JERRY L. SMITH, JUDGE.
Appellant, Danthony Michael Pender, was indicted by the Sullivan County Grand Jury for aggravated robbery in August of 2008. After a jury trial, Appellant was convicted as charged and sentenced as a Range I, standard offender to twelve years in incarceration. Appellant seeks a review of his conviction after the denial of a motion for new trial. On appeal, the following issues are presented for our review: (1) whether the evidence is sufficient to support the conviction; (2) whether the jury verdict was contrary to the law and evidence; (3) whether the trial court erred by failing to grant the motion for judgment of acquittal; and (4) whether the trial court erred by denying the motion for new trial. After a review, we determine that all of Appellant's issues involve the sufficiency of the convicting evidence. We determine that the evidence was sufficient to sustain the conviction. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
On the afternoon of Sunday, May 11, 2003, Jennifer Leagan was working at the Bristol Health Food Store in Bristol, Tennessee. Ms. Leagan owned the shop. Clennie Bowers, an employee, was working alongside Ms. Leagan. Sometime that afternoon, the bell at the front door rang, indicating to Ms. Leagan and Ms. Bowers that someone had entered the store. Ms. Leagan was at a table at the end of the counter at the time. She looked up and saw a man with a ski mask and a gun who demanded money. He stated, "I want your money now," as he walked down an aisle of the store. Both Ms. Leagan and Ms. Bowers thought the man was joking until he yelled "now."
Ms. Leagan walked to the cash register and the perpetrator told Ms. Bowers to go to the back of the store. Ms. Leagan pulled the drawer out of the cash register and laid it on the counter. The perpetrator again said, "I want your money now." Ms. Leagan did not "feel real comfortable because [she] had a gun pointed at [her]." She described the event as "scary."
Ms. Leagan described the perpetrator as around six feet tall with a medium build and not broad-shouldered. Ms. Leagan recalled that the man's voice was not extremely deep but not high either. Ms. Leagan could tell that the man was African-American. He wore a ski mask, brown cotton knit gloves, and a dark t-shirt. Ms. Leagan described the gun as black and "the kind where you have the clip that goes in the bottom."
Ms. Bowers described the perpetrator as black and tall with broad shoulders. He was not heavy set. Ms. Bowers recalled that he had on a dark ski mask, a dark hoodie, dark clothing, and gloves. The perpetrator carried a gun.
The perpetrator made off with $259 from the register then told Ms. Leagan to go to the back of the store. Ms. Leagan heard the door bell ring as she got to the back of the store. This made her think that the perpetrator had left the store. Ms. Bowers had already called 911. Ms. Leagan got on the phone with the 911 dispatcher and gave her information about the robbery.
Right after the perpetrator left the store, Ms. Bowers's daughter, Heather, came into the parking lot at the store to return her mother's vehicle.
The next morning, Ms. Leagan saw a news story on television about the robbery. There was a picture of a man that was alleged to have been driving the getaway car.
Ms. Leagan had even commented on the t-shirt when the man was in the store, making another employee look at the shirt too. Ms. Leagan informed the police that she recognized the man.
Lieutenant Craig Beyer of the Bristol Police Department responded to the dispatch call reporting the robbery.
Lieutenant Beyer stopped the vehicle a few blocks later with the assistance of the Bristol, Virginia Police. The car was registered to Co-defendant Grubb, who was driving the vehicle. Lieutenant Beyer noticed a plastic bag in the passenger seat containing a gun, a pair of gloves, and a canister of pepper spray. A ski mask was also recovered from the car.
Appellant was interviewed prior to his arrest. He waived his Miranda rights and agreed to be interviewed by Officer Johnny Hale of the Bristol Police Department on May 15, 2003. Appellant claimed that he worked with Co-defendant Grubb at Exide. He saw Co-defendant Grubb the day before the robbery and helped him work on his car for about thirty to forty-five minutes. He claimed that he knew about the robbery but was "at home and heard it on TV." Appellant stated that he was not near "Buckner Street on Sunday the 11th but [he does] live just about a block away from Russell Street." Appellant gave a hair and saliva sample for DNA analysis.
The car was towed to the Bristol, Tennessee Police Department. Bradley Everette, a special agent forensic scientist with the Tennessee Bureau of Investigation ("TBI"), performed a DNA analysis on the gloves that were found in the car. They tested positive for a small amount of DNA but not enough to obtain a DNA profile. The ski mask, on the other hand, tested positive for epithelial, a component of saliva. The sample contained DNA from both a minor and major contributor. There was not enough of a sample from the minor contributor to determine if the person was male or female. The major contributor was determined to be male. When the DNA profile was run through the CODIS database for comparison, Appellant was identified as a possible match. A sample was taken from Appellant for comparative testing. Appellant's DNA profile matched that of the major contributor to the DNA on the ski mask. Appellant's fingerprints were not found in the car.
Appellant's sister, Velda Pender, heard about the robbery on Mother's Day. She visited her brother that afternoon at his home. He was watching television at the time she got to his home. Ms. Pender told Appellant that she had heard about Co-defendant Grubb's involvement in a robbery. According to Ms. Pender, Appellant was surprised.
At the conclusion of the trial, the jury found Appellant guilty of aggravated robbery. At a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced Appellant to twelve years in incarceration. The trial court denied a motion for new trial. Appellant argues on appeal that: (1) the evidence is insufficient to support the conviction; (2) the jury verdict was contrary to the law and evidence; (3) the trial court erred by failing to grant the motion for judgment of acquittal; and (4) the trial court erred by denying the motion for new trial.
On appeal, Appellant raises several issues, all of which revolve around the sufficiency of the evidence. Appellant contends that his identity was not sufficiently established by circumstantial evidence. Specifically, he argues that the circumstantial evidence does not "`exclude every other reasonable hypothesis save the guilt of the defendant.'" See State v. Lewter, 313 S.W.3d 745, 748 (Tenn. 2010) (quoting State v. crawford, 420 S.W.2d 610, 612-13 (Tenn. 1971)). Appellant also cites State v. David Lynn Sisk, Nos. E2009-00320-CCA-R3-C and E2009-00320-CCA-R3-CD, 2010 WL 3502512 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Knoxville, Sept. 8, 2010), rev'd in part and remanded by State v. David Lynn Sisk, E2009-00320-SC-R11-CD, 2011 WL 2350304, ___ S.W.3d ___ (Tenn. June 15, 2011), to support his argument. The State, on the other hand, notes that Appellant fails to cite to the most recent supreme court case on the use of circumstantial evidence, State v. Dorantes, 331 S.W.3d 370 (Tenn. 2011), and argues that the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction.
To begin our analysis, we note that when a defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, this Court is obliged to review that claim according to certain well-settled principles. A verdict of guilty, rendered by a jury and "approved by the trial judge, accredits the testimony of the" State's witnesses and resolves all conflicts in the testimony in favor of the State. State v. Cazes, 875 S.W.2d 253, 259 (Tenn. 1994); State v. Harris, 839 S.W.2d 54, 75 (Tenn. 1992). Thus, although the accused is originally cloaked with a presumption of innocence, the jury verdict of guilty removes this presumption "and replaces it with one of guilt." State v. Tuggle, 639 S.W.2d 913, 914 (Tenn. 1982). Hence, on appeal, the burden of proof rests with the defendant to demonstrate the insufficiency of the convicting evidence. Id. The relevant question the reviewing court must answer is whether any rational trier of fact could have found the accused guilty of every element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. See Tenn. R. App. P. 13(e); Harris, 839 S.W.2d at 75. In making this decision, we are to accord the State "the strongest legitimate view of the evidence as well as all reasonable and legitimate inferences that may be drawn therefrom." See Tuggle, 639 S.W.2d at 914. As such, this Court is precluded from re-weighing or reconsidering the evidence when evaluating the convicting proof. State v. Morgan, 929 S.W.2d 380, 383 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1996); State v. Matthews, 805 S.W.2d 776, 779 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1990). Moreover, we may not substitute our own "inferences for those drawn by the trier of fact from circumstantial evidence." Matthews, 805 S.W.2d at 779. Further, questions concerning the credibility of the witnesses and the weight and value to be given to evidence, as well as all factual issues raised by such evidence, are resolved by the trier of fact and not the appellate courts. State v. Pruett, 788 S.W.2d 559, 561 (Tenn. 1990).
The guilt of a defendant, as well as any fact required to be proved, may be established by direct evidence, by circumstantial evidence, or by a combination of both. See State v. Pendergrass, 13 S.W.3d 389, 392-93 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1999). Recently, in David Lynn Sisk, the supreme court clarified the use of circumstantial evidence as a basis for a conviction. In David Lynn Sisk, the defendant was convicted of aggravated burglary and theft at trial, primarily on the basis of circumstantial evidence. 2011 WL 2350304, at *2. The circumstantial evidence involved a cigarette butt that was found at the scene and contained a match to the defendant's DNA. Id. On appeal, this Court reversed, holding that the evidence was insufficient to support the convictions for aggravated burglary and theft of $10,000 or more but less than $60,000. Id. at *1. The State appealed, arguing that the convictions should be reinstated. On appeal to the supreme court, the court chronicled the history of the use of convictions based on circumstantial evidence stating:
Id. at *6 (footnote omitted). By reinstating the convictions in David Lynn Sisk, our supreme court made clear that "[t]he standard of review [for sufficiency of the evidence] `is the same whether the conviction is based upon direct or circumstantial evidence.'" See State v. Dorantes, 331 S.W.3d 370, 379 (Tenn. 2011) (quoting State v. Hanson, 279 S.W.3d 265, 275 (Tenn. 2009)).
Applying the analysis utilized in David Lynn Sisk and Dorantes to the case herein, we review the evidence at trial in a light most favorable to the State. Appellant was convicted of aggravated robbery. Robbery is the "intentional or knowing theft of property from the person of another by violence or putting the person in fear." T.C.A. § 39-13-401(a). A robbery becomes aggravated either when the victim is seriously injured or when the defendant "display[s] . . . any article used . . . to lead the victim to reasonably believe it to be a deadly weapon." T.C.A. § 39-13-402(a).
Both Ms. Leagan and Clennie Bowers confirmed that the perpetrator was an AfricanA-merican male who was about six feet tall and wore dark clothing, a dark ski mask, and brown knit gloves. The perpetrator was carrying a black handgun. Heather Bowers arrived at the scene shortly after the robbery and saw a 1984 to 1986 Chevrolet Celebrity leaving the scene. The car had a Caucasian male driver and an African-American male passenger. The passenger was leaning over toward the driver with his arm down behind his back. Police located the car and followed it to Bristol, Virginia. The passenger jumped out of the car and escaped on foot. Co-defendant Grubbs was arrested as the driver of the car. The car contained a black pistol, a ski mask, and brown knit gloves. The ski mask contained DNA matching the DNA of Appellant.
Although a close case, the evidence is sufficient to support the conviction under the analysis announced in Dorantes. A man matching Appellant's description was seen leaving the scene of the crime in a car that contained a gun, ski mask with Appellant's DNA, and brown knit gloves. Again, we may not substitute our own "inferences for those drawn by the trier of fact from circumstantial evidence." Matthews, 805 S.W.2d at 779. Further, questions concerning the credibility of the witnesses and the weight and value to be given to evidence, as well as all factual issues raised by such evidence, are resolved by the trier of fact and not the appellate courts. Pruett, 788 S.W.2d at 561. Appellant is not entitled to relief on this issue.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.