Judges: "Goldberg, Stanley J."
Attorneys: Genise A. Conner, Pro se. Deborah K. MacKay , for respondent.
Filed: Jan. 25, 2010
Latest Update: Dec. 05, 2020
Summary: T.C. Summary Opinion 2010-8 UNITED STATES TAX COURT GENISE A. CONNER, Petitioner v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent Docket No. 26978-07S. Filed January 25, 2010. Genise A. Conner, pro se. Deborah K. MacKay, for respondent. GOLDBERG, Special Trial Judge: This case was heard pursuant to the provisions of section 7463 of the Internal Revenue Code (Code) in effect at the time the petition was filed. Pursuant to section 7463(b), the decision to be entered is not reviewable by any other c
Summary: T.C. Summary Opinion 2010-8 UNITED STATES TAX COURT GENISE A. CONNER, Petitioner v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent Docket No. 26978-07S. Filed January 25, 2010. Genise A. Conner, pro se. Deborah K. MacKay, for respondent. GOLDBERG, Special Trial Judge: This case was heard pursuant to the provisions of section 7463 of the Internal Revenue Code (Code) in effect at the time the petition was filed. Pursuant to section 7463(b), the decision to be entered is not reviewable by any other co..
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T.C. Summary Opinion 2010-8
UNITED STATES TAX COURT
GENISE A. CONNER, Petitioner v.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent
Docket No. 26978-07S. Filed January 25, 2010.
Genise A. Conner, pro se.
Deborah K. MacKay, for respondent.
GOLDBERG, Special Trial Judge: This case was heard pursuant
to the provisions of section 7463 of the Internal Revenue Code
(Code) in effect at the time the petition was filed. Pursuant to
section 7463(b), the decision to be entered is not reviewable by
any other court, and this opinion shall not be treated as
precedent for any other case. Unless otherwise indicated,
subsequent section references are to the Internal Revenue Code in
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effect for the year in issue, and all Rule references are to the
Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure.
Respondent determined a deficiency of $2,681 in
petitioner’s Federal income tax for 2006. The issues for
decision are whether petitioner is entitled to: (1) A
dependency exemption deduction for her niece JT;1 (2) an earned
income credit; (3) a child tax credit; and (4) head of household
filing status.
Background
Some of the facts have been stipulated and are so found.
The stipulation of facts and the attached exhibits are
incorporated herein by this reference. Petitioner resided in
Illinois when she filed her petition.
Throughout 2006 petitioner worked as a technician at
Heartland Pharmacy, where her main job was premixing medicines
for use in hospitals.
JT is petitioner’s niece, the daughter of petitioner’s
brother and his estranged girlfriend, Ms. Tigue. JT was 12
years old in 2006.
In late 2005 Ms. Tigue told petitioner that she had lost
her apartment, was out of work, and had no place to live. Ms.
Tigue wanted JT both to have a stable place to live and to
remain in the same school. Petitioner has seven or eight
1
The Court redacts the names of minors. See Rule 27(a)(3).
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grandchildren, most of whom at various times have lived with
her. Petitioner offered to take in JT because two of her
grandchildren had recently moved out of her apartment, thereby
creating space, and because JT was her niece. Thus, in late
2005 JT began living with petitioner, and this living
arrangement continued until early 2008.
In 2006 petitioner lived in a two-bedroom apartment.
Petitioner and her adult niece, Monia Conners, signed a 1-year
lease on October 1, 2005, which they renewed in 2006. The
apartment is a second-floor unit consisting of two bedrooms, a
living and dining room combination, a kitchen, and one bathroom.
Four people shared this apartment during 2006: Petitioner,
JT, Ms. Conners, and Ms. Conners’ daughter (petitioner’s
grandniece) who was about the same age as JT. Ms. Conners’
daughter slept in one bedroom with Ms. Conners, and JT slept in
petitioner’s bedroom. When Ms. Conners was employed, petitioner
and Ms. Conners shared the rent and utilities. However, because
Ms. Conners was unemployed for most of 2006, petitioner paid the
expenses for the apartment.
Ms. Tigue did not have a permanent residence during 2006.
She occasionally stayed overnight at petitioner’s apartment. At
other times, petitioner did not know where Ms. Tigue was living
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because Ms. Tigue drifted among the homes of various friends and
relatives throughout 2006.
JT continued to attend junior high school in the school
district where JT and Ms. Tigue had lived before Ms. Tigue lost
her apartment, approximately 20 miles from petitioner’s
apartment. Petitioner usually drove JT to school. If
petitioner was unable to take JT to school because of a change
in petitioner’s work schedule, Ms. Tigue would drop off JT at
school in the morning and return JT to petitioner’s apartment
after school, where the other relatives would care for JT.
Occasionally, if petitioner was working late, and no one was in
the apartment to care for JT, Ms. Tigue would bring JT to the
location where she was living and would care for JT until
petitioner arrived to take JT home.
Petitioner was not JT’s point of contact on school records.
Because Ms. Tigue wanted JT to attend the same school, she did
not change JT’s school records or contact information.
Petitioner did not receive any of JT’s report cards from school.
Ms. Tigue worked intermittently during 2006 and did not
receive unemployment benefits or any type of public assistance.
Petitioner provided all of the support for JT during the year.
This included buying JT’s food, providing housing, paying for
clothing, and providing spending money.
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Petitioner engaged a national tax preparation firm to
prepare her 2006 Federal income tax return. Petitioner filed
as a head of household, claimed a dependency exemption
deduction for JT, provided JT’s taxpayer identification number,
reported wages of $28,775, and claimed a standard deduction, an
earned income credit, and a child tax credit. These items
resulted in an overpayment of $3,066, of which $516 pertained
to the earned income credit.
Respondent, in a notice of deficiency, changed
petitioner’s filing status to single and disallowed the
dependency exemption deduction for JT, the earned income tax
credit, and the child tax credit.
After receipt of the notice of deficiency petitioner met
with respondent’s representative, who told petitioner to
provide a letter from JT’s mother confirming that JT lived with
petitioner during 2006. Subsequently, petitioner obtained and
mailed to respondent a signed and notarized letter dated
January 9, 2008, from Ms. Tigue stating that she allowed JT to
live with petitioner for 2006. After reviewing the notarized
letter respondent issued a notice dated September 8, 2008,
stating that: (1) Petitioner was recertified for the earned
income credit (EIC) for 2006; (2) in the future petitioner
would not have to complete Form 8862, Information To Claim
Earned Income Credit After Disallowance; and (3) petitioner
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would receive her 2006 EIC refund within 6 weeks. On or about
October 31, 2008, petitioner received a refund check for
$2,367, reflecting her entire overpayment for 2006, less an
amount she owed for 2005.
Discussion
I. Burden of Proof
In general, the Commissioner’s determination set forth in
a notice of deficiency is presumed correct, and the taxpayer
bears the burden of showing that the determination is in error.
Rule 142(a); Welch v. Helvering,
290 U.S. 111, 115 (1933).
Under section 7491(a) the burden may shift to the Commissioner
regarding factual matters if the taxpayer produces credible
evidence and meets the other requirements of the section.
Petitioner does not argue that she satisfied the elements for a
burden shift, but even if she did, we need not and explicitly
do not decide the issue because we resolve this case on the
preponderance of the evidence and not on an allocation of the
burden of proof, rendering the issue of burden moot. See
Knudsen v. Commissioner, 131 T.C. __, __ (2008) (slip op. at 6-
7); Cyman v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2009-144.
II. Deductions in General
Deductions are a matter of legislative grace, and
taxpayers must satisfy the statutory requirements for claiming
the deductions. See INDOPCO, Inc. v. Commissioner,
503 U.S.
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79, 84 (1992); New Colonial Ice Co. v. Helvering,
292 U.S. 435,
440 (1934). Taxpayers must maintain adequate records to
substantiate the amounts of credits and deductions claimed.
See sec. 6001; sec. 1.6001-1(a), Income Tax Regs.
A. Dependency Exemption Deduction
A taxpayer may claim a dependency exemption deduction for
each individual who is a dependent (as defined in section 152)
of the taxpayer for the year. Sec. 151(a), (c). The
definition of the term “dependent” includes a qualifying child
of the taxpayer. Sec. 152(a).
The taxpayer must establish that, pertinent here, the
qualifying child satisfies the following four requirements of
section 152(c)(1): (1) Bears a relationship to the taxpayer as
described in section 152(c)(2); (2) has the same principal
place of abode as the taxpayer for more than one-half of the
taxable year; (3) meets the age requirement of section
152(c)(3); and (4) has not provided more than one-half of his
or her own support for the taxable year.
JT satisfies the relationship requirement because she is
the descendant of petitioner’s brother; namely, his daughter.
Sec. 152(c)(2)(B). JT satisfies the residency test for 2006
because JT lived in petitioner’s apartment with petitioner for
the entire year, as confirmed by the notarized letter from JT’s
mother, Ms. Tigue. JT also satisfies the age requirement
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because JT reached age 12 in 2006 and was therefore under age
19 at the close of the taxable year. Sec. 152(c)(3)(A)(i).
With respect to the remaining test, whether JT provided
more than one-half of her own support in 2006, we observe that
JT reached age 12 in 2006, was a full-time junior high school
student, and had no earnings. Thus, we find JT provided none
of her own support.
Accordingly, we conclude that petitioner is entitled to a
dependency exemption deduction for JT for 2006 because JT is
petitioner’s qualifying child within the definition of section
152(c).
B. Earned Income Credit
Subject to certain limitations, an eligible individual is
allowed a tax credit calculated as a percentage of the
individual’s earned income. Sec. 32(a)(1). Earned income
includes wages. Sec. 32(c)(2)(A)(i). An eligible individual
includes “any individual who has a qualifying child for the
taxable year”. Sec. 32(c)(1)(A)(i).
We have already concluded that JT is a qualifying child of
petitioner for 2006. We also note that after petitioner
submitted a notarized letter from JT’s mother confirming that
JT lived with petitioner during all of 2006, respondent issued
a notice dated September 8, 2008, allowing petitioner the
earned income credit for 2006. Subsequently, respondent issued
a refund check for 2006 including the amount for petitioner’s
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2006 EIC. Accordingly, petitioner is entitled to the earned
income credit for 2006 because respondent has allowed the
credit and petitioner meets the requirements of section 32.
C. Child Tax Credit
A taxpayer may claim a child tax credit for each
qualifying child of the taxpayer as defined in section 152(c).
Sec. 24(a), (c)(1). Again, we have already concluded that JT
is petitioner’s qualifying child for purposes of the dependency
exemption deduction under section 152(c).
Further, petitioner meets the other requirements for the
child tax credit. Her adjusted gross income in 2006 was below
the phaseout amount of $75,000 for an individual who is not
married. See sec. 24(b)(2)(B). Petitioner included JT’s name
and Social Security number on the Form 1040, U.S. Individual
Income Tax Return, that petitioner filed for 2006. See sec.
24(e). Consequently, petitioner is entitled to the child tax
credit for 2006.
D. Head of Household Filing Status
The final issue is whether petitioner is eligible to file
as a head of household for 2006. Section 1(b) provides a
favorable income tax rate for an individual filing as a head of
household. As relevant here, to qualify as a head of household
a taxpayer must: (1) Be unmarried at the end of the taxable
year; (2) not be a surviving spouse; and (3) maintain as the
taxpayer’s home a household that constitutes for more than one-
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half of the taxable year the principal place of abode of a
qualifying child of the taxpayer as defined in section 152(c).
Sec. 2(b)(1).
We have already held that JT is a qualifying child of
petitioner with respect to section 152(c). Furthermore,
petitioner was not married at the end of 2006, was not a
surviving spouse, and maintained her apartment for more than
one-half of 2006 as JT’s principal place of abode. Accordingly,
petitioner is entitled to file as a head of household for 2006.
To reflect the foregoing,
Decision will be entered
for petitioner.