JERRY L. SMITH, J.
Appellant, Monroe James Dodson, Jr. and his co-defendants were indicted by the Davidson County Grand Jury for three counts of aggravated rape, two counts of especially aggravated kidnapping, two counts of aggravated robbery, one count of aggravated burglary, and one count of possession of a weapon during the commission of a felony. Appellant pled guilty to one count of aggravated rape, two counts of especially aggravated kidnapping, two counts of aggravated robbery, one count of aggravated burglary, and one count of employing a weapon during a felony with prior convictions. The trial court held a separate sentencing hearing and sentenced Appellant to an effective sentence of eighty-two years. Appellant appeals both the length of his sentences and the imposition of consecutive sentences. After a review of the record on appeal, we have determined that the enhancement factors used by the trial court were supported by the record and that, therefore, the length of the sentences is affirmed. We also conclude that the record on appeal supports the trial court's conclusion that Appellant is a dangerous offender and that consecutive sentences are warranted in his case. For these reasons, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.
The trial court related the following facts in its sentencing order:
After the jury was selected and the victim, E.K. testified, Appellant decided he wanted to enter a plea of guilty as part of a plea bargain. He pled guilty to one count of aggravated rape, two counts of especially aggravated kidnapping, two counts of aggravated robbery, one count of aggravated burglary, and one count of employing a weapon during a felony with prior convictions. The trial court subsequently held a sentencing hearing on March 26, 2010. On April 5, 2010, the trial court filed a sentencing order in which the trial court sentenced Appellant to twenty-five years for the aggravated rape, twenty-three years for each especially aggravated kidnapping, ten years for each aggravated robbery, five years for the aggravated burglary and six years for possession of a weapon during a felony. He was sentenced as a Range I, standard offender. Appellant's sentences for aggravated rape, especially aggravated kidnapping and employment of a weapon during a dangerous felony were to be served at 100%. The trial court ordered the sentencing for aggravated rape, both sentences for especially aggravated kidnapping, the sentence for aggravated burglary, and the sentence for possession of a weapon during a felony to be served consecutively to each other and the other sentences. The sentences for aggravated robbery were ordered to be served concurrently. Appellant's effective sentence was eighty-two years. In addition, the trial court ordered that the eighty-two year sentence be served consecutively to any sentence that was remaining on a prior conviction.
On appeal, Appellant argues that the trial court erred in its application of enhancement and mitigating factors and in imposing consecutive sentences. The State disagrees.
"When reviewing sentencing issues . . ., the appellate court shall conduct a de novo review on the record of the issues. The review shall be conducted with a presumption that the determinations made by the court from which the appeal is taken are correct." T.C.A. § 40-35-401(d). "However, the presumption of correctness which accompanies the trial court's action is conditioned upon the affirmative showing in the record that the trial court considered the sentencing principles and all relevant facts and circumstances." State v. Ashby, 823 S.W.2d 166, 169 (Tenn. 1991). We are to also recognize that the defendant bears "the burden of demonstrating that the sentence is improper." Ashby, 823 S.W.2d at 169.
In making its sentencing determination, a trial court, at the conclusion of the sentencing hearing, first determines the range of sentence and then determines the specific sentence and the appropriate combination of sentencing alternatives by considering: (1) the evidence, if any, received at the trial and the sentencing hearing; (2) the presentence report; (3) the principles of sentencing and arguments as to sentencing alternatives; (4) the nature and characteristics of the criminal conduct involved; (5) evidence and information offered by the parties on the enhancement and mitigating factors; (6) any statistical information provided by the administrative office of the courts regarding sentences for similar offenses; (7) any statements the defendant wishes to make in the defendant's behalf about sentencing; and (8) the potential for rehabilitation or treatment. T.C.A. §§ 40-35-210(a), (b), -103(5); State v. Williams, 920 S.W.2d 247, 258 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995). When imposing the sentence within the appropriate sentencing range for the defendant:
T.C.A. § 40-35-210(c) (2006).
At the outset we note that Appellant committed the criminal offenses at issue on December 22, 2008; therefore, the 2005 amendments to the Sentencing Act apply to our review of his sentencing. The 2005 amendments to the Sentencing Act made the application of the enhancement factors advisory in nature. See T.C.A. § 40-35-114; State v. Jackie Lynn Gray, No. M2007-02360-CCA-R3-CD, 2008 WL 2579175, at *5 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Nashville, June 28, 2008), perm. app. denied, (Tenn. Dec. 29, 2008); State v. Troy Sollis, No. W2007-00688-CCA-R3-CD, 2008 WL 1931688, at *3 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Jackson, May, 2, 2008). In fact, "[t]he 2005 amendments [to the sentencing act] deleted as grounds for appeal a claim that the trial court did not weigh properly the enhancement and mitigating factors." State v. Carter, 254 S.W.3d 335, 344 (Tenn. 2008).
After a review of the sentencing order, it is clear that the trial court considered the nature and characteristics of the criminal conduct involved, Appellant's history and background, the mitigating and enhancement factors, and the principles of sentencing. See id. at 345-46. Therefore, there is a presumption that the trial court's determination is correct.
The trial court applied six enhancement factors and no mitigating factors. The trial court made the following findings with regard to the applicable enhancement factors:
Appellant argues that the trial court erred in applying enhancement factors (1), (5), and (10). See T.C.A. § 40-35-115(1), (5), (10). With regard to enhancement factor (1), Appellant argues that "[t]here is no proof in the record that the Appellant had any prior convictions for violent offenses or felony convictions." (emphasis added). However, as is clearly stated in the statute, this enhancement factor is not based upon solely violent or felony offenses. The statute clearly reads "history of criminal convictions or criminal behavior." See T.C.A. § 40-35-115(1). We have reviewed the presentence report submitted at the sentencing hearing. Appellant's criminal history is quite extensive, starting when he was a juvenile and extending throughout the six years he was an adult leading up to the instant convictions. We conclude that this enhancement factor was properly applied.
Appellant argues the following with regard to the application of enhancement factors (5) and (10):
As stated above, Appellant pled guilty to aggravated rape, two counts of especially aggravated kidnapping, two counts of aggravated robbery, one count of aggravated burglary, and one count of employing a weapon during a felony. Therefore, Appellant has admitted that he participated in the offenses. He cannot now argue that the above enhancement factors do not apply because there was no proof that he was involved in the commission of the offenses. We conclude that the application of the enhancement factors are supported by the record. As stated above, the weight given to the enhancement and mitigating factors are no longer a basis for appeal. Carter, 254 S.W.3d at 344.
Therefore, this issue is without merit.
Appellant also argues that the trial court erred in imposing consecutive sentences. The State disagrees.
Under Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-115(a), if a defendant is convicted of more than one offense, the trial court shall order the sentences to run either consecutively or concurrently. A trial court may impose consecutive sentencing upon a determination that one or more of the criteria set forth in Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-115(b) exists. This section permits the trial court to impose consecutive sentences if the court finds, among other criteria, that:
T.C.A. § 40-35-115(b). When imposing a consecutive sentence, a trial court should also consider general sentencing principles, which include whether or not the length of a sentence is justly deserved in relation to the seriousness of the offense. See State v. Imfeld, 70 S.W.3d 698, 708 (Tenn. 2002). The imposition of consecutive sentencing is in the discretion of the trial court. See State v. Adams, 973 S.W.2d 224, 230-31 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1997).
This section permits the trial court to impose consecutive sentences if the court finds, among other criteria, that "the defendant is a dangerous offender whose behavior indicates little or no regard for human life, and no hesitation about committing a crime in which the risk to human life is high." T.C.A. § 40-35-115(b)(4). However, before ordering the defendant to serve consecutive sentences on the basis that he is a dangerous offender, the trial court must find that the resulting sentence is reasonably related to the severity of the crimes, necessary to protect the public against further criminal conduct, and in accord with the general sentencing principles. See State v. Imfeld, 70 S.W.3d 698, 708-09 (Tenn. 2002); State v. Wilkerson, 905 S.W.2d 933, 938-39 (Tenn. 1995).
The trial court made the following findings:
The trial court made the appropriate findings to support the imposition of consecutive sentences based upon the conclusion that Appellant is a dangerous offender. The record amply supports the findings of the trial court.
Therefore, this issue is without merit.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.