OPINION

CHARLES D. SUSANO, Jr., Judge.

This is a termination of parental rights case. F.N.M. (the child) was born out of wedlock while her biological father, W.C.G. (father), was incarcerated. Shortly after the child's birth, A.M.M. (mother) gave the child's physical custody to individuals, who would later choose to be the prospective adoptive parents. Soon thereafter, mother surrendered her parental rights to the child. The prospective adoptive parents filed a petition for adoption and termination of father's parental rights. Father opposed the adoption and filed a petition to establish paternity. After a hearing, the trial court found father to be the child's biological parent; but it also found that there is clear and convincing evidence supporting termination of his parental rights. Furthermore, the court found, by clear and convincing evidence, that termination is in the child's best interest. Father appeals. We modify the trial court's judgment. As modified, the judgment terminating father's rights is affirmed.

I.

Following communications on the internet, mother and father met for the first time in August or September 2011.1 The trial court found the two began an intimate relationship shortly thereafter, and father soon moved into mother's apartment. At the time, father was on probation from a twenty-year prison sentence. On October 2, 2011, father's employer accused him of theft. He was fired immediately and became subject to an arrest warrant. In late October or early November 2011, mother first learned she was pregnant; she soon told father that she was pregnant with his child. In November 2011, at father's request, a physician confirmed the pregnancy. In December 2011 or January 2012, mother discovered the outstanding warrant for father's arrest and turned him in to the police. He was arrested at her apartment on January 25, 2012. He later entered a best-interest guilty plea and remained incarcerated until October 3, 2014.

Mother decided to put her unborn child up for adoption. Father learned of this in February 2012. A few weeks before the child's birth, father filed with the Putative Father Registry on June 27, 2012. While mother was at the hospital preparing for the child's birth, she discussed with a hospital nurse her decision to put the child up for adoption. The nurse put her in touch with the prospective adoptive parents, S.L.D. and B.W.D. (petitioners). On July 16, 2012, two days after the child's birth, mother gave the child's physical custody to the petitioners. Petitioners' attorney informed father on July 27, 2012 that petitioners intended to file a petition to adopt on July 30, which they did. In the same petition, they asked the court to terminate father's parental rights. Also on July 30, the court granted the petitioners' motion for partial legal guardianship. On August 2, 2012, father filed an "Emergency Petition to Establish Paternity and Other Relief." Father's mother (R.F.) and stepfather (J.F.) soon filed a motion to intervene as third parties, seeking temporary custody of the child, pending the results of a DNA test, which was administered in an effort to determine whether father was the child's biological parent. Their motion was later dismissed on the ground of lack of standing.

The trial court found father to be the child's biological parent. The court also found clear and convincing evidence to terminate his parental rights on four separate grounds — abandonment by acts of wanton disregard; failure to promptly pay, without cause or excuse, a reasonable share of parental, natal, and postnatal expenses involving the birth of the child; failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume legal and physical custody of the child; and risk of substantial harm to the physical and psychological welfare of the child if the child was placed in father's legal and physical custody.2 By clear and convincing evidence, the court also determined that termination of father's parental rights was in the child's best interest. Father appeals.

II.

Father raises several issues on appeal, which we summarize below.

III.

"A biological parent's right to the care and custody of his or her child is among the oldest of the judicially recognized liberty interests protected by the Due Process Clauses of the federal and state constitutions." In re S.M., 149 S.W.3d 632, 638 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2004) (citing Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000)) (internal citations omitted). However, this right is not absolute. In re Audrey S., 182 S.W.3d 838, 860 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005) (citing State Dep't of Children's Servs. v. C.H.K., 154 S.W.3d 586, 589 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2004)).

Parties seeking to terminate a biological parent's parental rights must prove, by clear and convincing evidence, at least one statutory ground. In re Adoption of S.T.D., No. E2007-01240-COA-R3-PT, 2007 WL 3171034, at *3 (Tenn. Ct. App. E.S., filed Oct. 30, 2007) (citing Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(c)(1)). A petitioner also must prove by clear and convincing evidence that termination is in the child's best interest. Id. (citing Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(c)(2)). "Clear and convincing evidence is evidence in which there is no serious or substantial doubt about the correctness of the conclusions drawn from the evidence." In re Valentine, 79 S.W.3d 539, 546 (Tenn. 2002) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

We review this non-jury case de novo upon the record, mindful that the trial court's factual findings are presumed to be correct unless the evidence preponderates against those findings. There is no presumption of correctness as to the trial court's conclusions of law. C.H.K., 154 S.W.3d at 589 (citing Campbell v. Fla. Steel Corp., 919 S.W.2d 26 (Tenn. 1996); Tenn. R. App. P. 13(d)). "When a trial court has seen and heard witnesses, especially where issues of credibility and weight of oral testimony are involved, considerable deference must be accorded to . . . the trial court's factual findings." In re Adoption of S.T.D., 2007 WL 3171034, at *4 (citing Seals v. England/Corsair Upholstery Mfg. Co., Inc., 984 S.W.2d 912, 915 (Tenn. 1999)).

IV.

We first consider whether the petitioners proved by clear and convincing evidence the ground of wanton disregard of the child by father. Termination on this ground is proper if "the parent or guardian has engaged in conduct prior to incarceration that exhibits a wanton disregard for the welfare of the child." Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 36-1-102(1)(A)(iv) and -113(g) (Supp. 2015). This ground "applies to a parent who was incarcerated during all or part of the four months immediately preceding the filing of the petition to terminate that parent's rights. . . ." In re T.M.H., No. M2008-02427-COA-R3-PT, 2009 WL 1871873, at *6 (Tenn. Ct. App. M.S., filed June 29, 2009) (citing Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-102(1)(A)(iv)). Here, father was incarcerated for the entire four months preceding the petitioners' filing.

A parent's incarceration alone is not grounds for termination, but it is a "triggering mechanism," which "allows the court to take a closer look at the child's situation to determine whether the parental behavior that resulted in incarceration is part of a broader pattern of conduct that renders the parent unfit or poses a risk of substantial harm to the welfare of the child." In re Audrey S., 182 S.W.3d at 866. Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-102(1)(A)(iv) does not explicitly define "wanton disregard." In re H.A.L., No. M2005-00045-COA-R3-PT, 2005 WL 954866, at *6 (Tenn. Ct. App. M.S., filed Apr. 25, 2005). "[A]ctions that our courts have commonly found to constitute wanton disregard reflect a `me first' attitude involving the intentional performance of illegal or unreasonable acts and indifference to the consequences of the actions for the child." In re Anthony R., No. M2014-01753-COA-R3-PT, 2015 WL 3611244, at *3 (Tenn. Ct. App. M.S., filed June 9, 2015).

When determining whether termination is proper under this ground, courts are not limited to considering the parent's conduct in the four months prior to incarceration. In re T.M.H., 2009 WL 1871873, at *7 (citing In re Audrey S., 182 S.W.3d at 865). Additionally, in the context of this ground for termination, "our courts have extended the definition of `child' to include the period of pregnancy." In re Anthony R., 2015 WL 3611244, at *3 (internal citations omitted). Therefore, "[t]he conduct may occur before the birth of the child whose welfare is thereby put at risk." In re Jamazin H.M., No. W2013-01986-COA-R3-PT, 2014 WL 2442548, at *9 (Tenn. Ct. App. W.S., filed May 28, 2014), appeal denied (Aug. 22, 2014) (quoting In re T.M.H., 2009 WL 1871873, at *7) (internal quotation marks omitted).

In this case, father admitted at trial that he has been "very irresponsible" in his adult life. In December 2000, shortly after dropping out of high school, father pled guilty to thirteen felony thefts, three misdemeanor thefts, and one felony burglary. He was sentenced to nine months of incarceration and ten years of probation. He violated his probation in 2008, resulting in a six-month jail sentence and a ten-year extension of his probation. On October 2, 2011, $18,000 was discovered missing from father's workplace, Raceway Convenience Store. Father's employer discovered a surveillance video that linked father to the incident. As a result, he was fired from his job, again charged with theft, and a warrant was issued for his arrest, which he had learned of by mid-October 2011, a few weeks before he learned of the pregnancy.

Despite father's testimony to the contrary, the trial court determined father did not share details about his criminal past with mother, nor did he tell her about the theft charge he incurred while living with her. The trial court found that father also kept from mother that he had a young son, Bryce, from a previous relationship and that, as of September 9, 2011, he owed $9,631.82 in unpaid child support for that son. After being fired from Raceway, father continued living with mother but contributed nothing toward her household expenses. Mother testified at trial that after the pregnancy was confirmed father offered to pay for an abortion — an offer she refused. Mother stated that after that, father would not discuss the pregnancy or the child with her. Father disputed this. The trial court resolved this dispute in mother's favor.

The trial court found father's actions constituted abandonment by "wanton disregard:"

(Footnote added.)

We disagree with the trial court's reasoning on this ground. First, we have not found any case law holding that a person acts with wanton disregard for the welfare of his or her child by conceiving the child, regardless of the "criminal and social history" of the individuals involved. Contrary to the reasoning applied by the trial court,

In re Anthony R., 2015 WL 3611244, at *3 (emphasis added). Furthermore, we note that father committed each theft or burglary offense before he knew of the pregnancy. In explaining its finding on this ground, the trial court also included father's decisions to file notice with the Putative Father Registry, father becoming involved in the custody dispute between mother and her ex-husband, and father's failure to send mother any of the money he earned in prison. All of these actions occurred after father's incarceration. "Wanton disregard" considers a parent's "conduct prior to incarceration." Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-102(1)(A)(iv) (emphasis added).

We note that in the time period after father learned of the pregnancy but before his incarceration, he relied on support from mother and provided no support to her in return. Father was unemployed, and the trial court doubted his testimony that he had sought new employment. In the same time frame, mother worked regularly, but struggled to support the household by herself. Eventually, she was evicted from her apartment for not paying rent. During this same period, father also evaded an arrest warrant and failed to make any child support payments to Bryce, in defiance of a September 2011 court order to make monthly support payments of $300, the first of which was due October 1, 2011.

"We have repeatedly held that probation violations, repeated incarceration, criminal behavior, substance abuse, and the failure to provide adequate support or supervision for a child can, alone or in combination, constitute conduct that exhibits a wanton disregard for the welfare of a child." In re Audrey S., 182 S.W.3d at 867-68 (citations omitted). For a child in utero, we primarily have found wanton disregard where a parent, after learning of the pregnancy, commits the crime for which he or she is subsequently incarcerated, In re Jamazin H.M., 2014 WL 2442548, at *9; In re Maria B.S., No. E2012-01295-COA-R3-PT, 2013 WL 1304616, at *1 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 1, 2013), or commits a crime that puts the unborn child at risk of physical harm, In re T.M.H., 2009 WL 1871873, at *7 (finding father's commission of a violent physical attack on the mother of an unborn child during her pregnancy exhibited a wanton disregard); In re C.T.S., 156 S.W.3d 18, 25 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2004) (finding mother ingested illegal drugs during her pregnancy, demonstrating a wanton disregard).

Regarding the ground of wanton disregard, we find it significant that the incident that resulted in father's incarceration occurred before he knew of the pregnancy. Father's actions in the time between learning of the pregnancy and his arrest are simply insufficient to establish by clear and convincing evidence that he acted with wanton disregard for the child's welfare. We note, though, that his actions in that time period are relevant to other grounds for termination that we will now consider.

V.

A.

The trial court found three additional grounds to terminate father's parental rights. These grounds directly implicate two separate code provisions, i.e., Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(9)(A) and § 36-1-117(b), (c). To aid the reader in understanding the interplay between these separate code provisions, we will quote relevant language from both:

(Footnote added.)

We begin our analysis of the interplay between these two code sections by focusing on the language of Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(9)(A). As can be seen, this section expressly provides that the "termination" language in § 36-1-113(g)(9)(A) is not applicable to a "legal parent . . . of" a child. Rather, it is only applicable to a father who is described in § 36-1-117(b) or (c). Thus, our initial task is to determine whether the father in the case now before us is a "legal parent."

The concept of a "legal parent" is specifically addressed in Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-102(28). That section provides as follows:

In the current case, mother and father were never married and one never attempted to marry the other. The trial court found that, "[a]t no time prior to the entry of [the final order], has any court entered an order finding [father] to be the legal parent of [the child]." Nothing in the record contradicts this finding. There is also no indication in the record that father signed a voluntary acknowledgement of paternity, though we note that, a few weeks before the child's birth, he did file an intent to claim paternity with the Putative Father Registry. However, it is clear from the statutory scheme under review that "an intent to claim paternity filed with the Putative Father Registry" is not the same as "a voluntary acknowledgement of paternity." These are words of art. They are separate concepts with different meanings. See, e.g., Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 36-2-318(e). Reading the language of § 36-1-102(28), we conclude that father does not fall within any of the various meanings of the statutory words "legal parent."5

B.

Having determined that father is not the "legal parent," we now move to the additional language found in Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(9)(A), which mandates that a parent "who is described in § 36-1-117(b) or (c)" comes under the "termination" provisions of that section. To further aid the reader, we will again quote the pertinent language of § 36-1-117(b) and (c):

(Emphasis added.)

Father falls under both Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-117(b) and (c). As to subsection (b), he filed a petition to establish paternity of a child who was already the subject of an adoption proceeding. The prospective adoptive parents filed their petition to adopt in the trial court on July 30, 2012. The same petition also sought to terminate Father's parental rights. On August 2, 2012, father filed an "Emergency Petition to Establish Paternity and Other Relief" with the Davidson County Juvenile Court. After a hearing, the Davidson County Juvenile Court transferred the case to the trial court in an order entered October 8, 2012. In short, father filed a petition to establish paternity, but he did so after the child was the subject of an adoption proceeding.

As to subsection (c), father had not established paternity of the child when the child became the subject of an adoption proceeding. As stated above, he filed a petition to establish paternity after the adoption petition had been filed. In his petition father stated he "believes" the child to be his and that mother had "indicated" he was the father of the child, but he requested a DNA test to verify his paternity. Finally, father meets the description in subsection (c)(1) because he filed an intent to claim paternity with the Putative Father Registry on June 27, 2012, a few weeks before the child's birth.

In summary, the grounds for termination listed in Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(9)(A) apply to "any person who, at the time of the filing of a petition to terminate the parental rights of such person . . . is not the legal parent . . . of such child or who is described in § 36-1-117(b) or (c)." When the petition to terminate his rights was filed, father was not the child's legal parent and he was "described in § 36-1-117(b) or (c)." For these reasons, the grounds for termination listed in Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(9)(A) are applicable to this case.

C.

We now address whether the petitioners established by clear and convincing evidence that father failed to pay "without good cause or excuse . . . a reasonable share of prenatal, natal, and postnatal expenses involving the birth of the child in accordance with the person's financial means promptly upon the person's receipt of notice of the child's impending birth." Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(9)(A)(i). Father testified that he contributed nothing to mother's household or other expenses after he learned of the pregnancy. The trial court concluded father, instead, "lived off of [mother's] support."

Father explains that in the months before his incarceration he was unemployed but looking for work. On appeal, he argues that his "failure to pay was in accordance with his financial means" and that he acted "with good cause and excuse." The trial court rejected father's argument, instead finding him to have been "in good health" and "a relatively young man at age 33" with "no good cause or excuse for failing to pay a reasonable share of prenatal expenses incurred by [mother] and on behalf of [the child]." The trial court noted that father quickly found employment after his release from prison in 2014, counter to father's assertion that he had struggled to find work because of his criminal past. The trial court concluded he would have been just as able to find employment before his incarceration. We also note that even when father worked in prison and earned $25 a month, he failed to send any of it to support the child.

Father also argues that he did not provide for mother's pregnancy or birth expenses because "there were no such expenses." He described mother's expenses as "imaginary," and cites her testimony that she was on Medicaid and did not personally pay any doctor's bills. He also stated at trial that certain expenses for the child were not necessary because Mother had planned to re-use items, such as a crib and bedding, she purchased previously to care for her older daughter. Father relies on In re Anna S., No. E2009-02664-COA-R3-PT, 2010 WL 1838070, at *8 (Tenn. Ct. App. E.S., filed May 6, 2010) to support his argument that it is improper to terminate parental rights on this ground if the father was unaware any such expenses existed. Distinct from the facts of the current case, In re Anna S. involved a mother who refused the father's attempts to communicate with her during her pregnancy and who told the father's sister that she had miscarried. Id. In the current case, father knew of mother's pregnancy by November 2011 and knew by February 2012 that mother planned to give the child up for adoption.

The trial court found certain expenses are "normal and customary in connection with the pregnancy of any mother." Additionally, the court found that mother's income was "very limited" and although mother "did her best" to support herself, father, and Natalie, she was "ultimately evicted from her apartment because of her inability to provide adequate support." The evidence does not preponderate against the trial court's findings of fact. We affirm the trial court's ruling that there was clear and convincing evidence to establish that termination is proper under this ground.

D.

Next, we consider whether the petitioners proved that father failed to manifest an ability and willingness to assume legal and physical custody of the child such that it would be proper to terminate his parental rights under Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(9)(A)(iv). Father has expressed a willingness to assume legal and physical custody of the child. On October 20, 2014, shortly after his release from prison, father moved for temporary visitation with the child, though his request was denied. Soon after his release, he obtained employment earning $9 an hour and had the same job at the December 2014 trial. He also earned his General Education Diploma in prison. We note, too, that father's mother and stepfather, R.F. and J.F., intervened in the adoption proceeding, requesting custody of the child while father was incarcerated. R.F. also contacted mother three times during the pregnancy and once expressed to mother her desire to adopt the child. Both R.F. and J.F. testified on father's behalf at trial.

Even assuming father's willingness to take custody of the child, his circumstances raise several questions. First, he lives with his parents and does not pay rent. He has never had his own independent housing, instead staying with his mother, friends, girlfriends, and his mother's ex-husband. For most of his adult life, father largely has been reliant on others for basic living expenses. Even at trial, he admitted that he would need some help and support from others to care for the child if he were to be given custody. Father testified that if something were to happen to R.F. and J.F., then "my sister and my brother, aunts, uncles, there's a number of people who would help me." But besides R.F. and J.F., no other members of father's family testified on his behalf.

Father also has no means of transportation. He lacks a vehicle and a driver's license. His driver's license was suspended for an unpaid citation. The trial court found that "to reacquire his license" he would, "at minimum" have to pay restitution and back child support. Because of his repeated criminal offenses and probation violations, he will remain on probation until 2022. Although he had a job at the time of trial, his work history since he dropped out of high school has been sporadic, such that he frequently has been fired or left jobs without another lined up. On several occasions, he has gone for months without work while living off the support of family and friends.

Previously, the Supreme Court considered a similar question in In re Bernard T., 319 S.W.3d 586, 604-05 (Tenn. 2010). There, Junior D. — who was not the legal parent, biological parent, or putative father of all the children at issue in the case — was found to have "manifested a commendable willingness to assume legal custody of all the children. . . ." Id. But the court concluded that despite this willingness,

Id. The situation here is somewhat similar. Father continues to be reliant on his mother and stepfather for both housing and transportation. No home study has been done on R.F. and J.F.'s home. Regarding his income, father asserts that he works full-time, but his stepfather, who often drives him to work and helped father get the job, could not verify this at trial. Regarding his expenses, father has significant demands on his income due to child support for Bryce, probation fees, and restitution fees related to the Raceway theft.

We also addressed this ground in In re Adoption of S.T.D., and there, weighed a father's behavior toward his other children when considering whether he manifested an ability to care for the children at issue in that case. We stated,

2007 WL 3171034, at *8 (emphasis added). In September 2011, father was ordered to pay $300 per month to support Bryce and pay down an arrearage of $9,631.82. He did not make a single payment to comply with the order prior to his incarceration. At trial, father testified that he did not support Bryce even when he had the money to do so:

At the time of trial in December 2014, father reported that he paid more than $50 each month to pay down his arrearage, which by that time exceeded $14,000. While incarcerated, father never sent any of his income to support Bryce or F.N.M. Previously, we have found an incarcerated "[f]ather's failure to provide any support to [his children] despite having earned at least some small amount of money, and, with no credible explanation as to why he failed even to attempt to fulfill this basic parental duty, demonstrates willful failure to support." In re Maria B.S., 2013 WL 1304616, at *10.

The trial court determined that father also failed to visit Bryce at all in the four months prior to his 2012 incarceration.

As in In re Adoption of S.T.D., we find the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court's finding that father has not manifested an ability to assume legal and physical custody of the child. 2007 WL 3171034, at *8. The trial court found that father "states that he has a willingness and a desire to [assume legal and physical custody of the child], but without the ability to fulfill his willingness and desire, such is a hollow representation." The evidence supports the trial court's ruling. For the reasons stated above, we affirm the trial court's decision to terminate father's parental rights under Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(9)(A)(iv).

E.

We now consider whether placing the child in the father's legal and physical custody would pose a risk of substantial harm to the physical or psychological welfare of the child, such that termination of father's parental rights is appropriate under Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(9)(A)(v). Here, the trial court found "no reason to believe that [father] would harm [the child]. The issue is whether placing [the child] in the custody of [father] would pose substantial harm to her physical or psychological welfare."

The Supreme Court "reject[s] the contention . . . that at some point the fact that the child has been in the custody of a non-parent for a period of time means that a lesser standard can be applied in determining whether parental rights may be terminated." In re Swanson, 2 S.W.3d 180, 188 n.13 (Tenn. 1999). The court explained that "[s]uch a standard would increase the likelihood for delaying cases in order that the child remain in foster care." Id. Similarly, in In re Adoption of A.M.H., 215 S.W.3d 793 (Tenn. 2007), the High Court declined to terminate parental rights where "the only evidence of substantial harm arises from the delay caused by the protracted litigation and the failure of the court system to protect the parent-child relationship throughout the proceedings." 215 S.W.3d at 812. In that case, the court stated that "[e]vidence that [the child] will be harmed from a change in custody because she has lived and bonded with the [non-parents] cannot constitute the substantial harm required to prevent the parents from regaining custody." Id. (internal citation omitted; emphasis added).

Here, the trial court distinguished the case from A.M.H., stating in its final order:

In State v. C.H.H., No. E2001-02107-COA-R3-CV, 2002 WL 1021668, at *8-*9 (Tenn. Ct. App. E.S., filed May 21, 2002), we found that removing a child from a home in which the child had bonded with the foster family would constitute "substantial harm." In that case, we restated the trial court's finding

Id., at *9.

Here, mother testified that the petitioners met her at the hospital the day that she contacted them about the adoption. The child was delivered by Cesarean section. Mother testified that S.L.D., the prospective adoptive mother, held her hand throughout the surgery and was with her when the child was delivered. The delivering physician handed the child to S.L.D. after the delivery. Mother said she never held the child. The child has remained with the petitioners since her birth.

At trial, the petitioners presented Dr. William Kenner as an expert witness on child psychiatry. The trial court found "his testimony to be completely credible." Dr. Kenner had conducted a home visit of the petitioners' home, which lasted more than two hours. He testified to his observations during the visit. Dr. Kenner described the petitioners as "doting parents" and said that the child "loves them deeply and is quite securely bonded to them." He also added that the child is "quite healthy, she's gregarious and outgoing, loves people, and all of that speaks to the quality of her relationship — her relationships with her adoptive mother and father."

Dr. Kenner also outlined the adverse psychological and physical effects a child experiences if taken away from the person or persons with whom the child has bonded. He testified that "[i]t would be devastating for her . . . . [W]e now know that to remove a child from — and to break those attachment bonds, produces trauma and the children actually develop PTSD; post-traumatic stress disorder." Dr. Kenner further testified that "while she might not remember that she was taken away from the adoptive parents she loved, the damage would be there." He also added that "there are quite a number of physical experiences or physical problems that come up as a result of trauma." At trial, father testified that he has no reason to believe the child had not bonded with the petitioners. Still, father wishes for the child to be with her biological family.

The trial court held that

Petitioners have a significant bond with the child. She has known no other family besides them. Father does not have a relationship with the child, due in large part to his incarceration for almost all of the child's life. The evidence does not preponderate against the trial court's finding, and we affirm that the petitioners proved by clear and convincing evidence that removing the child from the petitioners' custody and placing her with father would cause her substantial physical and psychological harm.

VI.

Having found grounds to terminate father's parental rights, we must next determine whether the termination is in the best interest of the child. Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(c)(2). The question of best interest "must be determined from the child's perspective and not the parent's." In re Jamazin H.M., 2014 WL 2442548, at *11. Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(i) provides a non-exhaustive list of factors to consider to determine a child's best interest. In re Jacobe M.J., 434 S.W.3d 565, 573 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2014). These are:

Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(i)(1)-(9).

Father has provided little proof that he has substantially changed his circumstances. Although he earned a GED and had obtained a steady job prior to trial, many issues persist. He continues to rely on others for housing and transportation. No testimony was put forward to establish that his mother's home, his residence at the time of trial, would be a safe or suitable home for the child and no home study had been completed. The trial court also doubted that he would continue to reside there for any substantial period of time. The trial court found he "is still living the nomadic existence that he has experienced over the last fourteen or fifteen years" and that "[i]f [father] should move from the home of his mother and stepfather, the [c]ourt has no confidence that [he] will be able to establish a safe and healthy home for [the child]." Based on father's own testimony, he would need some support of other family to care for the child.

Dr. Kenner testified that a change in caretakers and physical environment would adversely affect the child. The trial court found, and the evidence supports, that the child has a strong relationship with the petitioners, such that "breaking the attachment bond" between them "would have a severe negative impact on [the child's] emotional, psychological, and medical condition." We note that father moved for a temporary visitation order on October 20, 2014, approximately eight weeks before trial, but was denied. The trial court found no proof that father had ever seen the child and found that the two of them have no relationship whatsoever. The testimony at trial established that the petitioners and child have a strong bond and supports the finding that the petitioners are devoted to the child. AGAPE of Nashville conducted a voluntary preliminary home study of the petitioners' home. The study revealed the petitioners "met the requirements by the State of Tennessee for adoptive parents." At trial, petitioners had two friends testify as character witnesses, both of whom described the petitioners as providing a safe and loving home for the child.

There is no indication in the record that father has ever provided any support to the child. Father did not send any of the money he earned in prison to support the child. Additionally, the trial court stated "since [father's] release, he has . . . made no tender to the court of any support that he would suggest should be provided to [the child]."

For all of the above reasons, we find that the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court's finding by clear and convincing evidence that it is in the best interest of the child to terminate father's parental rights.

VII.

The judgment of the trial court is affirmed as modified. The costs on appeal are assessed to the appellant, W.C.G. This case is remanded to the trial court for enforcement of the trial court's judgment, as modified, and for collection of costs assessed by the trial court.

W. NEAL McBRAYER, Judge, dissenting.

I agree with the majority that the prospective adoptive parents, S.L.D. and B.W.D., failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that W.C.G. ("Father") acted with wanton disregard for the child's welfare within the meaning of Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-1-102(1)(A)(iv) (2015). I also agree with the majority's interpretation of Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-1-113(g)(9)(A) (2015). However, in my view, our Supreme Court has interpreted Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-1-113(g)(9)(A) differently, and therefore, I am constrained by that interpretation to respectfully dissent.

Having found the evidence not clear and convincing that Father engaged in conduct prior to incarceration that exhibited a wanton disregard for the welfare of the child, this appeal requires us to consider whether the prospective adoptive parents proved a ground for termination under Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-1-113(g)(9)(A). The majority concludes that Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-1-113(g)(9)(A) is applicable because Father is not the "legal parent" as defined in Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-1-102(28) but Father does fit within the description of Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-1-117(b) or (c) (2014). I agree that Father is not the legal parent, but his situation does fall within Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-1-117(b) or (c). Nonetheless, under our Supreme Court precedent, Father's parental rights may not be terminated under Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-1-113(g)(9).

In 2010, our Supreme Court held that "grounds for termination in Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(9) cannot be used to terminate the rights of a person who is a child's biological parent, legal parent, or putative biological father at the time the termination petition is filed." In re Bernard T., 319 S.W.3d 586, 599 (Tenn. 2010). Earlier in the opinion, the court states a child's biological father would be considered a child's "putative biological father" if "he has filed a timely statement with the putative father registry." Id. at 598 (citing Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-117(c)(1)). In this case, as noted by the majority, Father filed with the putative father registry a few weeks before the child's birth, so Father does fit within the Supreme Court's definition of "putative biological father." As such, Father's rights may not be terminated under Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-1-113(g)(9).

In dissenting, I acknowledge that our Court has not always followed the Supreme Court's interpretation of Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-1-113(g)(9) as expressed in In re Bernard T. See, e.g., In re Dixie M.M., No. M2012-01226-COA-R3-PT, 2012 WL 4474155, at *2 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 27, 2012); In re Alexis M.M., No. E2012-00022-COA-R3-PT, 2012 WL 3553628, at *1 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 20, 2012). I also acknowledge that my position would result in the reversal of the trial court's judgment. However, until such time as the Supreme Court revisits its prior holding in In re Bernard T. or the Legislature amends Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-1-113(g)(9), I conclude the Supreme Court's interpretation of Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-1-113(g)(9) in In re Bernard T. is binding.