1) Those based on national standards; i.e., food, housekeeping
supplies, clothing, and personal care products and services;
(2) those based on local standards; i.e., housing, utilities, and
transportation; and (3) other expenses, which are not based on
national or local standards.
Id.
5
The guidelines are published on the IRS’s Web site at
http://www.irs.gov/individuals/article/0,,id=96543,00.html (last
visited May 30, 2008). The amount listed as the national or
local standard is effective as of Oct. 1, 2007.
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Petitioner testified that she estimated the expenses on her
Form 12510 for herself and her two children. With the exception
of the $1,435 for monthly rent, she has not substantiated her
expenses; i.e., by providing receipts or statements. Therefore,
the Court will use the national and local standards.
The monthly national standard allows a family of three:
Expenditure Amount
Food $626
Housekeeping supplies 61
Apparel & services 209
Personal care products & services 58
Miscellaneous 197
Out-of-pocket health care 171
Total 1,322
Petitioner is allowed $217 as operating costs for her
automobile (local standard). The Court has determined total
expenditures of $2,974, while she claimed net wages of $3,088.
Petitioner’s net wages exceed her expenditures by $114. Although
petitioner is supporting two children, she is gainfully employed
as a nurse--earning approximately $60,000 a year. In addition,
there is no information in the record as to the costs of her
children’s private school tuition or the value of any assets that
could be used to satisfy the liability (she testified that she
has since moved and is making payments on a home). The Court
also notes that petitioner may seek to enforce the terms of the
property settlement against Mr. Skolnick for the additional
penalties and interest. Consequently, the Court finds that
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petitioner has not shown that she will suffer economic hardship
if she is not relieved of the liability. See Monsour v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2004-190 (requesting spouse must prove
that the expenses qualify and that they are reasonable). This
factor weighs against granting relief. See Banderas v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2007-129 (lack of economic hardship
weighs against relief under Rev. Proc. 2003-61); cf. Butner v.
Commissioner, supra (same under Rev. Proc. 2000-15).
C. Knowledge or Reason To Know
The IRS will also consider whether the requesting spouse did
not know or had no reason to know that the nonrequesting spouse
would not pay the liability. Rev. Proc. 2003-61, sec.
4.03(2)(a)(iii)(A), 2003-2 C.B. at 298. As is relevant here, the
IRS will consider any deceit or evasiveness of the nonrequesting
spouse, the requesting spouse’s involvement in the household’s
finances, and any lavish or unusual expenditures compared with
past spending levels in determining whether the requesting spouse
had reason to know of the underpayment (the factors specified in
Price v. Commissioner,
887 F.2d 959, 965 (9th Cir. 1989)).
Id.
sec. 4.03(2)(a)(iii)(C).
Typically, in the case of a reported but unpaid liability,
the relevant knowledge is whether the taxpayer knew or had reason
to know when the return was signed that the tax would not be
paid. See Washington v. Commissioner,
120 T.C. 151; see also
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Feldman v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2003-201, affd. 152 Fed.
Appx. 622 (9th Cir. 2005). The general rule for unpaid
liabilities is that the requesting spouse must establish that:
(1) When she signed the return, she had no knowledge or reason to
know that the tax reported on the return would not be paid; and
(2) it was reasonable for her to believe that the nonrequesting
spouse would pay the tax shown due. See Morello v. Commissioner,
T.C. Memo. 2004-181; Ogonoski v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2004-
52; Collier v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2002-144.
Petitioner testified that: (1) Mr. Skolnick prepared and
electronically filed the return; (2) she was not present when he
filed it; (3) she was able to review the return but only after he
filed it; and (4) she does not recall signing a signature page.6
The Appeals officer’s “Case Activity Record” states:
“Knowledge--The NRS e-filed the return. The RS did not review.”
His workpapers merely state that she did not review the return
6
Whether petitioner failed to sign the 2003 Form 1040
necessarily implicates issues regarding whether she filed a joint
return and whether she is entitled to relief under sec. 6015(f).
See sec. 1.6015-4(a), Income Tax Regs. (the filing of a joint
return is a prerequisite to sec. 6015 relief). The Court finds
that petitioner intended to and did file a joint return with Mr.
Skolnick because she has not otherwise renounced the 2003 Form
1040 and she provided her “W-2s” to Mr. Skolnick. See Heim v.
Commissioner,
27 T.C. 270, 273 (1956), affd.
251 F.2d 44 (8th
Cir. 1958); Gudenschwager v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1989-6;
sec. 1.6013-1(a)(2), Income Tax Regs.; see also Ziegler v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2003-282 (the Court assumed that the
taxpayer conceded the filing of a joint return or ratified the
joint return that the nonrequesting spouse filed because she
continued to assert her entitlement to sec. 6015(f) relief).
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for accuracy, “she would also be charged with constructive
knowledge of the item”, and since the “withholding was reported
on the return, she has actual knowledge of the item.”
Petitioner and Mr. Skolnick’s Form 1040 showed an
overpayment for 2003 on account of overstated withholdings–-not
taxes due. Petitioner was not alerted to the fact that there was
a $31,165 “Proposed Balance Due” until she received the Notice
CP2000 in May 2005. Moreover, with respect to the Price factors,
petitioner’s involvement in their finances was insufficient to
put her in a position to have reason to know that the Form 1040
contained overstated withholdings when she signed it. There is
no evidence that their expenditures were unusual or extravagant
or that their overall standard of living significantly improved
during 2003 to put petitioner on notice that Mr. Skolnick
overstated their withholdings.
Arguably, weighing against petitioner is the officer’s
conclusion that “the 2003 refund was way out of line with prior
years. This should have triggered something.” Although the 2002
and 2003 returns are not in evidence, respondent represented that
$10,743.61 of the claimed $26,681 overpayment for 2003 was
applied to their joint liability for 2002.7
7
At trial respondent asserted that he did not include a copy
of the 2003 return because it was not part of the administrative
record, although he could have obtained one.
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Without the 2002 and 2003 returns, the Court is hesitant to
agree with the officer’s conclusion that the claimed $26,681
refund for 2003 “should have triggered something.” There is
nothing in the record establishing what that $10,743.61 liability
for 2002 consists of (i.e., a deficiency, interest, or
penalties). In addition, 2002 was the first year that the
Skolnicks had filed a joint return; thus, there was no real
filing history by which petitioner could have tested the 2003
refund for accuracy. The January 2006 property settlement
indicates they were going to claim a $2,047.03 overpayment for
2002 by January 31, 2006, which corroborates petitioner’s
testimony that she did not learn about the issues with the 2002
return until after the issues with the 2003 return had come to
light. On the basis of the evidence in the record, it does not
appear that “the 2003 refund was way out of line with prior
years” such that petitioner should have had reason to know that
Mr. Skolnick had overstated their withholdings for 2003.
On the basis of the foregoing, the Court finds that this
factor is neutral. See, e.g., Alpha Med., Inc. v. Commissioner,
172 F.3d 942 (6th Cir. 1999) (a factor favoring neither party is
neutral), revg. T.C. Memo. 1997-464.
D. Nonrequesting Spouse’s Legal Obligation
The IRS will also consider whether the nonrequesting spouse
has a legal obligation to pay the outstanding income tax
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liability pursuant to a divorce decree or agreement. See Rev.
Proc. 2003-61, sec. 4.03(2)(a)(iv), 2003-2 C.B. at 298. But if
the requesting spouse knew or had reason to know when the
agreement was entered into that the nonrequesting spouse would
not pay the liability, then this factor will not weigh in favor
of relief.
Id.
The property settlement provides that Mr. Skolnick agreed to
pay any additional liabilities for 2003. There is nothing in the
record indicating that petitioner knew or should have known when
she entered into the agreement that Mr. Skolnick would not pay
the liability-–he paid his half of the $31,656 liability when
they entered into the agreement in January 2006, and respondent
did not determine the addition to tax until February 2006. This
factor weighs in favor of relief. See id.; see also Magee v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2005-263 (applying Rev. Proc. 2003-61);
cf. Billings v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2007-234 (applying Rev.
Proc. 2000-15).
E. Significant Benefit
The IRS will consider whether the requesting spouse received
significant benefit beyond normal support as a result of the
unpaid tax liability. Rev. Proc. 2003-61, sec. 4.03(2)(a)(v),
2003-2 C.B. at 299.
On petitioner’s Form 12510, she claimed that she believed
that the refund was used to pay the Skolnicks’ household
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expenses. There is no evidence indicating that she received
significant benefit as a result of the unpaid tax liability.
Therefore, the Court concludes that this factor weighs in favor
of relief. See Magee v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2007-136 (lack
of significant benefit weighs in favor of relief under Rev. Proc.
2003-61); cf. Butner v.
Commissioner, supra (lack of significant
benefit weighed in favor of relief under former section 6013(e)
notwithstanding that Rev. Proc. 2000-15 stated that it was
neutral).
F. Compliance With Federal Tax Laws
The IRS will take into consideration whether the requesting
spouse has made a good faith effort to comply with the Federal
tax laws in the succeeding years. See Rev. Proc. 2003-61, sec.
4.03(2)(a)(vi), 2003-2 C.B. at 299.
This factor is neutral because no evidence or argument was
presented as to the issue. See Knorr v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo.
2004-212.
G. Abuse
The IRS will also consider whether the nonrequesting spouse
abused the requesting spouse. See Rev. Proc. 2003-61, sec.
4.03(2)(b)(i), 2003-2 C.B. at 299. The presence of abuse is a
factor favoring relief, and a history of abuse may mitigate the
requesting spouse’s knowledge or reason to know.
Id.
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Petitioner testified that Mr. Skolnick was “not necessarily
physically abusive.” Therefore, this factor is neutral.
Id.
(the presence of abuse weighs in favor of relief while lack of
abuse does not weigh against relief); see also Magee v.
Commissioner, supra (lack of abuse is a neutral factor under Rev.
Proc. 2003-61); cf. Butner v.
Commissioner, supra (same under
Rev. Proc. 2000-15).
H. Mental or Physical Health
The IRS will take into consideration whether the requesting
spouse was in poor mental or physical health on the date she
signed the return or at the time relief was requested. See Rev.
Proc. 2003-61, sec. 4.03(2)(b)(ii), 2003-2 C.B. at 299.
There is no evidence in the record that petitioner’s mental
or physical health was poor; therefore, this factor is neutral.
See id.; see also Magee v.
Commissioner, supra.
I. Conclusion: Weight of the Factors
Petitioner has presented a strong case for relief from joint
and several liability. Three factors weigh in favor of relief,
one, economic hardship, weighs against relief, and four factors
are neutral. While the economic hardship factor weighs against
her, it does not outweigh the other factors. Accordingly,
petitioner is entitled to relief under section 6015(f).
VI. Petitioner’s Refund Claim
Petitioner has requested a refund of amounts paid towards
the 2003 tax liability.
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In pertinent part, section 6015(g)(1) provides that a refund
shall be allowed to the extent it is attributable to the
operation of section 6015 except to the extent that it may be
affected by other specified sections.
Rev. Proc. 2003-61, sec. 4.04(2), 2003-2 C.B. at 299,
provides that in a case involving an underpayment of income tax,
a requesting spouse is eligible for a refund of separate payments
made after July 22, 1998, if she establishes that she provided
the funds used to make the payment for which she seeks a refund.
But a requesting spouse is not eligible for refunds of payments
made with the joint return, joint payments, or payments that the
nonrequesting spouse made.
Id.
Respondent has represented that petitioner and Mr.
Skolnick’s 2003 return was timely filed; the filing date is
deemed to be April 15, 2004. See sec. 6513(a). On April 15,
2004, petitioner paid $3,795 in the form of withholdings. See
sec. 6513(b)(1) (certain withheld amounts are paid on the 15th
day of the 4th month following the close of the taxable year).
Her withholdings constitute a payment made with the joint return;
consequently, she is not eligible for a refund with respect to
that payment. See Rev. Proc. 2003-61, sec. 4.04(2); cf.
Rosenthal v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2004-89. In January 2006
Mr. Skolnick submitted a $31,656 payment, of which petitioner
paid half.8 The January 2006 payment encompasses a $31,656 joint
8
Petitioner’s Form 8857, received by the IRS on June 20,
(continued...)
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payment and in part a payment made by a nonrequesting spouse.
Consequently, petitioner is not eligible for a refund with
respect to the January 2006 payment. See Rev. Proc. 2003-61,
sec. 4.04(2); cf. Rosenthal v.
Commissioner, supra.
In conclusion, the Court holds that petitioner is entitled
to relief from joint and several liability under section 6015(f)
with respect to the unpaid addition to tax under section
6651(a)(2) and interest for 2003. But petitioner is not entitled
to any refund for 2003.
To reflect the foregoing,
An appropriate decision will
be entered.
8
(...continued)
2005, is a claim for a refund. See Washington v. Commissioner,
120 T.C. 137, 161-162 (2003). Her petition, filed on July 3,
2006, also includes a refund claim. Petitioner’s refund claims
are timely with respect to both payments. See sec. 6511(a) (a
claim for credit or refund of an overpayment of any tax shall be
filed by the taxpayer within: (1) 3 years from the time the
return was filed, or (2) 2 years from the time the tax was paid,
whichever period expires later).