CAMILLE R. MCMULLEN, J.
The Defendant-Appellant, Troy Jones, was convicted by a Davidson County jury of three counts of aggravated burglary and one count of sexual battery, for which he received an effective sentence of five years' imprisonment.
On September 22, 2013, Miracle Holt was awakened by an intruder, who was "hovering" over her and "feeling on her buttocks." When she confronted the intruder, he ran and hid behind a bathroom door. Holt alerted other family members in the apartment and called her brother from a back room for help. Holt's brother, G. D'Angelo Mason, encountered the intruder inside the apartment and observed him stuffing an alarm clock in his pants. Mason ran back to his room, put on his shoes, and chased the intruder. Within minutes, Mason apprehended the Defendant and physically confronted him at a nearby basketball court. The Defendant denied being the intruder and claimed that he had just retrieved an alarm clock from a friend and was returning to his dorm room at Fisk University. An investigation ensued, and the Defendant was subsequently indicted for the above charges.
Miracle Holt lived with her mother, her sister, Prodeon Johnson, and her brother, G. D'Angelo Mason, in the Herman Street Apartments in Nashville, Tennessee. At trial, Holt narrated the layout of their small apartment through several photographs, which showed where she slept on the night of the offense, the bathroom, the bathroom hallway, the kitchen, and the living room area. On the night of the offense, Holt, her brother and his girlfriend, Holt's sister, their cousin, and two children were asleep in the apartment. Holt testified that she awoke to an intruder with a shoulder length, dreadlock hairstyle "hovering" over her and "feeling on" her buttocks. The intruder "grasp[ed] [her buttocks], trying to work his way around . . . under the covers . . . like a . . . sexual motion." She felt the intruder grab her buttocks at least twice. Holt said the intruder's face was close to hers. When she made eye contact with him, the intruder ran and hid behind the bathroom door. The bathroom light was on, and Holt was able to see "everything," including the intruder's face, hair, clothes, and weight. Once Holt realized she was not "dreaming," she woke up her sister and cousin, who initially thought she was joking. Holt then called her brother on the phone for him to come out of a back room in the apartment. Holt said that when her brother came out of the back room through the hallway, her sister threw a baby car seat at the intruder, and the intruder ran out the front door of the apartment.
Holt's brother and sister put on their shoes and ran after the intruder. Holt eventually caught up with them at a nearby basketball court, where they had confronted the Defendant. She recalled that upon being questioned about the intrusion, the Defendant said, "I was just going over to my friend's house to get an alarm clock to wake up in the morning." Holt said the Defendant pulled out an alarm clock, which she confirmed was the same alarm clock that had been taken from her apartment. During the confrontation, Holt's brother hit the Defendant with a spoon, and Holt struck the Defendant two or three times. Holt injured herself by hitting her head on the door on the night of the offense; however, she stressed it was not caused by the Defendant. Holt said her aunt's cell phone was also taken from the apartment, but she could not remember the exact description of the phone. She further explained that "a lady in the black car" apparently called the police, and Holt spoke to a detective about the incident. Holt identified the Defendant as the person who broke into her apartment at a hearing shortly after the offense and at trial. Holt explained that the Defendant looked differently at trial because of "[t]he dreads, and his face was rougher."
On cross-examination, Holt acknowledged that she muttered, "What the F" upon seeing the Defendant in her bedroom. She denied having consumed any alcohol or illegal drugs on the night of the offense. She also did not observe her brother and sister throw a chair down the stairwell at the Defendant and did not observe the intruder leave the apartment with the alarm clock in his hands. Holt confirmed that she received a "cut" on her head, but she did not believe that the injury came from the intruder. She did not recall telling police officers or emergency responders that the intruder had injured her. The Defendant later called Detective Gilbert Mana to impeach Holt's testimony. Detective Mana testified, in relevant part, that on the night of the offense, Holt did in fact attribute her injury to the Defendant "punch[ing] her in the forehead."
G. D'Angelo Mason, Holt's brother, testified consistently with the testimony of Holt. On the night of the offense, Mason awoke to his phone ringing. He answered the phone, but he went back to sleep because there was no verbal response from the caller. After his phone rang again, Mason heard his sisters and cousin yell his name. He jumped up and stopped by the bathroom to investigate. He initially thought they were joking, until one of his sisters told him an intruder was in the apartment. As Mason turned around, his sister, Prodeon Johnson, screamed, "someone's behind you." Mason jumped back as the intruder walked in front of him. At that point, Mason was in the kitchen, which was close to the bathroom, and the intruder was approximately three or four feet in front of him. Mason explained that light was emanating from his and his mother's bedroom, so the apartment was "bright." He was able to see the intruder's face and described him as black, heavy set, a little over six feet tall, with a dreadlock hairstyle, wearing a striped shirt.
Mason testified that as the intruder was leaving, he observed the intruder "acting like he [was] on the phone, but [he was] stuffing something in his pants." Mason said he saw the intruder stuffing his sister's alarm clock into his pants. Mason was unable to describe the phone the intruder was using, but he said the intruder was not talking to anyone. At that point, Mason ran to his room, grabbed his shoes, and began to leave the apartment. Mason then observed the intruder "jingling on the bottom door to try to get into the next apartment." He said as he saw the intruder attempting to access another apartment at the bottom of the staircase, he picked up a chair and threw it toward the intruder. He recalled one of his sisters and his girlfriend being with him when the chair was thrown. Within two minutes of throwing the chair, Mason encountered the Defendant walking on the sidewalk.
At this point, Mason was alone with the Defendant and confronted him about entering his apartment and touching his sister. Mason testified that the Defendant said, "Man, I don't know what you're talking about, I wasn't in your house, I was coming from a friend's house to get an alarm clock." The Defendant continued to explain, "I [go] to Fisk University. I can show you my [identification] badge[,]" but Mason said he was never shown any such badge. Mason admitted that he was frustrated because he did not believe the Defendant, and he began to yell at him. Mason acknowledged that he punched the Defendant while still questioning him about being inside his apartment. Asked how he was so certain the Defendant was the intruder he had seen in his apartment, Mason testified, "I recognized his hair, his shirt and the clock[.]" Mason confirmed that from the time he discovered the intruder in his apartment to the time he confronted the Defendant on Herman Street, Mason had not spoken with his sister, Miracle Holt.
Mason testified that the Defendant had his sister's alarm clock in his hands when he encountered him on the street. Mason stood in front of the Defendant in an effort to give security guards time to respond and to prevent the Defendant from getting away. Mason explained that the confrontation eventually reached a nearby basketball court, which was close to Fisk University. Mason testified that the Defendant never hit him and continued to explain that he attended Fisk University and had just left campus to get an alarm clock from his friend's house. Eventually, Mason's sisters, his girlfriend, and his cousin arrived at the basketball court. His sister, Prodeon Johnson, brought his mother's antique spoon, and Mason struck the Defendant with it. Two security guards and the police later responded to the incident, and Mason briefly spoke with them. He identified the alarm clock, admitted as an exhibit at trial, as the same alarm clock taken from his apartment on the night of the offense.
On cross-examination, Mason confirmed that his mother was not present at the apartment on the night of the offense and that everyone who was at the apartment, except for his sister's child, went outside to the basketball court. Mason agreed that Holt also punched the Defendant while at the basketball court and that he did not see the intruder pick up anything in the living room of the apartment. He insisted, however, that he observed the intruder holding a cell phone up to his ear with his left hand. Mason specified that he encountered the intruder at the corner of Herman Street and 17th Avenue, walking towards the basketball court. Mason testified that there were several other houses and another apartment complex located between Herman Street Apartments and Fisk University. On redirect, Mason said that he knew the alarm clock the Defendant had was the same alarm clock taken from his apartment because it was no longer in their apartment where his sister had left it.
Prodeon Johnson testified consistently with the testimony of Holt and Mason. She was the last person to go to sleep on the night of the offense. Holt woke Johnson up and told her that an intruder was inside the apartment. Although Johnson did not initially believe Holt, Johnson later observed the intruder behind the bathroom door. Johnson said she was lying on the couch facing the bathroom, kitchen, and her sister's room, approximately fifteen to twenty feet away from the bathroom. She confirmed that the bathroom light was on and described the intruder as wearing a shirt and some pants. Although Johnson could not see the intruder's face, she said that the intruder's hair was in "dreads" and that he was holding something in his hands. When she saw the intruder, she threw her child's car seat at him. She went into her mother's room with Holt, her cousin, and her child, and called her brother. Johnson said the intruder was "speed walking" out of the bathroom, towards the living room, and out the front door.
As the intruder was leaving the apartment, Johnson saw him pick up something in the living room and stuff it into his pants. Johnson said she and Mason threw a chair down the stairs and began following the intruder to a parking lot at Fisk University. Johnson recalled taking her mother's golden, antique spoon with her. Johnson said she, Mason, and Holt next encountered "the guy that had left out the house" at "the big field right . . . behind Fisk University." When they confronted the intruder, he said, "he didn't touch nobody, he didn't rape nobody," and he was swinging her alarm clock by the cord. She identified the alarm clock at trial as the same alarm clock taken from her apartment on the night of the offense. Johnson said the intruder took the alarm clock from the table where the television was in the living room and that she had not given him permission to take the clock. Johnson sustained a black eye from the intruder swinging the alarm clock, which broke. Johnson said police officers eventually responded to the scene, that she spoke with a detective, and that she was never asked about the alarm clock. At trial, Johnson was unable to identify the intruder who broke into her apartment on the night of the offense.
On cross-examination, Johnson admitted that she was involved in a fight with the Defendant but did not recall hitting him with the spoon. Johnson said the fight ensued after the Defendant denied being in their apartment, touching Holt, and taking her alarm clock. Johnson testified that she did not take the spoon from the apartment to the basketball court and could not remember how the spoon got to the basketball court. Johnson also did not recall how the spoon broke and said she never saw the Defendant being hit with the spoon. Johnson did not remember Mason's girlfriend being present at the basketball court. Johnson admitted to a prior theft conviction; however, she explained that she "pled guilty for a charge for my friends." Johnson said that prior to the burglary, the alarm clock was sitting on a table in the living room unplugged from the wall because she was in the process of moving her belongings from her mother's apartment to her new home. The alarm clock had a green and white back that was broken on the night of the offense; however, none of the broken pieces were recovered. On redirect examination, Johnson again said that the intruder she saw in her apartment was the same person she encountered later at the basketball court and that the alarm clock that that person had in his possession was hers. She again admitted to a prior theft conviction but said that her testimony at trial was truthful.
Detective Gilbert Mana of the Metro Nashville Police Department (MNPD) testified that in the early morning hours of September 22, 2013, he responded to a call at a basketball court near Herman Street. Initially, the call was reported as a fight in progress and later changed to a burglary. When he arrived at the scene, Detective Mana encountered several victims and the Defendant. After speaking with the individuals, Detective Mana learned of an incident that had occurred earlier at the Herman Street Apartments. Detective Mana described the victims' demeanor as "quite shocked and upset." He spoke with the Defendant, who claimed he had been "attacked by a group of males and females." Additional officers responded to the scene, and the crime scene unit was called to photograph the area. Upon canvassing the area, the crime scene unit recovered an alarm clock, which Detective Mana submitted to the police department's property room. Detective Mana identified the alarm clock, admitted as an exhibit at trial, and noted that the alarm cord was detached from the clock.
On cross-examination, Detective Mana confirmed that as the reporting officer, he completed an incident report, arrest report, and a property sheet for the instant offense. Detective Mana testified that other officers were already on the scene when he arrived, but he was responsible for changing the call from a fight in progress to a burglary. Detective Mana confirmed that he spoke with four victims on the night of the offense and that the information contained in his reports would have "been probably taken directly from the victims." He did not recall if the area was canvassed for any additional suspects. He confirmed that he was the only person who came in physical contact with the alarm clock, but he admitted that he did not attempt to collect any fingerprints from it.
On the night of the offense, Sergeant Jason Pierpoint with MNPD responded to the scene and was briefed by other officers. He determined that a "possible sexual assault had occurred during a possible burglary." Sergeant Pierpoint called Detective Ben Ward, a sex abuse detective, to report to the scene as well as additional crime scene officers to collect evidence. Officer Douglas Belcher, a crime scene investigator with MNPD, testified that he responded to a basketball court located near Herman Street, where he recovered several items including pieces of a plastic decorative spoon, pieces of an alarm clock, and a cell phone. Officer Belcher met with Sergeant Pierpoint and learned of an incident that had occurred earlier at one of the apartments in the Herman Street Apartment complex, which was nearby. Officer Belcher took photographs of the apartment and the basketball court and collected a cell phone from Detective Ward. He testified that all other property was collected by patrol officers. Officer Belcher testified the he took three pieces of the decorative spoon and a cell phone from Detective Ward to the property room, all of which were identified at trial and admitted as exhibits. He said a cell phone and alarm clock found on the basketball court were turned over to Detective Mana.
On cross-examination, Officer Belcher confirmed that a cell phone was given to him by Detective Ward. To his knowledge, that cell phone had been in the police department's property room since the offense occurred. He said a second cell phone was collected from the basketball court and given to Detective Mana. Officer Belcher had no other contact with that phone. He said the cell phone found on the ground at the basketball court was believed to be the victim's phone. Officer Belcher confirmed that he generated a report of his investigation which provided, in relevant part, that the phone found on the ground was located in three pieces, photographed, and believed to belong to the Defendant. He explained that originally, that phone was believed to belong to the Defendant, but by the end of the investigation, officers believed the phone belonged to one of the victims. Officer Belcher said he never had any contact with the alarm clock, and he was not aware of any fingerprint analysis performed on it.
MNPD Detective Ben Ward responded to the scene based upon a report of an alleged sexual assault that occurred during a burglary of an apartment in the Herman Street Apartment complex. Upon arrival, Detective Ward spoke with Holt, Johnson, and Mason. The Defendant also agreed to talk to Detective Ward at his office, which was about five minutes away. Prior to talking to Detective Ward, the Defendant was given an advice of rights form, which advised him of his rights under
The Defendant told Detective Ward that he could find Charles Graham by contacting John Escoe. During the video, the Defendant was given a cell phone to retrieve John Escoe's phone number. Detective Ward attempted to call the number given for John Escoe, but he did not receive a response. Detective Ward also attempted to follow up with Charles Graham at the address given, but he said the address was invalid. He investigated nearby addresses, but he determined that those addresses were not associated with anyone by that name. Detective Ward testified that the cell phone that the Defendant used to retrieve John Escoe's phone number was given to Detective Mana. Following his discussion with the Defendant, Detective Ward also spoke to Holt's aunt regarding ownership of one of the cell phones found at the scene. He could not recall which phone belonged to which owner, but he believed that one phone was returned to Holt's aunt, and one was turned in to the police property room as belonging to the Defendant. Detective Ward did not recall if the cell phone turned in to the property room was in fact the cell phone found at the scene. Detective Ward identified the Defendant at trial as the person he encountered at the basketball court and subsequently interviewed on the night of the offense. Detective Ward confirmed that the Defendant's appearance at trial was "obviously a lot different" than his appearance during the recorded interview. On cross-examination, Detective Ward admitted that he did not request fingerprint analysis to be performed on the alarm clock recovered from the scene.
Stewart Watts, the Assistant Director of Residence Life and Campus Services at Fisk University, testified that he had access to the housing records of students at Fisk University. In response to a request from Detective Ward, Watts retrieved the housing records for the Defendant, which were admitted into evidence at trial. In the summer of 2008, the Defendant lived on campus for a precollege program. From August 2008 to July 2009, the Defendant also lived in New Livingston Hall and Shane Hall. However, Watts testified that there were no records of the Defendant living in student housing from July 2009 to 2013. On cross-examination, Watts acknowledged that he knew the Defendant and was his resident advisor in 2008 and 2009. Watts said two residents lived in Room 326 at New Livingston Hall during a summer program in 2013; however, he was not asked to bring the records for those residents.
In the fall of 2013, Dr. Gary Nash, a professor of music at Fisk University, taught a music theory course, and the Defendant was enrolled as a student. Dr. Nash testified that the Defendant previously had taken two prerequisite courses under his instruction. Dr. Nash recalled an incident that occurred in his class on or about September 10 or 11, 2013, involving the Defendant. Dr. Nash testified that the Defendant said "something that was inappropriate and unacceptable," and the Defendant walked out of class following a stern but professional reprimand. The Defendant never returned to any of Dr. Nash's classes. Dr. Nash identified the Defendant at trial, but he noted that the Defendant appeared "considerably different" than he did when he was enrolled in his class. On cross-examination, Dr. Nash said he issued the Defendant a letter grade of "E" for his fall 2013 course, which was more reflective of an incomplete than a withdrawal. Following the testimony of Dr. Nash, the State rested its case-in-chief.
The Defendant began his case by admitting his transcripts from Fisk University into evidence at trial. According to the transcript, the Defendant was enrolled at Fisk University from summer of 2008 to fall of 2013. In fall of 2013, he was enrolled exclusively in Dr. Nash's music theory class. The Defendant then recalled Detective Mana, who testified that on the night of the offense, Holt attributed her injury to the Defendant "punch[ing] her in the forehead." Detective Mana also observed Johnson with a bruised left eye, which Johnson explained happened when "she was punched . . . by the [D]efendant." Detective Mana testified that as the arresting officer, he was able to obtain statistical information regarding the Defendant and that according to the state database, the Defendant was 5'10" and 160 pounds. On cross-examination, Detective Mana confirmed that his conversations with the victims were not recorded, and the information contained in his report, which he used to refresh his recollection, came from conversations with all four victims. Detective Mana agreed that he did not personally measure the Defendant and that he had obtained the statistical information from information already collected in the state database. Detective Mana said he also observed injuries to the Defendant's hand on the night of the offense. Detective Mana confirmed that Detective Ward was also present at the scene.
Following the testimony of Detective Mana, the defense rested, and the State presented Detective Ward in its rebuttal proof. Detective Ward testified that on the night of the offense, he interviewed Holt in the front seat of his unmarked police car and that this interview was audio recorded. Detective Ward recalled the interview lasting approximately fifteen to thirty minutes. He testified that during the interview, Holt did not initiate statements regarding the injury to her forehead. Detective Ward also recalled interviewing Johnson at the scene and testified that Johnson did not initiate statements about her injury. Detective Ward said that Johnson "didn't think that [the injury] was done purposely[.]" Excerpts from Holt's interview were played for the jury. He testified that although Detective Mana was present at the scene, Detective Mana was not present when Detective Ward was speaking with the victims.
Following deliberation, the jury found the Defendant guilty as charged of three counts of aggravated burglary and one count of sexual battery. At the September 14 and November 6, 2017 sentencing hearings, the Defendant's presentence report, an addendum to the presentence report, and his psychosexual evaluation were admitted as exhibits without objection. The Defendant provided the following allocution,
Following arguments and consideration of the evidence presented, the trial court determined that the Defendant was not an appropriate candidate for alternative sentencing and sentenced him, as a Range I, standard offender, to five years on each count of aggravated burglary and two years for the sexual battery. The trial court merged the aggravated burglary charges and aligned the sentences concurrently, for a total effective sentence of five years' imprisonment. On November 8, 2017, the Defendant filed a motion for new trial, which was denied on January 18, 2018. The Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal and is now properly before this court.
The Defendant contends that the trial court erred in allowing the State "to improperly demonstrate that [the Defendant] was dishonest in his denial of criminal activity by introducing extrinsic evidence that contradicted collateral matters referenced in statements on the evening" of the offense. The Defendant insists that his comments within his statement of denial to Detective Ward, claiming that he was a student at Fisk University and that he lived in a dorm on campus were tantamount to live witness testimony under Rule 803 of the Tennessee Rules of Evidence. As such, the Defendant argues that the State was barred from impeaching their own witness under the collateral fact rule because "introduction of such evidence tends to confuse the jury and uselessly to protract and increase the expense of judicial investigations." In response, the State contends that the trial court properly exercised its discretion in allowing the State to present direct, relevant evidence that the Defendant, contrary to his statements to the victims and the police, did not attend Fisk University or live on its campus at the time of the offense. We agree with the State.
Prior to trial, the Defendant filed a motion entitled, "MOTION IN LIMINE 7 (TO EXCLUDE IMPERMISSIBLE IMPEACHMENT AND CHARACTER EVIDENCE IN STATE'S CASE IN CHIEF)." On April 17, 2017, the trial court conducted a hearing to determine if the State would be permitted to impeach the Defendant's recorded interview within its case-in-chief. Defense counsel explained his position, in relevant part, as follows:
So what I'm asking the Court is, if they are going to play his recorded statement, . . . in their case in chief, then that is essentially as far as they get, and they don't get to put on a bunch of other evidence to say — to impeach that statement. If [the Defendant] testifies, all bets are off, they can impeach all day long . . ., but if they are going to just play a statement and [the Defendant] chooses not to testify, then they don't get to introduce a whole bunch of extra evidence to show that he was lying during that statement.
In response, the State objected and reasoned as follows:
At the conclusion of arguments, the trial court denied the motion in limine, reasoning, in pertinent part, as follows:
Generally, "questions concerning the admissibility of evidence rest within the sound discretion of the trial court, and this [c]ourt will not interfere in the absence of abuse appearing on the face of the record."
The following evidentiary rules govern the resolution of this issue. Rule 607 of the Tennessee Rules of Evidence provides that "[t]he credibility of a witness may be attacked by any party, including the party calling the witness. . . so long as the questioning is not a pretext for putting inadmissible hearsay before the jury." Tenn. R. Evid. 607;
Rule 806 of the Tennessee Rules of Evidence provides as follows:
Tenn. R. Evid. 806. Tennessee Rule of Evidence 403 provides that relevant evidence "may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury[.]" Tenn. R. Evid. 403. Prejudicial evidence is not excluded as a matter of law.
As an initial matter, to the extent that the Defendant argues that the State was barred from introducing evidence that impeached the Defendant's video-recorded statement based on the collateral fact rule, we agree with the State, and conclude that this issue is waived for failure to present it to the trial court.
Additionally, upon being further questioned by Detective Ward, the Defendant continued to deny any knowledge of the offense in his video-recorded statement. The Defendant provided specific details supporting his claim that he was innocently in the area only because he was a Fisk student who lived nearby in New Livingston Residence Hall Room 326. He further claimed that a friend named Charles Graham, who Detective Ward could reach only by contacting John Escoe, provided him with the alarm clock earlier that evening. In our view, the State, having the burden to prove these offenses beyond a reasonable doubt, was entitled to prove through direct evidence that the Defendant's statements to police that he was a student at Fisk University, that he lived in a nearby dorm, and that Charles Graham provided him with the alarm clock were false. Here, we are reminded that "a false statement made by a defendant in explanation of conduct which is the subject of criminal charges against him is admissible as tending to show consciousness of guilt."
The State provided independent, direct evidence establishing the falsity of the Defendant's statements, enabling the jury to infer the Defendant's consciousness of guilt. In contrast to the Defendant's comments within his video recorded statement, the assistant director of residence life at Fisk University testified that the Defendant did not live on campus in New Livingston Residence Hall Room 326 at the time of the offense, his music professor testified that the Defendant had effectively dropped out of his class in early September 2013, and Detective Ward testified that the address the Defendant gave him to reach John Escoe did not exist. This evidence was indeed probative of whether the Defendant was present in the victims' apartment at the time of the offense, and it cannot be said to have any tendency for the jury to have rested its decision on an improper basis or to have confused the jury in any way. Accordingly, the Defendant is not entitled to relief on this issue.
Next, the Defendant argues that the evidence is insufficient to convict him of aggravated burglary and sexual battery. The Defendant does not dispute that the offenses were committed; instead, he argues that the State failed to establish his identity as the perpetrator of the offenses. In response, the State contends that the evidence was sufficient to support each of the Defendant's convictions. We agree with the State.
On appeal, the State is entitled to the strongest legitimate view of the evidence and all reasonable inferences which may be drawn from that evidence.
"The identity of the perpetrator is an essential element of any crime."
As charged in this case, aggravated burglary is the burglary of a habitation as defined in Tennessee Code Annotated sections 39-14-401 and 39-14-402. Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-14-403(a). A person commits burglary who, without the effective consent of the property owner, enters a building and commits or attempts to commit a felony, theft or assault. Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-14-402(a)(3). Habitation means any structure, including buildings, module units, mobile homes, trailers, and tents, which is designed or adapted for the overnight accommodation of persons. Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-14-401(1)(a). Sexual battery is unlawful sexual contact with a victim by the defendant when the sexual contact is accomplished without the consent of the victim and the defendant knows or has reason to know at the time of the contact that the victim did not consent. Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-505(a)(2).
The Defendant argues that the State failed to establish the Defendant's identity as the perpetrator of the offense because two of the three victims were unable to identify the Defendant as the perpetrator at trial. Additionally, the Defendant argues that Holt's identification of the Defendant at trial should be discredited because she was "significantly inconsistent in her descriptions of key events-casting great doubt on whether she was truly identifying the alleged assailant or simply pointing to the most likely candidate at counsel table." Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, on the night of the offense, an intruder entered the victims' apartment in the early morning hours and grabbed Holt on the buttocks while she was asleep. She awoke and verbally confronted the intruder, who then ran behind a bathroom door. At trial, Holt said the intruder's face was close to hers, and she made eye contact with him. She described the lighting conditions of the apartment, which enabled her to see "everything," including the intruder's face, hair, clothes, and weight. She specifically noted that the intruder had a dreadlock hairstyle at the time of the offense and that the Defendant's hair had changed at the time of trial. Nearly each witness who encountered the Defendant around the time of the offense testified that his appearance had changed at the time of trial. However, Holt was certain that the Defendant was the same man that had intruded into her apartment and grabbed her buttocks on the night of the offense.
Mason testified that within minutes of observing the intruder attempt to enter another apartment, he put on his shoes and ran after the intruder. While Mason and Johnson were unable to identify the Defendant as the perpetrator at trial, they were certain that the Defendant was the same man they had encountered on the night of the offense at a nearby basketball court who was in possession of Johnson's alarm clock. Mason confronted the Defendant, who denied any knowledge of the burglary and claimed he was a Fisk student on his way back to his dorm. As previously discussed, subsequent investigation revealed the falsity of the Defendant's explanation for being in the area. Based on this evidence, any rational juror could have found the Defendant guilty of aggravated burglary and sexual assault. He is not entitled to relief on this issue.
Finally, the Defendant argues that the trial court erred "in applying certain enhancement factors and increasing the [Defendant's] sentence beyond the minimum in the Range." The State argues that the trial court considered relevant factors and imposed a sentence consistent with the purposes and principles of the Sentencing Act. We agree with the State.
We review the length of a within-range sentence imposed by the trial court under an abuse of discretion standard with a presumption of reasonableness.
A trial court must consider the following when determining a defendant's specific sentence and the appropriate combination of sentencing alternatives:
Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-210(b)(1)-(8). In addition, "[t]he potential or lack of potential for the rehabilitation or treatment of the defendant should be considered in determining the sentence alternative or length of a term to be imposed." Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-103(5). The court must impose a sentence "no greater than that deserved for the offense committed" and "the least severe measure necessary to achieve the purposes for which the sentence is imposed[.]" Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 40-35-103(2), (4). As relevant here, aggravated burglary is a Class C felony and carries a penalty of three to six years' imprisonment for a Range I, standard offender. Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-14-403(b), 40-35-112(a)(3). Sexual battery is a Class E felony and carries a penalty of one to two years' imprisonment for a Range I, standard offender.
In this appeal, the Defendant does not challenge any of the enhancement or mitigating factors applied by the trial court. Instead, he argues generally that the trial court failed to comply with the purposes and principles of the Sentencing Act because "the Appellant had no felony record and would potentially have been a candidate for probation if he did not have other pending charges." He additionally argues that "a low to mid-range sentence to serve would have served the ends of justice without diminishing the seriousness of the property offense, would have been the least restrictive means necessary to achieve these goals, and would have taken into account the appropriate sentencing principles." Our review of the record shows that the trial court engaged in an extensive review of the above sentencing law and principles prior to imposing the Defendant's effective five-year sentence. Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court properly imposed the sentence in this case. The Defendant is not entitled to relief.
Based on the foregoing reasoning and analysis, the judgments of the trial court are affirmed.
