ALCALA, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which MEYERS, JOHNSON, HERVEY, and COCHRAN, JJ., joined.
In this second petition for discretionary review filed by appellant, Wilton Larron Mahaffey, we determine that the court of appeals erred by holding that a driver must signal a lane change when his lane merges with another lane.
Appellant was traveling in the far right lane of State Highway 198, approaching the bridge dividing Gun Barrel City from Payne Springs.
At the hearing on the motion to suppress, Sergeant Sparks testified that he was following appellant's car south on Highway 198, when both cars passed a "Lane Ends, Merge Left" sign: "Mr. Mahaffey's vehicle was traveling southbound in the outside lane, which would be the right-hand lane closest to the curb. As it approached the area just south of where he's at where that lane ends, he merged... to the left ... without signaling that merge, the lane change." Sergeant
On cross-examination, Sergeant Sparks explained that appellant's car never crossed over any lane dividers or markers. Nonetheless, he still considered the road to be two lanes after the lines ended, although he was not sure if it would be considered two lanes under the law.
Defense counsel argued that the merge was not a lane change. He acknowledged that there was no Texas authority directly on point, but relied on Trahan v. State, 16 S.W.3d 146 (Tex.App.-Beaumont 2000, no pet.). In Trahan, the Beaumont court of appeals held that the failure to signal an exit from a freeway did not violate Section 545.104 when there was no evidence that Trahan "turned" or changed lanes to exit. Id. at 147. Defense counsel also distinguished State v. Dewbre, 133 Idaho 663, 991 P.2d 388 (Idaho Ct.App.1999), an Idaho case factually similar to this one, in which the court held that a signal was required for a merge because the plain language of the Idaho statute explicitly required a signal for a movement right or left upon a highway.
The trial court denied the motion to suppress and signed agreed findings of fact and conclusions of law:
The DWI was resolved with a plea bargain, and the trial court certified appellant's right to appeal the ruling on the motion to suppress.
On appellant's first direct appeal challenging the trial court's denial of his motion, the court of appeals affirmed the ruling, holding that appellant was required to signal because his "movement from right to left on a roadway amounts to a `turn' under chapter 545." Mahaffey v. State, No. 12-08-00430-CR, 2009 WL 2517121, *4, 2009 Tex.App. LEXIS 6444, *11 (Tex.App.-Tyler Aug. 19, 2009) (not designated for publication). On his first petition for discretionary review, this Court addressed whether "a driver in Texas, who passes a traffic sign that states, `Lane Ends, Merge Left,' and who merges left after the right lane ends—that is, where the broken dividing lines between the two lanes cease and the line dividing the right-hand lane from the shoulder angles inward—" is required to signal that maneuver under Texas Transportation Code Section 545.104(a). Mahaffey v. State, 316 S.W.3d 633, 634 (Tex.Crim.App. 2010) ("Mahaffey I"). We reversed the court of appeals, noting that the court's holding "leads to an absurd result: a requirement that a driver must signal any movement that is not a perfectly straight trajectory." Mahaffey I, 316 S.W.3d at 640. We instead concluded that "[u]nder the plain language of the Transportation Code, all movements right or left on the roadway must be made safely, but only some—turns, lane changes, or starts from a parked position—require a signal."
On remand, the court of appeals affirmed the trial court's ruling. Mahaffey, No. 12-08-00430-CR, 2011 WL 721505, 2011 Tex.App. LEXIS 1507. Finding the term "change lanes" unambiguous,
Id. at *3, 2011 Tex.App. LEXIS 1507, at *12.
In his second petition for discretionary review, appellant complains that the court of appeals's holding conflicts with our holding in Mahaffey I. Appellant argues that his conduct did not constitute a lane change under the signal statute because, in merging left when his lane ended, he did not "change lanes," but rather "was simply following the `direct course' of the road." See TEX. TRANSP. CODE § 545.104(a). He concludes that Sergeant Sparks's interpretation of the signal statute, which was premised on where the officer believed the lane ended, was an objectively unreasonable reading of the plain language of that provision. See id.
In response, the State contends that the ordinary meaning of "change" is "to make a shift from one to another" and that "lane" means "a strip of roadway for a single line of vehicles" and argues that appellant's lateral movement constituted shifting from one such area of the roadway to another. It further contends that because the statute does not include the term "marked" to modify "lanes," the fact that appellant did not pass over lane markings is not outcome determinative.
Because the historical facts are not disputed, and because statutory construction is a question of law, we review the trial court's ruling on the motion to suppress de novo. See Oles v. State, 993 S.W.2d 103, 106 (Tex.Crim.App.1999) (citing Guzman v. State, 955 S.W.2d 85, 89 (Tex.Crim.App.
When interpreting statutes, courts must "seek to effectuate the `collective' intent or purpose of the legislators who enacted the legislation." Boykin v. State, 818 S.W.2d 782, 785 (Tex.Crim.App. 1991)). Toward that end, "we necessarily focus our attention on the literal text of the statute in question and attempt to discern the fair, objective meaning of that text at the time of its enactment." Id. However, where application of a statute's plain language would lead to absurd consequences, or where "the language is not plain but rather ambiguous," a court may consider "such extratextual factors as executive or administrative interpretations of the statute or legislative history." Id. at 785-86. In this context, ambiguity exists when a statute may be understood by reasonably well-informed persons in two or more different senses; conversely, a statute is unambiguous where it reasonably permits no more than one understanding. See State v. Neesley, 239 S.W.3d 780, 783 (Tex.Crim.App.2007).
In interpreting statutes, we presume that the Legislature intended for the entire statutory scheme to be effective. See TEX. GOV'T CODE § 311.021(2); Murray v. State, 302 S.W.3d 874, 879, 881 (Tex.Crim. App.2009) (in construing statute, looked to other provisions within entire "statutory scheme" rather than merely the single, discrete provision at issue). Texas Transportation Code Section 541.302(7) provides, "In this subtitle,
Here, the record reveals that the highway on which appellant was driving was comprised of "clearly marked lanes for vehicular travel" and, therefore, was a "laned roadway" as described in the definitions statute. See id. § 541.302(7). It logically follows that once the clear markings on that highway terminated, so, too, did the corresponding "lane."
The State suggests that focusing on the absence of lane markings yields absurd results, such as exempting from the signal statute lane changes made within
In support of its conclusion that the cessation of lane markings in this case was of no legal consequence, the court of appeals cites Turner v. State, 261 S.W.3d 129, 133 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 2008, no pet.), as "holding that [the] record supported [the] trial court's findings that the appellant did not signal intent to change lanes even though the appellant's vehicle did not cross lane dividing lines." Mahaffey, No. 12-08-00430-CR, 2011 WL 721505 at *3, 2011 Tex.App. LEXIS 1507 at *12. In Turner, the appellant was stopped for failing to signal a right-hand turn from one road onto another at an intersection. Turner, 261 S.W.3d at 131-32. The lane from which he turned widened as it approached the intersection and was not exclusively used for right turns; instead, a car traveling on that lane could continue traveling straight through the intersection. Id. at 132. The court held that, because he was not turning from a designated turn-only lane, the appellant was required to signal the turn under the signal statute. Id. at 133 (citing TEX. TRANSP. CODE § 545.104(a)). But the court further concluded that even if that part of the roadway was one from which only a right turn could be made, appellant would still have been "required to signal to indicate his intention to move into that portion of the roadway or `lane.'" Id.
Turner is distinguishable. Assuming, as did the Turner court, that the portion of the roadway from which Turner turned did, in fact, permit only right turns (while the other portion continued straight), a signal would have been required because the act of turning from that road onto another would constitute a "turn" under the statute, despite that such a turn would technically be the driver's only option. See TEX. TRANSP. CODE § 545.104(a); Mahaffey I, 316 S.W.3d at 637. We conclude that the court of appeals's reliance on Turner was misplaced.
We hold that Sergeant Sparks failed to articulate specific facts that support a reasonable suspicion that appellant had violated Texas Transportation Code Section 545.104(a). See TEX. TRANSP.CODE § 545.104(a). We, therefore, hold that there was no reasonable suspicion for the initial stop and that the trial court erred
MEYERS, J., filed a concurring opinion.
KELLER, P.J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which PRICE and KEASLER, JJ., joined.
WOMACK, J., dissented.
MEYERS, J., concurring.
I agree with the majority that the court of appeals erred in holding that a driver must use a lane-change signal when his lane merges with another lane. There are two ways to deal with the issue in this case. The first way is logistically, which is how the majority analyzes this issue: The lane in which Appellant was driving ended, so he was not making a lane change, but rather merging into the only remaining lane. We could also consider this issue from a legal standpoint. Because the sign said "Lane Ends, Merge Left" all drivers were being directed by the authority of the sign to enter the left lane. This is equivalent to an officer directing traffic into another lane, which, as we all know, would not require a lane-change signal. The driver in this case did not commit a traffic violation and the officer did not have reasonable suspicion to stop him. With these comments, I join the majority opinion.
KELLER, P.J., dissenting in which PRICE and KEASLER, JJ., joined.
The traffic sign in this case read, "lane ends, merge left." From this sign, we know that the right lane ended. If a person's lane ends, that person must change lanes to continue driving down the roadway. And changing lanes means he must signal. I agree with the court of appeals, which stated:
Because appellant's lane ended,
I respectfully dissent.
In Madden v. State, we explained that the pertinent issue was "not whether appellant was speeding," but whether the officer "had a reasonable belief that he was speeding. Even police officers may be mistaken about an historical fact such as `speeding,' as long as that mistake was not unreasonable." 242 S.W.3d 504, 509 n. 7 (Tex.Crim.App.2007). Unlike Madden, here there is no mistake about the historical facts. Rather, the matter before us is the application of the law to the facts. See Garcia v. State, 43 S.W.3d 527, 531 (Tex. Crim.App.2001) (addressing sufficiency of facts to justify stop: "The question, then, is whether the child looking back several times is enough to establish reasonable suspicion for a seat belt violation."). As the Second Court of Appeals has explained, evidence that an officer "reasonably suspected that a defendant had violated a traffic law" is constitutionally insufficient because to hold otherwise "would transform the Fourth Amendment's objective standard into a subjective standard dependent on the whims of the police's `understanding' of the law." Fowler v. State, 266 S.W.3d 498, 504 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2008, pet. ref'd).
