Judges: Gerber,Joel
Attorneys: Young B. Chung , for petitioners. Alexander D. DeVitis , for respondent.
Filed: Feb. 04, 2009
Latest Update: Dec. 05, 2020
Summary: T.C. Summary Opinion 2009-18 UNITED STATES TAX COURT JAMES ANTHONY GREIF, Petitioner v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent VANLAN T. BUI, Petitioner v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent Docket Nos. 4709-07S, 4710-07S. Filed February 4, 2009. Young B. Chung, for petitioners. Alexander D. DeVitis, for respondent. GERBER, Judge: These consolidated cases1 were heard pursuant to the provisions of section 7463 of the Internal 1 These cases are consolidated for purposes of trial, b
Summary: T.C. Summary Opinion 2009-18 UNITED STATES TAX COURT JAMES ANTHONY GREIF, Petitioner v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent VANLAN T. BUI, Petitioner v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent Docket Nos. 4709-07S, 4710-07S. Filed February 4, 2009. Young B. Chung, for petitioners. Alexander D. DeVitis, for respondent. GERBER, Judge: These consolidated cases1 were heard pursuant to the provisions of section 7463 of the Internal 1 These cases are consolidated for purposes of trial, br..
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T.C. Summary Opinion 2009-18
UNITED STATES TAX COURT
JAMES ANTHONY GREIF, Petitioner v.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent
VANLAN T. BUI, Petitioner v. COMMISSIONER
OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent
Docket Nos. 4709-07S, 4710-07S. Filed February 4, 2009.
Young B. Chung, for petitioners.
Alexander D. DeVitis, for respondent.
GERBER, Judge: These consolidated cases1 were heard
pursuant to the provisions of section 7463 of the Internal
1
These cases are consolidated for purposes of trial,
briefing, and opinion and involve coowners of realty who filed
separate petitions with respect to a casualty loss regarding
their coowned real property. Petitioners are James Anthony Greif
and VanLan T. Bui.
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Revenue Code in effect when the petitions were filed. Unless
otherwise indicated, all section references are to the Internal
Revenue Code in effect for 2003, the taxable year in issue, and
all Rule references are to the Tax Court Rules of Practice and
Procedure. Pursuant to section 7463(b), the decisions to be
entered are not reviewable by any other court, and this opinion
shall not be treated as precedent for any other case. For Mr.
Greif’s and Miss Bui’s 2003 tax years, respondent determined
income tax deficiencies of $9,191 and $11,447, respectively.
Respondent also determined accuracy-related penalties under
section 6662(a) for Mr. Greif and Miss Bui of $1,838 and $2,289,
respectively. The sole question for our consideration is whether
petitioners incurred a deductible casualty or theft loss during
their 2003 tax years.
Background2
At the time their petitions were filed, petitioners resided
in Washington State. Each petitioner’s 2003 Federal income tax
return included a gross casualty loss of $171,163. After
computational limitations, Mr. Greif claimed $164,672 and Miss
Bui claimed $163,991 as a casualty loss on their respective 2003
Schedules A, Itemized Deductions.
2
These cases were submitted at a Los Angeles, California,
trial session under Rule 122 with the facts fully stipulated by
the parties.
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On May 4, 1999, petitioners purchased, for $57,100,
unimproved real property (parcel) in SeaTac, Washington, with the
intent of placing a personal residence on the property. The
parcel was roughly square with boundaries from approximately 208
to 224 feet. The parcel had a relatively steep grade, dropping
60 feet from one side to the other. The improved real property
had been appraised on April 13, 1999, at a projected value of
$320,000 upon completion of the planned improvements.
Petitioners secured a $236,848 construction loan and on or
about March 28, 1999, hired Gifford Olson (Mr. Olson) as a
general contractor to build the residence at that price.
Construction began in June 1999. Later that year it was
discovered that Mr. Olson had built the driveway on a portion of
the area intended for the septic system drain field. Because
this deviated from the plans approved by the city and violated
the King County Health Department’s setback requirement,
petitioners were denied an occupancy permit. Other problems
included the removal of vegetation on the slopes of the property
and the negligent construction of the road leading to the house.
These errors created instability in the soil.
The costs to correct the various problems mounted, and after
drawing $182,500 from the $236,848 construction loan, Mr. Olson
abandoned the project in June 2000. At that point, the home
building project was 70 percent complete. At petitioners’
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request, the King County Board of Equalization reduced the
assessed value of the improved real property to $23,000 on the
basis that the parcel was considered “unbuildable” for lack of a
sewer connection.
On September 29, 2000, Mr. Olson sued petitioners alleging
that he was still owed $35,000 for materials and labor.
Petitioners answered Mr. Olson’s complaint, denying they owed any
amount. Without setting forth a specific amount of relief,
petitioners counterclaimed for breach of contract, negligence,
and violation of the Washington State Consumer Protection Act.
In addition to a few other complaints about Mr. Olson’s
performance, petitioners sought relief for the denial of the
occupancy permit due to the misplacement of the road and the
damage to the slope and drain field.
On March 13, 2002, Judge Michael J. Heavey, Superior Court
for King County, State of Washington, issued a memorandum opinion
in which he generally described the contractual dealings between
Mr. Olson and petitioners as follows:
The plaintiff [Olson] and defendant [petitioners] were
both greedy. The plaintiff saw an opportunity to break into
fullscale home building and the defendant saw an opportunity
to get a custom home as opposed to a modular home. They
ignored problems and cut corners. The contract and
specifications they entered into were deficient. There was
no survey of the lot corners. They both ignored that it was
a difficult lot; with a challenging access, septic, and site
location issues. No persons (contractor, owner, sanitarian,
engineer) located the drain field and reserve drainfield
areas and flagged them off. They needed serious legal,
engineering, architectural and licensed sanitarian
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professional help. Their collective ignorance and greed
blinded them to these realities. Both were reluctant to
fully discuss and resolve overruns. They continually danced
around these issues without fully addressing them. There
was no schedule, no change order process, no definitions of
“allowance” or “default allowance”, no clear statement of
work, and no real specifications: i.e., a prescription for
disaster.
On the basis of those and other found facts, Judge Heavey
held that Mr. Olson did not commit a deceptive trade practice but
that he did default on the contract and negligently damaged the
septic drain field. Petitioners were awarded costs of obtaining
a new septic field design and approval and the costs of
“rockery”, or a retaining wall to preserve the drain field.
Petitioners were also awarded a $38,150 judgment to supplement
the $40,000 remaining in the construction loan in order to finish
the home.
Petitioners also filed a claim with Mr. Olson’s insurance
carrier seeking to recoup $280,000 of alleged damage to
petitioners’ parcel by Mr. Olson. After discussions with the
carrier, petitioners’ attorney advised them that Mr. Olson’s
policy did not cover the type of damage caused to petitioners’
property. Petitioners, during 2003, filed a claim under their own
homeowner’s policy but were denied on the basis that it covered
only damage to the improvements and not the realty. Petitioners,
however, did not concede that the insurance companies were
without liability.
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On March 9, 2001, the King County Health Department granted
Mr. Greif a waiver on the setback requirement. Petitioners were
required only to submit the new plans for approval and to
construct the septic system in order to obtain the occupancy
permit. Neither was done, and later surface erosion invalidated
the waiver. Petitioners’ later requests for a new waiver were
denied.
During April 2002 the city of Kent hired a geotechnical
engineer to inspect petitioners’ parcel of land. The engineer
concluded that there was instability in the slope and roadway
alignment which, if uncorrected, could result in a landslide and
cause damage to the real property improvements. Petitioners
subsequently hired a geotechnical engineering firm, Krazan &
Associates, Inc. (Krazan), to examine the property. Krazan’s
report made findings similar to the city engineer’s. Petitioners
contend some earth movement occurred sometime between May 2002
and June 2003, resulting in the accumulation of soil along the
eastern edge of the property and causing some damage to
vegetation and a gate.
On November 25, 2002, petitioners filed a motion for
reconsideration and clarification of Judge Heavey’s March 13,
2002, memorandum opinion. In their motion petitioners pointed
out that there was evidence that it would cost $153,000 to
correct the problems with the road that cut across the drain
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field. During a period of cross-motions in the superior court
proceeding (petitioners’ motion for reconsideration and Mr.
Olson’s motion to dismiss) Mr. Olson voluntarily entered into a
liquidating bankruptcy on May 1, 2003. In the bankruptcy
proceeding Mr. Greif filed a motion, that was granted, seeking to
lift the stay as it related to his pursuit of Mr. Olson in the
superior court proceeding. Petitioners also filed an adversary
proceeding complaint objecting to the discharge of Mr. Olson’s
debt. Mr. Olson moved to dismiss petitioners’ complaint, and on
December 12, 2003, petitioners’ response indicated they would not
oppose the motion but would proceed with their action in Superior
Court for King County. On January 8, 2004, the bankruptcy
trustee filed a report of no distribution, and on May 11, 2004,
Mr. Olson’s claimed debt to petitioners was discharged.
Mr. Greif claimed casualty or theft losses with respect to
the subject property on his 2001 and 2002 income tax returns of
$23,000 and $48,000, respectively. Petitioners claimed a
casualty loss for 2003 on the basis of their belief that Mr.
Olson’s bankruptcy rendered any relief in the superior court
proceeding uncollectable and also because of their inability to
recover from insurance companies. On their respective 2003
income tax returns, petitioners each claimed a $171,163 basis in
the improved real property, no insurance recovery, and a fair
market value of $250,000 before and $78,837 after the casualty.
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During 2004 development of the surrounding area made the
municipal sewer system accessible to petitioners’ property.
Petitioners were granted an occupancy permit, and they moved into
the residence in the latter part of 2006 or early 2007. On
January 25, 2007, petitioners’ improved realty was assessed on
the local tax rolls at $496,000, comprised of $69,000 for land
and $427,000 for improvements.
On October 26, 2006, petitioners stipulated to the superior
court’s dismissal of their suit against Mr. Olson. In 2007
petitioners accepted $7,500 from Mr. Olson’s insurance carrier in
settlement of their claims.
Discussion
The parties submitted this case fully stipulated, thereby
rendering irrelevant questions about whether the burden of proof
shifted. See sec. 7491(a). Petitioners, however, bear the
burden of showing entitlement to casualty loss deductions. See
Rule 142(a); New Colonial Ice Co. v. Helvering,
292 U.S. 435, 440
(1934). In addition, respondent bears the burden of production
with respect to the accuracy-related penalties determined under
section 6662(a). See sec. 7491(c).
I. Casualty Loss Deduction
Under section 165(a), deductions are allowable for losses
not compensated for by insurance or otherwise. In the case of an
individual, section 165(c)(3), subject to the limitations of
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sections 165(h), permits a nonbusiness casualty loss. Section
165(h) sets forth dollar and percentage limitations or thresholds
for claiming casualty losses. Section 165(h) permits an
individual to deduct a casualty loss only to the extent each loss
exceeds $100 and the aggregate of such casualty gains and losses
exceeds 10 percent of adjusted gross income.
A. Casualty Loss
The term “casualty” is not clearly defined in the Code or
the regulations. Section 165(c)(3) mentions losses arising from
“fire, storm, shipwreck, or other casualty”. In defining the
term “other casualty”, courts apply the rule of ejusdem generis
and look for characteristics similar to those of a fire, storm,
or shipwreck. Maher v. Commissioner,
76 T.C. 593, 596 (1981),
affd.
680 F.2d 91 (11th Cir. 1982). Courts have interpreted
“other casualty” to require an undesigned, sudden and unexpected
event, or a sudden, cataclysmic, and devastating loss. Torre v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2001-218, affd.
52 Fed. Appx. 965 (9th
Cir. 2002).
Petitioners claim two losses. First, petitioners contend
they were denied an occupancy permit because damage to the septic
system drain field made the septic area unusable and
significantly decreased the value of the property. Second,
petitioners contend the land was rendered unstable when Mr. Olson
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removed vegetation along the slopes of the property and cut the
road too steep into the hillside.
Petitioners argue that the damage to the drain field and
slope was sudden because it was not caused by gradual
deterioration and happened over a relatively short period.
Petitioners argue that the damage was unexpected because such
damage does not usually occur during the construction of homes on
similarly situated properties. Petitioners correctly observe
that negligence is not an automatic bar to a casualty loss
deduction. See White v. Commissioner,
48 T.C. 430, 435 (1967).
The foreseeability of an event or the presence of negligence does
not preclude the finding that the event was a casualty. Heyn v.
Commissioner,
46 T.C. 302, 308 (1966). Both are merely factors
in making such a determination.
Id.
Nevertheless, we hold that petitioners’ losses were not
casualties because neither was the result of sudden or unexpected
events. Damage caused by faulty construction methods has long
been held not to constitute a casualty loss. Matheson v.
Commissioner,
18 B.T.A. 674 (1930), affd.
54 F.2d 537 (2d Cir.
1931). In petitioners’ litigation against Mr. Olson, the court
found that Mr. Olson mistakenly encroached onto the area of the
septic system drain field while excavating for the driveway.
Petitioners contend that the damage to the drain field site
occurred instead when a subcontractor negligently drove a
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bulldozer over the area. Regardless of how the drain field was
damaged, the end result was the placement of the driveway over a
portion of the intended drain field site. When this occurred,
the location of the driveway no longer conformed with the
approved plans and violated the setback requirement. For that
reason, petitioners were denied an occupancy permit, and the
property lost most of its value.
Casualty losses have been allowed in faulty construction
cases typically where there has been a subsequent, unexpected
event apart from the contractor’s negligence. See Marx v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1991-598 (subsequent leaks in taxpayer’s
roof arising from its negligent repair were a casualty loss, but
the original leak from its faulty construction was not); Hayutin
v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1972-127 (flood damage proximately
caused not by faulty construction of taxpayer’s home, but by
plumber stepping on unprotected pipe), affd.
508 F.2d 462 (10th
Cir. 1974). Whether the encroachment onto the drain field site
was the result of negligent excavation or a bulldozer running
over the area is irrelevant. Denial of the occupancy permit was
based on the driveway being too close to the drain field. The
improper placement of the driveway is simply a matter of faulty
construction. Once the driveway had been constructed, there was
no later event that caused further harm to the property.
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Petitioners cite the Heyn case as an example of the
allowance of a casualty loss based on a contractor’s negligence.
In Heyn v. Commissioner, supra at 305, the contractor
unilaterally deviated from the prescribed excavation method and
was warned of the likelihood of a landslide occurring.
Nevertheless, the Court allowed the casualty loss because the
physical characteristics of the landslide were those normally
associated with a casualty, and the landslide involved a sudden
and violent movement of a large mass of earth that was
cataclysmic in character.
Id. at 307-308.
We have held that the magnitude of the taxpayer’s loss is
another factor to consider in the casualty loss analysis. See
White v. Commissioner, supra at 434. It was the physical
characteristics and magnitude of the taxpayer’s loss which the
Court in Heyn found akin to the sudden and devastating loss
suffered during a fire, storm, or shipwreck.
Petitioners contend the soil instability culminated in a
landslide sometime between May 2002 and June 2003. However, the
record does not adequately support this contention. The
geotechnical engineer’s report from Krazan merely notes
instability created by the removal of vegetation from the slopes
and the steep angle of the driveway. The report stated that if
those conditions were not mitigated, there would be an adverse
effect on the property; but it made no mention of a landslide.
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Similarly, a letter from the Department of the Army notes that
the city’s engineering manager made the same observations about
the instability on the property. This letter is dated June 11,
2003 (after the purported landslide), and also fails to mention
that such an event occurred. In the absence of such an event
petitioners have experienced only instability in the slopes of
their property. This is not the type of loss that can be
considered sudden, cataclysmic, and devastating or the result of
an undesigned, sudden, and unexpected event.
Furthermore, a taxpayer may not knowingly allow his property
to be damaged or willfully damage the property himself. See
White v. Commissioner, supra at 435; Pryor v. Commissioner, T.C.
Memo. 1987-80. Petitioners were granted a waiver on the setback
requirement and could have thus obtained an occupancy permit,
thereby mitigating the loss they suffered. By failing to pursue
the variance, petitioners knowingly perpetuated the impediment to
completion of the real property improvements.
Petitioners’ loss was the product of Mr. Olson’s negligent
construction and not some unexpected event. There was no
devastating or cataclysmic damage to the property, such as a
landslide. Petitioners could have remedied the occupancy permit
problem, but they neglected to take the necessary steps to do so.
We accordingly hold that petitioners’ loss was not a casualty.
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B. Amount of Loss3
The amount of a particular casualty loss deduction is
limited to the lesser of (1) the difference between the fair
market value of the property before and after the loss, or (2)
the adjusted basis provided in section 1011 for determining the
loss from the sale or other disposition of the property. Sec.
165(b); secs. 1.165-7(b)(1), 1.165-8(c), Income Tax Regs.
Petitioners have not met their burden of establishing the
amount of their loss. They have not demonstrated the value of
the property before their loss. Petitioners purchased the parcel
on May 4, 1999, for $57,100. No appraisal was made at that time.
Petitioners did submit an appraisal performed before the purchase
(dated April 13, 1999) as proof that the property was valued at
$320,000. However, the report was marked “subject to completion
per plans and specifications.” Construction of the home began in
June. The encroachment of the driveway into the septic system
drain field was discovered later that year, and construction had
not yet been completed at that time. Therefore, the property
could not have been worth as much as the full estimated value in
that appraisal report. The next valuation of the property was
3
We consider whether petitioners have established the amount
of a loss because petitioners have made the generalized
alternative contention that their loss was a theft loss. Because
we conclude that the amount of the loss has not been established,
no further consideration need be given to petitioners’
alternative contention.
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not made until after petitioners’ loss, when it was assessed at
$23,000 for the 2000 tax year.
Petitioners have also failed to establish their adjusted
bases in the property at the time of the loss. Petitioners now
contend that they each had an adjusted basis of $119,725. They
arrived at this number by adding the $57,100 purchase price of
the parcel to the $182,500 already paid to Mr. Olson at the time
he stopped work on the home in June 2000. These calculations are
imprecise, and the measure of their loss has more to do with the
construction of the driveway over the drain field site.
Petitioners have not documented how much of the $182,500 paid to
Mr. Olson was for work done afterwards. Such amounts are not
properly includable in petitioners’ adjusted basis at the time of
the loss.
Petitioners have not provided sufficient evidence for us to
determine the value of the property before the loss and their
adjusted bases at the time of the loss. Both of these figures
are necessary to determining the proper amount allowable as a
loss. We therefore hold that petitioners have not established
the amount of their loss.
C. Reasonable Prospect of Recovery
Even when a taxpayer has suffered a casualty loss, he cannot
deduct the loss if he has a claim for reimbursement with a
reasonable prospect of recovery. Sec. 1.165-1(d)(2)(i), Income
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Tax Regs. Deduction of the loss is disallowed until the taxable
year in which it can be ascertained with reasonable certainty
whether reimbursement will be received.
Id. This determination
can be made upon a settlement, an adjudication, or an abandonment
of the claim.
Id.
Courts apply an objective standard in determining whether
such a “reasonable expectation” existed at the end of the year
the deduction is claimed. Ramsay Scarlett & Co. v. Commissioner,
61 T.C. 795, 811-812 (1974), affd.
521 F.2d 786 (4th Cir. 1975).
The standard is applied with foresight, and facts not reasonably
foreseeable at the close of the particular year are not
considered.
Id. The taxpayer’s pursuit of litigation suggests a
reasonable prospect of recovery existed but does not require such
a finding. See Halliburton Co. v. Commissioner,
93 T.C. 758, 775
(1989), affd.
946 F.2d 395 (5th Cir. 1991). Proof of subsequent
events may, however, be allowed to confirm a conclusion as to
whether there was a reasonable prospect of recovery.
Id. at 774-
775.
Petitioners contend that the denial of coverage by Mr.
Olson’s insurance carrier proves they had no reasonable prospect
of recovery. Petitioners note that their attorney advised them
on January 21, 2007, that Mr. Olson’s insurance policy did not,
in fact, cover their claim.
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Petitioners litigated the denial of coverage, and we
accordingly hold that they have not met their burden of proving a
reasonable prospect of recovery did not exist at the end of 2003.
In Mr. Olson’s 2003 bankruptcy proceeding petitioners stated that
Mr. Olson’s insurance carrier was liable for many of Mr. Greif’s
claims against him. Petitioners requested that the stay to be
lifted so that they could proceed against the insurance carrier.
As of December 12, 2003, petitioners indicated their intent to
continue with the litigation against Mr. Olson. While
petitioners’ decision to litigate does not decide the issue, it
does demonstrate that they had not yet abandoned their claim for
reimbursement. With the ongoing litigation, it could not be
ascertained with reasonable certainty that petitioners would not
prevail in their suit against Mr. Olson and recover the judgment
from his insurance carrier. The continuation of the litigation
until 2006 and the fact that a settlement was reached in 2007
suggest that a reasonable prospect of recovery did exist.
The fact that petitioners maintained their claim for
insurance reimbursement and had a reasonable prospect of recovery
at the end of 2003 also militates against allowing them a
casualty loss deduction.
D. Conclusion
Petitioners’ loss was not of the type contemplated by
section 165(c). Petitioners failed to establish the true amount
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of their loss and still had a claim for reimbursement with a
reasonable prospect of recovery in 2003. For these reasons, we
hold that petitioners are not entitled to casualty loss
deductions.
II. Accuracy-Related Penalties
Section 6662(a) and (b)(1) and (2) imposes an accuracy-
related penalty of 20 percent on the portion of an underpayment
attributable to negligence, disregard of rules or regulations, or
a substantial understatement of income tax. Negligence is
defined as a lack of due care or failure to do what a reasonable
person would do under the circumstances. A disregard of rules or
regulations includes any careless, reckless, or intentional
disregard. Sec. 6662(c). An understatement is substantial if it
exceeds the greater of: (1) 10 percent of the tax required to be
shown on the return for the taxable year, or (2) $5,000. Sec.
6662(d)(1)(A). Neely v. Commissioner,
85 T.C. 934, 947 (1985).
Section 6001 requires taxpayers to maintain adequate records from
which their correct tax liability may be determined.
Petitioners’ understatements of income tax are substantial.
Mr. Greif reported a tax liability of zero, whereas his correct
liability was $9,191. Miss Bui also reported a tax liability of
zero, whereas her correct liability was $11,447. Both
understatements of income tax are substantial because they exceed
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$5,000 or 10 percent of the tax required to be shown on the
return.
Petitioners’ underpayments are also attributable to
negligence. Petitioners declared a total adjusted basis of
$342,326 in their 2003 returns, but they provided no
documentation as to how they arrived at this figure. Petitioners
have since claimed the adjusted basis was $239,450 without
explaining this discrepancy. Both petitioners claimed casualty
loss deductions of $171,163. The deductions far exceed the
$239,450 petitioners now claim to be the property’s total
adjusted basis. Even if we assume the $239,450 figure is correct
and ignore the property’s preloss value, petitioners’ claimed
casualty losses plainly exceeded the $239,450 adjusted basis
limitation on their casualty loss deductions.
As discussed above, petitioners also failed to properly
establish the value of the property before their loss.
Petitioners claimed preloss value of $320,000 was based on an
appraisal report conditioned on the completion of the planned
improvements. Such improvements had not been completed at the
time petitioners’ loss occurred. At the time their loss
occurred, petitioners should have known that the property was not
worth the full value listed in the appraisal report.
Petitioners contend that they acted in good faith and with
reasonable cause by relying on the advice of a tax professional.
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Section 6664(c)(1) provides that the section 6662 penalty does
not apply to any portion of an underpayment if reasonable cause
existed and the taxpayers acted in good faith.
Reliance on the advice of a tax professional is not an
absolute defense to negligence. Freytag v. Commissioner,
89 T.C.
849, 888 (1987), affd.
904 F.2d 1011 (5th Cir. 1990), affd.
501
U.S. 868 (1991). Such reliance does not necessarily establish
reasonable cause and good faith. Sec. 1.6664-4(b)(1), Income Tax
Regs. The determination of whether a taxpayer acted with
reasonable cause and in good faith is made by taking into account
all pertinent facts and circumstances.
Id. To establish good
faith reliance, taxpayers must prove that: (1) They provided the
preparer complete and accurate information, (2) an incorrect
return was a result of the preparer’s mistakes, and (3) the
taxpayers believed in good faith that they were relying on a
competent return preparer’s advice. Estate of Goldman v.
Commissioner,
112 T.C. 317, 324 (1999), affd. without published
opinion sub nom. Schutter v. Commissioner,
242 F.3d 390 (10th
Cir. 2000).
Petitioners have not shown how they calculated $342,326 as
their adjusted basis. They should have known that the $171,163
deduction was overstated irrespective of who chose to use that
figure. Accordingly, petitioners are liable for the accuracy-
related penalties under section 6662(a).
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To reflect the foregoing,
Decisions will be entered
for respondent.