Judges: "Dean, John F."
Attorneys: Jonathan Decatorsmith , for petitioners. Robyn R. Gilliom , for respondent.
Filed: Apr. 14, 2010
Latest Update: Dec. 05, 2020
Summary: T.C. Summary Opinion 2010-45 UNITED STATES TAX COURT PAUL EDWARD HENDRICKSON AND CYNTHIA PUSATERI-HENDRICKSON, Petitioners v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent Docket No. 31302-08S. Filed April 14, 2010. Jonathan Decatorsmith, for petitioners. Robyn R. Gilliom, for respondent. DEAN, Special Trial Judge: This case was heard pursuant to the provisions of section 7463 of the Internal Revenue Code in effect at the time the petition was filed. Pursuant to section 7463(b), the decision to b
Summary: T.C. Summary Opinion 2010-45 UNITED STATES TAX COURT PAUL EDWARD HENDRICKSON AND CYNTHIA PUSATERI-HENDRICKSON, Petitioners v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent Docket No. 31302-08S. Filed April 14, 2010. Jonathan Decatorsmith, for petitioners. Robyn R. Gilliom, for respondent. DEAN, Special Trial Judge: This case was heard pursuant to the provisions of section 7463 of the Internal Revenue Code in effect at the time the petition was filed. Pursuant to section 7463(b), the decision to be..
More
T.C. Summary Opinion 2010-45
UNITED STATES TAX COURT
PAUL EDWARD HENDRICKSON AND CYNTHIA PUSATERI-HENDRICKSON,
Petitioners v.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent
Docket No. 31302-08S. Filed April 14, 2010.
Jonathan Decatorsmith, for petitioners.
Robyn R. Gilliom, for respondent.
DEAN, Special Trial Judge: This case was heard pursuant to
the provisions of section 7463 of the Internal Revenue Code in
effect at the time the petition was filed. Pursuant to section
7463(b), the decision to be entered is not reviewable by any
other court, and this opinion shall not be treated as precedent
for any other case. Unless otherwise indicated, subsequent
section references are to the Internal Revenue Code in effect for
- 2 -
the year in issue, and all Rule references are to the Tax Court
Rules of Practice and Procedure.
For 2006 respondent determined a deficiency of $3,650 in
petitioners’ Federal income tax. The issues for decision are
whether petitioners: (1) Are entitled to dependency exemption
deductions for petitioner Paul Edward Hendrickson’s (Mr.
Hendrickson) two daughters for 2006; and (2) are entitled to
child tax credits for his two daughters for 2006.
Background
Some of the facts have been stipulated and are so found.
The stipulation of facts and the attached exhibits are
incorporated herein by reference. When petitioners filed their
petition, they resided in Illinois.
Petitioners timely filed a joint Federal income tax return
for 2006. Petitioners claimed two dependency exemption
deductions and child tax credits for Mr. Hendrickson’s daughters.
Petitioners did not attach Form 8332, Release of Claim to
Exemption for Child of Divorced or Separated Parents, or its
equivalent, to their Form 1040, U.S. Individual Income Tax
Return.
In 2006 Mr. Hendrickson’s children did not reside with him,
but lived with Mr. Hendrickson’s ex-wife, who was the custodial
parent of the children. Petitioners, however, supported the
children financially, and a 2008 State court order awarded Mr.
- 3 -
Hendrickson the dependency exemption deductions for his children,
retroactive to tax year 2005. The court order was signed by the
judge and by Mr. Hendrickson’s attorney, but it was not signed by
Mr. Hendrickson’s ex-wife, the custodial parent.
Respondent issued a notice of deficiency on May 16, 2008,
disallowing petitioners’ claimed dependency exemption deductions
and child tax credits for Mr. Hendrickson’s daughters.
Discussion
I. Burden of Proof
Generally, the Commissioner’s determinations are presumed
correct, and the taxpayer bears the burden of proving that those
determinations are erroneous.1 Rule 142(a); see INDOPCO, Inc. v.
Commissioner,
503 U.S. 79, 84 (1992); Welch v. Helvering,
290
U.S. 111, 115 (1933).
II. Dependency Exemption Deductions
Section 151(c), in pertinent part, allows a taxpayer to
claim as a deduction the exemption amount for each individual who
is a “dependent” of the taxpayer as defined in section 152 and
who is the taxpayer’s child and satisfies certain age
requirements.
1
Petitioners have not claimed or shown that they meet the
requirements under sec. 7491(a) to shift the burden of proof to
respondent as to any factual issue relating to their liability
for tax.
- 4 -
Section 152(a) defines “dependent” to mean a qualifying
child or a qualifying relative of the taxpayer.
In the case of divorced or separated parents, section
152(e)(1) provides that when a child is in the custody of one
parent for over one-half of the year, the child is treated as
being the qualifying child or qualifying relative of the
noncustodial parent only if the requirements of section 152(e)(2)
or (3) are met.2
Section 152(e)(2) provides: “if * * * the custodial parent
signs a written declaration (in such manner and form as the
Secretary may by regulations prescribe)” that he or she will not
claim the child as a dependent and the noncustodial parent
attaches the written declaration to his or her return for the
taxable year, then the noncustodial parent is entitled to the
dependency exemption deduction. For purposes of section
152(e)(2), the term “noncustodial parent” means the parent who is
not the custodial parent. See sec. 152(e)(4)(A), and (B).
The written declaration may be made on a form provided by
the Service or a document that conforms to its substance. Miller
v. Commissioner,
114 T.C. 184, 190-191 (2000) (citing sec. 1.152-
2
The exceptions in sec. 152(e)(3) and (5) do not apply.
There was no multiple support agreement, and there is no pre-1985
instrument. Thus, petitioners are entitled to the dependency
exemption deductions only if the requirements of sec. 152(e)(2)
are met.
- 5 -
4T(a), Q&A-3, Temporary Income Tax Regs., 49 Fed. Reg. 34459
(Aug. 31, 1984)), affd. on other grounds sub nom. Lovejoy v.
Commissioner,
293 F.3d 1208 (10th Cir. 2002); see also Neal v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1999-97. The written declaration is
embodied in Form 8332, and it incorporates the requirements of
section 152(e)(2). Miller v. Commissioner, supra at 190.
The parties agree that Mr. Hendrickson’s ex-wife is the
custodial parent as defined in section 152(e)(4)(A). Although
petitioners provided a signed State court order entitling Mr.
Hendrickson to the dependency exemption deductions for his
daughters, it does not contain the signature of the custodial
parent.
Although the Court understands the difficulty of
petitioners’ situation, the Court is unable to disregard the
unambiguous requirements of section 152(e)(2) for claiming a
dependency exemption deduction. Because petitioners did not
provide a Form 8332 or its equivalent signed by the custodial
parent the Court must disallow the dependency exemption
deductions.
III. Child Tax Credit
Subject to the limitation based on adjusted gross income in
section 24(b)(1), section 24(a) provides a credit with respect to
each qualifying child of the taxpayer. Section 24(c)(1) defines
the term “qualifying child” as a “qualifying child of the
- 6 -
taxpayer (as defined in section 152(c)) who has not attained age
17.” It has not been shown that Mr. Hendrickson’s daughters are
to be treated as his qualifying children. Therefore, petitioners
are not entitled to claim these children as qualifying children
for purposes of the child tax credit.
To reflect the foregoing,
Decision will be entered
for respondent.