T.C. Memo. 2010-106



                       UNITED STATES TAX COURT



                  SUZANNE J. PIERRE, Petitioner v.
            COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent*



     Docket No. 753-07.                   Filed May 13, 2010.



     Kathryn Keneally and Meryl G. Finkelstein, for petitioner.

     Lydia A. Branche, for respondent.



         SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM FINDINGS OF FACT AND OPINION


     KROUPA, Judge:    Respondent determined a $1,130,2161

deficiency for 2000 and a $24,969 deficiency for 2001 in




     *
      This opinion supplements our prior opinion, Pierre v.
Commissioner, 133 T.C. __ (2009).
     1
      All monetary values are rounded to the nearest dollar,
unless otherwise indicated.
                                -2-

petitioner’s Federal gift tax and generation-skipping transfer

(GST) tax.

     The Court bifurcated the issues in this case, and we

addressed a legal issue of first impression in an earlier Court-

reviewed opinion.   Pierre v. Commissioner, 133 T.C. __ (2009)

(Pierre I).   In Pierre I the Court held that petitioner’s single-

member LLC, Pierre Family, LLC,2 is not disregarded for gift tax

valuation purposes under the “check-the-box” regulations of

sections 301.7701-1 through 301.7701-3, Proced. & Admin. Regs.

Accordingly, a transfer by petitioner of an interest in her

single-member LLC is treated as such and subject to discounts for

lack of control and marketability, rather than as the transfer of

a proportionate share of the underlying assets owned by the LLC.3

     After our decision in Pierre I and concessions,4   we must

still decide two issues.   We first decide whether the step

transaction doctrine applies to collapse petitioner’s gift and

sale transfers into transfers of two 50-percent interests in


     2
      We refer to Pierre Family, LLC as Pierre LLC.
     3
      As a result of the holding, we did not find that petitioner
made indirect gifts of Pierre LLC assets under the analysis of
Senda v. Commissioner, 

(8th Cir. 2006), affg. T.C.
Memo. 2004-160, and Shepherd v. Commissioner, 

(2000), affd. 

(11th Cir. 2002).
     4
      Respondent conceded that petitioner is not liable for a
late-filing addition to tax under sec. 6651(a)(1) or an accuracy-
related penalty under sec. 6662(a). All section references are
to the Internal Revenue Code (Code) in effect for the years at
issue, and all Rule references are to the Tax Court Rules of
Practice and Procedure, unless otherwise indicated.
                                  -3-

Pierre LLC.   We hold that it does.     We then determine whether the

lack of control and marketability discounts petitioner reported

should be reduced.    Respondent focused on the legal issue decided

in Pierre I rather than on providing evidence concerning the

appropriate discounts.   Our job is to weigh the evidence before

us.   Accordingly, we find that there should be a slight reduction

in the lack of control discount and no reduction in the discount

for lack of marketability.

                          FINDINGS OF FACT

      Some of the facts have been stipulated and are so found.

The stipulation of facts and the accompanying exhibits are

incorporated by this reference.     We also incorporate the findings

in Pierre I for purposes of this opinion.      We repeat here only

the facts necessary to understand the discussion that follows,

and we supplement those facts to address the remaining issues.

Petitioner resided in New York at the time she filed the

petition.

The Pierre Family

      Petitioner was born in France.    Her first marriage ended

quickly in divorce.   She left her 9-month old son Jacques with

his grandparents in Brittany and began to look for work.

Petitioner came to the United States in 1948 and eventually

married Dr. Jules Pierre.    She rarely saw Jacques until he moved

to the United States as a young man.
                               -4-

     Dr. Pierre used Richard Mesirow (Mr. Mesirow) of Mesirow

Financial to handle his financial matters.    He and petitioner

trusted Mr. Mesirow, and petitioner continued to work with him

after Dr. Pierre died.

     Petitioner had been a widow for many years when she received

a $10 million cash gift from a wealthy friend in 2000.    She,

being 85, was concerned with both the income and estate tax

implications of this substantial gift, which increased her net

worth from approximately $2 million to $12 million.    Petitioner

turned to Mr. Mesirow for financial advice.    He assisted

petitioner in forming a plan to meet her own income needs and the

needs of her only son and granddaughter.

     Petitioner wanted to provide for her son and granddaughter

without eroding her family’s wealth with estate and gift taxes.

She had previously provided occasional financial assistance to

her son Jacques, a restaurateur.   Petitioner also provided some

financial support for the care of Jacques’ only daughter Kati

Despretz, petitioner’s sole granddaughter.

     Mr. Mesirow prepared an investment strategy memorandum

reflecting petitioner’s tax concerns and financial goals.

Petitioner wanted to have an annual tax-free income.    They

arranged for her annual tax-free income to be $300,000, of which

$180,000 was to meet her personal expenses and $120,000 was to be

split evenly between Jacques and Kati.   Accordingly, Mr. Mesirow
                                -5-

suggested that petitioner invest $8 million in New York municipal

bonds.

     Mr. Mesirow also advised petitioner to invest the remaining

$4.25 million, which she wished to give Jacques and Kati, in

stocks, mutual funds, and other marketable securities.    He

suggested that she create a family limited partnership to enable

her to transfer $4.25 million of cash and marketable securities

to Jacques and Kati.   Mr. Mesirow worked with petitioner’s estate

attorneys, John Reiner of Reiner, Reiner, & Reiner LLP and Philip

J. Michaels of Fulbright & Jaworski LLP, to develop a plan where

petitioner would transfer the $4.25 million of cash and

marketable securities to an entity so that the gifts would be

subject to valuation discounts for transfer tax purposes.

     Petitioner’s first step was to organize the single-member

Pierre Family, LLC (Pierre LLC) on July 13, 2000.   Petitioner

then created the Jacques Despretz 2000 Trust (J Trust) and the

Kati Despretz 2000 Trust (K Trust) (collectively, the trusts) on

July 24, 2000.   Mr. Reiner was named a co-trustee of both trusts,

and Jacques and Kati were named co-trustees of their respective

trusts.

     Petitioner then transferred the $4.25 million of cash and

marketable securities to Pierre LLC on September 15, 2000.     As

planned, petitioner maintained approximately $8 million in fixed

income assets outside Pierre LLC to generate tax-free income.
                                -6-

     Petitioner then transferred her entire interest in Pierre

LLC to the trusts 12 days after funding the LLC.   Each trust

received a 50-percent interest in Pierre LLC.

     James F. Shuey of James F. Shuey & Associates performed an

appraisal of Pierre LLC.   Mr. Shuey valued a 1-percent

nonmanaging interest in Pierre LLC at $26,965.   He discounted the

value of Pierre LLC’s $4.25 million of cash and marketable

securities by 10 percent for lack of control and 30 percent for

lack of marketability for a 36.55-percent cumulative discount.

After considering her then available applicable credit amount and

GST tax exemption, petitioner and her advisers determined that

she could make a gift of a 9.5-percent membership interest in

Pierre LLC to each of the trusts (the gift transactions) without

triggering gift taxes.   She also sold each of the trusts a 40.5-

percent membership interest in exchange for a secured promissory

note (the sale transactions) on September 27, 2000 (date of the

transfers).

     The notes each had a face amount of $1,092,133 consistent

with Mr. Shuey’s appraisal.   The notes bore interest at 6.09

percent annually, payable in 10 annual installments, and were

secured by the respective 40.5-percent membership interests in

Pierre LLC.   Pierre LLC made distributions to the trusts so that

the trusts could make the yearly interest payments to petitioner.
                                 -7-

No principal payments have been made in the eight years since the

notes were executed.

Operation of Pierre LLC

     The LLC agreement vests control over Pierre LLC with its

manager.    Petitioner named herself the sole manager of Pierre LLC

at its formation and maintained control of Pierre LLC until she

appointed Mr. Reiner as her successor.    Neither Jacques nor Kati

has participated in the management of Pierre LLC or attended its

meetings, nor do they understand its basic operation.   Mr. Reiner

conducts the operation of Pierre LLC, and Mr. Mesirow manages its

investments.

     Pierre LLC has held meetings and maintained minutes of its

meetings.   Mr. Reiner prepared the Pierre LLC general journal and

the Pierre LLC ledger for 2000, the only documents reflecting the

capital accounts of the members of Pierre LLC.   Mr. Reiner

recorded petitioner’s initial capital contribution as $3,533,032,

the cost basis of the $4.25 million of marketable securities

transferred to Pierre LLC.   He then credited each trust’s capital

account with $1,766,516, half the value of petitioner’s initial

capital contribution, on the date of the transfers.   He wrote

that these adjustments were “to reflect gift transfer by Suzanne

Pierre to J. Despretz Trust and K. Despretz Trust” rather than

distinguishing the gift transactions from the sale transactions

(collectively, the transfers at issue).   Mr. Reiner used these
                                  -8-

documents to prepare Pierre LLC’s Form 1065, U.S. Return of

Partnership Income, for 2000.   Some time later, he discarded the

journal and the ledger.

Payment of Gift Tax Liabilities

     Petitioner filed a Form 709, United States Gift (and

Generation-Skipping Transfer) Tax Return, for 2000 and reported

the gift to each trust of the 9.5-percent Pierre LLC interest.

She reported the value of the taxable gift to each trust as

$256,168 (determined by multiplying a 9.5-percent interest times

the $26,965 appraisal value of a 1-percent nonmanaging interest

in Pierre LLC).   She failed to report the gift to the K Trust as

a direct skip for GST tax purposes.

Respondent’s Examination and Tax Court Proceedings

     Respondent examined petitioner’s gift tax return and issued

a deficiency notice for 2000 and 2001.   Respondent determined

that petitioner’s gift transfers of the 9.5-percent Pierre LLC

interests to the J Trust and the K Trust are properly treated as

gifts of assets valued at $403,750 each, not as transfers of

Pierre LLC interests.   Respondent further determined that

petitioner made indirect gifts of 40.5 percent of the assets of

Pierre LLC to both the J Trust and the K Trust.   Respondent

valued each of these transfers at $629,117 after taking into

account the value of the promissory notes.   Respondent also

determined that the transfers to the K Trust were direct skips
                                -9-

for GST tax purposes.   The parties agree that the adjustments

made with respect to gift tax for 2001 and to GST tax for 2000

and 2001 are computational and are based upon respondent’s

determinations concerning the values of petitioner’s 2000 gifts.

      Petitioner timely filed a petition.

                              OPINION

I.    Introduction

      The remaining issues after Pierre I concern the step

transaction doctrine and discounts for lack of control and lack

of marketability as they affect the fair market value for Federal

gift tax purposes of petitioner’s gifts to the trusts.   We first

address the burden of proof, then turn to the gift tax generally.

Next we discuss the step transaction doctrine to determine

whether the transactions at issue should be collapsed into gifts

of two 50-percent interests in Pierre LLC.   Finally, we determine

the appropriate discounts for lack of control and lack of

marketability.

II.   Burden of Proof

      Petitioner argues that respondent bears the burden of proof

on all fact issues5 because she has produced credible evidence


      5
      The Commissioner’s determinations are generally presumed
correct, and the taxpayer bears the burden of proving that the
Commissioner’s determinations are in error. Rule 142(a); Welch
v. Helvering, 

, 115 (1933). The burden of proof
shifts to the Commissioner, however, with respect to a factual
issue relevant to a taxpayer’s liability for tax when the
taxpayer introduces credible evidence with respect to the issue
                                                   (continued...)
                                -10-

and otherwise met the requirements of section 7491.     We may

determine factual issues on the weight of the evidence, however,

unless there is an evidentiary tie.     See Knudsen v. Commissioner,

(2008); Kendricks v. Commissioner, 

, 75

(2005) (and the cases cited thereat); McCorkle v. Commissioner,

, 63 (2005).    We have examined the stipulated facts

and the evidence presented at trial, and we find no such

evidentiary tie.    Accordingly, we find it unnecessary to

determine who has the burden of proof.

III. The Gift Tax

     We now turn to gift tax.    Section 2501 imposes a tax on the

transfer of property by gift.    The gift tax applies whether the

gift is direct or indirect.    Sec. 2511.   Congress intended to use

the term “gifts” in its most comprehensive sense.     Commissioner

v. Wemyss, 

, 306 (1945).     Accordingly, transfers of

property by gift, by whatever means effected, are subject to

Federal gift tax.    Dickman v. Commissioner, 

, 334

(1984).

     The Federal gift tax is imposed on the fair market value of

the property transferred if a gift is made in property.      See

secs. 2502 and 2503.    A gift of property is valued as of the date

of the transfer.    Sec. 2512(a).   The gift is measured by the



     5
      (...continued)
and meets the other requirements of sec. 7491(a).     Sec.
7491(a)(1) and (2)(A) and (B).
                                 -11-

value of the property passing from the donor and not necessarily

by the enrichment to the donee.     See sec. 25.2511-2(a), Gift Tax

Regs.     Where property is transferred for less than adequate and

full consideration in money or money’s worth, the amount of the

gift is the amount by which the value of the property transferred

exceeds the value of the consideration received.     See sec.

2512(b).

IV.   The Step Transaction Doctrine

      We now discuss whether the step transaction doctrine applies

to the transfers at issue.     Petitioner argues that the four

transfers of her entire interest in Pierre LLC6 each had

independent business purposes to preclude the four transactions

from being collapsed under the step transaction doctrine.       She

lists several nontax reasons for establishing Pierre LLC but no

separate nontax reason for splitting the gift transfers from the

sale transfers.     Respondent argues that petitioner intended to

transfer a 50-percent interest in Pierre LLC to each trust.       She

divided the transfers at issue into four transfers only to avoid

gift tax.     Respondent further argues that the gift and sale

transactions should be collapsed and treated as disguised gifts

of 50-percent interests to each trust to the extent their value

exceeds the value of the trust’s promissory note.     Accordingly,



      6
      Petitioner gifted a 9.5-percent interest in Pierre LLC to
each trust before she sold a 40.5-percent interest to each trust
in exchange for promissory notes.
                               -12-

respondent contends that the gifts should be valued as two 50-

percent undivided interests in Pierre LLC rather than the two

9.5-percent interests petitioner reported.   We agree with

respondent.

     The step transaction doctrine embodies substance over form

principles.   It treats a series of formally separate steps as a

single transaction if the steps are in substance integrated,

interdependent, and focused toward a particular result.    See

Commissioner v. Clark, 

, 738 (1989).   Where an

interrelated series of steps is taken pursuant to a plan to

achieve an intended result, the tax consequences are to be

determined not by viewing each step in isolation, but by

considering all of them as an integrated whole.    Holman v.

Commissioner, 

, 187 (2008), affd. ___ F.3d ___ (8th

Cir., Apr. 7, 2010); Gross v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2008-221.

The step transaction doctrine is “well-established” and

“expressly sanctioned” and may be applied in the area of gift tax

where intra-family transactions often occur.   See Senda v.

Commissioner, 

, 1049 (8th Cir. 2006) (citing

Commissioner v. Clark, supra at 738), affg. T.C. Memo. 2004-160.

     It is appropriate to use the step transaction doctrine where

the only reason that a single transaction was done as two or more

separate transactions was to avoid gift tax.   Estate of Cidulka

v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1996-149 (collapsing decedent’s
                                 -13-

transfer to family members of minority interests in closely held

stock with his same-day sale/redemption of his remaining stock in

the corporation in exchange for a note).   We have applied the

step transaction doctrine to aggregate a taxpayer’s two separate

same-day transfers to a partnership of undivided 50-percent

interests in land to reflect the economic substance of the

transaction.    See Shepherd v. Commissioner, 

, 389

(2000), affd. 

(11th Cir. 2002).   We have also

collapsed a taxpayer’s separate same-day steps of funding a

partnership with the taxpayer’s gifts of partnership interests

where, at best, the transactions were integrated and, in effect,

simultaneous.    Senda v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2004-160, affd.

(8th Cir. 2006).

     Whether several transactions should be considered integrated

steps of a single transaction is a question of fact.    Senda v.

.    We therefore turn to the facts.

The transfers at issue all occurred on the same day.   Moreover,

virtually no time elapsed between the transfers.   Petitioner gave

away her entire interest in Pierre LLC within the time it took

for four documents to be signed.    In addition, the record

indicates that petitioner intended to transfer her entire

interest in Pierre LLC to the trusts without paying any gift

taxes.   We find compelling that Mr. Reiner recorded the transfers

at issue as two gifts of 50-percent interests in Pierre LLC in
                                -14-

the contemporaneous journal and ledger and that he used these

records to prepare Pierre LLC’s tax return.    Mr. Reiner testified

at trial, however, that he later discarded these records because

they contained inaccuracies, including the characterization of

the transfers.   We do not so easily ignore Mr. Reiner’s

contemporaneous description of the transaction.

     Petitioner intended to transfer two 50-percent interests to

the trusts, but she first gifted small interests in Pierre LLC to

use a portion of her then-available credit and her GST tax

exemption.   We find that petitioner had primarily tax-motivated

reasons for structuring the gift transfers as she did.     She then

sold interests in Pierre LLC in exchange for the promissory notes

that were significantly discounted using the 36.55-percent

valuation discount.    No principal payments have been made on the

notes despite the passage of eight years.    Further, Pierre LLC

has made yearly distributions to the trusts so that the trusts

could make the yearly interest payments.    Consequently, she

transferred $4.25 million of assets within Pierre LLC without

paying any gift tax.    Petitioner intended not just to minimize

gift tax liability but to eliminate it entirely.

     We find that nothing of tax-independent significance

occurred in the moments between the gift transactions and the

sale transactions.    We also find that the gift transactions and

the sale transactions were planned as a single transaction and
                               -15-

that the multiple steps were used solely for tax purposes.

Accordingly, we hold that petitioner made a gift to each trust of

a 50-percent interest in Pierre LLC to the extent the interest

exceeds the value of the promissory note executed by the trust.

V.   Valuation

     We must now determine the value of a 50-percent interest in

Pierre LLC on the date of the transfers.   The value of gifted

property is determined as of the date of the gift as “the price

at which such property would change hands between a willing buyer

and a willing seller, neither being under any compulsion to buy

or to sell, and both having reasonable knowledge of relevant

facts.”   Sec. 2512; sec. 25.2512-1, Gift Tax Regs.   The willing

buyer and willing seller are hypothetical persons, rather than

specific individuals or entities, and their characteristics are

not necessarily the same as those of the donor and the donee.

Holman v. Commissioner, supra at 200.   The hypothetical willing

buyer and seller are presumed to be dedicated to achieving the

maximum economic advantage.   

not value the Pierre LLC interests by reference to the

trusts’ ownership through the LLC after transfer but rather by

their value in petitioner’s hands at the moment of transfer.     See

Shepherd v. 

.   Ultimately, the

value we determine need not be directly traceable to specific

testimony if it is within the range of values that may be
                                -16-

properly derived from consideration of all the evidence.      E.g.,

Peracchio v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2003-280.

     The parties agree that a willing buyer would presumably pay

less for the Pierre LLC interests than for an outright purchase

of its freely transferable cash and securities because she would

have limited control of her investment under the LLC agreement.

See Estate of Petter v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2009-280; Estate

of Erickson v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2007-107.    For example,

the LLC agreement vests control with the manager and restricts

members’ rights to transfer their interests or withdraw.7

     Mr. Shuey determined that the fair market value of Pierre

LLC interests would be subject to a 10-percent lack of control

discount and 30-percent marketability discount, for a 36.55

cumulative discount.   Petitioner determined the percentage

interests in Pierre LLC that she should gift and sell after she

consulted with Mr. Shuey.    She then reported each gift of a 9.5-

percent Pierre LLC interest on her gift tax return at the

$256,168 discounted value.   At trial, petitioner called on expert

witness Daniel Kerrigan of Management Planning, Inc. (MPI) who

concluded that the appropriate discounts were 10 percent for lack




     7
      Respondent does not challenge the validity of these
restrictions for valuation purposes under the special valuation
rules of Ch. 14. See secs. 2701-2703.
                               -17-

of control and 35 percent for lack of marketability, for a

combined discount of 41.5 percent.8

     Respondent did not introduce an expert report at trial

because of his position that the gifts were of the underlying

assets of Pierre LLC.   See Pierre v. Commissioner, 133 T.C. __

(2009).   Respondent argues, however, that the discounts for lack

of control and marketability determined by petitioner’s expert

witness should be reduced.   We address each of these discounts in

turn.

     A.   Lack of Control (Minority) Discount

     We begin with the lack of control discount.   A minority

discount may apply where a partner lacks control as indicated by

such factors as the inability to participate in management, to

direct distributions, or to compel liquidation or withdraw from

the partnership without the consent of the controlling interest.

See Estate of Bischoff v. Commissioner, 

, 49 (1977).

Degree of control is the critical factor in deciding whether the

lack of control discount applies and the amount of the discount,

if any.   See 

opinion sometimes aids the Court in determining
valuation; other times, it does not. See Laureys v.
Commissioner, 

, 129 (1989). We may accept the opinion
of an expert in its entirety, or we may be selective in the use
of any portion thereof. See Parker v. Commissioner, 

,
562 (1986); Buffalo Tool & Die Mfg. Co. v. Commissioner, 

, 452 (1980).
                                 -18-

     Petitioner relied on Mr. Shuey’s determination that a 10-

percent lack of control discount was appropriate in valuing the

transfers at issue.   At trial, petitioner’s expert witness echoed

Mr. Shuey’s determination.   Mr. Kerrigan reviewed the LLC

agreement to see what specific rights and restrictions applied to

a 40.5-percent interest and a 9.5-percent interest in Pierre LLC

and concluded that a 10-percent lack of control discount applies.

Respondent argues that petitioner’s expert should have reviewed

the rights and restrictions related to the two 50-percent blocks

petitioner gifted to the trusts rather than the 9.5-percent

interests petitioner reported.    We agree.

     Mr. Kerrigan testified that he had not valued a 50-percent

Pierre LLC interest and that to do so he would continue to look

to the rights and restrictions under the LLC agreement.      For

example, he pointed out that a 50-percent ownership interest

would allow a member to block the appointment of a new manager

but a minority interest would not.      He therefore admitted that

the discount would be modestly reduced to as low as 8 percent,

and we so find.

     B.   Marketability Discount

     Petitioner argues that an additional marketability discount

should be applied to reflect the lack of a ready market for

Pierre LLC interests.   Petitioner valued the Pierre LLC interests

using Mr. Shuey’s determination that a 30-percent marketability
                                -19-

discount is appropriate.   Petitioner’s expert witness at trial

increased the marketability discount to 35 percent.9

Notwithstanding this increase, petitioner advocates for only the

30-percent marketability discount on which she relied.

     Respondent challenges certain aspects of Mr. Kerrigan’s

expert report and argues that a 35-percent marketability discount

is too high.10   Respondent failed to argue, however, that the 30-

percent marketability discount petitioner actually applied in

valuing a Pierre LLC interest is inappropriate.   Further,

respondent offered no evidence or expert testimony concerning the


     9
      Mr. Kerrigan examined the difference between the price
investors paid for privately placed shares (restricted stocks)
and actively traded shares in the same company. We have
recognized this approach to valuation for a limited liability
entity that primarily serves as an investment vehicle for
marketable securities. Holman v. Commissioner, 

(2008) (12.5-percent marketability discount appropriate), affd.
___ F.3d ___ (8th Cir., Apr. 7, 2010). Mr. Kerrigan cited 13
studies of private sales of restricted stocks from 1971 to 2002
including MPI’s proprietary study of private sales of restricted
stocks from 1985 to 2000. Mr. Kerrigan relied on MPI’s study,
which reported a median marketability discount of 24.8 percent.
Mr. Kerrigan looked to specific factors concerning the operation
of Pierre LLC, as well as the terms of the LLC agreement, in
reaching his conclusion that an increased marketability discount
of 35 percent was appropriate.
     10
      Respondent argues that the studies Mr. Kerrigan relied on
show a decrease in the median private placement discount from
approximately 34 percent before 1990 to as low as 13 percent
after April 1997. The parties agree that this decrease
correlates with looser restrictions on unregistered securities
under Securities and Exchange Commission rule 144, 17 C.F.R. sec.
230.144 (1999). The parties disagree as to whether the decrease
is relevant in valuing an interest in Pierre LLC. Respondent
provides no evidence, however, concerning the effect of this
downward trend on the valuation of a Pierre LLC interest.
                               -20-

value of a Pierre LLC interest.   Accordingly, we find, after

reviewing the available evidence, that a 30-percent marketability

discount is appropriate for these facts.

VI.   Conclusion

      We have considered all arguments made in reaching our

decision, and, to the extent not mentioned, we conclude that they

are moot, irrelevant, or without merit.

      To reflect the foregoing and the concessions of the parties,


                                           Decision will be entered

                                      under Rule 155.