Judges: GALE
Attorneys: Edwin Davila, Jr., Pro se. Rose E. Gole , for respondent.
Filed: Jan. 10, 2012
Latest Update: Nov. 21, 2020
Summary: T.C. Summary Opinion 2012-6 UNITED STATES TAX COURT EDWIN DAVILA, JR., Petitioner v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent Docket No. 1614-11S. Filed January 10, 2012. Edwin Davila, Jr., pro se. Rose E. Gole, for respondent. GALE, Judge: This case was heard pursuant to the provisions of section 7463 of the Internal Revenue Code in effect when the petition was filed.1 Pursuant to section 7463(b), the decision to be entered is not reviewable by any other court, and this opinion shall not be
Summary: T.C. Summary Opinion 2012-6 UNITED STATES TAX COURT EDWIN DAVILA, JR., Petitioner v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent Docket No. 1614-11S. Filed January 10, 2012. Edwin Davila, Jr., pro se. Rose E. Gole, for respondent. GALE, Judge: This case was heard pursuant to the provisions of section 7463 of the Internal Revenue Code in effect when the petition was filed.1 Pursuant to section 7463(b), the decision to be entered is not reviewable by any other court, and this opinion shall not be ..
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T.C. Summary Opinion 2012-6
UNITED STATES TAX COURT
EDWIN DAVILA, JR., Petitioner v.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent
Docket No. 1614-11S. Filed January 10, 2012.
Edwin Davila, Jr., pro se.
Rose E. Gole, for respondent.
GALE, Judge: This case was heard pursuant to the provisions
of section 7463 of the Internal Revenue Code in effect when the
petition was filed.1 Pursuant to section 7463(b), the decision
to be entered is not reviewable by any other court, and this
opinion shall not be treated as precedent for any other case.
1
Unless otherwise noted, all section references are to the
Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as in effect for the taxable year
in issue.
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Respondent determined a deficiency in petitioner Edwin
Davila, Jr.’s (Mr. Davila) 2009 Federal income tax of $6,464.
The issues for decision are whether, with respect to the two
minor children of his cousin, Mr. Davila was entitled for 2009
to: (1) Two exemptions for dependents; (2) a child tax credit;
(3) an earned income tax credit; and (4) “head of household”
filing status. We conclude that he was not entitled to any of
the foregoing.
Background
Some of the facts have been stipulated and are so found.
The stipulation of facts and the accompanying exhibits are
incorporated herein by this reference. At the time the petition
was filed, Mr. Davila resided in New York.
Mr. Davila’s first cousin and her two minor children, born
in 2002 and 2007, lived with him from approximately May to
December of 2009. In addition to housing, he provided certain
other necessities for his cousin and her children during this
period. Mr. Davila’s cousin had moved herself and her children
in with Mr. Davila in May 2009 because she feared for her safety
from her estranged husband if she remained in her own residence.
On his 2009 Federal income tax return, Mr. Davila reported
taxable income from wages, salaries, or tips of $25,728 and
claimed both of his cousin’s children as dependents, and with
respect to the children also claimed a child tax credit, an
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earned income tax credit, and head of household filing status.
Respondent issued a notice of deficiency to Mr. Davila in which
he determined that Mr. Davila was not entitled to any of the
foregoing.
Discussion
Personal Exemption
In addition to a personal exemption for himself, Mr. Davila
claimed personal exemptions with respect to two dependents, which
respondent disallowed. Section 151(c) provides for a personal
exemption for each individual who is a dependent, as defined in
section 152, of the taxpayer for the taxable year. A “dependent”
means a qualifying child or a qualifying relative. Sec. 152(a).
A “qualifying child” means an individual who, among other
requirements, bears a relationship to the taxpayer that is
enumerated in section 152(c)(2); namely, the individual is a
child of the taxpayer or descendant of such a child; or a
brother, sister, stepbrother, or stepsister of the taxpayer or a
descendant thereof. The children Mr. Davila claimed as
dependents are the offspring of his cousin. Consequently, they
do not have any of the foregoing family relationships with him
and accordingly neither is a “qualifying child” for purposes of
section 152. Thus, the children are not Mr. Davila’s dependents
by virtue of either’s being a “qualifying child”.
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Section 152(d) defines a “qualifying relative”. A
qualifying relative must either satisfy one of the family
relationships enumerated in the statute, sec. 152(d)(2)(A)-(G),2
or be an individual who “for the taxable year of the taxpayer”
has the same principal place of abode as the taxpayer and is a
member of the taxpayer’s household (meaning that the individual
receives more than one-half of his support from the taxpayer),
sec. 152(d)(2)(H). The regulations issued under section 152
clarify the requirement that an individual who does not satisfy
one of the enumerated family relationships must live with the
taxpayer for the entire taxable year to meet the definition of a
qualifying relative. Sec. 1.152-1(b), Income Tax Regs.;3 see
also Von Tersch v. Commissioner,
47 T.C. 415, 422 (1967);
Trowbridge v. Commissioner,
30 T.C. 879, 880 (1958), affd. 268
2
The enumerated relationships for a qualifying relative are,
with respect to the taxpayer: (1) A child or a descendant of a
child; (2) a brother, sister, stepbrother, or stepsister; (3) the
father or mother, or an ancestor of either; (4) a stepfather or
stepmother; (5) a son or daughter of a brother or sister of the
taxpayer; (6) a brother or sister of the father or mother of the
taxpayer; or (7) a son-in-law, daughter-in-law, father-in-law,
mother-in-law, brother-in-law, or sister-in-law.
3
Although sec. 1.152-1(b), Income Tax Regs., has not been
amended to reflect changes in sec. 152 that were enacted by the
Working Families Tax Relief Act of 2004, Pub. L. 108-311, sec.
201, 118 Stat. 1169, we note that the language of former sec.
152(a)(9), which is interpreted in sec. 1.152-1(b), Income Tax
Regs., and the caselaw cited above, has been carried over
unchanged in current sec. 152(d)(2)(H). We thus conclude that
the regulatory interpretation that “for the taxable year of the
taxpayer” (as used in sec. 152(d)(2)(H)) means for the entire
taxable year remains in force.
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F.2d 208 (9th Cir. 1959); Golden v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo.
1997-355; Douglas v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1994-519, affd.
without published opinion
86 F.3d 1161 (9th Cir. 1996).
The parties focused their dispute at trial on whether Mr.
Davila had provided more than one-half of the support for his
cousin’s children in 2009. However, the relative amount of Mr.
Davila’s support is of no consequence, given that it is
undisputed that the children resided with Mr. Davila for less
than the entire taxable year during 2009. The children’s
partial-year residency with Mr. Davila precludes the status of
either as a “qualifying relative” under section 152(d)(2)(H), and
they do not satisfy any of the family relationships listed in
section 152(d)(2)(A)-(G). Consequently, neither of the children
is a “qualifying relative” within the meaning of section
152(d)(2).
Because neither of the children at issue is a “qualifying
child” or a “qualifying relative” within the meaning of section
152(c) or (d), they are not Mr. Davila’s dependents and he
accordingly is not entitled to the two personal exemptions he
claimed with respect to them for 2009.
Child Tax Credit
Mr. Davila claimed a child tax credit under section 24 with
respect to two children, which respondent disallowed. Section 24
allows a tax credit with respect to any qualifying child of the
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taxpayer. A “qualifying child” for this purpose means a
“qualifying child” as defined in section 152(c). Sec. 24(c). As
we have concluded that neither of the children at issue is a
“qualifying child” as defined in section 152(c), Mr. Davila is
not entitled to a child tax credit for 2009.
Earned Income Tax Credit
Mr. Davila claimed an earned income tax credit under section
32 on the basis of his having two qualifying children.
Respondent disallowed the entire tax credit.
The earned income tax credit is phased out depending on the
amount of the taxpayer’s “earned income” as defined in section
32(c)(2) and on whether the taxpayer has one or more qualifying
children.4 Sec. 32(b). Generally, “earned income” means the sum
of the taxpayer’s wages, salaries, tips, other employment
compensation, and earnings from self-employment that is
includable in gross income for the taxable year. See sec.
32(c)(2). The tax credit is increased for one or more qualifying
children. See sec. 32(b). A “qualifying child” for this purpose
generally means a “qualifying child” as defined in section
152(c). Sec. 32(c)(3).
Mr. Davila had “earned income” within the meaning of section
32(c)(2) of $25,728 for 2009. As we have concluded that neither
4
For 2009, the credit is completely phased out for taxpayers
with no qualifying children and earned income at or above
$13,440. Rev. Proc. 2008-66, 2008-45 I.R.B. 1107, 1111.
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of the children at issue is a “qualifying child” as defined in
section 152(c), and given that Mr. Davila’s earned income exceeds
the $13,440 figure at which the credit is phased out for a
taxpayer with no “qualifying child”, he is not entitled to any
earned income tax credit for 2009.
Head of Household Filing Status
Mr. Davila claimed head of household filing status;
respondent determined that his filing status was single for 2009.
Section 1(b) imposes a tax rate schedule for an individual who is
a “head of household” as defined in section 2(b). An individual
qualifies as a head of household if, inter alia, he maintains as
his home a household which constitutes the principal place of
abode of a “qualifying child” as defined in section 152(c) or a
“dependent” under section 151. Sec. 2(b)(1). As we have
concluded that neither of the children is either a “qualifying
child” as defined in section 152(c) or otherwise a “dependent”
under section 151 (as defined in section 152), Mr. Davila is not
entitled to claim head of household filing status for 2009. We
therefore sustain respondent’s determination that Mr. Davila’s
filing status for 2009 was single.
To reflect the foregoing,
Decision will be entered for
respondent.