MEMORANDUM OPINION1

PER CURIAM.

This appeal is being pursued from the trial court's order of August 9, 2011. That order is not a final order. Accordingly, the appellant Gloria G. Neuenschwander's appeal is hereby dismissed.

The trial court's order of August 9, 2011, includes findings and conclusions. The order directs the parties to file material pertaining to "a reasonable attorney['s] fee." The order goes on to provide that "[t]hereafter, the Court will assess a reasonable attorney['s] fee." Furthermore, the appellee asserts that within 30 days of the entry of the subject order, the appellant filed a Tenn. R. Civ. P. 59 motion. In any event, the order of August 9, 2011, is not a final order. "A final judgment is one that resolves all the issues in the case, `leaving nothing else for the trial court to do.'" In re Estate of Henderson, 121 S.W.3d 643, 645 (Tenn. 2003) (quoting State ex rel. McAllister v. Goode, 968 S.W.2d 834, 840 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1997)). Tenn. R. App. P. 3(a) provides, in relevant part, that "any order that adjudicates fewer than all the claims or the rights and liabilities of fewer than all the parties is not enforceable or appealable. . . ." "Such an order is interlocutory or interim in nature and generally cannot be appealed as of right." In re Estate of Henderson, 121 S.W.3d at 645. This court does not have subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate an appeal if there is no final judgment. See Bayberry Assocs. v. Jones, 783 S.W.2d 553, 559 (Tenn. 1990) ("Unless an appeal from an interlocutory order is provided by the rules or by statute, appellate courts have jurisdiction over final judgments only.").

As this appeal was taken from an order that was not final, we lack subject matter jurisdiction. Accordingly, we must dismiss the appeal.

The appeal of this matter is dismissed and this case is remanded to the trial court. Costs on appeal are taxed to the appellant, Gloria G. Neuenschwander.