MEMORANDUM OPINION1

RICHARD H. DINKINS, J.

Defendant appeals a judgment holding that he ran a stop sign, contending that the court did not have subject matter or in personam jurisdiction over the matter, and that the Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County lacked standing to bring the action. We affirm the decision of the trial court.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On February 28, 2013, Robert W. Donaldson, Jr., was stopped for allegedly failing to stop at a stop sign. Officer Daryl Morton of the Metropolitan Nashville Police Department issued Mr. Donaldson a traffic citation for the unlawful use of a license plate, failing to change his address on his driver's license, lack of proof of insurance, and running a stop sign.

On May 22, the Metropolitan General Sessions Court held a hearing on the traffic citation. The court held that Mr. Donaldson ran the bus stop sign in violation of Metropolitan Code of Laws § 12.24.040 and assessed a $50.00 fine; the other charges were retired.

Mr. Donaldson appealed to the Circuit Court, which held a bench trial on November 13. At the trial, Officer Morton was called to testify about the offense. Following the testimony of Officer Morton, Mr. Donaldson moved to retire the citation on the ground that the court did not have jurisdiction over the case and that the Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County ("Metro") lacked standing to prosecute the action. The court denied the motion and proceeded to find Mr. Donaldson guilty of running the stop sign.

Mr. Donaldson appeals, contending that Metro lacked standing to bring the action, and that the General Sessions and Circuit Courts lacked subject matter and in personam jurisdiction to adjudicate the case.

II. DISCUSSION

Mr. Donaldson's premises that Metro lacked standing to bring the action before the court because it did not suffer any damages or injuries, and that the lower courts lacked subject matter and in personam jurisdiction, are based on a fundamental misunderstanding of the procedure at hand. Section 2.01(30) of the Metropolitan Charter grants Metro the authority "[t]o regulate the operation of motor vehicles and exercise control over all traffic, including parking, upon or across the streets, roads, alleys and walkways of the metropolitan government." Metro also has the authority to issue citations for violations of its traffic laws pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 7-3-5012. Moreover, Metro police officers have a duty to enforce all traffic laws and regulations of Metro, and all state laws applicable to traffic in the Metro area. Metropolitan Code of Laws § 12.08.050(A). Officer Morton testified that he observed Mr. Donaldson run the bus stop sign, and that he issued Mr. Donaldson a traffic citation for violating Section 12.24.040. Therefore, Metro had the authority to issue the traffic citation and pursue enforcement.

Mr. Donaldson's contentions that the "lower courts" lacked subject matter jurisdiction because he "did not consent to do business with [Metro]"3 and in personam jurisdiction because the citation did not include the "time and place" at which he was to appear in court4 are without merit. Mr. Donaldson subjected himself to the laws of Metro by operating a vehicle within the Metropolitan Government. See Metropolitan Code of Laws § 12.08.010 ("It is unlawful for any person to do any act forbidden, or fail to perform any act required, in this title.").

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.