RICHARD H. DINKINS, JUDGE.
Assistant Chief Shift Commander of city fire department appeals trial court affirmance of hearing committee's finding of just cause for his termination. Finding that the trial court appropriately applied the proper standard of review, we affirm the trial court's judgment.
Jeff Burkhart was employed by the City of Clarksville Fire Department for approximately twenty-two years and served as Assistant Chief Shift Commander for six years until he was terminated on April 26, 2007.
On the morning of April 20, 2007, Mr. Burkhart attended a meeting with the Fire Chief, Deputy Fire Chief, and Mayor Piper at which Mayor Piper informed Mr. Burkhart that he was considering transferring him to the position of Building and Maintenance Supervisor. In a subsequent meeting that afternoon, Mr. Burkhart told the Fire Chief, Deputy Fire Chief, and Mayor Piper that he was not interested in the job, felt unqualified for the position, and thought the position presented a serious safety risk.
On April 26, 2007, Mayor Piper met with Mr. Burkhart and explained that Mr. Burkhart would be transferred to the Building and Maintenance Supervisor position. Mr. Burkhart again voiced his concerns and refused to take the position. In response, Mayor Piper terminated him, effective that day, for violation of City Code § 1-1317(10).
Mr. Burkhart appealed the Mayor's decision, and on May 31, 2007, an appeal hearing was held before a "hearing committee," which was comprised of two city council members and one city employee of equal pay grade pursuant to City Code § 1316(f)(1)(c).
On August 14, 2007, Mr. Burkhart filed a Petition for Judicial Review in the Chancery Court of Davidson County alleging that Mayor Piper's decision to transfer him from Assistant Chief Shift Commander to Building and Maintenance Supervisor was a demotion under the City Code, and as a result, the transfer could only be made on a showing of cause and by affording him due process rights. The City filed a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, lack of personal jurisdiction, improper venue, insufficiency of service of process and for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. On October 26, 2007, the Davidson County Chancery Court entered an Order denying the motion to dismiss and holding that venue was not proper in Davidson County. In addition, the court held:
On November 23, 2009, the Montgomery County Chancery Court entered a Memorandum Opinion and Order finding that the City's hearing committee was "acting as the equivalent of a civil service board," and reviewed Mr. Burkhart's Petition for Judicial Review under the standards set forth in Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-5-322(h). The court upheld the Mayor's decision to terminate Mr. Burkhart stating:
The City raises an additional issue, "Whether the trial court erred in applying the standards of the Uniform Administrative Procedures Act, Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-5-322, pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 27-9-114 instead of the standards of a common law writ of certiorari."
The parties disagree over the appropriate standard of review in this case. The City of Clarksville contends that the matter is properly reviewed under the common law writ of certiorari, because, among other things, the hearing committee was not acting in the role of a "civil service board" when it reviewed Mayor Piper's termination decision. Mr. Burkhart argues that pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 27-9-114, this case should be reviewed under the Uniform Administrative Procedures Act ("UAPA"), Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-5-301 et seq.
Tenn. Code Ann. § 27-9-114 governs the procedure and appellate review for proceedings involving certain public employees and states in relevant part:
Tidwell v. City of Memphis, 193 S.W.3d 555, 559—60 (Tenn. 2006) (citing McCallen v. City of Memphis, 786 S.W.2d 633, 638 (Tenn.1990)). Thus, the resolution of this appeal requires us to determine whether the hearing committee which reviewed Mayor Piper's termination decision qualifies as a civil service board under Tenn. Code Ann. § 27-9-114.
In Tidwell, the Supreme Court declined to limit the definition of a civil service board, as used in Tenn. Code Ann. § 27-9-114, only to those municipal entities that are technically designated as such. Id. at 562 (citing Johnson v. Johnson, 37 S.W.3d 392, 298 (Tenn. 2001)). Instead, the Court placed substance over form and reasoned that an entity sitting in an "adjudicative capacity" making "decisions that affect a worker's employment status" is the "functional equivalent" of a civil service board as contemplated in Tenn. Code Ann. § 27-91-14. Id. at 562. The Court further reasoned that the municipal entity at issue in Tidwell was a civil service board because, among other things, it held hearings, analyzed evidence, and determined appeals from administrative decisions. Id. at 563.
In the case before us, the Davidson and Montgomery County Chancery Courts determined that the City's hearing committee was acting as the equivalent of a civil service board. We agree.
Pursuant to the narrow standard of review at Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-5-322 a reviewing court
(5)(A) Unsupported by evidence which is both substantial and material in the light of the entire record.
Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-5-322(h). The scope of the review of this Court and the lower courts is confined to the record made before the hearing committee, however, we review matters of law is de novo with no presumption of correctness. See Davis v. Shelby County Sheriff's Dep't, 278 S.W.3d 256, 262 (Tenn. 2009); Metro. Gov't of Nashville v. Shacklett, 554 S.W.2d 601, 604 (Tenn. 1977). In reviewing the decision of the trial court, this Court must determine whether the trial court properly applied the standard of review found at Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-5-322(h). See Jones v. Bureau of TennCare, 94 S.W.3d 495, 501 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2002) (quoting Papachristou v. Univ. of Tennessee, 29 S.W.3d 487, 490 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000)).
Mr. Burkhart contends that the decision of the hearing committee was arbitrary and capricious, asserting that the hearing committee based its decision to affirm Mayor Piper's decision "on its conclusion that the mayor has authority to terminate city employees" instead of "whether the decision of [Mayor Piper] is supported by substantial and material evidence."
The standard of review under subsection (4) of Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-5-322(h) has been described as follows:
City of Memphis v. Civil Serv. Comm'n of City of Memphis, 216 S.W.3d 311, 316 (Tenn. 2007) (citing Jackson Mobilphone Co. v. Tenn. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 876 S.W.2d 106, 110—11 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1993)). Provisions (4) and (5) under Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-5-322(h) each relate to the sufficiency of the evidence; however, decisions with adequate evidentiary support might still be arbitrary and capricious if caused by a clear error in judgment. Id. (citing Jackson Mobilphone Co., 876 S.W.2d at 110). Substantial and material evidence has been defined as "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a rational conclusion and such as to furnish a reasonably sound basis for the action under consideration." City of Memphis v. Civi l Service Comm'n, 239 S.W.3d 202, 208—09 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2007).
The record of the administrative appeal hearing shows that Mayor Piper proposed to transfer Mr. Burkhart to the position of Building and Maintenance Supervisor due to Mr. Burkhart's expertise in the construction industry. Mr. Burkhart was given the opportunity to accept or reject the job transfer, and Mr. Burkhart chose to refuse the position stating, "I'm not going to accept the transfer because of a safety issue and I'm not qualified for the job." Mayor Piper testified that he terminated Mr. Burkhart for "not taking a direct order of transfer" which was insubordination and grounds for dismissal under City Code § 1-1317. We conclude that a reasonable person could determine that Mr. Burkhart's refusal of the position constituted "[i]nsubordination or failure to carry out instructions or job assignments" under the City Code and, consequently, that the Mayor's decision was not arbitrary and capricious within the meaning of Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-5-322(h)(4).
We next turn to Mr. Burkhart's contention that the decision of the hearing committee was not supported by substantial and material evidence because Mr. Burkart had justifiable reasons for refusing what he characterizes as a demotion.
The interim Human Resources Director for the city, Sheila Michaels, testified that the Mayor had not taken the steps necessary to insure that the new position was of equal pay and grade to the position Mr. Burkhart held. There was also testimony that Mr. Burkhart may have been subjected to a 90 day probationary period in the new position. Mayor Piper testified he was in the process of rebuilding the Maintenance Department, that he was aware of Mr. Burkhart's experience in the construction industry and felt that Mr. Burkhart could lead the department, and that he intended to laterally transfer Mr. Burkhart without a loss of pay or benefits.
We acknowledge that the fact that the Mayor had not completed the steps necessary to reclassify the position and his failure to effectively communicate his intentions in that regard placed Mr. Burkhart in a difficult position. However, the committee's rejection of Mr. Burkhart's contention that the proposed transfer was actually a demotion, as contemplated by the city code is supported by the evidence. To the extent the evidence is conflicting, we cannot reverse the decision of the hearing committee "simply because the evidence also supports another conclusion." City of Memphis v. Civl Service Comm'n, 239 S.W.3d at 211. Moreover, this Court may not substitute our judgment for that of the hearing committee as to the weight of the evidence on factual issues. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-5-322(h)(5)(B); Papachristou, 29 S.W.3d at 490.
Accordingly, we hold that the trial court properly found that the hearing committee's decision was not arbitrary and capricious and was supported by substantial and material evidence. For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
