Laura Carter Higley, Justice.
Oystermen (1) Hannah Reef, Inc., (2) Shrimps R Us, (3) Ivo Slabic, and (4) Michael Ivic seek to enforce property rights conferred to them under leases entitling them to cultivate and harvest oysters in certain parts of Galveston Bay and to enforce their rights to fish for oysters in public waters pursuant to licenses issued by the Texas Parks and Wildlife Department, an agency of the State of Texas. In 2014, the Chambers-Liberty Counties Navigation District ("the Navigation District"), to which the State had conveyed submerged land within Galveston and Chambers Counties in Galveston Bay, entered into a "Coastal Surface Lease" for "the Planting, Transplanting and Harvesting of Oysters (and other related purposes)" with appellee Sustainable Texas Oyster Resource Management L.L.C. ("STORM").
The Oystermen sued STORM in Galveston County District Court, alleging that STORM has interfered with their respective property rights under their oyster leases. The Oystermen also sought a declaration that STORM cannot prohibit them from harvesting oysters in the public fishing areas.
STORM moved to transfer the venue of Shrimps R Us's and Slabic's claims to Chambers County, in which their two oyster leases lie. The trial court denied the motion, and STORM filed this interlocutory appeal and petition for writ of mandamus to challenge the order denying its motion to transfer venue.
We affirm the trial court's order in the interlocutory appeal. Because STORM has an adequate remedy by appeal, we deny the petition for writ of mandamus.
In 1957 and 1967, the State of Texas conveyed land submerged by the waters of Galveston Bay to the Navigation District. The submerged land, located in Chambers and Galveston Counties, was conveyed by a series of land patents. The patents expressly reserved mineral rights to the State. The patents also reserved, "for the benefit of the general public [,] the right to use that portion of the above described land which shall actually be covered by water for hunting, fishing, or other recreational purposes ..."
Between 1975 and 1989, the Texas Parks and Wildlife Department, an agency of the State, issued six certificates of location, leasing six tracts of submerged land in Galveston Bay to private parties. These six tracts of submerged land lie within the land transferred to the Navigation District by the State of Texas in 1957 and 1967. The six leases, known specifically as Lease Nos. 409A, 410A, 413A, 431A, 430A, and 433A, permit the leaseholders to plant and harvest oysters on the submerged land described in the leases.
Over the years, each of the six oyster leases was transferred to a different private party, as permitted by the Texas Parks and Wildlife Department. By 2014, the six leases were held by the Oystermen, as follows: Hannah Reef held Lease Nos. 413A and 433A; Shrimps R Us held Lease No. 431 A; Ivo Slabic held Lease No. 430A; and Michael Ivic held Lease Nos. 409A and 410A. The portion of the submerged land subject to the leaseholds owned by Hannah Reef and Ivic — Lease Nos. 409A, 410A, 413A, and 433A — are located in Galveston County. The portion of the submerged land subject to leaseholds owned by Slabic and Shrimps R
On April 14, 2014, the Navigation District entered into a "Coastal Surface Lease" with STORM. The Coastal Surface Lease grants STORM the exclusive right, for a period of 30 years, to cultivate and harvest oysters on approximately 23,000 acres of submerged land in Galveston Bay. The lease states that ownership of the submerged land was conveyed to the Navigation District by the State of Texas by patents in 1957 and 1967. Included within these 23,000 acres is the submerged land subject to the six private oyster leases issued by the Texas Parks and Wildlife Department and currently held by the four Oystermen.
On August 5, 2014, STORM sent a letter to the Oystermen entitled "No Trespass Notice" and "No Unauthorized Oyster Activities Notice." The letter informed the Oystermen as follows:
On July 24, 2015, the Oystermen filed suit against STORM in Galveston County District Court to enforce their respective property rights under the six private oyster leases. They asserted, "Galveston County Venue in this Court is proper under Tex. Civ. Prac. Rem. Code, § 15.011, as this action relates to the lease of lands located in Galveston Bay, Galveston County, Texas and to remove encumbrances on and quiet title to said property." The Oystermen asserted claims to quiet title, for trespass to try title, and for tortious interference with prospective business relations. They sought declaratory and injunctive relief as well as damages.
On September 4, 2015, STORM answered, generally denying the Oystermen's claims and specifically denying the
On October 19, 2015, the Oystermen responded to the motion to transfer venue. They argued that venue is proper in Galveston County for Shrimps R Us's and Slabic's claims because Shrimps R Us and Slabic have established the four elements necessary for joinder found in Civil Practice and Remedies Code section 15.003(a). See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 15.003(a) (Vernon Supp.2015).
As part of these factors, Shrimps R Us and Slabic asserted that they have an essential need for their claims to be decided in Galveston County District Court, where the suit is pending. See id. at 15.003(a)(3). Shrimps R Us, Inc. and Slabic claimed that they "conduct their business in Galveston County." They stated that "[r]ecords related to their claim are located in Galveston County as all of the leases at issue in this matter are recorded in Galveston County." They pointed out that "[a]ll four Plaintiffs have jointly engaged counsel located in Galveston County" and claimed that "transferring this case to a different county would be cost prohibitive." They further claimed, "Forcing some Plaintiffs to pursue claims outside of Galveston County would result in unnecessary duplication, increased costs of suit, and undue hardship on plaintiffs and their witnesses."
Among the evidence offered to support the response was Slabic's affidavit. In his affidavit, Slabic testified as follows:
On October 23, 2015, the Oystermen filed their fourth amended petition. The Oystermen continued to pursue claims to quiet title, for trespass to try title, and for tortious interference, asserting their respective property rights under the six oyster leases issued by Texas Parks and Wildlife Department. The Oystermen maintain that their leases are valid and that the 23,000-acre Coastal Surface Lease, issued by the Navigation District to STORM, covering the same areas as the Oystermen's private oyster leases and public fishing areas, is invalid. The Oystermen averred that the Texas Parks and Wildlife Department "has the sole authority to issue leases (along with certificates of location) authorizing persons to plant oysters and make a private oyster bed in the public waters of the State." They alleged that the Navigation District does not "have any legal authority to lease the submerged lands for purposes of cultivating or harvesting oysters."
The Oystermen sought a declaration that their oysters leases are valid and enforceable and that the Coastal Surface Lease is not valid and enforceable. The Oystermen also sought "title and possession of the property as set forth in their leases." The Oystermen further requested that STORM be enjoined "from seeking enforcement of [the Coastal Surface Lease] against [the Oystermen], in any manner, and interfering with [the Oystermen's] use and enjoyment of their property covered by their leases with the State." The Oystermen also sought a determination whether STORM, by way of the Coastal Surface Lease, could limit their right to harvest oysters from public fishing grounds in Galveston Bay that lie within the property subject to STORM's lease. The Oystermen averred that the Texas Parks and Wildlife Department "has the sole authority to issue commercial oyster fishermen's licenses to persons desiring to take oysters from public waters of the State [of Texas] . ." The Oystermen indicate that they each have licenses, issued by the Texas Parks and Wildlife Department, to fish for oysters in the public fishing areas of Galveston Bay. The Oystermen also sought "declaratory relief that the [Coastal Surface Lease] in no way prohibits their ability to fish for oysters in public waters."
The Oystermen also request monetary damages based on their tortious interference with prospective business relations claim. They alleged that STORM had engaged "in harassing conduct." The Oystermen claimed that STORM had navigated "their boats so close to [the Oystermen's] boats that at least one was forced aground." The Oystermen also alleged that STORM had been "following and filming one or more of [the Oystermen's] crews for purposes of intimidation, to frustrate [the Oystermen's] attempts to
In addition, the Oystermen requested a temporary injunction "to prevent [STORM] from acting pursuant to an invalid lease, including the exclusion of [the Oystermen] from the property at issue and/or interference with [the Oystermen's] quiet use and enjoyment of such property." The Oystermen further sought to restrain "STORM from interfering with their right to fish for oysters in public waters STORM now alleges it controls."
Following an evidentiary hearing, the trial court granted the Oystermen's request for a temporary injunction. The trial court's October 30, 2015 temporary-injunction order provides,
The trial court ordered STORM to refrain from entering the Oystermen's leaseholds and to refrain "from hunting, catching, transplanting, or disturbing" the oysters within the Oystermen's leaseholds. STORM was also restrained "from prohibiting, preventing, or limiting [the Oystermen's] access to and use of the area covered by the [Coastal Surface Lease], pursuant to licenses issued by the [Texas Parks and Wildlife Department]." STORM was further restrained "from interfering with, harassing, or disrupting [the Oystermen's] oyster fishing activities or the oyster fishing activities of any duly licenses oyster fisherman."
The trial court conducted a hearing on STORM's motion to transfer venue on November 17, 2015. STORM reasserted its request that the claims of Shrimps R Us and Slabic be transferred from Galveston County to Chambers County. STORM argued that the claims should be transferred because Shrimps R Us's and Slabic's two oyster leases are located in Chambers County, unlike the other four oyster leases held by Ivic and Hannah Reef, which are located in Galveston County.
In defending against the motion to transfer, the Oystermen averred:
The trial court signed an order denying STORM's motion to transfer venue. STORM filed an interlocutory appeal and petition for writ of mandamus in this Court, challenging the order denying its motion to transfer. In both the interlocutory appeal and the mandamus proceeding, STORM presents two issues, contending that the trial court erred in denying its motion to transfer venue. STORM asserts that the motion should have been granted because Shrimps R Us and Slabic did not meet the requirements of Civil Practice and Remedies Code Section 15.003 to join in Hannah Reefs and Ivic's suit in Galveston County. Specifically, STORM asserts that, to remain joined in the suit under Section 15.003, Shrimps R Us and Slabic needed to either (1) independently establish venue in Galveston County or (2) establish an essential need to "bring their title suit" in Galveston County.
As a preliminary matter, we determine whether we have appellate jurisdiction to review the trial court's interlocutory order denying STORM's motion to transfer venue. Generally, we do not have jurisdiction to review a trial court's venue determination. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 15.064(a) (Vernon 2002). In this case, the parties assert that we have jurisdiction pursuant to Civil Practice and Remedies Code Section 15.003. Section 15.003, entitled "Multiple Plaintiffs and Intervening Plaintiffs," provides in relevant part, as follows:
Id. § 15.003(a)-(b) (Vernon Supp.2015) (emphasis added).
Pursuant to Section 15.003(b), the legislature has provided, in cases involving multiple plaintiffs, as here, a limited right to interlocutory appeal to challenge a trial court's determination that a plaintiff did or did not independently establish proper venue or did or did not establish the prerequisites of subsections (a)(l)-(4). Id. § 15.003(b). Accordingly, we conclude that we have jurisdiction over this interlocutory appeal pursuant to section 15.003(b). See id.; Ramirez v. Collier, Shannon, Scott, PLLC, 123 S.W.3d 43, 50 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2003, pet. denied).
"Section 15.003(a) takes as its starting point a `person who is unable to establish proper venue.'" Surgitek v. Abel, 997 S.W.2d 598, 603 (Tex.1999). Accordingly, a trial court must first determine whether a plaintiff can independently establish proper venue before it reaches the four joinder elements found in section 15.003(a)(1)-(4). Id.; see TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 15.003(a).
A plaintiff independently establishes venue with prima facia proof that venue is proper. See Surgitek, 997 S.W.2d at 603. "Prima facie proof is made when the venue facts are properly pleaded and an affidavit, and any duly proved attachments to the affidavit, are filed fully and specifically setting forth the facts supporting each pleading." TEX. R. CIV. P. 87(3)(a); see also Surgitek, 997 S.W.2d at 603. A plaintiffs prima facie proof is not subject to rebuttal, cross-examination, impeachment, or disproof. Ruiz v. Concco, Inc., 868 S.W.2d 752, 757 (Tex.1993). If the plaintiff proves venue facts that support venue, the trial court must maintain the lawsuit in the county were suit was filed unless the motion to transfer is based on an established ground of mandatory venue. TEX R. CIV. P. 87(3)(c). If the plaintiff fails to meet this burden, the trial court must transfer the lawsuit to another specified county of proper venue. Wilson v. Tex. Parks and Wildlife Dep't, 886 S.W.2d 259, 260 (Tex.1994).
If he cannot independently establish venue to support joinder, a plaintiff may nonetheless avoid transfer by establishing the following four factors:
TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 15.003(a)(1)-(4).
Given the subjective nature of these four factors, a plaintiff may offer a wider range of prima proof to establish these factors than is offered to independently establish venue. See Surgitek, 997 S.W.2d at 603 ("[W]e conclude that the trial court has discretion to allow a broader
Section 15.003 expressly precludes this Court from considering the trial court's denial of STORM's motion to transfer venue under either an abuse-of-discretion or substantial-evidence standard. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 15.003(c)(1). Instead, we "conduct a de novo review of the entire record to determine whether a trial court's section 15.003(a) joinder determination was proper." Surgitek, 997 S.W.2d at 603; see also Tex. Windstorm Ins. Ass'n v. Boyle, No. 01-13-00874-CV, 2014 WL 527574, at *2 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] Feb. 6, 2014, no pet.) (mem.op.). We "make [our] own determination of the propriety of joinder under section 15.003(a), with no deference to the trial court's ruling." Surgitek, 997 S.W.2d at 603. We are "not constrained solely to review the pleadings and affidavits, but should consider the entire record, including any evidence presented at the hearing." Id.
Certain kinds of suits involving land must be filed in the county where all or a portion of the property is located. In re Signorelli Co., 446 S.W.3d 470, 473 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2014, orig. proceeding). In this regard, Civil Practice and Remedies Code Section 15.011 provides as follows:
TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 15.011 (Vernon 2002). Two venue facts must be established to show that venue is mandatory under section 15.011:(1) that the nature of the suit fits within those listed in section 15.011; and (2) that all or part of the realty at issue is located in the county where venue is sought. In re Signorelli Co., 446 S.W.3d at 473.
A claim falls within the mandatory venue provision of Section 15.011 when the essence of the dispute involves an interest in real property. See In re Applied Chem. Magnesias Corp., 206 S.W.3d 114, 118-19 (Tex.2006) (orig. proceeding). Because it involves an interest in real property, a claim seeking to enforce and validate an interest in a leasehold, such as the oyster leases, would be the type of dispute that fits within those listed hi Section 15.011. See id.
Here, it is undisputed that the four oyster leases held by Hannah Reef and Ivic involve property located in Galveston County. For this reason, the parties agree that, under Section 15.011, the mandatory venue for Hannah Reefs and Ivic's claims, seeking to enforce Hannah Reefs and Ivic's property rights under their oyster leases, are claims properly decided in Galveston County.
Furthermore, evidence admitted at the temporary-injunction hearing and referenced at the venue hearing, including maps and testimony delineating the location of the Coastal Surface Lease and the public fishing areas, shows that the public fishing areas, subject to the Coastal Surface Lease, are located within both Chambers and Galveston Counties. Thus, the Oystermen's claims for declaratory relief, seeking a declaration that Coastal Surface Lease is invalid and does not prohibit them from harvesting oysters in the public fishing areas, are properly brought under 15.011, in Galveston County. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 15.011 (providing that an action shall be brought in county where all or part of the property is located); see also Hanzel v. Herring, 80 S.W.3d 167, 170-71 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2002, no pet.) (upholding trial court's denial of motion to transfer venue in case where evidence showed leases spanned two counties and suit was filed in one of those counties). Thus, we conclude that Shrimps R Us and Slabic independently established venue in Galveston County with respect to their claims for declaratory relief regarding the validity of the Coastal Surface Lease and the Oysterman's rights to harvest oysters in the public fishing areas.
We now turn to whether Shrimps R Us's and Slabic's claims to enforce their private property rights under their oyster leases should be transferred to Chambers County. It is undisputed that Shrimps R Us's and Slabic's oyster leases are located in Chambers County. STORM asserts that, just as Section 15.011 requires Hannah Reef's and Ivies claims — involving their private oyster leases — to be brought in Galveston County, Section 15.011 requires Shrimps R Us's and Slabic's claims, involving their private oyster leases, to be brought in Chambers County. Because Section 15.011 is a mandatory venue provision, STORM argues that Shrimps R Us and Slabic cannot otherwise independently establish venue in Galveston County for their claims related to their leaseholds in Chambers County.
STORM further asserts that, not only have Shrimps R Us and Slabic failed to independently establish venue in Galveston County, they also have not established an "essential need," as required under Section 15.003(a)(3), to have their claims tried in Galveston County.
In Surgitek, the Supreme Court of Texas defined "essential" as "indispensably necessary." Surgitek, Bristol-Myers Corp. v. Abel, 997 S.W.2d 598, 604 (Tex. 1999). There, 104 plaintiffs, who could not independently establish proper venue, sought to join with two plaintiffs, who had independently established proper venue in Bexar County. Id. at 600. All the plaintiffs alleged injuries from defective breast implants. Id. To show essential need, the Surgitek plaintiffs asserted that there were common facts and issues, that the defendant, Surgitek, had designated the same expert witnesses, that the witnesses were located throughout the country, and that the plaintiffs needed to pool their resources against common experts and issues. Id. at 604.
Noting that the burden to establish essential need is extremely high, the Surgitek court held that the plaintiffs had not established essential need. Id. It stated, "The trial court's order in this case kept all of the remaining plaintiffs together in a single action, thereby allowing them to pool resources. Thus, if the need to pool resources were dispositive, the plaintiffs could have no complaint." Id. The court concluded that the plaintiffs had not established that it was "indispensably necessary" to try their claims in Bexar County. Id.
In this case, Ivic's and Slabic's affidavits were offered to establish essential need for Shrimps R Us's and Slabic's claims to be tried in Galveston County. In their response to STORM's motion to transfer venue, Shrimps R Us and Slabic relied on these affidavits to show (1) they "conduct their businesses in Galveston County;" (2) "[r]ecords related to their claim are located in Galveston County," including the oyster leases, which are recorded in Galveston County; (3) "[a]ll four Plaintiffs have jointly engaged counsel located in Galveston County and transferring this case to a different county would be cost prohibitive"; and (4) "[f]orcing some Plaintiffs to pursue claims outside of Galveston County would result in unnecessary duplication, increased costs of suit, and undue hardship on plaintiffs and their witnesses."
We agree with STORM that, under Surgitek, the reasons proffered in the affidavits do not show that it is indispensably necessary for Shrimps R Us's and Slabic's oyster-lease claims to be tried in Galveston County; that is, the reasons proffered in the affidavits do not establish an essential need for the oyster-lease claims to be brought in Galveston County. See id.; see also Ramirez, 123 S.W.3d at 52 (holding that use of common investigator, pooling of resources, presence of common facts and issues, and location of witnesses across the country did not establish essential need); Smith v. Adair, 96 S.W.3d 700, 707 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2003, pet. denied) (holding that convenience, judicial economy, and sharing of costs do not establish essential need).
Shrimps R Us and Slabic, however, offer another basis to establish essential need. They assert that transferring all or part of their claims to Chambers County has the potential to result in inconsistent judgments. Shrimps R Us and Slabic assert that there is one central issue that is important to all claims being asserted: the validity of the Coastal Surface Lease. They point out that, as discussed above, Galveston County is the proper county for the Oystermen's declaratory-judgment claims regarding whether
In response, STORM argues that any determination of the validity of the Coastal Surface Lease would not have a preclusive effect on the claims it seeks to have transferred to Chambers County; that is, it would not have a preclusive effect on Shrimps RUs's and Slabic's claims to enforce their rights to harvest oysters on the submerged land covered by their private oyster leases. STORM specifically points to Shrimps R Us's and Slabic's trespass-to-try-title claim, asserting that claim would not be affected because that claim does not require Shrimps R Us and Slabic to show that STORM does not have a valid lease.
"A trespass to try title action is the method of determining title to lands, tenements, or other real property" and is the exclusive method to adjudicate rival claims of title to real property. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 22.001(a) (Vernon 2014); Vernon v. Perrier, 390 S.W.3d 47, 54 (Tex. App.-El Paso 2012, pet. denied). A trespass-to-try-title action is used to clear problems in chains of title to recover possession of land alleged to be unlawfully withheld from a rightful owner. See Martin v. Amerman, 133 S.W.3d 262, 265 (Tex. 2004).
STORM correctly points out that a plaintiff in a trespass-to-try-title action must recover on the strength of its own title and may not rely on the weakness of the defendant's title. See Rogers v. Ricane Enters., Inc., 884 S.W.2d 763, 768 (Tex.1994); Diversified, Inc. v. Hall, 23 S.W.3d 403, 406 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2000, pet. denied). A plaintiff may only prevail on a trespass-to-try-title claim "(1) by proving a regular chain of conveyances from the sovereign, (2) by proving a superior title out of a common source, (3) by proving title by limitations, or (4) by proving prior possession, and that the possession has not been abandoned." Rogers, 884 S.W.2d at 768. Here, the Oystermen will need to show that they received superior title from a common source: the State of Texas.
We disagree with STORM, however, that the declaratory-judgment claims do not have the potential to affect the trespass-to try-title claims. The Oystermen's declaratory-judgment claims necessarily entail a determination of the Coastal Surface Lease's validity, which itself necessarily entails a determination whether the Navigation District received the right to cultivate and harvest oysters on the submerged lands when the land was conveyed to it by the State of Texas in 1957 and 1967. If the State retained that right, then the Navigation District could not lease the submerged lands to STORM for the purpose of cultivating oysters. If the State did not retain that right, either in the patents or by law, and the right was conveyed to the Navigation District, then the district may have had the right to enter into the Coastal Surface Lease with STORM. Concomitantly, the Texas Parks and Wildlife Department, an agency of the State, may not have had the right to lease the submerged land under the private oyster leases in the 1970s and 1980s. Such a determination would undermine the Oystermen's trespass-for-title claims because they would be unable to show either the strength or the superiority of their titles from a common source.
To show the superiority of their titles, the Oystermen must establish that the State of Texas possessed the right to cultivate
In short, the issue of the validity of STORM'S Coastal Surface Lease will necessarily be litigated and tried on the merits in Galveston County, which is not only a county of proper venue for all four Oystermen's declaratory-judgment claims under section 15.003 of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code but a county of mandatory venue under section 15.011. Thus, the Galveston trial court's determination of the declaratory-judgment action is ultimately determinative of an essential issue to be tried in all four Oystermen's suits for trespass to try title — whether, after it issued the land patents, the State retained and possessed the right to use the submerged land for purposes of oyster cultivating and harvesting.
Under well-established Texas law, the doctrine of "[i]ssue preclusion, or collateral estoppel, prevents re-litigation of particular issues already resolved in a prior suit." Barr v. Resolution Trust Corp ex rel. Sunbelt Fed. Sav., 837 S.W.2d 627, 628 (Tex.1992). A party seeking to benefit from collateral estoppel must establish that (1) facts sought to be litigated in second action were fully and fairly litigated in first action, (2) those facts were essential to judgment in first action, and (3) the parties were cast as adversaries in first action. Sysco Food Serv. Inc. v. Trapnell 890 S.W.2d 796, 801 (Tex.1994); see also Bonniwell v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 663 S.W.2d 816, 818 (Tex.1984) (holding that collateral estoppel bars relitigation of any ultimate issue of fact actually litigated and essential to the judgment in a prior suit, regardless of whether the second suit is based on same cause of action); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 27 (1982) ("When an issue of fact or law is actually litigated and determined by a valid and final judgment, and the determination is essential to the judgment, the determination is conclusive in a subsequent action between the parties, whether on the same or a different claim."). "The doctrine of collateral estoppel ... is designed to promote judicial efficiency, protect parties from multiple lawsuits, and prevent inconsistent judgments by precluding the relitigation of issues." Sysco Food Servs., 890 S.W.2d at 801.
Here, the validity of the Coastal Surface Lease, as determined by the Galveston County court, will determine the validity or invalidity of that lease with respect to all plaintiffs and will necessarily resolve whether, after issuance of the land patents, the State retained and possessed the right to cultivate and harvest oysters on the submerged land, an issue essential to determining the trespass-to-try-title claims. Any subsequent separate litigation as to these claims would not only be wasteful and duplicative but, most decisively, may be barred by collateral estoppel, prohibiting the re-litigation of issues that have been finally determined in litigation between the same parties.
We hold that the trial court did not err when it denied STORM's motion to transfer venue. We overrule STORM's two issues as discussed supra.
STORM has also filed a petition for writ of mandamus, challenging the trial court's order denying its motion to transfer venue.
Mandamus is an extraordinary remedy that will issue only if (1) the trial court clearly abused its discretion and (2) the party requesting mandamus relief has no adequate remedy by appeal. In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 148 S.W.3d 124, 135-36 (Tex.2004). As discussed, STORM has the right to an interlocutory appeal of the order. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 15.003(b). When the legislature has created the right to bring an interlocutory appeal, the remedy is adequate. See In re Shkedy, No. 14-12-00972-CV, 2012 WL 5337204, at *1 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] Oct. 30, 2012) (mem.op.). "Interlocutory appeals lie as of right and must be decided on the merits; mandamus, on the other hand, is an extraordinary remedy, not issued as a matter of right, but at the discretion of the court." Id. (citing Prudential, 148 S.W.3d at 138).
Accordingly, STORM is not entitled to mandamus relief because it has an adequate remedy by appeal. See id. STORM's petition for writ of mandamus is denied.
In the interlocutory appeal, we affirm the trial court's order denying STORM's motion to transfer venue.
