ANDY D. BENNETT, J.
Mother of a third-grade student filed a common-law writ of certiorari seeking judicial review of school board's decision to uphold a semester long expulsion of her child. The child was considered disabled due to his diagnosis of Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder ("ADHD") and was provided with an Individualized Education Program ("IEP") as required under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act ("IDEA"). Mother argues that the school board was without authority to expel her child and that the school failed to appropriately administer his IEP which caused his misbehavior. After reviewing the record and relevant authorities, we reject Mother's arguments and affirm the trial court's order upholding the expulsion.
Quentin Link attended Harpeth Valley Elementary School ("HVES") from kindergarten through third grade. Throughout his tenure at HVES, Quentin struggled with disciplinary problems and disruptive behavior. He was suspended both in and out of school and was ultimately expelled from HVES at the end of his third grade year. During his third grade year, HVES created an Individualized Education Program ("IEP") for Quentin due to his diagnosis of Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder ("ADHD"). Iris Link, Quentin's mother, appealed the decision to expel Quentin through the administrative appeal process. The decision to expel Quentin was upheld, and Ms. Link filed a petition for common-law writ of certiorari in the chancery court. The trial court upheld the expulsion and this appeal ensued.
Quentin's behavioral issues began when he entered Kindergarten in 2007. Disciplinary reports during the 2007 to 2008 school year reflect that Quentin engaged in "defiant" behavior and was disruptive in class.
Quentin's disciplinary problems persisted in the first grade. During his 2008 to 2009 school year, Quentin's teachers described his behavior as "disruptive", "disrespectful", and "out of control" in the disciplinary reports.
Quentin's disciplinary issues continued in second grade. During the 2009 to 2010 school year, Quentin continued the same pattern of disobedience.
Ms. Ashford further opined: "Based upon information obtained from the student, parents and teachers, from behavioral observations, and from psychometric data, this examiner's diagnostic impression is that Quentin does not demonstrate the characteristics of a student with a Learning Disability." On May 11, 2010, Ms. Link signed an "Eligibility Report" stating that Quentin did not presently "meet the standard of any disabilities" and was "not eligible for special education."
The summer prior to Quentin's third grade year, Principal Halliburton and assistant principal, Dr. Kaye Rackard, recommended that Quentin split his school day between two teachers. This change was intended to give Quentin a break in the day, a change of environment, and the opportunity to develop a rapport with two adults. Ms. Link consented to this arrangement and selected Quentin's teachers. Principal Halliburton organized the classroom rosters to be comprised of students who would be able to ignore Quentin's behaviors and/or offer peer support to him.
On July 30, 2010, Quentin returned to Vanderbilt for a follow-up evaluation with Dr. Rimrodt and was diagnosed with "ADHD — combined type" and "adjustment disorder with mixed features of emotional and behavioral disruption." Based on this diagnosis and the scores from his psychological evaluation, the school determined he was eligible for exceptional educational services under the category of "other — health impairments."
In the fall of Quentin's third grade year, HVES created an Individual Education Program ("IEP") for Quentin as required under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act ("IDEA"), 20 U.S.C. § 1400 et seq. Ms. Link was present for the IEP meeting and participated in the development of the IEP. She signed a document indicating, "I have been informed and understand my rights as a parent, and have received a copy of the notice of procedural safeguards." The IEP required several interventions including fifteen minutes of one-on-one time with a special education teacher each day and the development of a personalized behavior plan. The behavior plan, developed on November 12, 2010, instituted a "crisis plan or safety plan" which required a resource teacher to intervene when Quentin's behaviors escalated and became unmanageable in the classroom setting.
On November 3, 2010, HVES entered into a Student Probation Contract with Quentin. The contract stated, in relevant part, "I, Quentin Link, understand that my behavior in the past has not been acceptable and this behavior cannot continue. I also understand that schools are to provide a safe and orderly learning environment, and that I will not be allowed to deny others the right to learn." Quentin also agreed to avoid being referred to the office for misbehaving, make an honest effort to maintain passing grades, follow all the rules and regulations of the Board of Education, demonstrate a respectful attitude toward classmates, teachers, and school personnel, and comply with directions given by school personnel. Ms. Link, Principal Halliburton, Dr. Rackard, and a child advocate from Tennessee Voices were present to discuss and sign the contract.
During his third grade year, Quentin was suspended both in and out of school for his repeated misbehavior. The following incidents were documented by Principal Halliburton in the HVES Individual Student Discipline Detail Report for the 2010 to 2011 school year:
On May 11, 2011, Quentin was referred to the principal's office three times. The disciplinary report described the incidents as follows:
As a result of these incidents, HVES suspended Quentin and subsequently gave Ms. Link notice of its intent to expel him for one calendar year. The Notice of Expulsion contained a list of offenses warranting expulsion including alleged violations of Code 8-10 ("willful/persistent violation of school rules"), 74-10 ("other conduct prejudicial to good order"), and 29-10 ("bullying").
On May 16, 2011, Ms. Link, Principal Halliburton, two special education teachers, a general education teacher, an assessment specialist, Dr. Rackard, and a child advocate from Tennessee Voices, who was present at Ms. Link's request, attended a Manifestation Determination to discuss whether Quentin's behavior was caused by his diagnosis of ADHD. At the conclusion of the hearing, Ms. Link, and the other school personnel, signed a Manifestation Determination form stating, "Quentin's diagnosis as ADHD does not cause a substantial impact on his consist[e]nt willful disobedience with all adults making requests." Following the hearing, Ms. Link was notified of her right to appeal the expulsion and was sent a document which stated, in pertinent part:
Quentin did not enroll at McCann. Instead, he finished the final weeks of his third grade year in homebound school services.
Ms. Link appealed the principal's decision to expel Quentin, and the Disciplinary Review Board ("DRB") held a Level One hearing on May 24, 2011. The DRB was comprised of three principals from local schools. On a form completed at the hearing, the "Reason for Appeal" was described as follows: "Ms. Link feels that the punishment is too severe for the alleged violations."
After deliberating, the DRB upheld the expulsion based on a finding that Quentin violated Code 8-10 ("willful/persistent violation of school rules") and Code 74-10 ("other conduct prejudicial to good order"). The DRB dismissed the allegation of bullying and modified the expulsion to last one semester rather than an entire school year. The Board also requested that, in the event that Quentin returned to the Metro Public School System, he should be given Moderate Intervention Services ("MIS") based on his behavior.
Ms. Link appealed the decision of the DRB, and a Level Two hearing was held before the School Board Director's Designee on June 7, 2011. Ms. Link, Quentin, Principal Halliburton, Dr. Rackard, and Tracy Johnson were present. On a form entitled "Level Two Discipline Appeal to Executive Director/Director's Designee" the "Reason for Appeal" was described as, "Mom wanted to provide additional information."
Ms. Link appealed the Level Two decision to the Metro school board. Pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 49-6-3401(b)(6), the board is authorized to "grant or deny a request for a board hearing and may affirm or overturn the decision of the hearing authority with or without a hearing before the board." The board voted to deny the request to hear the case and upheld the one semester suspension, which ran during the fall semester of the 2011-2012 school year.
Ms. Link filed a petition for a common-law writ of certiorari on September 12, 2011 alleging that Quentin was "unfairly, improperly and unlawfully expelled." The court held a hearing on August 29, 2012, and by order entered December 14, 2012, the trial court upheld the decision of the school board finding it was supported by substantial and material evidence. Ms. Link appeals the decision of the chancery court.
After exhausting the elaborate administrative review process for the imposition of student discipline, a parent acting on behalf of her child may pursue judicial review using a common-law petition for writ of certiorari pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 27-8-101. Heyne v. Metro. Nashville Bd. of Pub. Educ., 380 S.W.3d 715, 728 (Tenn. 2012). When reviewing a school official's decisions regarding student discipline, our Supreme Court has opined that "[c]reating a climate conducive to learning and maintaining discipline in public schools between kindergarten and the twelfth grade are not judicial functions." Id. at 728-29. Therefore, courts must employ the limited standard of review available under a common-law writ of certiorari to "guard against the risk that the courts might undertake to exercise power that does not belong to them." Id. at 728.
Parties using a common-law writ of certiorari to challenge an adverse disciplinary decision of a local school board "have the burden of presenting evidence establishing that the officials (1) exceeded their jurisdiction, (2) followed an unlawful procedure, (3) acted illegally, arbitrarily, or fraudulently, or (4) acted without material evidence to support their decision." Id. at 730. Courts may not inquire into the intrinsic correctness of the lower tribunal's decision, Steward v. Schofield, 368 S.W.3d 457, 465 (Tenn. 2012); reweigh the evidence, Watts v. Civil Serv. Bd. for Columbia, 606 S.W.2d 274, 277 (Tenn. 1980); or substitute their judgment for that of the lower tribunal. Harding Acad. v. Metro. Gov't of Nashville & Davidson Cnty. 222 S.W.3d 359, 363 (Tenn. 2007). "The care and restraint reflected in the limited standard of review available through a common-law writ of certiorari helps to avoid the risk that the courts will be asked to become super school boards insofar as student discipline is concerned." Heyne, 380 S.W.3d at 729. In addition, we presume that the decisions of local public school officials were made in good faith. Id.
Ms. Link presents two issues for our review. First, she asserts the trial court erred in upholding Quentin's expulsion because the school board lacked authority to expel (rather than suspend) Quentin for "conduct prejudicial to good order." Second, she argues that it is illegal to expel an elementary school student for conduct prejudicial to good order where the student has been diagnosed with ADHD and the school did not follow the IEP. We will address these contentions in turn.
Ms. Link argues that Quentin's expulsion "violated the statutory authority granted by the Tennessee Legislature." She focuses her argument on a distinction between suspension and expulsion. In support of her contention, Ms. Link cites to Tenn. Code Ann. § 49-6-3401(a) which authorizes suspensions as follows:
Ms. Link goes on to cite Tenn. Code Ann. § 49-6-3401(g) which provides that a student can be expelled for one calendar year for offenses such as bringing firearms or drugs to school. Ms. Link posits that because Tenn. Code Ann. § 49-6-3401(a) uses the word "suspend" rather than "expel" a principal does not have authority to expel a student for the offenses enumerated in that section. We disagree.
Tennessee Code Annotated section 49-6-3401(g) goes on to state that "[d]isciplinary policies and procedures for all other student offenses, including terms of suspensions and expulsions, shall be determined by local board of education policy." Metro publishes its disciplinary policies and procedures in a "Student-Parent Code of Conduct & Handbook" ("Code of Conduct"). The Code of Conduct adopted for the 2010-2011 school year included a section entitled "Disruption of School — 24-10 Violation of School Rules" which states, in relevant part as follows:
(Emphasis added). The Code of Conduct expressly allows for the expulsion of a student as a disciplinary consequence of engaging in behavior characterized as "conduct prejudicial to good order" or for "repeated violations."
Ms. Link does not argue that Quentin's behavioral episodes do not constitute "conduct prejudicial to good order" or "repeated violations." Indeed, the record reflects that Quentin was suspended in and out of school eight times during his third grade year and was written up for disciplinary infractions approximately fifty-five times from kindergarten through third grade. Quentin was repeatedly disruptive in class and created a safety dilemma for his teachers when he ran in and out of classrooms and refused to follow directions. There is material evidence to support the board's finding that Quentin repeatedly violated school rules and engaged in conduct prejudicial to good order. Moreover, the Code of Conduct authorized the board to expel students for these behaviors.
Ms. Link argues that Quentin's behavioral problems were linked to his disability and that it was unlawful for the school board to expel Quentin because HVES failed to follow the requirements of his IEP. Metro argues that Ms. Link is estopped from raising these issues due to her failure to exhaust administrative remedies.
As a student with a disability and an IEP, Quentin was afforded certain procedural protections under the IDEA. Therefore, we begin our analysis by examining the scope, purpose, and procedural safeguards of the IDEA.
The primary purpose of the IDEA is "to ensure that all children with disabilities have available to them a free appropriate public education [("FAPE")]." 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d). The primary mechanism for assuring that a disabled student receives a FAPE is the creation of an IEP. An IEP provides an individualized instruction plan for the student that is tailored to meet the needs created by his or her disability. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1401(14); 1414(d). To achieve the purpose of the IDEA, federal funds are provided to states
The IDEA does not eliminate a school's ability to discipline disabled students for their misbehavior. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(k)(1). Pursuant to the IDEA, if a child with a disability is removed from the classroom for longer than ten consecutive days for a disciplinary reason, the school must conduct a manifestation determination to determine whether the behavior requiring discipline resulted from the child's disability or whether the behavior is a direct result of a failure to implement the child's IEP. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(k)(1)(E). The procedures for the manifestation determination are outlined in 20 U.S.C. § 1415(k)(1)(E)(i) as follows:
On May 16, 2011, Ms. Link, Principal Halliburton, two special education teachers, a general education teacher, an assessment specialist, Dr. Rackard, and a child advocate from Tennessee Voices, who was present at Ms. Link's request, attended a Manifestation Determination Hearing. At the conclusion of the hearing, a form entitled "Metropolitan Nashville Public Schools Manifestation Determination" was filled out and signed by all who were present at the hearing. The form included the following relevant questions:
Both questions were answered in the negative. In addition, the following statement was handwritten on the form: "Quentin's diagnosis as ADHD does not cause a substantial impact on his consist[e]nt willful disobedience with all adults making requests." Ms. Link signed the form and checked a box beside the following statements: "I have been informed of and understand my rights[,]" and "I agree with the manifestation determination decision." In sum, Ms. Link and the HVES administrators agreed that Quentin's misconduct was unrelated to his disability and that his conduct was not a result of the school's failure to implement the IEP.
Because the behavior giving rise to the violation of school code was determined not to be a manifestation of Quentin's disability, "the relevant disciplinary procedures applicable to children without disabilities" were able to be applied to Quentin. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(k)(1)(C). Pursuant to 20 U.S.C. § 1415(k)(1)(C), the disciplinary procedures could be applied "in the same manner and for the same duration in which the procedures would be applied to children without disabilities. . . ." HVES proceeded to apply the Code of Conduct to Quentin.
The procedure for appealing the decision rendered at the Manifestation Determination Hearing is different from the procedure for appealing the discipline meted out under the Code of Conduct.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the chancery court is affirmed. Costs of the appeal are assessed against the appellant.
(Emphasis added). Following the Manifestation Determination Hearing, the HVES faculty proposed an alternative placement for Quentin at McCann Alternative Learning Center. Ms. Link refused the alternative placement even though transportation to the learning center was offered.
