EVELYN V. KEYES, Justice.
Following the issuance of our March 1, 2012 opinion and judgment on rehearing, appellant, Samson Lone Star, Limited Partnership n/k/a Samson Lone Star L.L.C. ("Samson"), moved for further rehearing on issues relating to the supersede as bond and surety. Appellees, Charles G. Hooks, et al. ("the Hooks"), moved for further rehearing asking this Court to clarify its ruling regarding post judgment interest. Subsequently, on April 16, 2012, the Hooks moved for en banc reconsideration of our March 1, 2012 opinion. We grant both motions for rehearing, withdraw our opinion and judgment of March 1, 2012, and issue this opinion and judgment in their stead. We dismiss the Hooks' April 16, 2012 motion for en banc reconsideration as moot.
This is an appeal from a final judgment against Samson for more than $21 million in favor of the Hooks. Samson has a number of oil and gas leases from landowners in Hardin and Jefferson Counties, including the Hooks. The judgment arises from an oil and gas case in which the Hooks brought suit against Samson with respect to three oil and gas leases, two in Hardin County, Texas (the "95-acre Lease" and the "10-acre Lease," collectively the "Hardin County Leases") and one in Jefferson County, Texas (the "Jefferson County Lease"). The Hooks sued Samson for breach of contract, fraud, fraudulent concealment, statutory fraud, negligent misrepresentation, violation of the Texas Natural Resources Code by failure to properly pay royalties, statutory negligence, common law negligence per se, injunctive relief, and declaratory judgment.
The trial court granted Samson's motion for partial summary judgment on whether it had breached certain offset obligations under the Leases. It also granted the Hooks' motions for summary judgment on claims for additional royalties related to their claims of "unpooling" with respect to the Hardin County Leases and breach of the "most favored nations" clause in both Hardin County Leases and the Jefferson County Lease.
The questions of whether Samson committed fraud against the Hooks with respect to a well drilled within the buffer zone of the Hooks' Jefferson County Lease
In eight issues, Samson complains that (1) there is legally and factually insufficient evidence of common law fraud; (2) there is legally and factually insufficient evidence of statutory fraud; (3) the statute of limitations bars the Hooks' fraud claims; (4) there is legally and factually insufficient evidence to support the jury's finding on fraud damages; (5) the trial court erred in interpreting the phrase "formation production" in the Hooks' Leases as requiring Samson to pay twice for molecules of gas produced as condensate; (6) the trial court erred in entering judgment in favor of the Hooks for additional royalties based on the unpooling issue with respect to the Hardin County Leases and on the most favored nations clauses in all three Leases; (7) the trial court erred in elevating lease provisions into a permanent injunction, and there is no evidence to support the injunction or attorney's fees; and (8) the trial court erred by granting post-judgment interest at the rate of 18%, compounded annually.
In a single issue, the Hooks complain on cross-appeal that the trial court erred in rendering summary judgment in favor of Samson on the issue of whether Samson breached certain offset obligations in the Hooks' leases. We affirm the trial court's summary judgment order in favor of Samson on its offset obligations.
With respect to Samson's appeal, we affirm the portion of the trial court's judgment awarding the Hooks reimbursement for ad valorem taxes as stipulated by the parties, and we reverse the remainder of the final judgment of the trial court and render judgment that the Hooks take nothing on those claims.
In 1999, the Hooks entered into the Jefferson County Lease with Samson. This lease covered 640 acres owned by the Hooks in the Dyches survey in Jefferson County, Texas and was bordered by Pine Island Bayou, which also serves as the county line between Jefferson and Hardin Counties.
Article VI of the Jefferson County Lease was a section called "Offset Obligations." In this section, Samson covenanted to operate the leased premises as a reasonably prudent operator would and to protect the leased premises from drainage. Article VI also contained specific obligations for Samson in case of potential drainage. This Article provided that if a gas well were completed within 1,320 feet from the leased premises, then, within 90 days from the date of the sale of first production from that well, Samson must take one of three actions: (1) drill an offset well; (2) pay the Hooks "compensatory royalties" — in addition to any royalties currently due — in a sum equal to the royalties that would be payable under the
In April 2000, Samson began drilling a gas well, the Black Stone Minerals No. 1 (the "BSM No. 1 well"), on a tract it owned in Hardin County adjacent to the Hooks' 640-acre Jefferson County Lease. This adjacent tract was located in Hardin County. The surface drillsite was outside the 1,320-foot buffer zone around the Hooks' Jefferson County Lease that triggered Samson's offset obligations under Article VI(A) of the Lease. However, the well was a directional well that slanted away from the surface drillsite. Originally, the BSM No. 1 well was planned with a bottom hole location 1,080 feet from the Hooks' lease line on the east, a location within the 1,320-foot buffer zone of the Hooks' Jefferson County Lease. This proposed well location was reflected on a plat titled "Proposed Well Location [BSM No.]1 Walker Pettitt League, A-43, Hardin County, Texas," which was prepared and signed by a third-party surveyor on March 22, 2000. The surveyor certified that "this is a true and correct plat based on a ground survey made under my supervision on March 22, 2000." This plat was filed with the Railroad Commission of Texas ("Railroad Commission").
The March 22, 2000 plat showed a 704-acre gas pooling unit (the "BSM No. 1 unit") designated by Samson that ran along Pine Island Bayou, the Hardin County/Jefferson County line, on the east. This line was also the western boundary of the tract containing the Hooks' Jefferson County Lease. The Hooks and their co-owners of the tract on which their Jefferson
It is undisputed that "FSL" meant "From the Southern Line" of the Walker Pettitt Survey, "FNL" meant "From the Northern Line" of the Survey, and "FEL" meant "From the Eastern Line" of the Survey, which was the Hardin County/Jefferson County line at Pine Island Bayou. Thus, in this notation, the surface location of the BSM No. 1 well was 1,600 feet from the eastern line of the survey at Pine Island Bayou, and the proposed bottom hole location was about 1,080 feet from the eastern line, which marked the western line of the Hooks' Jefferson County Lease. The proposed bottom hole was therefore within the 1,320-foot buffer zone for the Jefferson County Lease.
Although the March 22, 2000 plat of the designated BSM No. 1 unit estimated the location of the proposed bottom hole location of the BSM No. 1 well, the exact bottom hole location of the well, following drilling, could only be ascertained from a directional survey. This survey was completed in July 2000 and was also filed with the Railroad Commission. Both parties agree that the survey showed the BSM No. 1 well to be bottomed 1,184 feet from the Hooks' Jefferson County Lease, within the 1,320-foot buffer zone of the Lease. Thus, Samson had an obligation under the terms of the "Offset Obligations" in the Hooks' Jefferson County Lease to (1) drill an offset well, (2) pay the Hooks "compensatory royalties," or (3) release the "offset acreage" within 90 days from the date production was first "sold, removed, or otherwise marketed" from the well.
The BSM No. 1 well was completed in August 2000, and the first gas sales occurred in late October 2000. Because the bottom hole of the well was within the 1,320-foot buffer zone of the Hooks' Jefferson County Lease, the first gas sales triggered Samson's offset obligations under the terms of the Lease. The Hooks complain, and the jury found, however, that Samson did not follow the provisions in Article VI(A) of the Jefferson County Lease, which provided that, within 90 days of the first sale of gas from a well within its buffer zone, Samson must drill an offset well, pay the Hooks compensatory royalties, or release the offset acreage. Instead, the jury found that Samson attempted to avoid those obligations by seeking to pool the Hooks' interest in the production from the BSM No. 1 well with those of other mineral owners, despite the lack of pooling authority in the Jefferson County Lease, while concealing the bottom hole location of the BSM No. 1 well.
In December 2000, Samson filed a P-12 "Pooling Authority" form with the Railroad Commission that reflected a reconfigured BSM No. 1 pooling unit. By letter, Samson informed the Commission that a portion of the 704 acres in the original BSM No. 1 unit was to be put into a separate 308.41-acre pooling unit for the proposed Black Stone Minerals No. A-1 well (the "BSM A-1 well"). Attached to the letter was a "Certificate of Pooling Authority," which represented the Broussard tract, on which the Hooks' Jefferson County Lease lay, as one of the tracts whose mineral-rights owners either had
The arrows pointing to the surface and bottom hole locations on the November 16 plat of the redesignated BSM No. 1 unit were the same as those pointing to the proposed surface and bottom hole locations on the original March 22, 2000 plat of the unit. However, the acreage of the unit had been changed to show a different 704-acre configuration for the BSM No. 1 unit from that originally filed with the Railroad Commission. The redesignated BSM No. 1 unit, unlike the previously designated BSM No. 1 unit, extended beyond the eastern line of Hardin County at Pine Island Bayou into Jefferson County. The certificate, signed by Lanoue, stated that "this is a true and correct plat based on the best of my knowledge November 16, 2000."
On February 15, 2001, Samson sent the Hooks a letter offering to pool 50 acres covered by the Hooks' Jefferson County Lease into there designated BSM No. 1 gas pooling unit for the BSM No. 1 well. Attached to the letter was a copy of the plat of the reconfigured unit Samson had filed with the Railroad Commission in December 2000.
On February 20, 2001, before accepting Samson's offer to pool — which would require amendment of Article VI of the Hooks' Jefferson County Lease to permit pooling — Charles Hooks, the landowner and an attorney who had participated in a number of oil and gas deals, called Lanoue and sought more information. Charles Hooks inquired about the BSM No. 1 well's location and about how his property fit in the unit. Lanoue told him that the well was about 1,500 feet away from Pine Island Bayou, the boundary between Hardin and Jefferson Counties and the western line of the Hooks' Jefferson County Lease.
Hooks requested a plat showing where his acreage would lie within the proposed reconfigured BSM No. 1 unit. That same day, Lanoue sent Hooks the scaled plat of the redesignated BSM No. 1 pooling unit that Samson had filed with the Railroad Commission in December 2000. This plat was certified by Lanoue as "a true and correct plat based on the best of my knowledge December 28, 2000. "A number of changes had been made to the March 22, 2000 plat showing the original BSM No. 1 gas pooling unit to reflect the redesignated unit. The plat of the reconfigured unit had different boundaries extending further west and also further east into Jefferson County, encompassing part of the Broussard tract on the east that had not been included in the original unit designation. The plat had been highlighted to show the location of the Hooks' 50 acres east of Pine Island Bayou.
Like the March 2000 plat of the original BSM No. 1 unit, the plat of the redesignated BSM No. 1 unit contained the arrow pointing to the location of the bottom hole, but it gave slightly changed coordinates from those of the proposed bottom hole of the BSM No. 1 well on the March 2000 plat. At trial, Lanoue testified that he changed these coordinates with a ruler. Also, instead of a line running from the proposed bottom hole location and showing ±1,080 feet to the eastern line of the unit at Pine Island Bayou, the plat showed a different line to the bayou with an undesignated starting point. The plat also showed an eastern border of the reconfigured BSM No. 1 unit beyond the bayou and encompassing a portion of the Hooks' Jefferson County Lease. Above the line was the designation "±1400'." An arrow stating
In addition, the plat stated:
This language in the plat thus expressly stated that the bottom hole of the BSM No. 1 well was located about 1,400 feet from the eastern line of the redesignated BSM No. 1 unit, which encompassed the Hooks' 50 acres from their Jefferson County Lease between Pine Island Bayou and the eastern edge of the redesignated unit. According to this notation, the bottom hole of the BSM No. 1 well was within 1,320 feet of the "leased premises," and, therefore, inside the buffer zone for the Hooks' Jefferson County Lease
Lanoue testified at trial that he added the notation that showed the bottom hole of the BSM No. 1 well to be ± 1,400 feet from the eastern line of the unit in August 2000 to reflect the newly shaped unit. He also testified that he got the notation "740 feet from the east line and 290 feet from the south line" "from myself." He did not go to the directional survey which had been previously completed to determine the exact location of the bottom hole. However, he intended the numbers to be "[a]s accurate as a land guy is using a ruler on a scaled piece of paper that might not even be to scale."
Hooks testified at trial, however, that Lanoue orally told him that the BSM No. 1 well was 1,500 feet from Pine Island Bayou. He then looked at the plat and concluded that the bottom hole location was approximately 1,400 feet west of Pine Island Bayou and thus outside the line that would have triggered the 1,320 foot offset provisions in the Jefferson County Lease. He made no other inquiries regarding the plat or the bottom hole of the well, and he did not check the records filed with the Railroad Commission to determine the exact location of the bottom hole.
After making the pooling offer to the Hooks, Lanoue executed the designation of the BSM No. 1 pooling unit in February 2001 and recorded it in the county's real property records on March 7, 2001, showing the Hooks as participating in the pool for the BSM No. 1 unit. However, the Hooks did not actually consent to pool the 50 acres from their Jefferson County Lease into the BSM No. 1 unit until May 25, 2001, and they conditioned their assent on a formal amendment to the lease which they were to prepare and submit to Samson. The Hooks did not prepare the formal amendment, however, and the parties never executed such an amendment. Instead, the Hooks agreed to a division order setting out their percentage distribution of the unit's proceeds, which stated that Samson would pay the Hooks royalties based on a stated percentage of their acreage in the unit to the entire acreage of the BSM No. 1 unit unless notified otherwise in writing.
After the Hooks agreed to pool 50 acres of their Jefferson County Lease into the BSM No. 1 unit, Samson drilled a second well, the Joyce DuJay No. 1 well ("DuJay No. 1 well"), within the 1,320-foot buffer zone of the Hooks' Jefferson County Lease. That well was completed in January 2002 and made part of another pooling unit, the DuJay No. 1 unit, in which the Hooks also participated and from which they received royalties. This well was offset by the BSM No. 1 unit. Hooks testified that he was not defrauded with respect to the DuJay No. 1 unit.
In addition to their Jefferson County Lease, the Hooks also owned two leases in Hardin County near the BSM No. 1 well, the 95-acre and 10-acre Hardin County Leases. Unlike the Hooks' Jefferson County Lease, these Leases did provide for pooling in terms that were essentially the same with respect to the manner and methods of pooling.
The Hardin County Leases both contained language calling for an instrument "identifying and describing the pooled acreage" and stating that a "pooled unit shall become effective on the date such instrument or instruments are so filed for record." Article V(E) of the pooling provision in each Lease also stated that production from any part of a pooled unit that included the leased premises was considered production from the leased premises "regardless of whether ... such production was secured before or after the date of this lease or the date of the instrument designating the pooled unit." The 95-acre Lease provided in Article V(E) as follows:
(Emphasis added.)
In February 2001, Samson finished directionally drilling and completed the BSM A-1 well north of the BSM No. 1 well on Samson's own lease in Hardin County (the "Black Stone Minerals/FirnBank lease"). The mineral interests underlying this lease were owned 87.5% by Black Stone Minerals and 12.5% by FirnBank as cotenants.
Samson did not have the contractual authority to pool under its leases with either Black Stone Minerals or FirnBank. Samson therefore negotiated with the leaseholders for such a right and concluded that both of the lessors were in agreement.
FirnBank consented to be pooled into the BSM A-1 Unit in May 2001. Samson also obtained written consent from the Hooks to pool their Hardin County Leases into the BSM A-1 unit. In addition, it obtained the agreement of the Texas General Land Office and the School Land Board (collectively, the "State of Texas"), who owned adjacent land, to pool that land into the unit. However, Black Stone Minerals, the 87.5% owner of the mineral interests underlying the drill site, declined to consent to the pooling unit.
Samson drilled and completed the BSM A-1 well, and the well began producing in June 2001 from the depth range of the formation at the horizon from 12,304 to 12,332 feet. In December 2001, Samson finished another gas well, the DuJay No. 1 well. The DuJay No. 1 well produced from some of the same land designated to the BSM A-1 unit, but it reached from 13,150 to 13,176 feet — a lower horizon than the BSM A-1 well. The DuJay No. 1 well began producing in January 2002.
In February 2002, after failing to receive Black Stone Minerals' consent to the BSM A-1 pooling unit, Samson amended the BSM A-1 unit designation. It executed and recorded a designation for a new unit, the Joyce DuJay No. 1 Gas unit ("DuJay No. 1 unit") that recited an effective date as of first production of the DuJay No. 1 well, i.e., January 2002. The DuJay No. 1 unit designated a new, smaller, 571-acre unit with a different name, different leases, different depths and different boundaries from the BSM A-1 unit. The DuJay No. 1 unit included some of the deeper strata of the originally designated BSM A-1 unit, but it excluded the EY5 horizon from which the BSM A-1 well was producing at 12,304 to 12,332 feet. Instead, the designated DuJay No. 1 unit pooled its leases as to gas well production from 12,800 feet and deeper, including some already-pooled depths carved out of the BSM A-1 unit (12,400-13,800 feet) and deeper strata (below 13,800 feet). Because of its depth limitations, the DuJay No. 1 unit included the DuJay No. 1 well, but not the shallower-completed BSM A-1 well. The designated acreage excluded most of the Black Stone Minerals/FirnBank lease, but it included the Hooks' Hardin County Leases and the State's leases.
Samson did not get consent from the Hooks to vacate or amend the BSM A-1 unit or to "unpool" their interests from the BSM A-1 unit or well. However, it informed the Hooks that the BSM A-1 unit had been amended and the unit name had been changed. It stated, "Please note that the Unit Designation for the Black Stone Minerals `A' No. 1 is being amended and will now be called the Joyce DuJay No. 1 unit. No additional action is needed on your part." After the BSM A-1 unit was amended, reconstituted, and renamed the DuJay No. 1 unit, Samson paid, and the Hooks accepted, royalty payments from pooled production from the DuJay No. 1 well from the date of first production until
Subsequently, Samson drilled another DuJay well (the "DuJay A-1 well") and created a separate pooling unit for that well. The DuJay A-1 unit differed from the DuJay No. 1 unit by depth limitation and acreage. The DuJay A-1 well began producing on September 25, 2002. However, Samson did not file the DuJay A-1 unit designation until July 2003. The Hooks' Hardin County Leases were likewise pooled into the designated DuJay A-1 unit, and the Hooks accepted royalties on the production from that unit as well from the date of first production until after trial had begun in the instant action.
The Hooks' Hardin County Leases also contained a "most favored nation" clause. This clause provided that, under certain circumstances, the royalties payable to the Hooks must be elevated to match the highest royalty payable to Samson's other lessors.
Article III(K) of each of the Hooks' Leases contained a "formation production clause." Article III provided that the Hooks were to receive as royalties 25% of "the market value at the wells" on the "gas, including casinghead gas or other gaseous substances produced from said land," or 25% of "the price received therefor by Lessee." Likewise, they were to receive as royalties 25% of "all liquid hydrocarbons that may be produced from said land." Article III(K) provided, "For the purposes of calculating all royalties payable under Article III herein, it is expressly provided that all such calculations shall be based on formation production as reported on Texas Railroad Commission forms P-1 and P-2."
In August 2004, several mineral-rights owners who had leased to Samson filed a suit against Samson styled Joyce DuJay Lee v. Samson Lone Star. The plaintiffs, who did not include the Hooks, complained about pooling issues unrelated to the BSM No. 1 well. In December 2004, other landowners, also not including the Hooks, filed a second action, styled Thomas Klorer et al. v. Samson, complaining about the same issues. In August 2005, these two actions were consolidated.
On his birthday in November 2006, Charles Hooks, as an oil and gas attorney, attended a seminar for oil and gas attorneys. There, he met an attorney who told him he was handling the Klorer and Lee cases against Samson.
On November 16, 2006, the Hooks were added to the consolidated suit in a Fifth Amended Petition. This petition alleged against Samson various breaches of contract and common law and statutory negligence related to the Hooks' Jefferson County Lease and their two Hardin County Leases. Among other things, the Hooks claimed that Samson had breached the Jefferson County Lease by not paying compensatory royalties based on the bottom hole of the BSM No. 1 well being within 1,320 feet from their Lease. The Hooks also claimed that Samson had improperly "unpooled" the BSM A-1 unit, and they sued to obtain all royalties they would have received from that unit as if all
The Hooks added fraud, fraudulent inducement, and statutory fraud claims with respect to the Jefferson County Lease in a Sixth Amended Petition, filed on May 7, 2007. The Hooks alleged in the alternative (1) that their Jefferson County Lease had never been a part of the BSM No. 1 unit because no agreement to amend that Lease to allow pooling was entered, and, therefore, they were entitled to damages under the Lease for the loss of their rights to require Samson either to drill an offset well, pay them compensatory royalties, or release their acreage, and (2) that Samson had made false representations to them as to the configuration of the BSM No. 1 unit and the location of the BSM No. 1 well to induce them to agree to amend the Jefferson County Lease to allow a portion of it to be pooled in the BSM No. 1 well and unit(the "offset obligations claim"). They contended that Samson had falsely represented "that the [BSM No. 1] (gas) well was more than 1,320' from the nearest lease line of the Hooks Jefferson County Lease" so that its offset obligations were not triggered under the Lease. The Hooks claimed that the representations were intended to save Samson from having to pay them the substantially greater compensatory royalties that would have been payable under the terms of the Lease for infringement of the 1,320-foot buffer zone.
In September 2007, the trial court severed the consolidated action against Samson into three different actions, one of which was the Hooks' action against Samson for fraud and breach of contract.
Subsequently, the Hooks moved for partial summary judgment on several of their claims based on the terms of their Leases. The Hooks moved for summary judgment on the unpooling claim, claiming that Samson did not have authority to vacate the BSM A-1 unit into which their Hardin County Leases were pooled and that, therefore, Samson had breached its lease contract by failing to pay them royalties on the BSM A-1 well. The Hooks also moved for summary judgment on their most favored nation claim, formation production claim, and offset claims. They argued that Samson failed to pay them "royalties based on a greater `Most Favored Nations' rate and compensatory royalties on certain offset encroaching wells."
Samson moved for partial summary judgment on the offset obligations provision, on the formation production claims, and on the most favored nation claim. Samson also moved for summary judgment on the Hooks' unpooling claim on the basis of limitations.
The trial court granted the Hooks' motion for summary judgment and denied Samson's motion on the unpooling claim. It assessed damages of $766,626.85 against Samson on the Hooks' unpooling claim.
The trial court granted Samson's motion for summary judgment for breach of the offset obligations provision in the Jefferson County Lease on limitations, and it denied the Hooks' corresponding motion. The trial court also disposed of some other contract claims by other partial summary judgment motions.
In 2008, the case went to trial solely on the Hooks' fraud claims with respect to the Jefferson County Lease and their formation production claims. The fraud claims included the Hooks' claims that Samson's landman, Lanoue, had made misrepresentations to them to get them to allow Samson to add their 50 acres subject to the Jefferson County Lease to the BSM No. 1 pooling unit for the BSM No. 1 well, which was within the 1,320-foot buffer zone for the Lease. The Hooks contended Samson made these misrepresentations to avoid abiding by the terms of Article VI(A) of the Jefferson County Lease, which they contended would have required Samson to drill an offset well, release their acreage, or pay them compensatory royalties, and, therefore, they were entitled to damages. The Hooks also claimed that they were entitled to additional royalties under the formation production clauses in both their Jefferson County and their Hardin County Leases.
The jury answered "yes" to the questions of whether Samson committed fraud and statutory fraud with respect to the BSM No. 1 well. It assessed damages against Samson for fraud in the amount of $20,081,638.07. The jury found that, in the exercise of reasonable diligence, the Hooks should have discovered Samson's fraud by Charles "Hook's Birthday April 2007." It did not respond, however, to the questions asking for a finding, by clear and convincing evidence, that the harm to the Hooks resulted from fraud or that Samson had actual awareness of the falsity of the representations or promise that the jury had found to be fraud.
Finally, the jury found that Samson's failure to pay royalties based on formation production resulted in underpayment of royalties on all three of the Hooks' Leases.
The trial court entered final judgment on the jury's verdict, awarding the Hooks $20,081,638.07 for damages proximately caused by Samson's fraud with respect to the BSM No. 1 well. The final judgment also reaffirmed and incorporated the trial court's previous summary judgment rulings in favor of the Hooks. In addition to the fraud award, the judgment awarded
Samson has appealed the judgment on the trial verdict and the partial summary judgments entered against it, and the Hooks have cross-appealed the partial summary judgments entered against them, all of which were incorporated in the final judgment.
Samson contends on appeal that the trial court erred in entering judgment on the jury's finding that it committed fraud with respect to the Hooks' Jefferson County Lease and that it withheld royalties on formation production with respect to all three of the Hooks' claims. It also contends that the trial court erred in granting the Hooks' motion for summary judgment on their unpooling claim with respect to the BSM A-1 well, in granting summary judgment on the Hooks' claim for royalties under the most favored nations clause in their Jefferson and Hardin County Leases, and in denying its own motion for summary judgment on those claims. Finally, Samson contends that the trial court erred by granting a permanent injunction in its final judgment requiring Samson to fulfill certain contract provisions on pain of contempt of court, that it erred in awarding attorney's fees to the Hooks, and that it erred in awarding the Hooks 18% post-judgment interest compounded annually.
The Hooks contend on cross-appeal that the trial court erred in ruling in Samson's favor on their claims that Samson breached the offset obligations clause in the Hardin County Leases.
In its third issue, Samson contends (1) that there is legally and factually insufficient evidence to support the jury's finding that the Hooks could not have discovered their fraud claims until April 2007 and (2) that the statute of limitations bars the Hooks' claim for fraud, fraudulent inducement, and statutory fraud with respect to the Jefferson County Lease.
To prove fraud, a plaintiff must show that the defendant made (1) a material misrepresentation (2) that was either known to be false when made or was asserted without knowledge of its truth (3) which was intended to be relied upon (4) which was indeed relied upon and (5) which caused injury. Dow Chem. Co. v. Francis, 46 S.W.3d 237, 242 (Tex.2001). To prove fraudulent inducement, these same elements of fraud must be established as they relate to a contract. Coastal Bank SSB v. Chase Bank of Tex., N.A., 135 S.W.3d 840, 843 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2004, no pet.). The statute of limitations for fraud is four years. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM.CODE ANN. § 16.004 (Vernon 2002).
"Statutes of limitations are intended to compel plaintiffs to assert their claims `within a reasonable period of time while the evidence is fresh in the minds of the parties and witnesses.'" Wagner &
The statute of limitations for fraud is four years. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM.CODE ANN. § 16.004(a)(4) (Vernon 2002); Exxon Corp. v. Emerald Oil & Gas Co., 348 S.W.3d 194, 216 (Tex.2011). "The statute of limitations for fraud begins to run from the time the party knew of the misrepresentation." Emerald Oil, 348 S.W.3d at 216; see also Little v. Smith, 943 S.W.2d 414, 420 (Tex.1997) ("Generally, in a case of fraud the statute of limitations does not commence to run until the fraud is discovered or until it might have been discovered by the exercise of reasonable diligence.").
The Hooks claimed, and the jury found, that in making their determination to agree to the pooling of 50 acres of their Jefferson County Lease in the BSM No. 1 unit, they relied solely on Lanoue's oral statement that the BSM No. 1 well was about 1,500 feet from their Lease line and on Charles Hooks' interpretation of the plat of the BSM No. 1 unit provided to him in response to his conversation with Lanoue on February 15, 2001. The Hooks also contended, and the jury found, that they did not discover that the bottom hole of the BSM No. 1 well was within their 1,320-foot buffer zone, entitling them to additional compensation royalties, until well within the limitations period as extended by application of the discovery rule.
Had the Hooks exercised reasonable diligence, they should have known of the exact location of the bottom hole when the directional survey was filed with the Railroad Commission in July 2000. See Emerald Oil, 348 S.W.3d at 216; Little, 943
The Hooks' fraud claims were not filed until May 2007, more than six years after pooling was proposed to them by Samson. We conclude that the Hooks knew or should have known information that led to the discovery of the alleged fraud no later than February 2001, as the necessary information was a matter of public record at that time. See BP Am. Prod. Co. v. Marshall, 342 S.W.3d 59, 66 (Tex.2011) (holding that information disclosing lessee's failure to continue good faith efforts to develop oil and gas lease was available from public records and "from several other sources, including the lessee"); HECI Exploration Co. v. Neel, 982 S.W.2d 881, 886 (Tex.1998) (holding that, because several sources of information about common reservoirs and operations are available to royalty owners, including Railroad Commission records, discovery rule deferring accrual of cause of action does not apply to claims of royalty owners for damage to common oil and gas reservoir).
The statute of limitations for fraud begins to run when the claimant knew or could have discovered the fraud by the exercise of reasonable diligence. See Little, 943 S.W.2d at 420. Thus, the statute of limitations began to run in February 2001, but the Hooks did not file suit until May 2007, which is well outside the limitations period. See Emerald Oil, 348 S.W.3d at 216. We hold that the Hooks' fraud claims are barred by limitations as a matter of law.
On rehearing, the Hooks argue that the issue of when they could have discovered the fraud was a question for the jury, citing Lesley v. Veterans Land Board, 352 S.W.3d 479, 485-86 (Tex.2011). That case addressed an alleged mistake in a reservation of a mineral interest. Id. The supreme court held that there were fact issues as to whether this mistake was so plain as to charge the grantor with knowledge of the mistake. Id. at 486. The court concluded, "In these circumstances, it cannot be said that, as a matter of law, Lesley knew or should have known of the mistake in her deed when she executed it. Whether her claim for reformation is barred by limitations involves disputed facts." Id. This scenario is distinguishable from the present case.
When a cause of action accrues is normally a question of law. Emerald Oil, 348 S.W.3d at 202. Our analysis of when the Hooks knew or should have known of facts that in the exercise of reasonable diligence would have led to the discovery of the alleged wrongful act demonstrates
We sustain Samson's third issue.
In its sixth issue, Samson challenges the trial court's summary judgment awarding the Hooks damages on their claim for royalties from the BSM A-1 unit due to Samson's improper unpooling of that unit.
Samson contends that because Black Stone Minerals, the 87.5% owner of the mineral rights on the drill site tract did not consent to pooling, (although FirnBank, the owner of a 12.5% interest in the mineral rights did), the "essential purpose for forming that unit had failed" and the BSM A-1 unit as originally designated was not formed. Thus, the amendment of the unit to exclude the non-consenting drill site mineral owner, Black Stone Minerals, was justified. Samson further argues that, after the BSM A-1 unit was amended and renamed the DuJay No. 1 unit, the Hooks accepted royalty payments from production on both DuJay units, which gave the Hooks a higher percentage of the production than they would have received under the BSM A-1 unit. Samson argues that, by accepting the royalty payments from the DuJay No. 1 well and the DuJay A-1 well, the Hooks accepted the amendment to the BSM A-1 unit and they understood and acknowledged that the BSM A-1 unit was not formed.
Alternatively, Samson argues that, if the amendment to the BSM A-1 unit was improper, the BSM A-1 unit still exists and the Hooks should have been paid in accordance with their interests in that unit, not in accordance with their interest in the two DuJay units, which were improperly formed. Moreover, it argues that the extent of the unit must be limited to FirnBank's 12.5% interest in the drill site tract because only FirnBank consented to pool its undivided interest in the gas produced from the BSM A-1 well.
The Hooks argue that the BSM A-1 unit was validly formed when FirnBank, the owner of a 12.5% undivided interest in the mineral rights to the drill site, consented to the unit and that this pooled unit could not be vacated or amended so long as gas continued to be produced from the BSM A-1 well. The Hooks agreed to the pooling of their Hardin County Leases in the BSM A-1 unit. Therefore, they argue, they are entitled to royalties from the BSM A-1 well in addition to the royalties they accepted from their participation in the DuJay No. 1 and DuJay A-1 pooling units.
An oil and gas lease is a contract and is therefore interpreted as such. Tittizer v. Union Gas Corp., 171 S.W.3d 857, 860 (Tex.2005). When construing a contract, the primary goal of the courts is to give effect to the parties' written expression of their intent. PG & E Gas
With respect to royalty interest owners, "pooling results in `a cross-conveyance of interests in land by agreement among the participating parties, each of whom obtains an undivided joint ownership in the royalty earned from the land in the "block" created by the agreement'" and each of whom receives royalty on the basis of the percentage of that party's acreage to the whole block. Browning Oil Co. v. Luecke, 38 S.W.3d 625, 633 (Tex. App.-Austin 2000, pet. denied) (quoting MCZ, Inc. v. Triolo, 708 S.W.2d 49, 52-53 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.)). In other words, pooling effects a cross-conveyance among the owners of the minerals under the various tracts in the pool so that all cotenants own undivided interests under the unitized tract in the proportion that their contribution bears to the unitized tract. Montgomery v. Rittersbacher, 424 S.W.2d 210, 213 (Tex.1968). Thus, when an oil and gas lease is executed by all of the owners of different mineral interests in two or more tracts, the royalties payable under the lease will be pooled, and all royalty interest owners in the land subject to the lease will share in production, no matter where the well is drilled on the leasehold. London v. Merriman, 756 S.W.2d 736, 739 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 1988, writ denied).
An oil and gas lessee has no power to pool, however, without the lessor's express authorization, usually contained in the lease's pooling clause. Tittizer, 171 S.W.3d at 860; Se. Pipe Line Co. v. Tichacek, 997 S.W.2d 166, 170 (Tex.1999); Luecke, 38 S.W.3d at 634 (holding that lessee's authority to pool is derived solely from terms of lease, and lessee has no power to pool absent express authority). "For pooling to be valid, it must be done in accordance with the terms of the methods and purposes specified in the lease." Tittizer, 171 S.W.3d at 860; Tichacek, 997 S.W.2d at 170. Good-faith pooling can be exercised multiple times. See Expando Prod. Co. v. Marshall, 407 S.W.2d 254, 259-60 (Tex.Civ.App.-Fort Worth 1966, writ ref'd n.r.e.). However, "[t]he lessors' land may be pooled only to the extent stipulated in the lease." Tittizer, 171 S.W.3d at 860 (quoting Jones v. Killingsworth, 403 S.W.2d 325, 327-28 (Tex.1965)).
Joinder by all interest owners is not necessary for a pooled unit to be valid. See Ladd Petroleum Corp. v. Eagle Oil & Gas Co., 695 S.W.2d 99, 106 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.); see also Whelan v. Placid Oil Co., 274 S.W.2d 125, 128 (Tex.Civ.App.-Texarkana 1954, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (holding that tenant in common has right to execute lease on his undivided interest in common property, notwithstanding nonjoinder of cotenant); Donnan v. Atl. Richfield, 732 S.W.2d 715, 717 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 1987, no writ) (stating that cotenant has right to incorporate pooling agreement into oil or gas lease without consent or joinder of cotenants, thereby binding his undivided interest). Rather, a tenant in common has the legal right to incorporate a pooling agreement into an original oil and gas lease without the consent or joinder of the other cotenants, creating a valid contract binding the undivided interest of the cotenant
A lessee cannot unilaterally terminate a unit that has a producing pooled well. See Ladd Petroleum Corp., 695 S.W.2d at 106-07. Rather, for a lessee to terminate a unit, either the lessors must agree to the unpooling or the lease must expressly authorize such termination. Id. at 107; see Williamson v. Mobil Producing Tex. & N.M., Inc., 737 S.W.2d 917, 921 (Tex.App.-Beaumont 1987, writ denied) ("So, clearly, the lessee, if it is `after the discovery of the same,' can change the pooling unit only subsequent to the cessation of production....").
When a mineral interest owner — a lessor — accepts royalty checks from a pooled unit, he has accepted that unit. See Montgomery, 424 S.W.2d at 214-15. Under the doctrine of equitable estoppel, mineral interest owners can not repudiate a unit designation after accepting royalties attributable to that unit. Cambridge Prod. Inc. v. Geodyne Nominee Corp., 292 S.W.3d 725, 732 (Tex.App.-Amarillo 2009, pet. denied).
Here, The Hardin County Leases granted Samson the authority to pool those leases with other land or leases. Under that authority, Samson obtained the Hooks' agreement to pool their interests with the undivided interests of the two drill site lessors, Black Stone Minerals and FirnBank, in the BSM A-1 unit. One of the two drillsite lessors — FirnBank — consented to the BSM A-1 unit. In addition, Samson pooled other lands and its own working interests into that unit. However, Black Stone Minerals refused to pool. Samson had no authority to pool Black Stone Minerals' interests without its express consent. See Tittizer, 171 S.W.3d at 860; Tichacek, 997 S.W.2d at 170; Luecke, 38 S.W.3d at 634. But it did not lack authority to form a gas production unit that included the mineral interests of Black Stone Minerals's cotenant, FirnBank. See Ladd Petroleum Corp., 695 S.W.2d at 106; Whelan, 274 S.W.2d at 128.
We agree with the Hooks that the originally designated BSM A-1 unit was validly formed, creating a valid contract binding FirnBank, the cotenant making the agreement, and the Hooks. See Whelan, 274 S.W.2d at 128. Thus, the Hardin County Leases and FirnBank's undivided 12.5% interest in the acreage of the designated unit, as well as the leases of the other consenting landowners, constituted a valid pooling unit. However, FirnBank pooled only its own undivided 12.5% interest in the production from the BSM A-1 unit. See id. at 129. The BSM A-1 unit that was created for the BSM A-1 well did not include the interest of Black Stone Minerals, who had not consented to pool its undivided mineral interest in the drill site lease, as a lessor. See Tittizer, 171 S.W.3d at 860; Tichacek, 997 S.W.2d at 170; Luecke, 38 S.W.3d at 634. Neither FirnBank nor the Hooks had the authority to bind Black Stone Minerals to their own agreement to pool. See Montgomery, 424 S.W.2d at 213; Whelan, 274 S.W.2d at 128.
While there was production from the original BSM A-1 unit, Samson had no
Samson pooled the Hooks' interests and those of the other interest holders in the originally designated BSM A-1 unit into both the DuJay No. 1 unit and the DuJay A-1 unit, pursuant to its right under the Hardin County Leases to exercise pooling authority multiple times, "at any time and from time to time...." Samson notified the Hooks, stating, "Please note that the Unit Designation for the Black Stone Minerals `A' No. 1 is being amended and will now be called the Joyce DuJay No. 1 Unit. No additional action is needed on your part."
The amended unit and redesignated pooling unit included reduced acreage from the Black Stone Minerals/FirnBank lease as well as the Hooks' Hardin County Leases and others from the original BSM A-1 unit, including the State's leases. Although the new DuJay No. 1 unit did not include the horizon from which the BSM A-1 well was producing, it did include deeper strata that had been included in the original BSM A-1 unit, including the depths from which the DuJay No. 1 well was producing. Subsequently, Samson designated a second new gas production unit that overlapped with the original BSM A-1 unit, which it named the DuJay A-1 unit. The DuJay A-1 unit included different strata not included in the DuJay No. 1 unit.
The completion of a producing well, the BSM A-1, within the unit area set out in the unitization agreement served to continue the leases granted to Samson by FirnBank, the Hooks, and the other landowners in full force and effect so long as any "unitized substance" continued to be produced from the BSM A-1 well, subject to unpooling through agreement of the lessors or through cessation of the production of unitized substance as provided in the habendum clause of the Hardin County Leases. See Ladd Petroleum Corp., 695 S.W.2d at 107; Whelan, 274 S.W.2d at 128. Therefore, Samson's redesignation of the BSM A-1 unit constituted a breach of the Hardin County Leases by Samson, as did its failure to pay the Hooks royalties on the production from the BSM A-1 well unless the lessors agreed to the unpooling.
The Hooks took no action to assert any rights under the originally designated BSM A-1 unit in response to Samson's amendment and redesignation of the BSM A-1 unit as the DuJay No. 1 unit and its subsequent designation of the DuJay A-1 unit until they filed suit for breach of contract against Samson in November 2006, more than four years from the date of first production and more than four years from the date the BSM A-1 unit was amended and redesignated and the Hooks were notified. Instead, the Hooks expressly agreed to accept the redesignation and terms of the new units, binding themselves to accept royalties pursuant to their pro rata share of the royalties from the DuJay No. 1 and DuJay A-1 units as calculated under the terms of the DuJay No. 1 and DuJay A-1 unitization agreements, and they did accept royalties from the production of both DuJay units until the time of trial in this case.
We hold, therefore, that the Hooks are estopped to assert an interest in royalties from production from the BSM A-1 well by their ratification of the amended and redesignated BSM A-1 unit.
We sustain Samson's sixth issue.
In its seventh issue, Samson claims that the trial court erred in rendering summary judgment in the Hooks' favor on the "most favored nations" lease clause contained in all three of the Hooks' Leases. This clause provided that, under certain circumstances, the royalties payable to the Hooks must be elevated to match the highest royalty payable to Samson's other lessors. Specifically, the clause provides:
The trial court granted summary judgment in the Hooks' favor, holding that this clause was triggered by royalty paid to the State of Texas under a pooling agreement with Samson that was higher than the royalty due to the Hooks.
It is undisputed that the State of Texas's lease under Pine Island Bayou ("State of Texas Lease") is a "Third Party Lease" within the meaning of that term in the most favored nations clause in the Leases in that it covers land located within three miles of the lands covered by the Hooks' Leases. The State, like FirnBank and the Hooks, originally consented to pooling to form the BSM A-1 unit. It declined, however, to consent to the subsequent DuJay No. 1 unit. In order to obtain the State's consent to pool its lease under Pine Island Bayou into the DuJay No. 1 unit, Samson entered into a pooling agreement wherein Samson became obligated to pay the State
A most favored nations clause is "a vendor protection clause [that] enables the vendor to receive the benefit of increases in the market price of his product over the term of a long range contract with a purchaser." Lone Star Gas Co. v. Howard Corp., 556 S.W.2d 372, 374 (Tex. Civ.App.-Texarkana 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.). Such a clause is enforced according to its terms. See id. at 375-76.
The most favored nations clause in the Leases referred specifically to Samson's obligation to pay the Hooks royalty per acre equal to that payable under any Third Party "oil and gas lease(s) part of which is located within three (3) miles of any exterior boundary of the subject lands covered by [the Hooks'] Lease that Samson entered." Here, however, Samson did not enter an "oil and gas lease" with the State that required it to pay higher royalties per acre than it was paying the Hooks under their Leases. It entered a settlement agreement, called a "Pooling Agreement," that raised only the royalty payable to the State on production from the DuJay No. 1 unit.
The difference between the royalties payable to the State on production from the DuJay No. 1 unit and the royalties paid to the Hooks did not represent a difference in the market price of gas at the time the pooling agreement was entered; nor did it represent a general increase in the royalty rate on the State's leases. It was an amount agreed upon by Samson and the State to induce the State to accept the amended unit in place of the BSM A-1 unit and to compensate the State for its loss of royalties from the BSM A-1 well due to Samson's amendment and redesignation of the BSM A-1 unit as the DuJay No. 1, excluding the BSM A-1 well formation.
We conclude that, under its plain terms, the most favored nations clause in the Hooks' Leases does not apply to trigger royalties payable to the Hooks equal to those payable under the settlement agreement reached between Samson and the State. Therefore, we hold that the trial court erred in granting the Hooks' motion for summary judgment for damages under the most favored nations clause in the Hardin County Leases.
We sustain Samson's seventh issue.
In its fifth issue, Samson complains about the jury's finding, in response to Question Number 8, that Samson's failure to pay royalty based on formation production resulted in underpayment of royalty under the Hooks' Jefferson and Hardin County Leases and the trial court's judgment awarding the Hooks damages based on the formation production clause in the Leases. Samson contends the issue was erroneously submitted to the jury because the construction of the contractual provision involved was a question of law for the trial court; therefore, the jury's response to Question Number 8 is immaterial. Samson argues that, as a matter of law, the lease provision in question, properly
Condensate consists of "hydrocarbons that exist in the form of gas when contained in the natural gas reservoir underground, which condense into liquid form when released from the reservoir's higher pressure and temperature." Bowden v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 247 S.W.3d 690, 704 n. 7 (Tex.2008). When gas is produced, it goes through a mechanical separator through which condensate drops out as a liquid at the wellhead. The Railroad Commission has implemented a system by which producers report the amount of gas in the reservoir before it is produced. This system requires producers to use a formula to calculate the volume of reservoir gas produced at the surface as a liquid. "Formation production" is thus the calculation of the total amount of natural gas taken from the reservoir in whatever form it arrives at the surface, whether in the form of gas or in the form of liquid condensate. Formation production calculations allow the Railroad Commission to track the amount of gas coming out of the ground to avoid overproduction.
Article III of each of the Hooks' Leases contained several paragraphs specifying how royalties were to be paid. It reads in pertinent part:
The Hooks base their formation production argument on Article III(K). They contend that although this provision expressly refers to the entirety of Article III, which covers payments for both liquids and gas, it requires that all calculations shall be based on gas as it exists in the reservoir so that royalties must be paid on liquid condensate both as it is produced in liquid form and as it exists in gaseous form in the reservoir.
The interpretation of the formation production provision in the Hooks' Leases is a matter of contract construction. Whether a contract is ambiguous is a question of law for the court. J.M. Davidson, Inc. v. Webster, 128 S.W.3d 223, 229 (Tex.2003). We construe the parties' intentions as expressed in the document, considering the entire writing and attempting to harmonize and give effect to all of the contract's provisions with reference to the whole agreement. Frost Nat'l Bank v. L & F Distribs., 165 S.W.3d 310, 311-12 (Tex.2005). "We construe contracts
Article III of the Hooks' Leases, governing the payment of royalties, addresses a number of royalty payment issues. In each case, it unambiguously states that Samson will pay 25% of the proceeds it receives, whether for gas or for liquids, as royalties to the Hooks unless the proceeds are below market value, in which case it must pay 25% of market value. In no place do the Leases state that, having paid royalties to the Hooks from the proceeds it receives on the sale of gas or liquid condensate, Samson must pay for the condensate a second time as it existed as gas in the reservoir. Article III does not state that Samson must pay a 25% royalty on "formation production" in addition to royalty on gas and liquids as produced, and we decline to read that provision into the unambiguous language of the Lease. See Mann Frankfort Stein & Lipp Advisors Inc. v. Fielding, 289 S.W.3d 844, 850 (Tex. 2009) ("[T]erms are to be implied in contract, not because they are reasonable, but because they are necessarily involved in the contractual relationship, such that the parties must have intended them and must have failed to express them only because of sheer inadvertence or because they are too obvious to need expression."). We agree with Samson that the unambiguous meaning of these lease provisions is that the Hooks are entitled to a 25% royalty on all gas and liquid hydrocarbons at the time proceeds are received from their sale.
We hold that, under its plain language, the formation production clause in Article III(K) of the Hooks' Jefferson County and Hardin County Leases does not operate to double the amount of royalties owed on the liquid condensate produced from the well. Therefore, the trial court erred in awarding the Hooks damages calculated under the formation production clause in their Leases.
We sustain Samson's fifth issue.
In its eighth issue, Samson claims that the trial court erred by granting a permanent injunction in its judgment that requires it to fulfill certain contractual provisions upon pain of contempt of court. Samson claims that no evidence was presented of the elements necessary for a permanent injunction.
The first item of injunctive relief requires Samson to pay the Hooks royalty on production from the BSM A-1 well commencing with production after May 2008. The fourth item states that Samson shall be liable for all ad valorem taxes on the Hooks' interests in the oil and gas leases at issue after November 2007, as long as those leases are in effect. The fifth item requires Samson to provide the Hooks with certain notices and information "as required by the oil and gas leases in this case while those leases are in effect."
A permanent injunction is proper only when there is evidence of four elements: (1) a wrongful act; (2) imminent harm; (3) irreparable injury, and (4) no adequate remedy at law. Jordan v. Landry's Seafood Rest., Inc., 89 S.W.3d 737, 742 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2002, pet. denied). The ruling is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Id. Courts do not
The Hooks have failed to cite to us any evidence showing that they are in danger of imminent harm or irreparable injury from Samson's failure to pay them royalties on production from the BSM A-1 well or ad valorem taxes or failure to provide them with lease notices and information. Nor have they shown that they have no adequate remedy at law for their grievances. Moreover, at least three of the items of injunctive relief decree future contractual performance, which is forbidden by Cytogenix. Id. Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court abused its discretion by including injunctive relief in its order (1) in the absence of any evidence of the elements of a permanent injunction and (2) when the injunctive relief decrees future contractual performance.
We sustain Samson's fifth issue.
In its eighth issue, Samson complains about the grant of attorney's fees in the final judgment. The parties stipulated that the Hooks' right to collect attorney's fees was contingent on the Hooks prevailing at trial and on appeal. During trial, the parties also stipulated that Samson owed the Hooks $52,257.22 related to ad valorem taxes. Although Samson asked this Court to reverse the trial court's judgment "in its entirety," the parties do not challenge the agreement as to Samson's payment of ad valorem taxes. However, the Hooks argue on rehearing that Samson's stipulation regarding ad valorem taxes means that the Hooks prevailed on a claim, and, thus, they are entitled to stipulated attorney's fees under the terms of a separate pre-trial fee stipulation.
The pre-trial fee stipulation provided that the stipulated attorney's fees "are owed to [the Hooks] by [Samson] if [the Hooks] prevail on any of their claims." The agreement then provided specific exceptions for claims not relevant here. The parties made a separate stipulation during trial that addressed the issue of the ad valorem taxes.
An "agreement between the parties will not be given greater effect than intended," and "[a] stipulation will not be construed as an admission of a fact intended to be controverted." Austin v. Austin, 603 S.W.2d 204, 207 (Tex.1980). Nothing in the ad valorem tax stipulation indicated that it was intended to constitute an admission that the Hooks had prevailed on that issue. Thus, the stipulated payment of ad valorem taxes does not entitle the Hooks to claim attorney's fees. See id. Because we have reversed the portions of the judgment in favor of the Hooks on which they could claim to be prevailing parties, and upon which their right to attorney's fees is contingent, we conclude that the Hooks are not entitled to attorney's fees.
We sustain Samson's eighth issue.
Additionally, in two sentences in its appellate brief, Samson claimed that
When the interest rate is not specified in a contract, post judgment interest should be calculated based on the statutory rate provided in Texas Finance Code section 304.003. See TEX. FIN.CODE ANN. § 304.003 (Vernon 2006) (providing judgment interest rate when interest rate or time price differential is not in contract). Section 304.003(b) provides that, "[o]n the 15th day of each month, the consumer credit commissioner shall determine the post judgment interest rate to be applied to a money judgment rendered during the succeeding calendar month." Id. § 304.003(b). Section 304.003(c) provides that, with exceptions not applicable here, "[t]he post judgment interest rate is... the prime rate as published by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System on the date of computation" or "five percent a year if the prime rate... described by Subdivision (1) is less than five percent." Id. § 304.003(c)(l)-(2). The prime rate is published in the Texas Register by the Secretary of State. Id. § 304.004 (Vernon 2006). This Court may take judicial notice of the correct, published rate on appeal. See Office of Pub. Util. Counsel v. Pub. Util. Comm'n of Tex., 878 S.W.2d 598, 600 (Tex.1994).
Here, when the trial court entered its final judgment on December 11, 2008, the judgment interest rate according to the consumer credit commissioner was five percent. See Judgment Rate Summary, http://www.occc.state.tx.us/pages/int_rates/Index.html (last visited May 22, 2012). Thus, the post judgment interest rate on Samson's obligation to pay the stipulated ad valorem taxes should be five percent. See TEX. FIN.CODE ANN. § 304.003(c).
We sustain Samson's issue on the post judgment interest rate.
We reverse the trial court's final judgment awarding the Hooks damages on their fraud, fraudulent inducement, statutory fraud, and formation production claims and render judgment that the Hooks take nothing by these claims. We likewise reverse the trial court's final judgment as it reaffirms and incorporates its summary judgments on the Hooks' unpooling and most favored nations claims and render judgment that the Hooks take nothing by these claims. Because of our holding on these issues, we vacate the trial court's award of attorney's fees. Finally, we vacate the permanent injunction entered against Samson by the trial court. We further hold that the proper post judgment interest rate is five percent.
Before trial, the Hooks and Samson filed cross-motions for summary judgment on the issue of whether Samson breached the
The Hooks filed a cross-appeal claiming, in one issue, that the trial court erred in granting Samson's motion for summary judgment and denying their own. The Hooks include in this issue sub-issues regarding the correct interpretation of Samson's offset obligations under the Jefferson County and Hardin County Leases, an exception in the Leases for pre-existing wells, and the statute of limitations.
Samson contends that the Hooks have waived their appeal of the summary judgments by failing to preserve it. It further argues that the trial court correctly interpreted the Hardin County Leases with respect to the issues raised by the Hooks on cross-appeal and correctly rendered summary judgment holding that the Hooks' offset claims are contract claims that are barred by limitations.
To prevail on a summary judgment motion, a movant has the burden of proving that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law and that there is no genuine issue of material fact. TEX.R. CIV. P. 166a(c); Cathey v. Booth, 900 S.W.2d 339, 341 (Tex. 1995). Neither party herein argues that a genuine issue of material fact exists which precludes summary judgment; instead, both claim that, as a matter of law, they are entitled to summary judgment based on the language of the Leases.
The Hooks' claims that Samson breached its offset obligations are breach of contract claims. The four-year statute of limitations applies to the Hooks' contract claims. See Stine v. Stewart, 80 S.W.3d 586, 592 (Tex.2002); HECI Exploration Co., 982 S.W.2d at 885. "It is well-settled law that a breach of contract claim accrues when the contract is breached." Stine, 80 S.W.3d at 592.
Here, Samson's alleged breach of its offset obligations occurred ninety days from the date of first production from the wells in question. For the BSM No. 1 well, the ninety days ran in January 2001. For the BSM A-1 well, the ninety days ran in September 2001. The Hooks did not file suit until November 2006, more than five years later.
We conclude that the Hooks' cause of action for Samson's breach of its offset obligations was barred by the four-year statute of limitations.
Because our resolution of this issue is dispositive, we do not reach the other sub-issues raised in the Hooks' cross-appeal.
We overrule the Hooks' issue on cross-appeal.
We modify the applicable post judgment interest rate to five percent and affirm the portion of the trial court's judgment awarding the Hooks $52,257.22 related to ad valorem taxes as stipulated by the parties. We reverse the remaining portions of the final judgment of the trial court, including the awards to the Hooks of $20,081,638.07 for damages proximately cause by fraud, $848,854.01 for damages for breach of the most favored nations clause, and $766,626.85 for damages for "unpooling" related to the BSM A-1 well, attorney's fees, other fees and costs. We hold that the Hooks take nothing by those
Justice SHARP, concurring in part and dissenting in part.
JIM SHARP, Justice.
I withdraw my dissenting and concurring opinion dated August 25, 2011 and substitute this opinion in its stead. I continue to dissent in part and concur in part.
It is undisputed that Samson drilled a directional well bottomed within the "buffer zone" established in the Hooks' Jefferson County Lease (the "Lease") and failed to elect between the three alternatives outlined in the Lease, thus exposing itself to liability for breach of contract. If the Lease had allowed pooling, Samson could have solved the problem by pooling the lands covered by the Lease with the adjacent lands. The Lease, however, did not allow pooling.
Samson's solution to this problem was to begin misrepresenting various "facts" to escape the consequences of its actions. Its landman, Lanoue, filed papers with the Railroad Commission falsely certifying that Samson had pooling authority from the Hooks. He later filed paperwork in the county's real property records falsely indicating that the Hooks had already agreed to pool. Lanoue then sent a letter to the Hooks asking them to agree to pool the westernmost 50 acres of the Hooks' acreage in the Lease into the BSM 1 Unit. When Charles Hooks called Lanoue and asked for more information about the well's location, Lanoue represented to Hooks that the well was located approximately 1500 feet from the lease line, a location outside the buffer zone. When Charles Hooks asked for a plat, Lanoue faxed him one that represented a bottom-hole location that was +/-1400 feet from the lease line, the accuracy of which he, Lanoue, had certified with no reference to an actual bottom-hole location, although it was ascertainable from a prior directional survey. Instead, when asked the origin of those measurements, he answered: "I got them from myself." On this basis the Hooks agreed to the formation of the unit.
Thus it is clear that Samson, through its representative, took action to cover up its own error by both oral and written misrepresentations to its lessor, born of "assuming" and "hoping." It is further clear that the Hooks, after asking for and receiving verification of Lanoue's oral representation in the form of a plat, believed its lessee's representations and made no attempt to go beyond them to discover the truth or falsity thereof. On these facts, the majority has found that the discovery rule does not apply to the Hooks' fraud, fraudulent inducement, and statutory fraud claims and that they are barred by limitations as a matter of law.
I reluctantly concur, based on the Texas Supreme Court's holding in BP America Production Co. v. Marshall, 342 S.W.3d 59 (Tex.2011). In that case, the Texas Supreme Court makes clear that no lies on the part of a lessee, however self-serving and egregious, are sufficient to toll limitations, as long as it is technically possible for the lessor to have discovered the lie by resort to the Railroad Commission records. This burden the Court imposes upon lessors is severe. It is now a lessor's duty to presume that any statement made by its lessee is false and to ransack the esoteric and oft-changing records at the Railroad Commission to discover the truth or falsity of its lessee's statements. If, as is often the case, these records are technical in nature and require expert review to ferret out the truth, it is the lessor's job to hire experts out of its own pocket to perform
Such is the case here. Had the Hooks presumed that Samson's oral representations, followed by written representations, about the bottom-hole location of the well were false, and had they hired an expert to resort to Railroad Commission records to trace the various filings (some of which were also false), that expert could have hit upon the directional survey and, by virtue of his expertise, interpreted it to prove the falsity of the representations. Instead they merely relied on the oral and written representations of their lessee, without undergoing what doubtless seemed to them the useless expense of hiring an expert to rake through the Railroad Commission records with an eye towards exposing a potential falsehood.
I believe the Texas Supreme Court has placed an unnecessary and very heavy burden on lessors by its ruling in BP America, one that will result either in much money being spent unnecessarily on prophylactic forensic review of Railroad Commission records or in many viable claims being lost to limitations. As we are, however, bound to follow the Court's rulings, I reluctantly concur in that part of the opinion that finds the Hooks' fraud, fraudulent inducement, and statutory fraud claims barred by limitations as a matter of law.
I dissent, however, to that part of the majority's opinion that sustains Samson's challenge to the trial court's findings concerning "unpooling" by amending a unit.
Early in 2001, Samson drilled the Black Stone Minerals No. A-1 well ("BSM A-1 Well") on a separate Samson lease. The mineral interests underlying this lease were owned 87.5% by Black Stone Minerals and 12.5% by FirnBank.
Because Samson was without contractual authority to pool pursuant to its leases with either Black Stone or FirnBank, it sought to negotiate with them for such a right. Before such agreement, if any, was reached, however, Samson unilaterally concluded that both of the lessors were in agreement. Pursuant to this unilateral conclusion, in March 2001, Samson filed a unit designation for a 704-acre unit called the Black Stone Minerals "A" No. 1 Gas Unit (the "BSM A-1 Unit"), which unitized the above-described leases as well as the Hooks' Hardin County leases (the "Hardin County Leases"). The designation recited that it was effective as of the date of first production. Firnbank consented to the pooling in May 2001. Written consent to pool was also obtained from the Hooks. The 87.5% interest owner, Black Stone Minerals, however, declined to consent.
Samson drilled and completed the BSM A-1 Well and it began producing in June 2001 from the depth range of the BSM A-1 Unit as designated by Samson. In December 2001, Samson finished another gas well ("Joyce DuJay No. 1 Well") from the surface of the BSM A-1 Unit that was completed within the area and depth limits of the BSM A-1 Unit. In February 2002, Samson executed and recorded a designation for a Joyce DuJay No. 1 Gas Unit ("DuJay 1 Unit") that recited an effective date as of first production of the DuJay No. 1 Well. Although termed an "Amendment" of the BSM A-1 Unit, it designated a new, smaller, 570-acre unit with a different name, different leases, different depths and different boundaries than the BSM A-1 Unit. The DuJay 1 Unit included some of the deeper strata of the BSM A-1 Unit, but excluded the horizon from which the BSM A-1 Well was producing. Thereafter, the BSM A-1 Well was produced as a
Samson claimed that the DuJay 1 Unit was an "amendment" of the BSM A-1 and thus that the BSM A-1 Unit no longer existed. In other words, it took the position that, because it failed to sign up all the other leaseholders in the BSM A-1 Unit, it could "de-designate" the earlier-designated BSM A-1 Unit. If Samson was correct, it did not need to pay the Hooks for their proportionate share of the BSM A-1 Well; if not, it did.
The Hooks moved for summary judgment claiming that Samson had no authority to terminate or invalidate the BSM A-1 Unit and therefore had breached its lease contract by failing to pay the Hooks royalties on the BSM A-1 Well. The trial court granted this motion. Samson, in its sixth point, contends that the trial court erred in granting this motion (and in denying its own cross-motion).
The majority opinion holds that, by accepting royalties from the DuJay 1 and DuJay A-1 Units, the Hooks "accepted" those units and thus, "[t]heir interest in the BSM A-1 unit was, therefore, terminated, and they are estopped to deny the validity of the unitization agreements for the DuJay 1 and DuJay A-1 as to their interest therein." The majority bases this decision on its conclusion that "a previously designated unit necessarily terminates upon the agreement of all the parties to the agreement to participate in a unit that is incompatible with the prior unit; and the parties who have consented to a new unitization of the same interests are estopped to deny termination of the prior inconsistent unit designation." The majority posits that accepting royalties from a unit the depth or acreage of which overlaps at all with any other unit amounts to a de facto agreement to terminate any earlier unit containing any part of the same depth or acreage.
The Hardin County Leases, however, contain no such limitations. Instead, the Hardin County Leases give Samson the right to exercise pooling authority multiple times, "at any time and from time to time." The language of the leases neither limits this pooling authority to certain depths, nor states or implies that pooling is only valid when the multiple pools do not overlap at any depth. To hold instead that the right to pool multiple times is limited to units that have no overlap is to imply a term in the contract that does not exist. A court is not free to make contracts for parties, nor must it imply terms in a contract without exercising extreme caution. See Universal Health Servs., Inc. RCW v. Renaissance Women's Group, P.A., 121 S.W.3d 742, 747 (Tex.2003). The Texas Supreme Court has held that "terms are to be implied in contract, not because they are reasonable, but because they are necessarily involved in the contractual relationship, such that the parties must have intended them and must have failed to express them only because of sheer inadvertence or because they are too obvious to need expression." Mann Frankfort Stein & Lipp Advisors, Inc. v. Fielding, 289 S.W.3d 844, 850 (Tex. 2009) (citing 11 Richard A. Lord, Williston on Contracts § 31:7 (4th ed.1999)). The rule set up by the majority is not one that is "necessarily involved" in the contractual relationship between a lessor and lessee and we ought not imply it.
Instead, it is black-letter law that a lessee cannot unilaterally terminate a unit, once formed. Good-faith pooling can be exercised multiple times. Expando Prod., Co. v. Marshall, 407 S.W.2d 254, 259-60 (Tex.Civ.App.-Fort Worth 1966, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (citing Texaco, Inc. v. Letterman, 343 S.W.2d 726, 731 (Tex.Civ.App.-Amarillo 1961, writ ref'd n.r.e.). The right to pool leases, however, does not mean the lessee can unilaterally terminate a unit that has a
Here, no party argues that there was a cessation of production from the BSM A-1 Unit. The only basis for finding that the BSM A-1 Unit was no longer valid is the majority's holding that, by accepting royalty on "conflicting" pooled units, the Hooks accepted those units and thus their interest in the BSM A-1 Unit terminated and they are estopped to deny the validity of the unitization agreements for the DuJay 1 and DuJay A-1 as to their interests. The majority cites three cases in support of this proposition. See Cambridge Prod., Inc. v. Geodyne Nominee Corp., 292 S.W.3d 725, 732 (Tex.App.-Amarillo 2009, pet. denied); Ladd, 695 S.W.2d at 107; Whelan v. Placid Oil Co., 274 S.W.2d 125, 128 (Tex.Civ.App.Texarkana 1954, writ ref'd n.r.e.). None, however, actually supports the majority's position. Cambridge holds that a top-lessee, the rights of which derive from its underlying lessors, is estopped from taking the position that a unit is terminated when its underlying lessors had taken an inconsistent position by accepting royalties from the unit. Cambridge, 292 S.W.3d at 732. Ladd holds that "an unpooling could only come about through an agreement of the lessors, or through a cessation of production as provided for in the habendum clauses." Ladd, 695 S.W.2d at 107. In Whelan, the Texarkana court found that parties that have accepted royalty pursuant to a unitization agreement are estopped from denying the validity of the unitization agreement. Whelan, 274 S.W.2d at 128.
All of these cases are distinguishable from the case at bar and none set up the rule that the majority asserts. The Hooks do not deny that they have "consented" to the DuJay 1 Unit. Instead, their position is that each of the units (the BSM A-1 Unit, the DuJay 1 Unit and the DuJay A-1 Unit) is independent of the other, and all could and did exist at the same time. Samson did not exhaust its right to pool by designating the BSM A-1 Unit, so its later DuJay 1 and DuJay A-1 Units were also valid. This position is consistent with the language of the pooling clause itself, which states that "[t]he above right and power to pool may be exercised at any time and from time to time."
The majority's ruling creates a new limitation on pooling, one found neither in the
For the reasons set forth above, I dissent to the portion of the majority's opinion sustaining Samson's sixth issue.
