CORNELIA A. CLARK, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which GARY R. WADE, C.J., and JANICE M. HOLDER, WILLIAM C. KOCH, JR., and SHARON G. LEE, JJ., joined.
We accepted this appeal to determine whether the petitioner is entitled to seek post-conviction relief from a judgment in a civil case finding her in criminal contempt and imposing sanctions, pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-9-102 (2012). We hold that a criminal contempt adjudication under Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-9-102 does not amount to a criminal conviction under the general criminal laws for purposes of the Post-Conviction Procedure Act. We affirm the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals affirming the dismissal of the petition.
The petitioner, Tracy Rose Baker, and Jeffrey D. Baker ("Husband") were divorced on January 12, 2009. The relationship between the Bakers remained acrimonious, and a series of contempt petitions were filed by both parties over the course of the months following the divorce decree. Husband's attorney acted as prosecutor on Husband's petitions for contempt. On April 16, 2010, while the petitioner was represented by counsel, she signed an agreed order, drawn up by Husband's attorney, which was then filed by the trial court.
On July 20, 2010, Husband filed a petition seeking to revoke the petitioner's probation, requesting an ex parte order discontinuing the petitioner's visitation with the couple's minor children, and seeking adjudications of criminal contempt against the petitioner. Husband's July 20, 2010 petition alleged numerous violations against the petitioner, including that the petitioner was continuing to engage in harassing conduct of Husband, that she had failed to attend counseling appointments, and that she had sent text messages to the
On July 21, 2010, a temporary restraining order was issued against the petitioner, enjoining her from exercising any parenting time pending further orders of the court. After a hearing on August 19, 2010, the trial court signed an order on August 24, 2010, finding the petitioner in violation of her probation and ordering her to serve a 180-day sentence in the Sumner County Jail.
The petitioner appealed from the trial court's August 24, 2010 order to the Court of Appeals. Baker I, 2012 WL 764918, at *5. In her appeal, the petitioner challenged: (1) the failure of the trial judge to recuse herself; (2) the propriety of Husband's attorney acting as a private prosecutor of the contempt action; (3) the failure of the trial court to follow the mandatory procedures, as outlined in Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969), State v. Mackey, 553 S.W.2d 337 (Tenn.1977), and Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(b), for the original criminal contempt "guilty pleas"; and (4) the length of the sentence imposed. The Court of Appeals denied relief on the first three issues, but granted relief on the fourth issue, reducing the petitioner's sentence in confinement to thirty days. Baker I, 2012 WL 764918, at *12. In a separate concurring opinion, one member of the Court of Appeals opined that the proper procedure for attacking the criminal contempt findings in the Agreed Order was by filing a petition for post-conviction relief. Id. at *13-14 (Cottrell, J., concurring). No application for permission to appeal was filed in this Court.
The petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief on April 18, 2011, and an amended petition two days later, challenging the criminal contempt adjudications in the Agreed Order on three grounds. The petitioner first alleged that the guilty pleas to eighteen instances of contemptuous conduct should be set aside because the trial court failed to conduct a hearing to assure the knowing and voluntary nature of the guilty pleas, pursuant to the requirements of Boykin, 395 U.S. at 242-43 & n. 5, 89 S.Ct. 1709, and Mackey, 553 S.W.2d at 344. The petitioner next alleged that the trial judge was biased against her because Husband's attorney was the judge's personal lawyer, former campaign treasurer, and a substantial donor to the judge's re-election campaign. Finally, the petitioner alleged that Husband's counsel improperly acted as a private prosecutor and, in that role, abused his prosecutorial discretion by unlawfully coercing the guilty pleas and sentences and by improperly conditioning the suspended sentence on the petitioner agreeing to surrender custody of her children and sell her house to pay his "undocumented" legal fee. The record does not indicate who received copies of the petition or amended petition. The district attorney general did not respond to the petition, but Husband's counsel answered the amended petition.
The trial court
The issue in this appeal — whether the petitioner is entitled to seek post-conviction relief from the Agreed Order — is a question of law, involving the interpretation of statutes; thus, our review is de novo with no presumption of correctness attaching to the rulings of the courts below. See Carter v. Bell, 279 S.W.3d 560, 564 (Tenn.2009).
The paramount rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and give effect to legislative intent without broadening the statute beyond its intended scope. Id. at 564. We "must always begin with the words that the General Assembly has chosen" and "give these words their natural and ordinary meaning." Lee Med., Inc. v. Beecher, 312 S.W.3d 515, 526 (Tenn.2010). "When statutory language is clear and unambiguous, we must apply its plain meaning in its normal and accepted use, without a forced interpretation that would extend the meaning of the language...." Carter, 279 S.W.3d at 564 (citing Overstreet v. TRW Commercial Steering Div., 256 S.W.3d 626, 630 (Tenn.2008)). Statutes should be construed in a reasonable manner "`which avoids statutory conflict and provides for harmonious operation of the laws.'" Frye v. Blue Ridge Neuroscience Ctr., P.C., 70 S.W.3d 710, 716 (Tenn.2002) (quoting Carver v. Citizen Utils. Co., 954 S.W.2d 34, 35 (Tenn. 1997)).
Prior to 1967, habeas corpus was the primary remedy available in Tennessee for obtaining post-conviction relief from a criminal conviction. The scope of habeas corpus relief in Tennessee was, and continues to be, narrow, providing relief only if a judgment of criminal conviction is facially void or a term of imprisonment has expired. See, e.g., Cantrell v. Easterling, 346 S.W.3d 445 (Tenn.2011) (discussing the history and current status of habeas corpus in Tennessee); House v. State, 911 S.W.2d 705 (Tenn.1995) (same); Archer v. State, 851 S.W.2d 157 (Tenn.1993) (same). Post-conviction remedies available in other states were also historically narrow in scope. House, 911 S.W.2d at 708-09 (citing Note, State Criminal Procedure and Federal Habeas Corpus, 80 Harv. L.Rev. 422 (1966)). As a result, persons convicted in state courts utilized federal habeas corpus petitions as the primary means of challenging state criminal convictions. See Case v. Nebraska, 381 U.S. 336, 338, 85 S.Ct. 1486, 14 L.Ed.2d 422 (1965) (per curiam) (Clark, J., concurring). The sheer volume of federal habeas corpus petitions filed by state inmates, as well as principles of comity, eventually led the United States Supreme Court to suggest that states enact statutory post-conviction procedures, which would afford state inmates an avenue to litigate alleged constitutional errors in state courts, at least in the first instance. See Id. at 339-40, 85 S.Ct. 1486.
The current version of the Act provides persons "in custody under a sentence of a court of this state" the automatic right to file one petition for post-conviction relief. Tenn.Code Ann. § 40-30-102(a), (c) (2012). With few exceptions, the petition must be filed within one year of the date of the final action of the highest state appellate court to which an appeal is taken or, if no appeal is taken, within one year of the date the judgment of conviction becomes final. Id. § 40-30-102(a)-(c). Additionally, post-conviction petitions must be filed in the court of conviction, must name the State as the respondent, and district attorneys general are required to respond to and defend against petitions for post-conviction relief. Id. §§ 40-30-104(a), -108.
The Act further provides that a "petition for post-conviction relief shall be limited to the assertion of claims for relief from the judgment or judgments entered in a single trial or proceeding." Id. § 40-30-104(c) (emphasis added). Post-conviction relief "shall be granted when the conviction or sentence is void or voidable because of the abridgement of any right guaranteed by the Constitution of Tennessee or the Constitution of the United States." Id. § 40-30-103 (emphasis added). Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 28, section 2(A), enacted to supplement the remedies and procedures set forth in the Act, defines a "petition for post-conviction relief" as "an application to the court, filed by or on behalf of a person convicted of and sentenced for the commission of a criminal offense, that seeks to have the conviction or sentence set aside."
Having reviewed briefly the origins of the relevant post-conviction statutes, we turn now to contempt.
This Court has written on contempt on many occasions, yet the subject continues to stymy the bench and bar both in its definition and in its application. We take this opportunity to explain again the difference between civil and criminal contempt, the rights afforded contemnors, and the sanctions available upon an adjudication of contempt.
The power of courts to punish contempts can be traced back to twelfth century
Graham v. Williamson, 128 Tenn. 720, 164 S.W. 781, 782 (1914).
However, at common law, the power of courts to punish contempts was vast and undefined, and with such unlimited and undefined discretionary power came the potential for abuse. Accordingly, in 1831, the Tennessee General Assembly enacted legislation to curb the contempt power of state judges. See Act of Dec. 19, 1831, ch. 19, 1831 Tenn. Pub. Acts 34; see also State v. Beeler, 387 S.W.3d 511, 519 (Tenn.2012). The contempt power of Tennessee courts remains circumscribed by statute. Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-9-102 provides:
Tenn.Code Ann. § 29-9-102 (2012).
Contempt proceedings are sui generis and are incidental to the case out of which they arise. Doe v. Bd. of Prof'l Responsibility, 104 S.W.3d 465, 474 (Tenn. 2003). Although contempt proceedings are traditionally classified as "civil" or "criminal," in point of fact, contempt proceedings are neither wholly civil nor criminal in nature and may partake of the characteristics of both. Gompers v. Buck's Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 441, 31 S.Ct. 492, 55 L.Ed. 797 (1911); Bowdon v. Bowdon, 198 Tenn. 143, 278 S.W.2d 670, 672 (1955). "It is not the fact of punishment, but rather its character and purpose, that often serve to distinguish between the two classes of cases." Gompers, 221 U.S. at 441, 31 S.Ct. 492. Tennessee courts are vested with the authority to punish both types of contempt with either a fine, a period of confinement, or both. Tenn.Code Ann. §§ 29-9-103(a), -104 (2012). However, unless otherwise specified, fines may not exceed fifty dollars and imprisonment may not exceed ten days. Id. § 29-9-103(b).
Criminal contempt, by contrast, is designed "to preserve the power and vindicate the dignity and authority of the law and the court as an organ of society." Beeler, 387 S.W.3d at 520 (quoting Black v. Blount, 938 S.W.2d 394, 398 (Tenn.1996)); Daugherty, 191 S.W. at 974. Sanctions for criminal contempt are generally both punitive and unconditional in nature, designed to punish past behavior, not to coerce directly compliance with a court order or influence future behavior. See Beeler, 387 S.W.3d at 520; Black, 938 S.W.2d at 398. Therefore, when a court imposes a definite term of confinement for conduct constituting criminal contempt, the contemnor cannot shorten the term by agreeing not to continue in the behavior that resulted in his confinement. Gompers, 221 U.S. at 442, 31 S.Ct. 492. "Such imprisonment operates not as a remedy coercive in its nature, but solely as punishment for the completed act of disobedience." Id. at 442-43, 31 S.Ct. 492.
Criminal contempt is often regarded as a "crime" because certain substantial rights and constitutional privileges afforded criminal defendants are also afforded criminal contemnors. For example, indirect criminal contempt may only be punished after the accused contemnor has been given notice and an opportunity to respond to the allegations at a hearing.
Not all rights afforded criminal defendants are available to alleged criminal contemnors, however. Contemnors are not entitled to a jury trial if the criminal contempt is not "serious" enough to require the protection of the constitutional right to a jury trial. Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194, 198, 88 S.Ct. 1477, 20 L.Ed.2d 522 (1968). Although the Supreme Court has not expressly defined what constitutes a "serious contempt," the Court has repeatedly held that a jury trial is not required if the contempt is punished by confinement of six months or less. See Taylor v. Hayes, 418 U.S. 488, 496, 94 S.Ct. 2697, 41 L.Ed.2d 897 (1974); Cheff v. Schnackenberg, 384 U.S. 373, 379-80, 86 S.Ct. 1523, 16 L.Ed.2d 629 (1966); cf. Bloom, 391 U.S. at 211, 88 S.Ct. 1477 (concluding that a contempt punished by a two-year term of imprisonment is a "serious offense" to which the right to trial by jury applies); Int'l Union, United Mine Workers of Am. v. Bagwell, 512 U.S. 821, 837-38, 114 S.Ct. 2552, 129 L.Ed.2d 642 (1994) (holding that a fifty-two million dollar fine could not be imposed as a sanction for criminal contempt except through a jury trial). Similarly, in this State "[t]he general rule is that a constitutional guaranty of jury trial does not apply to proceedings to punish for contempt of court whether in a court of law, a court of equity, a court having criminal jurisdiction, or other court." Pass v. State, 181 Tenn. 613, 184 S.W.2d 1, 3 (1944) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Ahern v. Ahern, 15 S.W.3d 73, 82 (Tenn.2000).
Additionally, unlike criminal prosecutions, general contempt proceedings do not require an indictment and subsequent prosecution by the State. Tenn. R.Crim. P. 42(b)(2); Green v. United States, 356 U.S. 165, 185-86, 78 S.Ct. 632, 2 L.Ed.2d 672 (1958), overruled in part on other grounds by Bloom, 391 U.S. at 196 n. 1, 198, 88 S.Ct. 1477; State v. Wood, 91 S.W.3d 769, 773 (Tenn.Ct.App.2002) (recognizing that criminal contempt is not initiated by an indictment or presentment).
Having reviewed the history, purpose, and language of the post-conviction relief and contempt statutes, we return to the question presented in this appeal: is the petitioner entitled to seek post-conviction relief from the Agreed Order finding her in criminal contempt pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-9-102? The answer to this question is no.
The language of Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-9-102 does not define contempt as a criminal offense or prescribe a conviction for contempt. Though criminal contempt has been regarded as a "crime" for some purposes, see Black, 938 S.W.2d at 402, criminal contempt proceedings
Id. (quoting Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils S.A., 481 U.S. 787, 800, 107 S.Ct. 2124, 95 L.Ed.2d 740 (1987)). Despite imprecise language in prior Tennessee appellate decisions, a person found in contempt pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-9-102 has not been "convicted" of a criminal offense for purposes of the Post-Conviction Procedure Act. Rather, section 29-9-102 defines the circumstances that authorize courts to "inflict punishments" for contempt. Courts properly "find" or "hold" persons in contempt and impose "sanctions" or "punishment" for contempt but do not "convict" persons of contempt. See, e.g., Long v. McAllister-Long, 221 S.W.3d 1, 12-13 (Tenn.Ct.App.2006) (discussing "sanctions" available for criminal contempt and recognizing that persons accused of criminal contempt "may not be found to be in criminal contempt in the absence of proof beyond a reasonable doubt that they have willfully failed to comply with the court's order" (emphasis added)); State ex rel. Flowers v. Tenn. Trucking Ass'n Self Ins. Grp. Trust, 209 S.W.3d 602, 611-13 (Tenn. Ct.App.2006) (discussing the "sanctions" available to a court to punish for contempt).
In contrast, post-conviction relief, by its very nature, presupposes the existence of a conviction for a criminal offense. Black's Law Dictionary defines "conviction" as follows: "The act or process of judicially finding someone guilty of a crime; ... [t]he judgment (as by a jury verdict) that a person is guilty of a crime." Black's Law Dictionary 384 (9th ed.2009). Thus, a "conviction" cannot be based on conduct that does not violate one of the general criminal laws of this State. Criminal offenses are defined by the General Assembly, State v. Burdin, 924 S.W.2d 82, 87
The Legislature's enactment of other statutes defining certain types of contemptuous conduct as criminal offenses supports our conclusion that contempt findings pursuant to section 29-9-102 should not be viewed as criminal convictions for purposes of the Post-Conviction Procedure Act. See Tenn.Code Ann. § 36-5-104; Brown, 914 S.W.2d at 888 (recognizing that the failure to comply with a court order to pay child support is both contemptuous behavior and a criminal offense under Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-5-104(a)). Similarly, the Legislature has enacted statutes defining jury tampering and failure to appear as criminal offenses, see Tenn.Code Ann. §§ 39-16-509, -609 (2010), even though this conduct is also subject to general contempt provisions, id. § 29-9-102(3), (5) (2012). These examples indicate that, had the Legislature intended for general criminal contempt to also constitute a criminal offense for purposes of the Post-Conviction Procedure Act, it would have so provided, as it has in other instances.
Post-conviction relief, by its very definition, is a remedy for seeking relief from convictions of criminal offenses. It is not available to challenge findings of general criminal contempt arising from civil cases. Rather, the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure provide the avenues for seeking relief from judgments in civil cases. See Tenn. R. Civ. P. 59, 60; Discover Bank v. Morgan, 363 S.W.3d 479, 488-89 (Tenn. 2012).
The plain language of the Post-Conviction Procedure Act provides a mechanism for seeking relief from criminal convictions. A finding of criminal contempt pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-9-102 is not a criminal conviction. Thus, the petitioner was not entitled to seek post-conviction relief from the criminal contempt findings in the Agreed Order. We affirm the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals affirming the trial court's dismissal of the petition for postconviction relief. Costs of this appeal are taxed to Tracy Rose Baker, for which execution may issue if necessary.
