RICHARD H. DINKINS, J.
A mother and father were divorced in 1993, and the mother was granted custody of the two children born of the marriage; the father was ordered to pay child support for their two children in the amount of $50 per week. In 1997 the children came into the custody of their maternal grandfather, and in 2007, the Tennessee Department of Human Services Child Support Division filed a petition to set child support against the father. After a hearing in February 2008 that the father did not attend, the trial court entered an order in March that increased his monthly support obligation and declared that he owed more than $31,000 in arrearages. Thereafter the father filed a pro se petition to modify the support order, asserting that the March 2008 order was defective; his petition was dismissed. On appeal to this court we held that the father was entitled to relief and vacated the order. The father thereafter filed a Motion for Further Relief in the trial court seeking reimbursement of child support payments he made pursuant to the March 2008 order; after a hearing on the motion, the court entered an order in accordance with the Court of Appeals' opinion and denied father's motion for further relief. Father appeals; finding no error, we affirm the judgment of the juvenile court.
This case comes before us for the second time. The salient facts are set forth in the prior opinion:
Murphy v. State Child Support Servs., No. M2012-02514-COA-R3-JV, 2014 WL 1715092, at *1-2 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 29, 2014) (footnotes omitted).
Mr. Murphy appealed. After addressing a procedural matter, we held that the court had no authority to set a child support obligation in the March 2008 order in light of the existing divorce decree that established Mr. Murphy's support obligation. Id. at *5. We proceeded to determine that the trial court erroneously applied the child support guidelines in modifying his obligation, vacated the judgment, and remanded the case "for any further proceedings necessary." Id. at *6.
On remand, Mr. Murphy filed a Motion for Further Relief, in which he sought to recover the amounts he had paid pursuant to the March 2008 order,
Mr. Murphy timely appealed and articulates the following issues for our review:
Our review of a court's findings of fact is de novo with a presumption of correctness unless the evidence preponderates otherwise, in accordance with Tenn. R. App. P. 13(d). A trial court's conclusions of law are subject to a de novo review with no presumption of correctness. Southern Constructors, Inc. v. Loudon County Bd. of Educ., 58 S.W.3d 706, 710 (Tenn. 2001).
Mr. Murphy seeks a money judgment against the Department for the funds he paid, contending that, based on the Court of Appeals' previous opinion in this case, the Department "has no standing to retain the funds paid to Child Support Enforcement" and that "[t]he State has no judgment, order, or warrant to justify retaining the funds paid by appellant," thus entitling him to reimbursement of his child support payments.
In denying Mr. Murphy's motion, the trial court held that "the State shall not be ordered to repay the Respondent the child support through the State in the juvenile case at bar by this Court based on Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-101(a)(7)."
Our holding that the court properly applied Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-101(a)(7) pretermits our consideration of the second issue raised by Mr. Murphy, i.e., whether the court erred in denying his motion for further relief.
Mr. Murphy contends that the retention of his child support payments violates his "Constitutional rights to due process." Citing State ex rel. Phillips v. Phillips
The essence of Mr. Murphy's argument, as we perceive it, is that the proceedings in the juvenile court on remand did not afford him due process because the court lacked jurisdiction and because the court retained his property, i.e. his money paid as child support, when the court did not order that he be reimbursed.
As to the jurisdictional issue, Mr. Murphy is mistaken. Tenn. Code Ann. § 37-1-104(d)(1)(A) states, "The juvenile court has concurrent jurisdiction and statewide jurisdiction with other courts having the jurisdiction to order support for minor children and shall have statewide jurisdiction over the parties involved in the case." This Court has interpreted the authority of the juvenile courts as follows: "The juvenile courts have broad statutory authority . . . to issue orders setting, modifying, or even terminating child support." White, 2001 WL 134601, at *2 (citing Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 36-5-401, -701, -2101, 37-1-104(d)). Thus, the juvenile court had subject matter jurisdiction over this child support case. During the appeal, jurisdiction was vested in this court and, upon our remand, the juvenile court regained jurisdiction over the case and the parties, and thus had the authority to rule on Mr. Murphy's motions.
Mr. Murphy makes no reference to the record, as required by Tenn. R. App. P. 27(a)(7)(A), or to any facts to support his contention that he was deprived of due process.
"The fundamental requirement of due process is the opportunity to be heard `at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.'" Heyne v. Metro. Nashville Bd. of Pub. Educ., 380 S.W.3d 715, 732 (Tenn. 2012) (quoting Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976)). The record before us shows that, after entry of the March 2008 order, Mr. Murphy filed a petition for relief and, upon the denial of the same, appealed to this court and succeeded in having the judgment vacated. When the case returned to the trial court, he filed a motion seeking reimbursement of amounts he had paid pursuant to the vacated order. The juvenile court considered his motion and argument and, on the basis of the applicable statute and law, denied him relief. It is this order which we review in this opinion.
Nothing in our earlier opinion, the record before us, or Mr. Murphy's brief on appeal indicates that Mr. Murphy was deprived of his day in court or of an opportunity to be heard. The fact that the law does not afford him the relief he seeks in the circumstances presented does not equate to a denial of his right to due process of law.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the juvenile court is affirmed. This case is remanded to the juvenile court for further proceedings as may be necessary. Costs on appeal are taxed to Mr. Murphy.
In its brief, the Department states that the motion was "apparently denied, because Petitioner then filed a motion to reconsider the denial, asserting that `[n]either the State nor this court have standing to retain funds paid by Petitioner pursuant to a vacated order." The September 25 order, which we shall discuss infra, disposed of all pending matters.
E2012-01957-COA-R3-CV, 2013 WL 1803958, at *4 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 30, 2013) (internal citations omitted) (quoting C.S.C. v. Knox County Bd. of Educ., E2006-00087-COA-R3-CV, 2006 WL 3731304, at *9 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 19, 2006)).