Judges: "Dean, John F."
Attorneys: Leopold Koziej and Maria Koziej, Pro sese. Michael T. Shelton , for respondent.
Filed: Apr. 12, 2010
Latest Update: Dec. 05, 2020
Summary: T.C. Summary Opinion 2010-40 UNITED STATES TAX COURT LEOPOLD KOZIEJ AND MARIA KOZIEJ, Petitioners v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent Docket No. 28871-08S. Filed April 12, 2010. Leopold Koziej and Maria Koziej, pro sese. Michael T. Shelton, for respondent. DEAN, Special Trial Judge: This case was heard pursuant to the provisions of section 7463 of the Internal Revenue Code in effect when the petition was filed. Pursuant to section 7463(b), the decision to be entered is not reviewable
Summary: T.C. Summary Opinion 2010-40 UNITED STATES TAX COURT LEOPOLD KOZIEJ AND MARIA KOZIEJ, Petitioners v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent Docket No. 28871-08S. Filed April 12, 2010. Leopold Koziej and Maria Koziej, pro sese. Michael T. Shelton, for respondent. DEAN, Special Trial Judge: This case was heard pursuant to the provisions of section 7463 of the Internal Revenue Code in effect when the petition was filed. Pursuant to section 7463(b), the decision to be entered is not reviewable ..
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T.C. Summary Opinion 2010-40
UNITED STATES TAX COURT
LEOPOLD KOZIEJ AND MARIA KOZIEJ, Petitioners v.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent
Docket No. 28871-08S. Filed April 12, 2010.
Leopold Koziej and Maria Koziej, pro sese.
Michael T. Shelton, for respondent.
DEAN, Special Trial Judge: This case was heard pursuant to
the provisions of section 7463 of the Internal Revenue Code in
effect when the petition was filed. Pursuant to section 7463(b),
the decision to be entered is not reviewable by any other court,
and this opinion shall not be treated as precedent for any other
case. Unless otherwise indicated, subsequent section references
are to the Internal Revenue Code in effect for the years in
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issue, and all Rule references are to the Tax Court Rules of
Practice and Procedure.
Respondent determined the following deficiencies
in, and accuracy-related penalties under section 6662(a) on,
petitioners’ Federal income taxes:
Accuracy-Related Penalty
Year Deficiency Sec. 6662(a)
2004 $2,559 $511.80
2005 10,120 2,024.00
The issues for decision are whether: (1) Amounts deposited
in petitioners’ bank accounts in excess of their reported income
for 2004 and 2005 constitute income; and (2) petitioners are
liable for accuracy-related penalties under section 6662(a) for
2004 and 2005.
Background
Some of the facts have been stipulated and are so found.
The stipulation of facts, the stipulation of settled issues, and
the attached exhibits are incorporated herein by reference. When
petitioners filed their petition, they resided in Illinois.
Petitioners timely filed their 2004 and 2005 Federal income
tax returns. They reported total gross sales of $429,866 for
2004 and $641,917 for 2005 from their construction business.
During the years at issue petitioners operated JMB
Construction and borrowed money to cover expenses associated with
the costs of their business.
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In a notice of deficiency respondent determined that
petitioners failed to report income of $10,355 for 2004 and
$37,391 for 2005. Respondent further determined that petitioners
were liable for accuracy-related penalties of $511.80 and $2,024
for 2004 and 2005, respectively.
Petitioners agree that the disputed amounts were deposited
in their bank accounts and not reported as income for 2004 and
2005. Petitioners assert, however, that these deposits
constituted loans and are thus nontaxable.
Discussion
I. Evidentiary Matters
In general, the Court conducts trials in accordance with the
rules of evidence for trials without a jury in the U.S. District
Court for the District of Columbia, and accordingly, follows the
Federal Rules of Evidence. Sec. 7453; Rule 143(a); Clough v.
Commissioner,
119 T.C. 183, 188 (2002). However, Rule 174(b)
carves out an exception for trials of small tax cases under the
provisions of section 7463(a). Under Rule 174(b), the Court
conducts small tax cases as informally as possible and
consequently may admit any evidence that the Court deems to have
probative value. Schwartz v. Commissioner,
128 T.C. 6, 7 (2007).
Respondent objects to several documents proffered by
petitioners, arguing that they constitute inadmissible hearsay.
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A. Affidavits
Petitioners proffered several affidavits from friends and
acquaintances averring that they had lent petitioners money in
2004 and 2005.
There is no corroborating evidence, however, other than
petitioners’ own testimony, that petitioners’ friends lent them
money in 2004 or 2005. For example, there is no evidence in the
record that petitioners entered into a loan agreement with any of
these parties or that petitioners intended to repay the “lent”
funds. Therefore, the Court will sustain respondent’s
objections. See Rule 174(b).
B. Checks
Petitioners proffered several checks made out to “JMB
Construction” or “cash” and alleged that these checks constituted
loans. Again, however, other than petitioners’ own testimony,
there is no evidence that the checks constituted loans as opposed
to income.
Because there is no indication that these checks constituted
loans, sufficient grounds exist to sustain respondent’s
evidentiary objection.
II. Burden of Proof
Generally, the Commissioner’s determinations are presumed
correct, and the taxpayer bears the burden of proving that those
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determinations are erroneous.1 Rule 142(a); see INDOPCO, Inc. v.
Commissioner,
503 U.S. 79, 84 (1992); Welch v. Helvering,
290
U.S. 111, 115 (1933).
III. Unreported Income
Respondent determined deficiencies in petitioners’ Federal
income taxes for 2004 and 2005 by using the bank deposits method.
“The bank deposits method assumes that all money deposited
in a taxpayer’s bank account during a given period constitutes
taxable income, but the Government must take into account any
nontaxable source or deductible expense of which it has
knowledge.” Clayton v. Commissioner,
102 T.C. 632, 645-646
(1994).
“The use of the bank deposit method for computing income has
long been sanctioned by the courts.” Estate of Mason v.
Commissioner,
64 T.C. 651, 656 (1975) (and cases cited thereat),
affd.
566 F.2d 2 (6th Cir. 1977). “A bank deposit is prima facie
evidence of income and respondent need not prove a likely source
of that income.” Tokarski v. Commissioner,
87 T.C. 74, 77 (1986)
(citing Estate of Mason v. Commissioner, supra at 656-657). The
burden of showing duplications is on the taxpayer. Zarnow v.
Commissioner,
48 T.C. 213, 216 (1967).
1
Petitioners have not claimed or shown that they meet the
requirements under sec. 7491(a) to shift the burden of proof to
respondent as to any factual issue relating to their liability
for tax.
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Petitioners reported gross sales of $429,866 for 2004.
That year deposits in their bank accounts totaled $495,406.43
Respondent determined that $10,355 of their unreported deposits
was income. For 2005 petitioners reported gross sales of
$641,917. Respondent calculated petitioners’ total deposits for
2005 and determined that $37,391 of the unreported deposits was
income.2
Petitioners do not contest that unreported amounts of
$10,355 in 2004 and $37,391 in 2005, as determined by respondent,
were deposited into their bank accounts. Petitioners assert,
however, that these amounts constituted loans and are thus
nontaxable.
Receipt of a loan is not income to the borrower for Federal
income tax purposes. Karns Prime & Fancy Food, Ltd. v.
Commissioner,
494 F.3d 404, 405 (3d Cir. 2007), affg. T.C. Memo.
2005-233; Toberman v. Commissioner,
294 F.3d 985, 988 (8th Cir.
2002), affg. in part and revg. in part T.C. Memo. 2000-221. In
determining whether a given transaction constitutes a loan for
Federal income tax purposes, the substance, rather than the form,
of the transaction is controlling. Karns Prime & Fancy Food,
Ltd. v. Commissioner, supra at 408. The factors considered by
the courts to determine whether a transaction constitutes a valid
2
For 2005 respondent determined that $206,860.98 of
petitioners’ unreported deposits was not income.
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debt include: The existence of a written or formal debt
instrument, the existence of specific terms for the debt, the
terms for repayment of the debt, whether the taxpayer had any
legal obligation to repay the loan, and whether the taxpayer held
an actual intent to repay the loan. Welch v. Commissioner,
204
F.3d 1228, 1230 (9th Cir. 2000), affg. T.C. Memo. 1998-121.
Petitioners testified that they received several loans from
friends in 2004 and 2005 to finance their construction business.3
On September 21, 2005, they also obtained two lines of credit
totaling $303,060.
Although petitioners testified that they received loans from
friends, there is no corroborating evidence showing that the
money they received constituted loans as opposed to income.
Petitioners did not present evidence that they entered into loan
agreements with any of their friends or that petitioners intended
to repay the purported loans.
Petitioners provided multiple bank statements striving to
corroborate their testimony that they received loans from friends
in 2004 and 2005. Petitioners identified several deposits,
claiming that the deposits constituted loans. The bank
statements, however, are uninformative. The statements designate
3
Marian Czarnik also testified that he lent petitioners
$4,000 in 2004. He verified that he endorsed a check written in
October 2004 for $4,000. This check, however, was made out to
“cash”, and there is no corroborating evidence that the money was
“lent” to petitioners.
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deposits simply as a “deposit” and provide the date and the
amount of the deposit. The statements do not indicate the source
or origination of any of the deposited funds, and there is no
indication that the deposits constituted loans as opposed to
income.
Petitioners also claim that they made several draws on their
line of credit in 2005. Petitioners identified two separate
deposits in their bank records, on August 3 and 9, 2005. They
argue that these deposits resulted from draws on their line of
credit; one in the amount of $40,000 and the other in the amount
of $80,000. Despite petitioners’ assertions, these deposits were
actually made more than 1 month before the date petitioners
obtained their credit line. Furthermore, petitioners did not
show that any remaining deposit in 2005 resulted from a draw on
their line of credit.
Petitioners have failed to show that the unreported amounts
for 2004 and 2005 were attributable to loans or that they did not
constitute income. On the basis of the foregoing, the Court is
unable to conclude that the unreported income is nontaxable.
Respondent’s determinations are sustained.
IV. Accuracy-Related Penalty
Section 6662(a) and (b)(1) and (2) imposes a 20-percent
accuracy-related penalty for any portion of an underpayment that
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is attributable to: (1) Negligence or disregard of rules or
regulations; or (2) a substantial understatement of income tax.4
Section 6662(c) defines “negligence” to include “any failure
to make a reasonable attempt to comply with the provisions of
this title,” and “disregard” to include “any careless, reckless,
or intentional disregard.” Negligence also includes any failure
by the taxpayer to keep adequate books and records or to
substantiate items properly. Sec. 1.6662-3(b)(1), Income Tax
Regs.
The Commissioner bears the burden of production with respect
to the applicability of an accuracy-related penalty determined in
a notice of deficiency. See sec. 7491(c). In order to meet the
burden of production under section 7491(c), the Commissioner need
only make a prima facie case that imposition of the penalty or
addition to tax is appropriate. Higbee v. Commissioner,
116 T.C.
438, 446 (2001). Once he has met his burden, the burden of proof
is upon the taxpayer to prove that the accuracy-related penalty
does not apply because of reasonable cause, substantial
authority, or the like. See secs. 6662(d)(2)(B), 6664(c); Higbee
v. Commissioner, supra at 448.
4
Because the Court finds that petitioners were negligent or
disregarded rules or regulations, the Court need not discuss
whether there is a substantial understatement of income tax. See
sec. 6662(b).
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Respondent determined accuracy-related penalties of $511.80
and $2,024 for 2004 and 2005, respectively. Petitioners’ tax
liabilities for 2004 and 2005 are attributable solely to their
failure to report as income their claimed receipt of loans.
Petitioners did not keep the records required by the Code to
substantiate receipt of loans. Failure to keep adequate records
is evidence not only of negligence, but also of intentional
disregard of regulations. See sec. 1.6662-3(b)(1) and (2),
Income Tax Regs.; see also Magnon v. Commissioner,
73 T.C. 980,
1008 (1980). Petitioners have failed to demonstrate that they
were not negligent, and the Court finds that respondent has met
his burden of production under section 7491(c).
An accuracy-related penalty is not imposed on any portion of
the underpayment as to which the taxpayer acted with reasonable
cause and in good faith. Sec. 6664(c)(1). Section 1.6664-
4(b)(1), Income Tax Regs., incorporates a facts and circumstances
test to determine whether the taxpayer acted with reasonable
cause and in good faith. The most important factor is the extent
of the taxpayer’s effort to assess his proper tax liability.
Id.
Petitioners failed to present any evidence or argument as to
why they should not be subject to the accuracy-related penalties
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for 2004 and 2005. Accordingly, respondent’s determinations of
accuracy-related penalties for 2004 and 2005 are sustained.
To reflect the foregoing,
Decision will be entered
for respondent.