OPINION

BOB PEMBERTON, Justice.

In 2006, appellant Suzanne Kearns Dewalt was convicted of aggravated kidnapping of her young son to avoid a child-custody order.1 She was sentenced to a five-year prison term, which she has since completed and been released into the free world again. But among other lingering consequences of her conviction, Dewalt is now required to register as a "sex offender" under Chapter 62 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.2 Although both sides agree that Dewalt has not been charged with or convicted of any "sex offense" as that term would normally be understood, it remains that her conviction for aggravated kidnapping, coupled with a mandatory affirmative finding made by the district court that the victim (Dewalt's son) was less than 17 years of age at the time of the offense,3 established a "reportable conviction" that triggers Chapter 62's reporting obligations.4 Consequently, Dewalt is, in the eyes of Texas law, a "sex offender" who must self-report as such through the end of the current decade.5

At least for purposes of this proceeding, Dewalt has not disputed that Texas's "sex offender" registration requirements apply to her in the first instance. Instead, emphasizing the non-sexual nature of her offense (in the sense normally understood), Dewalt filed a motion for early termination of her obligation to register, invoking the mechanisms set forth in Subsection I of Chapter 62.6 The district court denied that relief, and Dewalt brought this appeal. Following the district court's ruling on Dewalt's motion for early termination, the State procured a "nunc pro tunc" version of Dewalt's judgment of conviction, and Dewalt subsequently "amended" her notice of appeal to also challenge that ruling.

We conclude that we lack subject-matter jurisdiction over Dewalt's challenge to either ruling. Alternatively, in the event we somehow possess jurisdiction to review one or both rulings, we could not conclude there is reversible error.

MOTION FOR EARLY TERMINATION

Under Subchapter I of Chapter 62, an offender required to register as a "sex offender" other than as a condition of parole or probation7 may file a motion for early termination of the reporting obligation if he or she has first requested and obtained an "individual risk assessment under Article 62.403."8 Article 62.403 directs the Council on Sex Offender Treatment (the Council) to "establish, develop, or adopt an individual risk assessment tool" or group of tools that "evaluates the criminal history of the person required to register" and "seeks to predict" continuing dangerousness and the likelihood of committing further reportable offenses.9 This risk-assessment tool or group of tools, in turn, is to be used by the Council in evaluating offenders intending to seek early termination.10 The Council must also "provide to the person a written report detailing the outcome of [the] evaluation," i.e., the offender's continuing dangerousness and the likelihood of committing further reportable offenses.11

Article 62.403 further requires that the Council "shall" perform the evaluation and provide the report upon the "written request" of an offender who meets two additional prerequisites: (1) the offender has only a single reportable adjudication or conviction; and (2) that single adjudication or conviction "appears on the list published under Article 62.402(b)."12 Under article 62.402, the Council by rule is to "determine the minimum required registration period under federal law for each reportable conviction or adjudication under this chapter,"13 compare these periods to the applicable registration requirement under Texas law, and "compile and publish a list of reportable convictions or adjudications for which a person must register under this chapter for a period that exceeds the minimum required registration period under federal law."14 Thus, "the list published under Article 62.402" on which the reportable conviction must appear refers to the one prepared by the Council that identifies reportable convictions or adjudications for which the Texas sex-offender registration statute imposes a longer registration requirement than federal law would. Assuming the offender succeeds in obtaining "an individual risk assessment under Article 62.403," article 62.404 permits the offender to file a motion for early termination with the trial court that sentenced him or her.15 Subsection (b) of article 62.404 requires that the motion must be accompanied by: (1) a certified copy of the written report that the offender obtained under article 62.403; and (2) "a written explanation of how the reportable conviction or adjudication giving rise to the movant's registration under this chapter qualifies as a reportable conviction or adjudication that appears on the list published under Article 62.402(b)."16

Article 62.405, in turn, addresses the trial court's duties and powers upon the filing of a motion for early termination. The trial court "may" — a word that denotes discretion, as Dewalt acknowledges17 — either "deny without hearing the movant's request for early termination" or "hold a hearing ... to determine whether to grant or deny the motion."18 Subchapter I provides no further guidance regarding the manner in which the trial court exercises its discretion in choosing between granting a hearing versus denying the motion outright. In this case, the district court opted to hold a hearing on Dewalt's motion.

As for the scope of the court's discretion in deciding the merits of the motion, Subchapter I informs the court only of the following circumstances in which it "may not" grant relief:

Nor does Subchapter I expressly confer any right to appeal either the grant or denial of a motion for early termination, and this presents the first of several hurdles to relief that Dewalt cannot overcome. "[I]n Texas, appeals by either the State or the defendant in a criminal case are permitted only when they are specifically authorized by statute."20 Stated another way, in criminal cases, "[t]he standard for determining jurisdiction is not whether the appeal is precluded by law, but whether the appeal is authorized by law."21 The sole provision authorizing an appeal that appears anywhere in Chapter 62 applies to a trial court's order granting or denying a juvenile's motion to be exempt from sex-offender registration requirements.22 There is no provision in the statute authorizing an appeal from the trial court's grant or denial of a motion for early termination.

Although Dewalt acknowledges that Chapter 62 contains no provision authorizing her to appeal the denial of her motion for early termination, she insists that such a ruling is appealable under Article 44.02 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the general authorization permitting appeals by criminal defendants.23 While recognizing that 44.02 authorizes appeals only from "final judgments,"24 Dewalt urges that an appeal from the denial of a motion for early termination is "essentially an appeal from a final judgment." We disagree. In this context, "final judgment" refers to a final judgment of conviction, as defined by Article 42.01 of the Code — "A judgment is the written declaration of the court signed by the trial judge and entered of record showing the conviction or acquittal of the defendant."25 The district court's denial of Dewalt's motion for early termination is not a final judgment of conviction, and is, therefore, not a "final judgment" that can be appealed under article 44.02.

However, Dewalt's primary argument in support of jurisdiction is that the limitations governing criminal appeals are inapplicable here because "sex offender" registration, and her motion for early termination of it, are civil rather than criminal in nature, and that the ruling denying her motion would be appealable under civil law principles. We need go no further than to reject Dewalt's characterization of motions for early termination as civil rather than criminal in nature. As previously indicated, "sex offender" registration is governed by Chapter 62 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, and it is well settled that "[d]isputes which arise over the enforcement of statutes governed by the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, and which arise as a result of or incident to a criminal prosecution, are criminal law matters."26 Additionally, the requirement to register as a sex offender is a result of and incident to a criminal prosecution, and a motion for early termination must be filed in a trial court with jurisdiction over criminal cases — specifically, the trial court that sentenced the offender for the reportable conviction or adjudication.27

Dewalt claims that the Court of Criminal Appeals recognized in Rodriguez v. State28 that motions for early termination are civil rather than criminal in nature. We disagree. In Rodriguez, the sole issue was "whether the retrospective application of Texas's sex offender registration statute to appellant violates the Ex Post Facto Clauses of the United States and Texas Constitutions."29 The Court of Criminal Appeals concluded that it did not, reasoning that the statute could be applied to people who had committed eligible offenses prior to the enactment of the statute because the law was "civil and remedial in nature" and "not so punitive as to transform the statute into a criminal sanction."30 Rodriguez does not impact our analysis. Although "sex offender" registration requirements may not be a "criminal sanction" that implicates the Ex Post Facto Clause, it is nevertheless "a result of and incident to a criminal prosecution" and gives rise to a dispute regarding construction and application of the Code of Criminal Procedure — the sine qua non of a proceeding governed by the requirements and limitations applicable to criminal appeals rather than civil ones. We are similarly unpersuaded by Dewalt's emphasis on the fact that the "sex offender" early termination is administrated by the Council, an agency administratively attached to the Department of State Health Services,31 rather than a more conventional "law enforcement" agency. Even if these features of the regulatory scheme were otherwise relevant, Dewalt is not challenging any decision or procedure of the Council — only the district court's decision denying her motion for early termination, a decision made by the same court that had convicted her of the criminal offense giving rise to her registration obligation, and one governed by provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

In the absence of any statute conferring her the right to appeal the district court's denial of her motion for early termination, we must conclude that we lack subject-matter jurisdiction over Dewalt's appeal purporting to challenge that ruling.32 We further note that at least two of our sister courts have reached the same conclusion regarding attempted appeals from similar trial court rulings pursuant to Chapter 6233 and that Chapter 62, in this respect, is similar to other criminal statutes in which the Legislature has seen fit to insulate from appellate review certain discretionary trial court decisions bearing on punishment.34

In a final alternative attempt to invoke our jurisdiction, Dewalt urges us to treat her attempted appeal as a petition for writ of mandamus. Even if we could exercise jurisdiction on this basis, we would conclude that Dewalt has not shown herself entitled to relief. In criminal cases, the test for determining whether mandamus relief is appropriate requires the relator to establish both: (1) that she has no adequate remedy at law to redress her alleged harm; and (2) that what she seeks to compel is a ministerial act, not involving a discretionary or judicial decision.35 The latter requirement is satisfied if the relator can show she has "a clear right to the relief sought."36 In other words, the relator is entitled to relief "`when the facts and circumstances dictate but one rational decision' under unequivocal, well-settled (i.e., from extant statutory, constitutional, or case law sources), and clearly controlling legal principles."37

Dewalt has failed to meet this standard for at least two reasons. First, the record conclusively establishes one of the two circumstances, previously summarized, in which trial courts have no discretion to grant a motion for early termination: Dewalt failed to submit with her motion — and could not submit — all of the accompanying "documents required under Article 62.404(b)," namely, a "written explanation of how the reportable conviction or adjudication giving rise to the movant's registration under this chapter qualifies as a reportable conviction or adjudication that appears on the list published under Article 62.402(b)."38 This is so because Dewalt's offense giving rise to her registration obligation, aggravated kidnapping, is not among those that the Council has included on the list it publishes under Article 62.402(b).39 While Dewalt presented proof to the effect that her offense met Article 62.402's substantive requirements for offenses that the Council includes on the list, it remains that her offense has not actually "appear[ed] on the list published under Article 62.402(b)," and inclusion of the offense on the list, not merely eligibility to be included, is what the Legislature has required before a movant can obtain early termination.40

Second, even assuming that the district court had any discretion in ruling on Dewalt's motion, we could not conclude that the court's "only rational decision" was to grant it. Dewalt emphasizes the non-sexual nature of her reportable "sex offense," adding that her individual risk assessment classified her as a "low risk to reoffend." While having some initial intuitive appeal, Dewalt's argument overlooks that Chapter 62 actually imposes "sex offender" registration not only on "sex offenders" as that term is commonly understood, but also those committing certain non-sexual crimes having child victims,41 a statutory feature evidently calculated to satisfy conditions for obtaining federal funding under the Jacob Wetterling Crimes Against Children and Sexually Violent Offender Registration Act.42 Consequently, Texas's "sex offender" registration regime reflects the Legislature's public policy judgment that the nature of certain crimes, including but not limited to those ordinarily considered "sex crimes," warrant the imposition of reporting requirements that enable the victims, other affected persons, and the larger public to ascertain the offender's whereabouts once the offender returns to the free world.43

Subsection I of Chapter 62 gives the trial court discretion to decide, in essence, whether it should make an exception to these reporting requirements based on a particular offender's unique circumstances. Among the evidence before the district court here was the reporter's record from Dewalt's criminal trial (which also included evidence regarding the prior child-custody battle with her ex-husband, the father of the child she later kidnapped) and this Court's opinion affirming her conviction. Without belaboring the contents of this record, suffice it to say that in the face of it, we cannot conclude that the district court exceeded its discretion under Subchapter I in determining that Dewalt's whereabouts should continue to be made known to her son, her ex-husband, and the public. Accordingly, even if we could entertain Dewalt's challenge to the district court's ruling on early termination by treating it as an original proceeding, we could not conclude that Dewalt has established an entitlement to relief.

JUDGMENT NUNC PRO TUNC

As previously indicated, the circumstances of Dewalt's offense of conviction triggered a requirement that the district court include an affirmative finding in the judgment that the victim (Dewalt's son) was younger than 17 years of age at the time of the offense.44 The parties agree that it was the judgment with this finding that gave rise to Dewalt's obligation to register as a "sex offender."45 However, this requirement that Dewalt register as a "sex offender," in turn, triggered an additional obligation on the part of the trial court to include in the judgment "a statement that the registration requirement of [Chapter 62] applies to the defendant and a statement of the age of the victim of the offense."46 In Dewalt's original 2006 judgment, the district court stated — contrary to the substantive components that controlled "sex offender" registration — that "The Sex Offender Registration Requirements under Chapter 62, CCP, do not apply to the Defendant" and "[t]he age of the victim at the time of the offense was not applicable."

The State filed a motion for entry of a nunc pro tunc judgment that would correct the discrepancy. Dewalt filed a response in opposition. The district court granted the State's motion and later, on November 20, 2012, signed a judgment nunc pro tunc stating, correctly, that "The Sex Offender Registration Requirements under Chapter 62, CCP, do apply to the Defendant. The age of the victim at the time of the offense was 5 years old." Thereafter, Dewalt, who had previously filed a notice of appeal challenging only the district court's denial of her motion for early termination, purported to "amend" her notice to add a challenge to the judgment nunc pro tunc. Although acknowledging that the judgment nunc pro tunc has no direct impact on her obligation to report as a "sex offender" — in essence, these are two separate appeals within the same cause — Dewalt complains that the district court made changes to the judgment that were not merely "clerical" in nature.

We are compelled to dismiss Dewalt's appeal of the judgment nunc pro tunc for want of subject-matter jurisdiction. A timely notice of appeal is necessary to invoke appellate jurisdiction.47 In criminal cases, the notice of appeal must be filed within 30 days after the day the trial court signs an appealable order48 (which include judgments nunc pro tunc49), subject to a single 15-day extension.50 The district court signed the judgment nunc pro tunc on November 20, 2012. Consequently, Dewalt had until January 4, 2013, at the latest, to perfect an appeal from that order.51 She failed to do so, filing her "amended" notice of appeal on January 30, 2013, almost four weeks thereafter.

In a sworn statement accompanying her "amended" notice of appeal, Dewalt asserts that the reason for her delay was that she had failed to receive a copy of the judgment nunc pro tunc, and had remained unaware of it, until January 7, 2013, after the appellate deadline had passed. Although this sort of circumstance might excuse an untimely notice of appeal in a civil case,52 "[n]o comparable rule exists for criminal cases,"53 and Texas courts have routinely held, as we must do here, that being unaware of an appealable order or judgment does not excuse an untimely notice of appeal.54

In the absence of a timely notice of appeal from the judgment nunc pro tunc, our sole option is to dismiss Dewalt's attempted appeal of that order for want of jurisdiction.55 But in any event, we could not conclude on this record that the district court erred in signing the judgment nunc pro tunc.

"The purpose of a nunc pro tunc order is to correctly reflect from the records of the court a judgment actually made by it, but which for some reason was not entered of record at the proper time."56 "In other words, use of a judgment nunc pro tunc permits the court to correct now what the record reflects had already occurred at a time in the past."57 "A nunc pro tunc order may correct clerical errors in a judgment, but not judicial omissions."58 "A clerical error is one which does not result from judicial reasoning or determination."59

When the law requires the trial court to enter a particular finding in the written judgment of conviction, the trial court "retain[s] no discretion to do otherwise," and "the failure of the trial judge to do so [is] not an error of judicial reasoning but rather an error of a clerical nature."60 That is what occurred here — despite the substantive requirements for "sex offender" registration being met, the district court nonetheless failed to comply with the requirement that it include "a statement that the registration requirement of [Chapter 62] applies to the defendant and a statement of the age of the victim of the offense;"61 instead, the court stated precisely the opposite. This is the sort of "clerical" error that can properly be corrected by nunc pro tunc.62

CONCLUSION

We dismiss Dewalt's appeal (or appeals) for want of subject-matter jurisdiction. In the alternative, we would deny relief on the merits of her contentions.