CHARLES D. SUSANO, Jr., C.J.
In this parental termination case, the Department of Children's Services (DCS) took emergency custody of J.R.C. (the Child) following the arrest of his mother, B.C. (Mother) on charges of (1) promoting the manufacture of methamphetamine and (2) child neglect. The Child was adjudicated dependent, neglected, and severely abused. After a trial, the court terminated Mother's parental rights after finding, by clear and convincing evidence, that (1) grounds for termination were established, and (2) termination is in the best interest of the Child. Mother appeals and challenges each of these determinations. We affirm.
The Child was born to Mother in April 2012. No father is listed on the birth certificate.
In July 2013, DCS developed a permanency plan with a goal of returning the Child to Mother. On August 7, 2013, DCS filed a petition to terminate Mother's rights to the Child. The petition alleged two grounds for termination — abandonment by wanton disregard and severe child abuse. On November 27, 2013, following an adjudicatory hearing, the juvenile court declared the Child dependent, neglected and severely abused. Trial on the termination petition took place on February 6, 2014. Regarding her criminal convictions, Mother admitted that she had allowed a third party to manufacture methamphetamine in the home she shared with the Child. In return, she was paid $50 and given drugs for her own use. According to her testimony, Mother began using methamphetamine three years earlier and regularly smoked it some three times a week. Mother said she stopped using methamphetamine while pregnant with the Child, but resumed her drug habit when the Child was two months old. After the Child's removal, she stopped smoking methamphetamine but continued to smoke marijuana for a few more months, until September 2013. As a result, she failed three drug screens administered by DCS after her release from jail.
The proof showed that Mother completed permanency plan tasks including parenting classes, and a mental health and drug/alcohol evaluations, and she was set to complete recommended intensive outpatient drug treatment within a week. She had passed weekly drug screens since October 2013. Mother had exercised regular visitation with the Child except during her brief time in jail.
The Child's DCS foster care worker, Christy Lester, described the Child as being "wild," with "no regulation of emotion whatsoever" and uncontrolled behavior when he initially entered state custody. Since entering foster care, the Child had become "much more calm and loving," and was developing normally. As a result of the severe abuse adjudication, DCS was relieved of exercising reasonable efforts to reunify Mother and the Child. Ms. Lester testified, however, that she remained in contact with Mother, encouraged her to work on her permanency plan tasks, and made efforts to assist her to secure suitable housing. Regarding Mother's interactions with the Child, Ms. Lester had observed visits and concluded that Mother loved Child but had very little control over him.
At the time of trial, the Child was nearly two. He had remained in the same foster care home throughout the nine months since his removal. Ms. Lester observed that he was "very attached" to his foster parents, particularly his foster mother. The foster mother had worked with the Child and he had progressed from the "violent" behavior he showed initially — throwing objects, biting, pulling hair and otherwise trying to harm himself or others — to age-appropriate play and an ability to better control his emotions. Since accepting the Child into their home, the foster parents had become interested in adopting him.
For her part, Mother had lived in three different places since the Child's removal. At the time of trial, she was living with a friend of her mother, but testified she had arranged to rent an apartment of her own with assistance provided through her outpatient drug treatment program. She was employed for the past three weeks at McDonald's. Prior to then, her last employment was a year earlier, when she worked at a marina for three months. Mother relied on food stamps and other government assistance and help from her parents for support.
On March 24, 2014, the trial court ordered Mother's parental rights terminated. The court found that the ground of severe abuse was clearly and convincingly established as reflected by the November 2013 adjudicatory order. The court found that the remaining ground alleged — abandonment by wanton disregard — was not established.
As taken verbatim from her brief, Mother presents the following issues for our review:
With respect to parental termination cases, this Court has observed:
On our review, this Court has a duty to determine "whether the trial court's findings, made under a clear and convincing standard, are supported by a preponderance of the evidence."
First, Mother challenges the trial court's finding of sufficient evidence to establish grounds for termination. Her precise argument, however, is somewhat difficult to discern. Her statement of the "issues presented for review" notwithstanding, she takes the position that "[t]he trial court erred by terminating . . . Mother's parental rights even though [DCS] failed to produce sufficient evidence of Mother's willful abandonment due to incarceration." The substantive portion of her argument, in its entirety, is as follows:
As we have noted, DCS's petition alleged only two grounds for termination: severe child abuse and abandonment by wanton disregard. In setting out its findings, the trial court expressly concluded, (based on evidence indicating that she was jailed incident to her arrest only until being released on bond and that she was sentenced to no jail time upon her conviction), that Mother was not "incarcerated" for purposes of establishing abandonment as defined in Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-102(1)(A)(iv). Accordingly, the trial court concluded that abandonment by wanton disregard was not established in Mother's case.
In this manner, the court clearly terminated Mother's parental rights on the sole ground of severe abuse. We are therefore at a loss to understand Mother's singular focus on abandonment by wanton disregard in contesting grounds for termination.
Although Mother does not challenge severe abuse as grounds for termination, we have undertaken our review mindful that, at a minimum, a single statutory ground must be clearly and convincingly established in order to justify a basis for termination.
In turn, Tenn. Code Ann. § 37-1-102(b)(23)(D) (2012) defines "severe child abuse," in relevant part, as "[k]nowingly allowing a child to be present within a structure where the act of creating methamphetamine . . . is occurring[.]"
In the present case, the trial court previously found, by clear and convincing evidence, that the Child was severely abused by Mother "in that she knowingly allowed the child to be present within a structure where the act of creating methamphetamine . . . is occurring." The court therefore decreed the Child "a severely abused child . . . specifically, as defined by Tenn. Code Ann. § 37-1-102(b)(23)(D), . . . and that the severe abuse finding is as to [Mother]." Mother did not appeal the November 2013 adjudicatory order. As the State correctly contends, the order is thus final, and the severe abuse finding is established as a matter of law.
In short, grounds for termination were conclusively established by the adjudicatory order and its finding of severe child abuse. The trial court did not err in terminating Mother's rights based on her severe abuse of the Child.
Having affirmed the trial court's finding that grounds for termination exist, we next consider the issue of the Child's best interest. As we have noted, before terminating a parent's rights, a court must determine that two things have been clearly and convincingly proven — "not only that statutory grounds exist but also that termination is in the child's best interest."
This Court has observed that "[t]he above list is not exhaustive and there is no requirement that all of the factors must be present before a trial court can determine that termination of parental rights is in a child's best interest."
In the case at bar, the trial court expressly considered each of the statutory factors and concluded that several weighed in Mother's favor. This conclusion, however, did not end the court's analysis. The court further reasoned, in relevant part, as follows:
In this manner, the trial court properly considered the evidence in light of the relevant law. The court placed a heavy emphasis on the extremely dangerous living environment Mother created for the Child as the result of allowing methamphetamine to be manufactured in their home. In addition, the court was unable to conclude, based on her admitted resumption of her use of the drug that Mother would be able to provide appropriate care for the Child on a consistent basis going forward. The proof was to the effect that in the not-so-distant past Mother was able to cease her illicit drug use during her entire nine-month pregnancy with the Child, but thereafter resumed her habit within a month of becoming a parent and the Child's sole care-giver.
The facts do not preponderate against the trial court's findings in support of its determination of the Child's best interest. As properly viewed from the Child's perspective, the evidence clearly and convincingly establishes that it is in his best interest for Mother's parental rights to be terminated. We therefore uphold the termination order.
The judgment of the trial court terminating Mother's parental rights to the Child, J.R.C., is affirmed. Costs on appeal are taxed to the appellant, B.C. This case is remanded to the trial court, pursuant to applicable law, for enforcement of the trial court's judgment and the collection of costs assessed below.
