PATRICIA J. COTTRELL, P.J.
Purchaser of condominium at delinquent tax sale sought excess funds remaining after taxes and court costs had been paid. Purchaser prepared a Quitclaim Deed that transferred Taxpayer's title and redemption rights in property to Purchaser. Purchaser next prepared a Deed of Correction that corrected the spelling of Taxpayer's name, but that also included a clause purporting to transfer to Purchaser Taxpayer's right to the excess funds. Purchaser then prepared an Assignment of Excess Funds Payout that also purported to transfer Taxpayer's right to the excess funds to Purchaser. Trial court awarded excess funds to Taxpayer rather than to Purchaser after finding there was no meeting of the minds and that Purchaser failed to carry his burden of proving he provided consideration for Taxpayer's conveyance of the excess funds to him. Purchaser appealed and we affirm the trial court's judgment. We conclude there was no consideration for the Assignment of Excess Funds Payout and that the Deed of Correction is unenforceable because it is beyond the expectations of an ordinary person for a document titled Deed of Correction to transfer a right to receive $14,000 of excess funds to a purchaser of property.
This case centers around the right to excess funds left over from a tax sale of real property after the delinquent taxes owing on the property have been paid. Jackson LeRoy Hill, Jr. (the "Taxpayer") owned a condominium in Nashville that was sold at a tax sale in November 2008 for $17,500. Pete Knestrick purchased the property through his trustee, Charles Burridge (the "Purchaser"). The purchase price was deposited with the Clerk and Master of the Chancery Court in Davidson County. After the taxes and court costs were paid, there remained an excess of funds in the amount of $14,713.66 (the "Excess Funds").
The Purchaser prepared a Quitclaim Deed in February 2009 for the Taxpayer to sign, which he did, that transferred to the Purchaser the Taxpayer's interest in the condominium, including his redemption rights. The Purchaser then filed a motion with the trial court seeking the Excess Funds. The trial court denied this motion and invited the Purchaser to file another motion explaining why the Excess Funds should be paid to the Purchaser rather than the Taxpayer.
Following the trial court's denial of the Purchaser's motion, the Purchaser prepared a document entitled Deed of Correction. The Deed of Correction contained a clause that stated:
The Deed of Correction corrected the spelling of the Taxpayer's name. In addition, the Deed of Correction included the following clause, which was not in the Quitclaim Deed:
The Taxpayer signed the Deed of Correction, as requested. The Purchaser also prepared a document entitled Assignment of Excess Funds Payout that he presented to the Taxpayer, which the Taxpayer also signed. The Assignment of Excess Funds Payout contained the following provisions:
Relying on the Deed of Correction and the Assignment of Excess Funds Payout, the Purchaser filed a second motion in May 2010 asking the court to pay over to him the Excess Funds. In response to the Purchaser's second motion, the court issued an Order of Reference to Special Master. The Special Master was directed to interview the Taxpayer to determine whether he was aware of his entitlement to the Excess Funds, whether he intended to give the Purchaser the Excess Funds, and if so, why. The Special Master filed a report after meeting with the Taxpayer. The Special Master reported that the Taxpayer was not aware he was entitled to the Excess Funds until after he received the Order of Reference from the court and that he did not intend to give the Excess Funds to the Purchaser. The day after the Special Master filed his report, the Taxpayer sent a letter to the Clerk and Master asking that the Excess Funds be paid over to him.
The trial court held an evidentiary hearing on December 15, 2010, to determine how the Excess Funds should be distributed. The parties each testified at the hearing and presented contradictory testimony regarding the consideration the Purchaser gave the Taxpayer in exchange for signing the documents transferring the Taxpayer's rights in the property at issue.
The parties disagreed, however, about additional consideration the Purchaser gave the Taxpayer for executing the two additional documents. As the trial court stated in its Memorandum and Order, the Purchaser testified that he paid the Taxpayer an additional $500 in cash to sign the Deed of Correction and another $50 in cash to sign the Assignment of Excess Funds Payout. The trial court found, however, that the Purchaser did not carry his burden to show he paid the Taxpayer any money to convey the excess funds to the Purchaser:
The court awarded the Excess Funds to the Taxpayer. The court found the Taxpayer did not understand he had the right to the Excess Funds when he signed the Deed of Correction and the Assignment of Excess Funds Payout and that the Purchaser did not carry his burden to show he provided consideration for the Taxpayer's conveyance of these funds. The court concluded there was a lack of both consideration and a meeting of the minds with respect to the Taxpayer's conveyance of his rights to the Excess Funds to the Purchaser, and that the Purchaser therefore failed to prove there was a contract between the parties.
On appeal, the Purchaser argues the trial court erred in awarding the Excess Funds to the Taxpayer because the evidence showed (1) he paid a valuable consideration for the assignment of the Excess Funds and (2) the Taxpayer "quitclaimed and assigned" the right to these funds to the Purchaser when he signed the Deed of Correction and the Assignment of Excess Funds Payout.
Our review on appeal of the trial court's findings of fact is de novo with a presumption of correctness, unless the evidence preponderates otherwise. Tenn. R. App. P. 13(d); Blair v. Brownson, 197 S.W.3d 681, 684 (Tenn. 2006); Bogan v. Bogan, 60 S.W.3d 721, 727 (Tenn. 2001); Hass v. Knighton, 676 S.W.2d 554, 555 (Tenn. 1984). We review a trial court's conclusions of law de novo, with no presumption of correctness. Whaley v. Perkins, 197 S.W.3d 665, 670 (Tenn. 2006); Union Carbide Corp. v. Huddleston, 854 S.W.2d 87, 91 (Tenn. 1993).
It is a basic principle of law that all contracts must be supported by "adequate consideration." Bratton v. Bratton, 136 S.W.3d 595, 600 (Tenn. 2004). Consideration can take the form of either a benefit to the promisor or a detriment to, or an obligation upon, the promisee. Id.; see Brown Oil Co. v. Johnson, 689 S.W.2d 149, 151 (Tenn. 1985) (adequate consideration means the promisee does something it is under no legal obligation to do or refrains from doing something it has a legal right to do).
The evidence does not preponderate against the trial court's finding that the Assignment of Excess Funds Payout was not supported by consideration. The Assignment does not recite that any consideration was given in exchange for the Taxpayer's transfer of his rights to the Excess Funds, and the trial court found the Taxpayer did not receive anything of value in exchange for his execution of that document.
Turning now to the Correction of Deed, the evidence showed the Purchaser paid the Taxpayer $50 in exchange for his signature on that document. The Tennessee Supreme Court has stated that "Enforceability [of a contract] generally depends upon whether the terms of the contract are beyond the reasonable expectations of an ordinary person, or oppressive or unconscionable." Buraczynski v. Eyring, 919 S.W.2d 314, 320 (Tenn. 1996); see Philpot v. Tennessee Health Mgmt., 279 S.W.3d 573, 579 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2007) (same). Having already signed the Quitclaim Deed the Purchaser presented to him in February 2009, and then being asked a few months later to sign what he believed to be a related document entitled Deed of Correction, the Taxpayer would have had no reason to believe the Deed of Correction had any purpose other than to correct the spelling of his name or included any clause that related to anything more than the Quitclaim Deed did. Indeed, the proof in this case showed that the Taxpayer was not aware he had any rights to any Excess Funds before the trial court appointed a Special Master to interview the Taxpayer, which appointment took place after the Taxpayer signed the Correction of Deed.
Based on the facts of this case and on the applicable law, we find it is beyond the reasonable expectation of an ordinary person for a document called "Correction of Deed" to contain a provision assigning a right to receive over $14,000, and therefore decline to enforce the Correction of Deed. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's judgment awarding the Excess Funds to the Taxpayer.
For the reasons stated above, we affirm the trial court's judgment awarding the Excess Funds to the Taxpayer. Costs of appeal are assessed against the appellant, Pete Knestrick, for which execution may issue if necessary.