Keasler, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Keller, P.J., Johnson, Hervey, Alcala, Richardson, Yeary, and Newell, JJ., joined.
At William Finley's bench trial, the judge convicted him for resisting arrest when opposing police attempts to handcuff
On March 5, 2011, Officer Fuller came to Finley's residence looking for Dennis Boyd, Finley's future son-in-law, as part of a warrant-roundup. After some disagreement with Finley about the warrant's validity, Officer Fuller called for backup. Officer Rollins and Corporal Lauden arrived as backup and brought a copy of the arrest warrant. Because Finley still did not believe the warrant's validity, the officers called in Officer Connor who brought the actual warrant. Having seen it, Finley came to the door and stepped outside but continued to be uncooperative. Officer Connor then attempted to arrest Finley for hindering Boyd's apprehension.
Officer Connor told Finley to turn around and place his hands behind his back. When Finley did not do so, Officer Connor grabbed Finley's right arm. Officer Connor testified that Finley failed "to cooperate and pull[ed] his arms away from us." Specifically, Officer Connor testified that Finley tensed up and pulled his arms away from the arresting officers and towards Finley's abdomen. Because Officer Connor could not get Finley's arms behind his back, Officer Rollins assisted Officer Connor in pulling Finley's arms behind him. But when their attempts failed, the officers pinned Finley against the door and then to the ground. Once Officer Connor pinned him to the ground, Finley kept his arms beneath his body. Officer Rollins then tazed Finley twice until Finley stopped resisting. Afterwards, the officers arrested Finley for resisting arrest and hindering Boyd's apprehension.
The judge found Finley guilty of resisting arrest, but not guilty of hindering apprehension. The judge sentenced Finley to 90 days' confinement, probated for fifteen months and assessed six days in jail as a condition of probation. On appeal, Finley claimed that the evidence was legally insufficient to support his conviction. Finley argued that the evidence did not permit a rational trier of fact to find beyond a reasonable doubt that he used force against a peace officer. A divided court affirmed Finley's conviction.
A person resists arrest "if he intentionally prevents or obstructs a person he knows is a peace officer ... from effecting an arrest, search, or transportation of the actor or another by using force against the
We also held that these definitions pertain to force being used against the officer, not "against his broader goal of effectuating arrest."
In Dobbs, the defendant held a gun to his own head and threatened to take his own life.
Unlike in Dobbs, Finley used force against the officers by pulling against the officers' force. In this case, pulling away from the officers satisfies the "in opposition or hostility to" the police officers requirement. In light of Dobbs's broad definition of force, we conclude the evidence presented in this case was sufficient to convict Finley.
Under Jackson v. Virginia, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found the offense's elements beyond a reasonable doubt.
Based on the record, viewed in light of Dobbs's established definition of force, there is sufficient evidence from which a rational trier of fact could conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Finley used force or violence against the officers. Consequently, we affirm the court of appeals' judgment affirming Finley's conviction.
Meyers, J., filed a dissenting opinion.
Meyers, J., filed a dissenting opinion.
In Dobbs v. State, 434 S.W.3d 166 (Tex. Crim.App.2014), the majority concluded that the defendant's actions of displaying a gun, refusing to put the gun down, and threatening to shoot himself did not constitute "force against" a peace officer within the meaning of Texas Penal Code § 38.03. I dissented in that case because I felt that the defendant exerted force in opposition to the officers in the form of power, violence, and pressure against them, and that his actions were a clear threat to the officers. The majority now says that "pulling away from the officers satisfies the physical in opposition or hostility to the police officers requirement" and concludes that the Appellant in this case "used force against the officers by pulling against the officers' force." I am having a hard time understanding how brandishing a weapon in the presence of multiple police officers and threatening to shoot yourself if the officers attempt to arrest you-a situation that could result in the death or serious injury of multiple people-is not using force against an officer but holding your arms in front of you is.
Because I would hold that Appellant's conduct here was not sufficient to constitute force against an officer under Texas Penal Code § 38.03, I respectfully dissent.