In this case, respondent's basis for retroactively revoking the plan's qualifying status under section 401(a) is that the plan was not amended to incorporate statutory requirements enacted during 2000 and 2001.

Petitioner raises five arguments, 2011 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 61">*70 which we discuss below.

Petitioner argues that respondent's September 16, 2009, letter was not timely. ⁷ Petitioner claims that the "statute of limitations" for the plan's 2005 year expired on July 31, 2009, ⁸ and that respondent therefore was barred from revoking the plan's tax-exempt status for 2005 and earlier plan years. Petitioner's argument is without merit.

The period of limitations prescribed by section 6501(a)⁹ is a limitation on the assessment and collection of taxes; it does not limit respondent's broad authority to audit retirement plans and, if appropriate, to revoke retroactively a favorable determination letter. The period of limitations prescribed 2011 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 61">*71 by section 6501(a) is applicable neither to proceedings under section 7476 nor to respondent's determinations regarding the continued qualification of retirement plans under section 401(a), as they do not involve the imposition of any tax. ¹⁰Yarish Consulting, Inc. v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2010-174; Roblene, Inc. v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1999-161. Accordingly, respondent's revocation action was not improper by operation of any period of limitations.

Petitioner asserts that exhibits 14 and 15 attached to respondent's motion for summary judgment (purporting to represent petitioner's 2006 and 2005 Forms 5500-EZ, respectively) are "frauds" and that any 2011 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 61">*72 revocation action by respondent based thereon must be erroneous. We disagree.

Exhibits 14 and 15 attached to respondent's motion for summary judgment are identical to Exhibits 14-R and 15-R, respectively, of the administrative record filed herein. Generally, the facts represented in an administrative record are assumed to be true. Rule 217(b); Romann v. Commissioner, 111 T.C. 273">111 T.C. 273, 111 T.C. 273">274 (1998). Petitioner offers no evidentiary support for the contention that respondent's exhibits are fraudulent or incorrect. Mere allegations by the taxpayer are insufficient to show the existence of a genuine issue for trial. Rule 121(d); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317">477 U.S. at 324; Sundstrand Corp. v. Commissioner, 98 T.C. 518">98 T.C. 520.

Petitioner argues that notwithstanding its failure to timely amend for statutory changes, the plan retained its qualified status pursuant to Rev. Rul. 69-157, supra.

This revenue ruling addresses the issue of whether a trust retains its exempt status where a plan has discontinued contributions but otherwise continues in effect until all assets have been distributed from the plan's trust. This ruling does not address the issue of a plan's qualified 2011 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 61">*73 status where a plan has failed to timely amend as required by statutory changes. Petitioner's reliance on Rev. Rul. 69-157, supra, is misplaced.

Petitioner argues that because the plan in 2001 discontinued receiving contributions and barred admission of new participants, the plan ceased to exist and thereafter matured into a "Repository Trust". What petitioner means by the term "Repository Trust" is not clear; ¹¹ however, we believe petitioner argues that the plan terminated in or around 2001 and therefore was not required to amend for the above-referenced statutory enactments. We disagree.

Retirement plan terminations are formal events that have distinct requirements. Notably, formal plan terminations require that termination dates be established, the benefits of plan participants (and other liabilities under the plans) be determined with respect to the termination date, and all plan assets be distributed to satisfy those liabilities in accordance 2011 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 61">*74 with the terms of the plan as soon as administratively feasible after the termination date. Rev. Rul. 89-87, 1989-2 C.B. 81. Petitioner offers no evidence to show that the plan has been formally terminated, and petitioner's reliance on the allegation that the plan discontinued receiving contributions and barred admission of new participants thereby causing a termination of the plan is insufficient to create a genuine issue for trial. See Rule 121(d); 477 U.S. 317">Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, supra at 324; 98 T.C. 518">Sundstrand Corp. v. Commissioner, supra at 520.

Termination of a retirement plan will always cause a discontinuance of contributions, but a discontinuance of contributions might occur without a formal termination of the plan. Tionesta Sand & Gravel, Inc. v. Commissioner, 73 T.C. 758">73 T.C. 758, 73 T.C. 758">762 (1980), affd. without published opinion 642 F.2d 444">642 F.2d 444 (3d Cir. 1981). As noted above, Rev. Rul. 69-157, supra, provides that a trust which is part of a qualified plan—and has not been formally terminated—may retain its tax-exempt status despite the fact that contributions have been discontinued. Because no formal termination occurred, the plan was still required to comply with the requirements of section 401(a) in 2011 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 61">*75 order for the plan to be eligible for continued favorable tax treatment.

Respondent's basis for retroactively revoking the plan's qualifying status under section 401(a) is that the provisions of the plan were not amended to conform to certain changes in applicable law. Petitioner has admitted this failure. Petitioner argues, however, that because the plan was so simple, there was no need to amend the plan for statutory changes that would have had no effect on the operation of the plan. According to petitioner, any amendments to the plan would have had no meaningful purpose. We disagree with petitioner.

A qualified profit-sharing plan must meet statutory requirements both by its terms and in its operations. Buzzetta Constr. Corp. v. Commissioner, 92 T.C. 641">92 T.C. 641, 92 T.C. 641">646 (1989). The evaluation of the plan's failure to amend to meet statutory changes must be made in the context of what might have happened, not what actually occurred, during the years in issue. Basch Eng'g Inc. v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1990-212. In that context, we review briefly the amendments to the plan that were required by the above-referenced statutory changes. The Community Renewal Tax Relief Act 2011 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 61">*76 of 2000

CRA was enacted on December 21, 2000. ¹² CRA sec. 314(e), 114 Stat. 2763A-643, amended, inter alia, section 415(c)(3)(D) of the Code to require that a plan broaden its definition of compensation to include qualified transportation fringe benefits under section 132(f). The plan was never amended to include qualified transportation fringe benefits described in section 132(f) as required by the CRA. ^{132011 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 61">*77 2011 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 61">*78} The fact that no such fringe benefits were provided by Swan P.A. does not cure this defect. "[T]he fact that the defective plan provision did not become operative does not mean that the plan meets the [statutory] requirements". 73 T.C. 758">Tionesta Sand & Gravel, Inc. v. Commissioner, supra at 764. It is possible that during the years in issue Swan P.A. could have provided qualified transportation fringe benefits to its employee(s) under section 132(f), and these benefits would have to have been included in the plan's definition of compensation.

EGTRRA was enacted on June 7, 2001. ¹⁴ EGTRRA secs. 641(a)(1)(A) and (b)(2), 115 Stat. 118, 120, required qualified plans to amend their definition of an eligible retirement plan to include eligible deferred compensation plans under section 457(b) and annuity contracts under section 403(b), respectively. The plan's definition of eligible retirement plan was never amended to include annuity contracts or eligible deferred compensation plans. ^{152011 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 61">*79 2011 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 61">*80} The fact that no such annuity contracts or eligible deferred compensation plans were part of the plan during the years in issue does not cure this defect in the plan.

EGTRAA sec. 657(a)(1), 115 Stat. 135, amended section 401(a)(31) of the Code by adding subparagraph (B) requiring that mandatory distributions greater than $1,000 but less than $5,000 from a qualified plan be paid in a direct rollover to an individual retirement plan if the distributee fails to make a distribution 2011 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 61">*81 election and that the plan administrator provide the distributee written notice thereof. ¹⁶ A review of the plan shows no inclusion of either the automatic rollover provision or the notice provision required by amended section 401(a)(31)(B).

The requirements that a plan must satisfy for qualification under section 401(a) must be strictly met. Vague, general references in plan correspondence to such requirements are insufficient. "Congress has decided that these changes are necessary in the retirement plan area and we do not second guess its wisdom." Hamlin Dev. Co. v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1993-89.

Reviewing 2011 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 61">*82 the facts in the light most favorable to petitioner, we conclude that no genuine issue of material fact exists requiring a trial, and that, as a matter of law, respondent is entitled to summary judgment.

In reaching our decision, we have considered all of the arguments raised by petitioner, and to the extent not mentioned herein, we conclude they are moot, irrelevant, or without merit.

An appropriate order and decision will be entered for respondent.