MEMORANDUM OPINION
SWIFT,
Unless otherwise indicated, all section references are to the Internal Revenue Code, and all Rule references are to the Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure.
At the time the petition was filed, petitioner resided in San Francisco, California.
Petitioner and her husband, Christian Gronbeck, Jr. (Christian), were married more than 50 years ago. Christian was a medical doctor and a partner in a medical practice in San Rafael, California. During their marriage petitioner was not gainfully employed and was a homemaker and a mother of two children. On June 28, 2006, Christian passed away.
In the 1970s Christian purchased a .1998-percent limited partnership interest in Cedar-Riverside Properties (CRP), a Minnesota limited partnership. Petitioner was aware that Christian purchased the interest in CRP.
In 2009 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 51">*52 2003 Christian suffered a stroke and was admitted to a residential medical facility.
On December 24, 2003, along with other property interests, Christian's legal interest in CRP was transferred to petitioner at petitioner's and Christian's request via an order of the Superior Court of the State of California for the County of Santa Barbara, Anacapa Division. The purpose of the transfer of property to petitioner was to qualify Christian for State and Federal medical benefits while allowing petitioner to control the CRP and other property interests.
On their jointly filed Federal income tax returns for many years, petitioner and Christian reported losses relating to CRP.
On April 13, 2004, after an audit of CRP respondent determined that CRP constituted an improper tax shelter and that the CRP losses the CRP partners, including petitioner and Christian, had claimed over the years were improper.
On March 30, 2006, respondent and CRP's tax matters partner reached an agreement to settle the tax adjustments relating to CRP which respondent had determined.
Under the settlement respondent and CRP's tax matters partner stipulated that for 2005 the individual CRP partners who chose to participate 2009 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 51">*53 in the settlement would recognize capital gain in the form of a deemed distribution under
Pursuant to and consistent with the above settlement, for 2005 petitioner and Christian filed a joint Federal income tax return and reported thereon long-term capital gain of $ 247,011 relating to the CRP-related losses they had claimed in prior years and to the deemed distribution under
On May 22, 2006, 2009 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 51">*54 petitioner filed with respondent a request for equitable relief under
On September 15, 2006, respondent denied petitioner's
On October 18, 2006, petitioner filed an appeal with respondent's Appeals Office relating to respondent's September 15, 2006, denial of
On May 3, 2007, respondent issued to petitioner a written notice of determination denying petitioner's request for
When no material fact remains at issue, we may grant summary judgment as a matter of law.
Equitable relief from joint liability for Federal income taxes may be available to a spouse when it would be inequitable to hold the spouse liable.
Petitioner argues that the income in question is attributable to Christian, and not to her, because Christian was the sole owner of the CRP partnership interest during the years when essentially all of the CRP partnership losses were claimed. We disagree.
In 2003 Christian transferred his interest in CRP to petitioner so that he could qualify for medical benefits. The ownership interest was not forced upon petitioner; rather, it was done voluntarily by Christian and by petitioner to take advantage of State and Federal law.
On the basis of the undisputed 2009 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 51">*57 facts of this case (specifically the transfer of the CRP partnership interest to petitioner for State and Federal law purposes), petitioner's legal ownership of the CRP partnership interest in 2005 requires attribution of the $ 44,398 unpaid tax liability reported on petitioner's 2005 Federal income tax return to petitioner. Petitioner is not eligible for relief under
For the reasons stated, we shall grant respondent's motion for summary judgment.
1. In describing, in part, the threshold condition in question,