Judges: GUSTAFSON
Attorneys: Hamilton Loeb and Anne C. Loomis , for petitioner. Lindsey D. Stellwagen , for respondent.
Filed: Apr. 27, 2010
Latest Update: Nov. 21, 2020
Summary: SHOUKRI OSMAN SALEH ABDEL-FATTAH, PETITIONER v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, RESPONDENT Docket No. 4683–09. Filed April 27, 2010. In 2005–2007 P, a non-U.S. citizen, was an employee of the Embassy of the United Arab Emirates (UAE) in Washington, D.C., performing for that Embassy services of a sort that are performed by employees of the U.S. Embassy in the UAE. The UAE does not impose an income tax, so employees of the U.S. Embassy in the UAE incur no income tax; but the U.S. Department of S
Summary: SHOUKRI OSMAN SALEH ABDEL-FATTAH, PETITIONER v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, RESPONDENT Docket No. 4683–09. Filed April 27, 2010. In 2005–2007 P, a non-U.S. citizen, was an employee of the Embassy of the United Arab Emirates (UAE) in Washington, D.C., performing for that Embassy services of a sort that are performed by employees of the U.S. Embassy in the UAE. The UAE does not impose an income tax, so employees of the U.S. Embassy in the UAE incur no income tax; but the U.S. Department of St..
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SHOUKRI OSMAN SALEH ABDEL-FATTAH, PETITIONER v.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE,
RESPONDENT
Docket No. 4683–09. Filed April 27, 2010.
In 2005–2007 P, a non-U.S. citizen, was an employee of the
Embassy of the United Arab Emirates (UAE) in Washington,
D.C., performing for that Embassy services of a sort that are
performed by employees of the U.S. Embassy in the UAE. The
UAE does not impose an income tax, so employees of the U.S.
Embassy in the UAE incur no income tax; but the
U.S. Department of State did not certify this fact (pursuant
to I.R.C. sec. 893(b)) until 2008. For 2005–2007 P filed tax
returns reporting his embassy wages as income. R issued a
notice of deficiency for those years based on adjustments
unrelated to the embassy wages. P filed a petition in which
he contends that the embassy wages are exempt from income
tax under I.R.C. sec. 893. The parties agree that P satisfied
the three requirements for exemption from income tax under
I.R.C. sec. 893(a). Held: I.R.C. sec. 893 does not require, as a
condition of a claim of exemption by an employee of a foreign
government, the U.S. Department of State’s certification of
reciprocal exemption by the foreign country under I.R.C. sec.
893(b). Because P satisfied the three requirements of I.R.C.
sec. 893(a), his wages from working for the UAE Embassy
from 2005–2007 are exempt from income tax.
Hamilton Loeb and Anne C. Loomis, for petitioner.
Lindsey D. Stellwagen, for respondent.
OPINION
GUSTAFSON, Judge: The Internal Revenue Service (IRS)
issued to petitioner Shoukri Osman Saleh Abdel-Fattah a
notice of deficiency pursuant to section 6212, 1 showing the
IRS’s determination of the following deficiencies in income
tax, additions to tax for failure to file under section
6651(a)(1), and accuracy-related penalties under section 6662
for tax years 2005, 2006, and 2007:
1 Unless otherwise indicated, all citations of sections refer to the Internal Revenue Code (26
U.S.C.) in effect for the years in issue, and all citations of Rules refer to the Tax Court Rules
of Practice and Procedure.
190
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(190) ABDEL-FATTAH v. COMMISSIONER 191
Accuracy-related
Addition to tax penalty
Year Deficiency sec. 6651(a)(1) sec. 6662
2005 $6,428 --- $1,285.60
2006 6,465 $343.50 1,293.00
2007 6,858 --- 1,371.60
Mr. Abdel-Fattah brings this case pursuant to section
6213(a), asking this Court to redetermine those deficiencies.
After various concessions, the only issue for decision is
whether Mr. Abdel-Fattah’s wages paid by the Embassy of
the United Arab Emirates (UAE) are exempt from income tax
under section 893. That issue is currently before the Court
on the parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment. For the
reasons explained below, we will grant Mr. Abdel-Fattah’s
motion and deny respondent’s motion. 2
Background
The following facts are based on the parties’ stipulations
(which we incorporate herein by this reference) and on the
assertions in the parties’ motion papers that are supported
in accordance with Rule 121 and as to which the opposing
party did not raise any genuine issue of material fact. At the
time he filed his petition, Mr. Abdel-Fattah resided in Vir-
ginia.
The UAE and taxes
The United Arab Emirates was formed as a union of sepa-
rate emirates in 1971 and 1972. Since its founding, the UAE
has not imposed any income tax on individual income. This
non-taxation applies both to UAE nationals and to foreign
individuals who work in the UAE, including persons who are
employed by the U.S. Embassy or consulate in the UAE.
The UAE opened its Embassy in Washington, D.C., in 1974;
and in 1977 it became a party to the Vienna Convention on
Diplomatic Relations, Apr. 18, 1961, 23 U.S.T. 3227. Under
that convention, the administrative and technical and service
staff employed by the Embassy of the UAE was considered
exempt from U.S. tax starting in 1977.
2 If Mr. Abdel-Fattah’s motion were denied, then certain substantiation issues would have to
be resolved. Because we grant his motion, those issues are moot.
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192 134 UNITED STATES TAX COURT REPORTS (190)
However, in April 1991 the U.S. Department of State
(State Department) announced a change in its policy con-
cerning the interpretation of the relevant provision of the
Vienna Convention, so that A–2 visa holders were no longer
eligible for exemption from tax under the Vienna Convention.
In 1991 the State Department invited embassies to submit
certificates of reciprocity (which would result in a certifi-
cation of exemption under the Code—viz., section 893—
rather than under the Vienna Convention); but the UAE
Embassy did not submit a certificate of reciprocity or request
such certification from the State Department until after the
years at issue.
Mr. Abdel-Fattah’s employment and tax returns
Mr. Abdel-Fattah is an Egyptian national, and he was in
the United States as a nonresident alien on an A–2 visa
during the years in issue. Except for six months in 2006
during which he was unemployed, Mr. Abdel-Fattah was
employed by the UAE Embassy from 2000 through the years
at issue. In the three years at issue he worked for the UAE
Embassy as a security guard and as a driver.
Employees of the U.S. Government Embassy in the UAE
performed services similar to Mr. Abdel-Fattah’s services as
a driver and security guard. Like everyone else in the UAE,
those U.S. employees were not subject to income tax by the
UAE.
For each of the years 2005, 2006, and 2007 Mr. Abdel-
Fattah filed a Form 1040, U.S. Individual Income Tax
Return 3—the latest in April 2008—on which he reported his
UAE Embassy wages. His returns reported overpayments of
tax and claimed refunds.
State Department certification
As of August 2008 several UAE Embassy employees
(including Mr. Abdel-Fattah) had received inquiries from the
IRS. In response, on August 14, 2008, the UAE Embassy
requested from the State Department a certification under
3 A non-resident alien like Mr. Abdel-Fattah should use Form 1040NR, U.S. Nonresident Alien
Income Tax Return. Unlike the Form 1040NR, the Form 1040 that Mr. Abdel-Fattah filed in-
cludes certain credits for which non-resident aliens are ineligible. Mr. Abdel-Fattah concedes he
wrongly claimed items on Form 1040, and we therefore do not address further the distinctions
between Form 1040 and Form 1040NR.
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(190) ABDEL-FATTAH v. COMMISSIONER 193
section 893(b). On September 26, 2008—i.e., six weeks after
the request and nine months after the end of the latest year
at issue—the State Department issued such a certification,
signed by the Director of the Office of Foreign Missions,
which read:
Acting pursuant to Department of State Delegation of Authority 285
(October 31, 2005), I hereby certify to the Secretary of the Treasury, in
accordance with 26 U.S.C. § 893(b), that the government of the United
Arab Emirates does not tax the wages, fees or salaries of employees of the
United States Embassy and Consulate in the United Arab Emirates
received as compensation for their official services to the United States. I
further certify that such employees perform services of a character similar
to those performed by employees of the Embassy of the United Arab Emir-
ates and its consulates in the United States.
The State Department delivered the certification to the UAE
Embassy on October 1, 2008, and delivered it to the U.S.
Department of the Treasury on March 10, 2009.
Notice of deficiency
In June 2008 the IRS had commenced an examination of
Mr. Abdel-Fattah’s 2006 return. Eventually the IRS examined
all three years (2005, 2006, and 2007), and in December 2008
the IRS issued a notice of deficiency addressing all three
years. By that time the Secretary of State had already issued
the certification as to the UAE, but the IRS did not treat it as
retroactive. Consequently, the deficiency notice did not
reduce Mr. Abdel-Fattah’s income by the amount of his UAE
Embassy wages (which he had reported) but rather made
other adjustments, adverse to Mr. Abdel-Fattah, that
increased his tax liability (all of which Mr. Abdel-Fattah con-
cedes for purposes of this motion).
Tax Court petition
In response to the IRS’s December 2008 notice of deficiency,
Mr. Abdel-Fattah filed a timely petition in this Court. His
petition asserts that his UAE Embassy wages are exempt
from income tax under section 893.
Discussion
Section 893(a) provides a tax exemption for wages that sat-
isfy certain conditions, and Mr. Abdel-Fattah’s wages satis-
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194 134 UNITED STATES TAX COURT REPORTS (190)
fied all those conditions during the years in issue. Section
893(b) requires the Secretary of State to certify two of those
three conditions, but as of the years in suit the Secretary of
State had not yet certified those conditions. We must decide
whether, under section 893, the certification required in sub-
section (b) is a prerequisite to the exemption provided in
subsection (a). We hold that it is not, under the plain lan-
guage of section 893. 4
I. Summary judgment standards
Where the pertinent facts are not in dispute, a party may
move for summary judgment to expedite the litigation and
avoid an unnecessary trial. Fla. Peach Corp. v. Commis-
sioner, 90 T.C. 678, 681 (1988). Rule 121 provides for sum-
mary judgment in terms equivalent to Rule 56 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. Summary judgment may be granted
where there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and
a decision may be rendered as a matter of law. Rule 121(a)
and (b); see Sundstrand Corp. v. Commissioner, 98 T.C. 518,
520 (1992), affd. 17 F.3d 965 (7th Cir. 1994); Zaentz v.
Commissioner, 90 T.C. 753, 754 (1988). In this case the facts
are largely stipulated, and the parties acknowledge that
there are no genuine issues of material fact. 5
Where a motion for summary judgment involves an issue
of foreign law (here, the UAE’s non-taxation of individual
income), we look to Rule 146 (in pari materia with rule 44.1
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure). Where ‘‘an issue
concerning the law of a foreign country’’ is raised, ‘‘[t]he
Court’s determination shall be treated as a ruling on a ques-
4 In the alternative, if the section 893(b) certification is a condition of the section 893(a) ex-
emption, petitioner argues: that the State Department’s September 2008 certification of UAE
reciprocity is an ‘‘administrative determination * * * relating to the internal revenue laws’’
under section 7805(b)(8); that the IRS made no effective prescription that it would be applied
without retroactive effect; that there is no valid basis for non-retroactive application; and that
non-retroactive application is inconsistent with longstanding administrative practice. Respond-
ent disputes each of these propositions, and argues that, in any event, non-retroactive applica-
tion of the certification would be reviewed for abuse of discretion—which proposition petitioner
disputes. Respondent contends that retroactive application would perversely benefit noncompli-
ant taxpayers and punish compliant taxpayers. Because we decide that the section 893(b) certifi-
cation is not a prerequisite to the section 893(a) income tax exemption, we need not reach this
alternative argument as to retroactive application of the State Department’s certification. Like-
wise, since the employment tax exemption is not before us, we do not decide whether a State
Department certification could have retroactive effect for purposes of section 3121(b)(12)(B).
5 Respondent stated that the only disputed facts concern alleged delay or inaction by the State
Department; but Mr. Abdel-Fattah has made clear that he makes no such allegations, and he
affirms that there is no factual dispute regarding the section 893 issue.
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(190) ABDEL-FATTAH v. COMMISSIONER 195
tion of law’’, Rule 146, rather than fact, ‘‘so that appellate
review will not be narrowly confined by the ‘clearly erro-
neous’ standard’’, Fed. R. Civ. P. 44.1, Advisory Committee
Notes (1966 amendment). However, Rule 146 permits the
consideration of ‘‘testimony’’. Testimony about the law is nor-
mally not permitted, see O’Donnabhain v. Commissioner, 134
T.C. 34, 56 (2010), but Rule 146 permits such testimony, in
continuity with the former rule that foreign law was treated
as a factual matter, see Black Diamond S.S. Corp. v. Robert
Stewart & Sons, 336 U.S. 386, 397 (1949). Moreover, the
Court is not required to take judicial notice of foreign law of
which the parties have not made a showing. See Afshar v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1981–241, 41 T.C.M. 1489,
1503 (and cases cited thereat) (‘‘where neither party has
offered any material with respect to the applicable foreign
law, we need not take judicial notice of such law’’), affd. with-
out published opinion 692 F.2d 751 (4th Cir. 1982).
As a result, the procedure for establishing foreign law
remains analogous to the procedure for establishing facts.
For purposes of summary judgment under Rule 121, where
the moving party (here, Mr. Abdel-Fattah) makes a credible
showing of foreign law (the UAE’s non-taxation of individual
income) and the non-moving party makes no dispute, we can
determine foreign law on the basis of the movant’s showing.
II. Taxation of foreign government employees
A. Pre-1934 income tax and customs regulations
After the income tax was enacted and until 1934, the
Treasury Department granted an exemption from U.S.
income tax to employees in the consular offices of any foreign
country that granted a reciprocal exemption from its own
income tax to U.S. consular employees who worked in that
country. This exemption was not based on any statute but
was granted as a matter of administrative policy. The policy
was embodied in regulations that provided as follows:
All foreign consular officers and employees in foreign consulates in the
United States who are nationals of the States appointing them are exempt
from Federal income tax with respect to the wages, fees, and salaries
received by them in compensation for their consular services, provided the
appointing State grants a similar exemption to citizens of the United
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196 134 UNITED STATES TAX COURT REPORTS (190)
States who are American consular officers or employees of the American
consulates in such State. * * *
Regs. 65, art. 86 (1924). 6 The regulation did not state any
requirement as to certification, by the State Department, of
the foreign country’s reciprocal exemption.
During the same period the Customs Regulations of 1931
afforded a ‘‘somewhat comparable privilege’’ 7 allowing
exemption from customs on baggage and articles imported by
government representatives arriving in the United States.
Article 425 is ambiguous about the necessity of State Depart-
ment approval of a ‘‘privilege’’ as to baggage: It refers to
‘‘application to the Department of State’’; but it appears to
authorize the privilege upon a mere showing of ‘‘their creden-
tials or other proof of identity’’. Article 426 more explicitly
provides that a privilege as to ‘‘Imported articles’’ will be
allowed ‘‘only when application is made therefor through the
Department of State’’.
B. Income tax statutes
When the Treasury Department concluded that this policy,
though ‘‘meritorious from the standpoint of administrative
policy or expediency’’, was ‘‘indefensible from the standpoint
of law’’, it announced that it would cease to allow the exemp-
tion. 8 Corrective legislation was proposed, as to which the
Department of State ‘‘hope[d] that you [the Chairman of the
Committee on Ways and Means] will find it possible to bring
about its passage by the House of Representatives at an
early date.’’ 9 The Department of the Treasury had its own
reasons to favor the proposal. The Treasury Department
advised Congress:
A demand has been made upon the United States Treasury attache´ and
several American members of his staff for the payment of income taxes to
6 Regs.
77, art. 641 (1932), included an identical provision.
7 See
H. Rept. 1759, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1935), 1939–1 C.B. (Part 2) 891, 892 (‘‘A some-
what comparable privilege is afforded by the Customs’ Regulations of 1931, specifically articles
425 and 426, extending special customs courtesies and free entry privileges to representatives
of our own and foreign governments who arrive in the United States on official business’’). Be-
cause the Congress enacting the income tax exemption referred to these customs regulations as
creating only a ‘‘somewhat comparable privilege’’ (emphasis added), we infer that the details of
the customs regulations do not disclose the legislative intent as to the income tax exemption.
8 See letter from the Treasury Department to the Secretary of State (Aug. 7, 1934) 4–5, de-
scribed in H. Rept. 1759, supra at 3, 1939–1 C.B. (Part 2) at 892.
9 See letter from State Department to the Chairman, Committee on Ways and Means (Aug.
9, 1935), quoted in H. Rept. 1759, supra, at 2, 1939–1 C.B. (Part 2) at 892.
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(190) ABDEL-FATTAH v. COMMISSIONER 197
the Austrian Government. These officers are, of course, paying income
taxes to the United States, and payment of the Austrian taxes will impose
a real hardship.
If H.R. 7998 is enacted into law, however, it will be possible for our
Department of State to advise the Government of Austria that representa-
tives of that Government, employed in the United States and of a rank
comparable to that of the Treasury attache´ and his staff, would be exempt
from taxation upon the salaries they receive in the United States from the
Government of Austria. I am informed that the Austrian Government has
intimated that if this advice is received taxes will not be levied upon the
official income of our representatives in that country.
In view of these circumstances, I urgently recommend that favorable
consideration be given by your [Ways and Means] committee to H.R. 7998
with a view to its enactment at the earliest practicable date.
Very truly yours,
L.W. Robert, Jr.
Acting Secretary of the Treasury[10]
The House report explained that the proposed new statu-
tory exemption (H.R. 7998) ‘‘was formerly covered by
Treasury regulations.’’ H. Rept. 1759, 74th Cong., 1st Sess.
3 (1935), 1939–1 C.B. (Part 2) 891, 892. Section 116 of the
Revenue Act of 1934 was amended to add a new subsection
(h), as follows:
SEC. 116. EXCLUSIONS FROM GROSS INCOME.
In addition to the items specified in section 22(b), the following items
shall not be included in gross income and shall be exempt from taxation
under this title:
* * * * * * *
(h) COMPENSATION OF EMPLOYEES OF FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS.—Wages,
fees, or salary of an employee of a foreign government (including a con-
sular or other officer, or a nondiplomatic representative) received as com-
pensation for official services to such government—
(1) If such employee is not a citizen of the United States; and
(2) If the services are of a character similar to those performed by
employees of the Government of the United States in foreign countries;
and
(3) If the foreign government whose employee is claiming exemption
grants an equivalent exemption to employees of the Government of the
United States performing similar services in such foreign country.
The Secretary of State shall certify to the Secretary of the Treasury the
names of the foreign countries which grant an equivalent exemption to the
10 See letter from Treasury Department to the Chairman, Committee on Ways and Means
(Aug. 9, 1935), quoted in H. Rept. 1759, supra at 2, 1939–1 C.B. (Part 2) at 892.
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198 134 UNITED STATES TAX COURT REPORTS (190)
employees of the Government of the United States performing services in
such foreign countries, and the character of the services performed by
employees of the Government of the United States in foreign countries.
[Act of Aug. 27, 1935, ch. 767, 49 Stat. 908; emphasis added.]
The flush language referring to the Secretary of State was
thus in a single subsection with the rest of the provision, but
was not stated as one of the numbered conditions for the
exemption.
The next year, when the same Congress (the 74th) enacted
the Revenue Act of 1936, ch. 690, 49 Stat. 1648, it included
an almost identical provision, but it divided subsection (h)
into two paragraphs and gave them headings:
SEC. 116. EXCLUSIONS FROM GROSS INCOME.
In addition to the items specified in section 22(b), the following items
shall not be included in gross income and shall be exempt from taxation
under this title:
* * * * * * *
(h) COMPENSATION OF EMPLOYEES OF FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS.—
(1) RULE FOR EXCLUSION.—Wages, fees, or salary of an employee of a
foreign government (including a consular or other officer, or a nondiplo-
matic representative) received as compensation for official services to
such government—
(A) If such employee is not a citizen of the United States; and
(B) If the services are of a character similar to those performed by
employees of the Government of the United States in foreign countries;
and
(C) If the foreign government whose employee is claiming exemption
grants an equivalent exemption to employees of the Government of the
United States performing similar services in such foreign country.
(2) CERTIFICATE BY SECRETARY OF STATE.—The Secretary of State
shall certify to the Secretary of the Treasury the names of the foreign
countries which grant an equivalent exemption to the employees of the
Government of the United States performing services in such foreign
countries, and the character of the services performed by employees of
the Government of the United States in foreign countries.
[Emphasis added.]
In 1939 Congress reenacted the identical income tax exemp-
tion in section 116(h) of the Internal Revenue Code of
1939. 11
11 Section 116(h) was amended in 1945 to exempt the income of employees of international
organizations (such as the United Nations), in addition to employees of foreign governments. See
Act of Dec. 29, 1945, ch. 652, sec. 4, 59 Stat. 670; Ying v. Commissioner, 25 F.3d 84, 86–87 (2d
Cir. 1994), affg. in part and revg. in part 99 T.C. 273 (1992).
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(190) ABDEL-FATTAH v. COMMISSIONER 199
In 1954 Congress reenacted the income tax exemption in
section 116(h) of the 1939 Code, with no significant
change, 12 as section 893 of the Internal Revenue Code of
1954. It has thereafter appeared without relevant amend-
ment as section 893, and subsections (a) and (b) thereof pro-
vide as follows:
SEC. 893. COMPENSATION OF EMPLOYEES OF FOREIGN GOVERN-
MENTS OR INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS.
(a) RULE FOR EXCLUSION.—Wages, fees, or salary of any employee of a
foreign government or of an international organization (including a con-
sular or other officer, or a nondiplomatic representative), received as com-
pensation for official services to such government or international
organization shall not be included in gross income and shall be exempt
from taxation under this subtitle if—
(1) such employee is not a citizen of the United States * * *; and
(2) in the case of an employee of a foreign government, the services
are of a character similar to those performed by employees of the
Government of the United States in foreign countries; and
(3) in the case of an employee of a foreign government, the foreign
government grants an equivalent exemption to employees of the Govern-
ment of the United States performing similar services in such foreign
country.
(b) CERTIFICATE BY SECRETARY OF STATE.—The Secretary of State shall
certify to the Secretary of the Treasury the names of the foreign countries
which grant an equivalent exemption to the employees of the Government
of the United States performing services in such foreign countries, and the
character of the services performed by employees of the Government of the
United States in foreign countries.
Thus, as has been the case since 1936, the statute provides
the ‘‘Rule for Exclusion’’ in subsection (a) and instructs the
Secretary of State to certify reciprocity in a separate sub-
section (b). That certification is not presented in subsection
(a) as one of the conditions for the exemption; and section
893 does not explicitly provide that the wages shall be
exempt only ‘‘if ’’ the Secretary certifies reciprocity (unlike
the social security tax provisions, discussed next).
C. Employment tax statutes
The income tax provision in section 893 may be contrasted
with the corresponding employment tax provisions. In the
12 In enacting new section 893 as a stand-alone section, Congress included in section 893 the
introductory language from section 116 that specified that such compensation is not included
in gross income and is exempt from income tax.
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200 134 UNITED STATES TAX COURT REPORTS (190)
1930s as now, the income tax and employment taxes were
distinct; and though the compensation of foreign government
employees was made exempt from income tax by section
116(h), no equivalent exemption from Social Security tax had
yet been enacted. 13 Congress addressed that gap in the
Social Security Act Amendments of 1939, ch. 666, sec. 606,
53 Stat. 1383, which revised the definition of ‘‘employment’’
in section 1426(b) of the 1939 Code by adding new exceptions
in paragraphs (11) and (12):
(11) Service performed in the employ of a foreign government (including
service as a consular or other officer or employee or a nondiplomatic rep-
resentative);
(12) Service performed in the employ of an instrumentality wholly owned
by a foreign government—
(A) If the service is of a character similar to that performed in foreign
countries by employees of the United States Government or of an
instrumentality thereof; and
(B) If the Secretary of State shall certify to the Secretary of the
Treasury that the foreign government, with respect to whose instrumen-
tality and employees thereof exemption is claimed, grants an equivalent
exemption with respect to similar service performed in the foreign
country by employees of the United States Government and of
instrumentalities thereof * * *.
[Emphasis added.]
These employment tax exceptions survive verbatim in cur-
rent section 3121(b)(11) and (12) (and in identical exceptions
to the Federal Unemployment Tax in current section
3306(c)(11) and (12)), and they are incorporated by reference
into an exemption from self-employment tax, section
1402(c)(2)(C). These employment tax provisions bear two
obvious differences from the income tax provision in section
116(h) (now section 893). First, service performed in the
direct employ of a foreign government is simply stated in
paragraph (11) to be excepted from the Social Security tax—
without any stated conditions involving citizenship or the
reciprocity of the foreign government’s employment taxes. 14
13 Respondent explains, ‘‘the U.S. Government is not authorized under the U.S. Constitution
to pay foreign employment taxes on behalf of its employees. At the time of enactment and today,
foreign governments did not pay U.S. employment taxes based on claims of foreign sovereignty.
As a matter of reciprocity and practicality, Congress relieved foreign governments from payment
of the employer’s portion of U.S. social [security] taxes.’’
14 The unconditional character of the exception for employees of foreign governments is quite
clear in the legislative history. The House Report (H. Rept. 728, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. 61 (1939)),
explains the amendments to section 1426(b)(11) and (12) in the Social Security tax statute by
a cross-reference to the corresponding amendments to the Social Security benefits provisions,
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(190) ABDEL-FATTAH v. COMMISSIONER 201
Second, certification by the Secretary of State is made one of
two explicit conditions for the exception for service performed
for an instrumentality of the foreign government (i.e., ‘‘If the
Secretary of State shall certify’’ reciprocity (emphasis
added)).
In 1943, when employers began to be required to withhold
income tax from employee wages, Congress exempted wages
for services that U.S. citizens and residents performed for a
foreign government and wages earned by certain nonresident
aliens. See former sec. 1621(a)(5), (6), and (7), enacted by the
Current Tax Payment Act of 1943, ch. 120, sec. 2(a), 57 Stat.
126. Under current section 3401(a)(5), foreign governments
are unconditionally exempted from the duty to withhold
income tax from the compensation of U.S. citizens and resi-
dents. Under section 3401(a)(6), foreign governments are
exempted from the duty to withhold income tax from the
compensation of nonresident aliens only ‘‘as may be des-
ignated by regulations prescribed by the Secretary’’, but
those regulations make the exemption unconditional. See 26
C.F.R. sec. 31.3401(a)(5)–1(a)(2), Employment Tax Regs. That
is, foreign governments are exempt from income tax with-
holding whether or not the State Department has certified
reciprocity.
III. Lack of regulatory guidance on the income tax exemption
The income tax regulations promulgated under section
893—26 C.F.R. section 1.893–1, Income Tax Regs.—shed no
light on our issue, because they simply restate the statute.
Mr. Abdel-Fattah stresses that section 1.893–1(a) puts the
conditions for the exemption in a subparagraph (1) (‘‘Exempt
from tax’’) and sets out the duty of the Secretary of State to
certify reciprocity in the separate subparagraph (2) (‘‘Certifi-
cate by Secretary of State’’). However, in this regard the
regulation simply mirrors the statute, and if the wording of
the provisions in the regulation is meaningful, it is meaning-
ful only because the corresponding wording of the statute is
meaningful. If the corresponding wording of the statute does
section 209(b)(11) and (12). The benefits amendment is explained as follows: ‘‘Paragraph (11)
excepts service performed in the employ of a foreign government, and paragraph (12) similarly
excepts, on a basis of reciprocity, service performed in the employ of an instrumentality wholly
owned by a foreign government.’’ Id. at 48–49. To the same effect, see S. Rept. 734, 76th Cong.,
1st Sess. 58, 74 (1939).
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202 134 UNITED STATES TAX COURT REPORTS (190)
not have the significance that Mr. Abdel-Fattah urges, then
the regulation likewise does not have that significance. Thus,
the regulation does not add anything on this point.
The parties cite no published guidance of the IRS (such as
revenue rulings) that address the issue in this case. Rather,
Mr. Abdel-Fattah asks us to consider several private letter
rulings in support of his position. We decline to do so in light
of section 6110(k)(3), which provides:
(3) PRECEDENTIAL STATUS.—Unless the Secretary otherwise establishes
by regulations,[15] a written determination may not be used or cited as
precedent. [Emphasis added.]
We will not consider the private letter rulings that Mr.
Abdel-Fattah proffers.
IV. Interpretation of section 893
A. Two forms of certification statutes
Where a tax statute provides a benefit, states conditions
for its application, and provides that a government official
shall certify the fulfillment of those conditions, that certifi-
cation may take one of two alternative characters. We find
that, to be better able to put section 893 into perspective, it
is helpful to consider examples of statutory provisions of both
kinds.
1. Statutes in which certification is a prerequisite
Certification is sometimes required as a prerequisite to a
tax benefit provided in the Code. Where a statute is of this
sort, the absence of the certification precludes the claiming
of the benefit. For example, the employment tax exemption
of section 3121(b)(12)(B), by its terms, applies only ‘‘if the
Secretary of State shall certify * * * that the foreign govern-
ment * * * grants an equivalent exemption’’. (Emphasis
added.) Thus, certification is made an explicit condition of
the exemption. Respondent contends that section 893 is a
15 By regulation, taxpayers are permitted to cite and rely on published Revenue Rulings. See
26 C.F.R. sec. 601.601(d)(2)(v)(d), Statement of Procedural Rules (‘‘Revenue Rulings * * * are
published to provide precedents to be used in the disposition of other cases, and may be cited
and relied on for that purpose’’ (emphasis added)). However, the regulations applicable to any
other ‘‘written determination’’ (including a ‘‘ruling’’ that is ‘‘issued to a taxpayer’’), see 26 C.F.R.
sec. 301.6110–2(a), (d), Proced. & Admin. Regs., provide the default rule that a ‘‘written deter-
mination may not be used or cited as precedent’’, 26 C.F.R. sec. 301.6110–7(b), Proced. & Admin.
Regs.
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(190) ABDEL-FATTAH v. COMMISSIONER 203
provision of this sort and that the Secretary of State’s certifi-
cation of reciprocity is a prerequisite to the exemption ben-
efit.
Statutes of this sort—requiring certification as a pre-
requisite 16—have certain advantages of convenience and
administrability. Rather than assigning to the tax collector
the task of making, in the first instance, difficult determina-
tions that may be well outside his knowledge or expertise,
such a statute commits the determination to the agency with
the relevant subject-matter expertise. However, such statutes
may also have corresponding disadvantages. The tax benefit
may be denied, even in a circumstance clearly within
Congress’s intention to grant the benefit, because a certifi-
cation is lacking as a result of the certifying official’s delay
or error, or of a taxpayer’s failure to comply with the official’s
rules for requesting certification, or (depending on the
statute) of a third party’s failure to make the certification
request.
2. Statutes in which certification is not a prerequisite
Mr. Abdel-Fattah contends that section 893(b) is a provi-
sion of a different sort—i.e., one in which the absence of the
certification does not preclude the claiming of the benefit.
For example, taxes on firearms are not imposed on devices
that ‘‘the Secretary finds’’ have certain characteristics, sec.
5845(a), (f). Pursuant to 27 C.F.R. sections 479.24 and 479.25
(2009), a taxpayer requests such a determination from the
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF),
but before ATF makes any ruling, the manufacturer may
claim and sue for a refund of firearms tax. See, e.g., Blakley
v. United States, 593 F.3d 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2010); 27 C.F.R.
sec. 70.123 (2009). Congress certainly committed to ATF the
duty of classifying firearms, but ATF’s ruling is not a pre-
requisite to a taxpayer’s claim and is not immune from the
taxpayer’s challenge. 17
16 See also, e.g., Nielsen-True Pship. v. Commissioner, 109 T.C. 112, 120–125 (1997) (former
sec. 29(c)(2)(A) required a determination as a prerequisite for the credit), affd. sub nom. True
Oil Co. v. Commissioner, 170 F.3d 1294 (10th Cir. 1999); Manor Care, Inc. v. United States,
89
Fed. Cl. 618, 623 (2009) (certification by a State employment security agency is a prerequisite
to the work opportunity credit under sec. 38(b)(2) for wages paid to ‘‘a qualified SSI recipient’’
under sec. 51(d)(1)(H)).
17 See also, e.g., sec. 7428 (declaratory remedy by which an organization claiming tax-exempt
Continued
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204 134 UNITED STATES TAX COURT REPORTS (190)
A statute that allows a tax benefit without certification
may have advantages and disadvantages that are converse to
those of the first sort of statute. That is, this latter sort of
statute may require the tax collector or a reviewing court to
decide, without prior ventilation by subject-matter experts in
an agency, matters that may be outside the tax specialist’s
expertise (such as firearms classification); but on the other
hand these statutes assure that the vagaries of a certification
process do not block the intended benefit of the statute.
Thus, both of these approaches appear in different provi-
sions in the Internal Revenue Code. We now examine section
893 to see which approach is reflected there.
B. Analysis of certification in section 893
1. The language of section 893 does not condition the
income tax exemption on State Department certi-
fication.
In section 893 the exemption is not explicitly described as
conditional, as if it depended on certification by the Secretary
of State; it does not create the exemption only ‘‘if the Sec-
retary of State shall certify’’ as does section 3121(b)(12)(B).
Certification is not explicitly stated to be part of the exemp-
tion qualification (as in section 51(d)(9) (‘‘ ‘qualified SSI
recipient’ means any individual who is certified’’)). Rather,
section 893(a) provides for an exemption ‘‘if ’’ three conditions
are met (not including certification) and then comes to a full
stop. Certification is not a fourth ‘‘if ’’ in the list but instead
is addressed thereafter in subsection (b). Section 893(a) pro-
vides an exemption, and section 893(b) requires action by the
Secretary of State but does not purport to qualify the exemp-
tion or to take it away in any instance. We conclude, there-
fore, that under the plain language of the statute, certifi-
cation is not a condition or prerequisite of the exemption. 18
Mr. Abdel-Fattah’s argument about the language of the
statute stresses that the certification provision is in a sub-
section after and separate from the subsection imposing
status under sec. 501(c)(3) may challenge the IRS’s adverse ruling or failure to rule on the orga-
nization’s application for recognition of exempt status); sec. 7478 (declaratory remedy by which
a State or city that claims that interest on its bonds qualifies for exclusion under sec. 103 may
challenge the IRS’s adverse determination or failure to determine).
18 However, certification, when present, will dramatically simplify a taxpayer’s proof of section
893(a)(2) and (3).
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(190) ABDEL-FATTAH v. COMMISSIONER 205
three express conditions for the exemption and stresses that
the heading ‘‘Rule for Exclusion’’ is assigned to subsection (a)
only. We should not exaggerate the significance of the sub-
division and the placement of the heading since, as the
Supreme Court explained in Bhd. of R.R. Trainmen v. Balt.
& Ohio R.R., 331 U.S. 519, 528–529 (1947),
headings and titles are not meant to take the place of the detailed provi-
sions of the text. Nor are they necessarily designed to be a reference guide
or a synopsis. Where the text is complicated and prolific, headings and
titles can do no more than indicate the provisions in a most general
manner; to attempt to refer to each specific provision would often be
ungainly as well as useless. As a result, matters in the text which deviate
from those falling within the general pattern are frequently unreflected in
the headings and titles. Factors of this type have led to the wise rule that
the title of a statute and the heading of a section cannot limit the plain
meaning of the text. * * * For interpretative purposes, they are of use
only when they shed light on some ambiguous word or phrase. They are
but tools available for the resolution of a doubt. But they cannot undo or
limit that which the text makes plain.
In the case of section 893, however, the headings are not at
any variance with the text. Section 116(h) was originally
drafted in 1934 in such a way—with the State Department
certification being stated after, and distinctly from, the three
‘‘if ’’ conditions—that it was susceptible of being split neatly
and easily into two paragraphs (in 1936), without any re-
wording whatsoever. The headings added in 1936 correspond
to the text, in that the text of paragraph (1) with its three
explicit conditions does describe (as the heading indicates)
the ‘‘Rule for exclusion’’; and the text of paragraph (2) does
separately call for a ‘‘Certificate by Secretary of State’’. This
is an instance in which the headings ‘‘are of some use for
interpretative purposes’’, Wallace v. Commissioner, 128 T.C.
132, 140–141 (2007), and they confirm our reading of the text
of the statute.
2. The language of section 893 differs from that of com-
parable contemporaneous provisions.
This reading of the income tax statute—i.e., that the cer-
tification in section 893(b) is not a prerequisite to the benefit
provided in section 893(a)—is confirmed by comparison to the
different language Congress used five years later in 1939
when it provided a reciprocal exception from Social Security
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206 134 UNITED STATES TAX COURT REPORTS (190)
tax. Then-section 1426(b)(12)(B) (now section 3121(b)(12)(B))
excepted certain service for foreign instrumentalities—
If the Secretary of State shall certify to the Secretary of the Treasury that
the foreign government, with respect to whose instrumentality and
employees thereof exemption is claimed, grants an equivalent exemption
* * *. [Emphasis added.]
That language (unlike the language of section 893) plainly
makes the certification a condition of the exception. Congress
could have used such language in section 893, but it did not.
To read the statute as if it had been so worded would be not
to interpret it but to correct it, and we decline to do so.
The Congress that enacted the statute in 1934 had before
it both (1) the existing income tax regulations, which had not
explicitly required State Department certification of reci-
procity, and (2) the customs regulations that provided a
‘‘somewhat comparable privilege’’ (see supra note 7) that, in
some particulars, was available ‘‘only when application is
made therefor through the Department of State’’. In creating
the income tax exemption, Congress followed the model of
the income tax regulation and did not make the exemption
available ‘‘only when’’ the State Department had certified
reciprocity. Instead, the language (now in section 893(a)) that
creates the exemption is silent about the State Department.
Respondent defends his different interpretation by arguing
that section 893 is simply ‘‘less precisely drafted’’ than sec-
tion 3121(b)(12), but that begs the question. That is, the
argument assumes (without showing) that certification was
intended to be a condition of the exemption and then
explains the distance between that intention and the actual
statutory language as a lack of precision. If instead we look
first at what the statute says and attempt to learn from that
language what the legislative intention was, we find that
Congress precisely stated three conditions for the exemption
in what is now section 893(a) and then precisely stated, in
what is now section 893(b), a distinct obligation of the Sec-
retary of State. The text gives no indication of the intention
that respondent assumes, and bears no imprecision in
expressing its evident intention.
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(190) ABDEL-FATTAH v. COMMISSIONER 207
3. Treating State Department certification as a prerequisite
to the exemption is at odds with the purpose of the
statute.
Respondent argues that allowing a qualifying employee to
obtain the exemption without State Department certification
makes that certification ‘‘non-mandatory’’, whereas the
statute does admittedly use mandatory language (i.e., ‘‘The
Secretary of State shall certify to the Secretary of the
Treasury’’ (emphasis added)). However, the only mandate in
the statute is directed to the Secretary of State. That is,
there is no language in the statute mandating that the tax-
payer ‘‘shall obtain’’ a certification before claiming the
exemption, or mandating that the IRS ‘‘shall require’’ a cer-
tification before allowing the exemption. Rather, to facilitate
claims of exemption, Congress mandated action by the Sec-
retary of State, who ‘‘shall certify’’.
Our record shows that the Secretary of State certifies reci-
procity only upon the application by a foreign country for
such certification. That is, the State Department follows the
mandate of section 893(b) only when a foreign country first
applies for certification. It should be noted that the statute
makes no provision for a foreign country to apply for such
certification; that the statute does not conceive of a certifi-
cation being issued to a foreign country; 19 and that the
statute certainly does not condition the issuance of a certifi-
cation upon an application. We assume that, in view of the
complexity of the task of certifying income tax reciprocity of
all the countries in which U.S. citizens work for U.S. con-
sulates, the expedient of waiting for an application is prac-
tical—perhaps even inevitable. And even if this implementa-
tion of the mandate effectively permits the State Department
to fail indefinitely to do what section 893(b) says it ‘‘shall’’ do,
the income tax exemption of section 893(a) is not frustrated
as long as certification is not treated as a prerequisite. But
if certification were a prerequisite, and if an otherwise valid
claim for exemption failed for the lack of certification, then
19 In form, the State Department’s eventual certification as to the UAE was—consistent with
section 893(b)—directed to Treasury (‘‘I hereby certify to the Secretary of the Treasury’’). How-
ever, the certification (signed September 26, 2008) was promptly provided to the UAE on Octo-
ber 1, 2008, but was not transmitted to the Department of the Treasury until five months later,
on March 10, 2009. In substance, the State Department seems to treat the certification as grant-
ed to the foreign country upon its application.
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208 134 UNITED STATES TAX COURT REPORTS (190)
the failure of the State Department to make a certification
unless and until it received a (non-statutory) application
would preclude the exemption.
This dynamic is hard to reconcile with the congressional
intention in 1935. There is no evidence of a congressional
purpose to deny exemption until a foreign country had initi-
ated and completed an exemption application process. The
impulse behind the statute was not to reign in an overly gen-
erous IRS and use a State Department certification process to
restrict exemptions. On the contrary, the subject of real
interest to the Congress (and to both the State Department
and the Department of the Treasury) (see supra pp. 196–197)
was the adverse foreign tax consequences to U.S. consular
employees that was resulting from the lack of a reciprocal
U.S. income tax exemption. The congressional impulse was to
loosen the situation, not to tighten it—i.e., to create a statu-
tory exemption so that the prior administrative practice
could continue and U.S. workers in foreign countries would
not become subject to foreign taxes. It is possible that a
legislature creating such an exemption would nonetheless
establish procedures to limit it (e.g., requiring an application,
and denying an exemption not duly applied for and granted);
but the statute and the legislative history show no signs of
that contrary impulse.
Treating the State Department’s certification as separate
from the conditions for exemption hardly ‘‘relegates sub-
section (b) to a mere administrative ‘helpful hint’ ’’, as
respondent suggests. On the contrary, in a matter concerning
the application of U.S. law to foreign embassy staffs, Con-
gress sensibly charged the State Department (not the IRS)
with the front-line diplomatic responsibility of determining
the reciprocity of foreign tax law; and it seems fair to assume
not only that the State Department’s certification of reci-
procity will be the last word in virtually every case, 20 but
also that the State Department’s certification will greatly
20 Since respondent admits that Mr. Abdel-Fattah did meet the qualifications of section 893(a)
during the years in suit, we need not decide what standard of review would be adopted if one
or both of the qualifications of section 893(a)(2) and (3) were in dispute. Likewise, we need not
decide by what standard we would review a taxpayer’s challenge of an actual certification of
non-reciprocity—if in fact the State Department ever issues such negative certifications, which
our record does not disclose. Neither do we decide whether the Commissioner could deny section
893(a) treatment by disputing the correctness of a section 893(b) certification that had been
made by the State Department and had been relied on by an embassy employee.
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(190) ABDEL-FATTAH v. COMMISSIONER 209
simplify an embassy employee’s claim of exemption and the
IRS’s ruling on that claim. Only where there is no certifi-
cation will a dispute on the matter be at all likely.
4. Potential difficulties with the statute as written do not
warrant judicial correction of the statute.
Respondent contends that several difficulties may result
from this interpretation of section 893. He urges that in some
circumstances the reciprocity determination may be difficult
(for example, where the foreign country has a value added
tax or user fees from which U.S. Embassy employees are not
exempted, or where the determination requires treaty
interpretation, or where the information necessary to make
the determination may not be accessible to IRS agents or
even to the taxpayer). 21 Respondent suggests that, in cir-
cumstances where there is no State Department certification,
the statute as we interpret it—
• requires section 893 to be administered without the ben-
efit of ‘‘State’s expertise in the arena of international affairs’’;
• commits the reciprocity issue to the judgments of tax-
payers as they file returns, to IRS personnel as they examine
them, and to the several courts as the issues are litigated, so
that uniformity of outcome among foreign employees from
the same country is not assured; and
• fails to create an occasion for the State Department ‘‘to
ensure that Americans working at embassies abroad receive
equivalent exemptions * * * in their host countries’’ and
‘‘undercuts State’s ability to ensure reciprocity’’. 22
21 We assume arguendo that such difficulties exist, though they are not demonstrated on our
record. All that section 893 requires is a determination of ‘‘an equivalent exemption’’. Sec.
893(a)(2), (b). For this purpose, ‘‘an equivalent exemption’’ is an exemption equivalent to an
‘‘exempt[ion] from taxation under this subtitle’’. Sec. 893(a) (emphasis added). ‘‘[T]his subtitle’’
(of title 26, the Internal Revenue Code) is subtitle A, ‘‘Income Taxes’’. Inquiry into reciprocity
as to other taxes would therefore appear to be unnecessary. And where information necessary
to a determination of reciprocity is not accessible, then the outcome would presumably be re-
solved by the operation of the burden of proof.
22 Again, we assume arguendo that our interpretation has this disadvantage that respondent
describes—i.e., it diminishes the role of section 893 certification as a means for ensuring tax
exemption for U.S. consular employees in foreign countries. However, neither of the competing
interpretations of section 893 bars the State Department from determining how a foreign coun-
try treats U.S. consular employees and informing the IRS. Rather, the State Department may
do so on whatever schedule and by whatever means it desires; and if it finds non-reciprocity
in a given country and so advises the IRS, then presumably the IRS will follow the State De-
partment’s conclusion and will rule adversely on claims by employees of that country’s con-
sulate.
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210 134 UNITED STATES TAX COURT REPORTS (190)
These issues of diplomacy and tax administration might be
reasons to prefer a rule that required State Department cer-
tification as a prerequisite to the income tax exemption.
However, these considerations would be properly addressed
to Congress as reasons to enact such a rule; and in the
absence of such a rule, these considerations cannot alter our
interpretation of the different rule that Congress actually
enacted. If the rule that Congress enacted—which does not
require State Department certification as a condition for
claiming the exemption—is problematic for these reasons,
then the problems can be addressed not by corrective
interpretation but only by legislative amendment.
Respondent’s position here has an ironic resemblance to
the situation that existed in 1934. The Treasury Department
had administratively granted an exemption that the statute
did not provide, but Treasury came to realize the impropriety
of its having done so. Resisting the State Department’s
urging that the administrative exemption be perpetuated,
Treasury explained:
The formulation of such policies is not within the province of the execu-
tive department of the government. * * *
* * * * * * *
This Department fully appreciates the difficulties and possible loss of
revenue, to which you refer, as the result of any change in the practice
heretofore adopted * * *. The question, however, is not one which
addresses itself to administrative solution or which may properly be
considered or determined by this Department on the basis of the benefits
which might accrue to the United States by a continuation of such prac-
tice, but is one which involves the constitutional authority of this Depart-
ment to grant exemptions from taxation except as directed by the law-
making branches of the government.[23]
Now at issue is not the granting but the denying of the
exemption. Denying the exemption where the State Depart-
ment has not certified reciprocity could again be defended
‘‘on the basis of the benefits which might accrue to the
United States’’, but that action must again be said to be ‘‘not
within the province of the executive department of the
government’’. The IRS can no more deny now an exemption
on a condition that Congress did not impose than it could
allow then an exemption that Congress had not granted.
23 Letter from Treasury Department to the Secretary of State 4–5 (Aug. 7, 1934).
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(190) ABDEL-FATTAH v. COMMISSIONER 211
The statute as it stands does not require State Department
certification, and we therefore hold in favor of Mr. Abdel-
Fattah.
To reflect the foregoing,
An appropriate order will be issued, and
decision will be entered under Rule 155.
f
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