D. MICHAEL SWINEY, J.
The Juvenile Court for Johnson City ("the Juvenile Court") terminated the parental rights of Frank G. ("Father") to the minor child Ty-Shawn H. ("the Child") pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(6). Father appeals the termination of his parental rights to this Court. We find and hold that clear and convincing evidence existed to terminate Father's parental rights pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(6), and that clear and convincing evidence existed that the termination was in the Child's best interest. We, therefore, affirm the Juvenile Court's order terminating Father's parental rights to the Child.
The Child, born in January 2012, was removed from the custody of his mother only days after his birth.
Katie Wilhoit ("Wilhoit"), a case manager with DCS, testified first. Wilhoit testified that there is no meaningful relationship between Father and the Child. The Child has been in the same foster home for around 17 months. The foster family includes the Child's half-brother. According to Wilhoit, moving the Child from the foster home would have a detrimental impact on the Child. Wilhoit also testified to Father's 15 and a half year sentence for a drug-related offense.
Elizabeth Hayword ("Hayword"), Clinical Director for Foundations for Life Principals, testified next. Hayword was qualified as an expert in the field of parenting assessments and bonding assessments. Hayword conducted a bonding assessment in this case. Hayword observed the Child with the foster parents when he was about nine months old and testified to a close bond within the family. Hayword testified that the Child and his half-brother had affectionate ties. Regarding the foster family's home, Hayword testified: "[I]t was spotless. It was very clean. There were an appropriate amount of toys. The interactions were very peaceful and it seemed like a really happy home." Hayword stated that removing the Child from the foster family's home could be "very devastating and potentially harmful" to the Child.
Jonathan W. ("Foster Father") testified. Foster Father testified that the Child was brought to his family when the Child was two days old. Foster Father stated that the foster family consists of himself, his wife, their daughter, the Child, and the Child's half-brother. Foster Father testified about the Child's overall status:
Foster Father stated that he and his wife would "[a]bsolutely" consider adopting the Child should he become available for adoption.
Father testified, as well. As he was in a South Carolina federal correctional facility, Father testified by telephone. Father stated that his sister was available and willing to take custody of the Child. Father testified that it was his view that the State was trying to predetermine an outcome whereby the Child would live with the foster family instead of Father's family. Continuing his testimony, Father stated he is willing to renounce his parental rights to the Child if his sister is allowed to raise the Child. Father also expressed his desire for the Child to "keep my bloodline and name for future generations." According to Father, this goal of his to perpetuate his ancestral legacy could be effectuated if his sister instead of the foster family raised the Child.
In September 2013, the Juvenile Court entered its order finding and holding that clear and convincing evidence existed to terminate Father's parental rights pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(6), and that clear and convincing evidence existed that the termination was in the Child's best interest.
The Court has considered the statutory factors set out in Tennessee Code Annotated, Section 36-1-113(i) and has determined that there is clear and convincing evidence that it is in the best interest of the child for the parental rights of [Father] to be terminated. Father has not made such an adjustment of circumstance, conduct or conditions as to make it safe and in the child's best interest to be in his home. The Father was incarcerated at the Washington County Detention Center as a federal detainee when the child was placed in the protective custody of DCS and he has remained incarcerated, following his conviction for possession and selling crack cocaine, when the child was four (4) months old. Respondent [Father] is incarcerated on a sentence of one hundred and eighty-eight (188) months from the United States District Court, Eastern District of Tennessee at Greeneville . . . . Father is unable, due to his incarceration, to develop a relationship with the child and to change his circumstances. His incarceration precludes him in developing a relationship with the child during his formative years.
Due to his incarceration, Respondent [Father] has not maintained regular visitation or contact with the child.
The child has been in the custody of the Department of Children's Services since the child was four (4) days old. The Order from the January 12, 2012, hearing in the dependency and neglect proceedings reflected that [Father] was a federal detainee in the Washington County Detention Center at that time . . . . [Father] does not have a meaningful relationship with the child and cannot be expected to have a meaningful relationship with the child for many years.
(Format modified). Father appeals the termination of his parental rights to the Child.
Though not stated exactly as such, Father raises one issue on appeal: whether the Juvenile Court erred in finding and holding that it was in the Child's best interest for Father's parental rights to be terminated. Although Father does not appeal grounds for terminating his parental rights, we nevertheless also will address whether the Juvenile Court erred in finding and holding that a ground existed to terminate Father's parental rights to the Child pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(6).
Our Supreme Court reiterated the standard of review for cases involving termination of parental rights stating:
In re F.R.R., III, 193 S.W.3d 528, 530 (Tenn. 2006).
In Department of Children's Services v. D.G.S.L., this Court discussed the relevant burden of proof in cases involving termination of parental rights stating:
Dep't of Children's Servs. v. D.G.S.L., No. E2001-00742-COA-R3-JV, 2001 Tenn. App. LEXIS 941, at **16-17 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 28, 2001), no appl. perm. appeal filed. Clear and convincing evidence supporting any single ground will justify a termination order. E.g., In re Valentine, 79 S.W.3d 539, 546 (Tenn. 2002).
We first address whether the Juvenile Court erred in finding and holding that a ground existed to terminate Father's parental rights to the Child pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(6). Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(6) (Supp. 2013) provides the following as a ground for terminating parental rights:
The clear and convincing evidence in the record on appeal shows that Father had received a sentence totaling over ten years and that the Child was under the age of eight at the time the sentence was entered. As such, the Juvenile Court did not err in finding and holding that clear and convincing evidence existed that a ground was proven to terminate Father's parental rights to the Child pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(6).
We next address whether the Juvenile Court erred in finding and holding that it was in the Child's best interest for Father's parental rights to be terminated. At trial and on appeal, Father has argued that his family-namely, his sister-ought to raise the Child. Therefore, according to Father, the Juvenile Court erred in finding that it was in the Child's best interest for Father's parental rights to be terminated.
Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(i) provides a number of factors relative to this issue:
Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(i) (Supp. 2013).
The Juvenile Court made detailed findings regarding the issue of the Child's best interest as quoted above. Notwithstanding Father's argument that his sister should raise the Child, the evidence reflects that the Child already is thriving in the foster family home alongside his half-brother. We find, as did the Juvenile Court, that uprooting the Child from this positive environment could prove devastating to the Child. Meanwhile, given Father's long prison sentence, there is little prospect of Father forging any kind of genuine parental relationship with the Child in the near future. Father's desire that the Child be his legacy must yield to what is in the Child's best interest. The evidence in the record on appeal does not preponderate against the Juvenile Court's findings made under the clear and convincing evidence standard, and we find no error in the Juvenile Court's finding that it is in the Child's best interest for Father's parental rights to be terminated.
As a ground to terminate Father's parental rights was proven by clear and convincing evidence, and it was proven by clear and convincing evidence that the termination of Father's parental rights was in the Child's best interest, we affirm the Juvenile Court's judgment terminating Father's parental rights to the Child.
The judgment of the Juvenile Court is affirmed, and this cause is remanded to the Juvenile Court for collection of the costs below. The costs on appeal are assessed against the Appellant, Frank G., and his surety, if any.