THOMAS A. VARLAN, District Judge.
This civil action is before the Court on defendants' Motion to Dismiss or in the Alternative, for Partial Summary Judgment [Doc. 12]. No response was filed, and the time for doing so has passed. See E.D. Tenn. L.R. 7.1(a), 7.2. For the reasons explained herein, the Court will grant the alternative request for partial summary judgment.
This is a diversity action, which arose from a car accident that occurred in Campbell County, Tennessee on April 19, 2010 [Doc. 1]. On that date, plaintiff Lynne S. Ridgeway was driving her 2006 Cadillac in a northerly direction on Interstate 75 [Id.]. At approximately the same time and place, defendant Peter A. Bergman ("defendant Bergman") was driving a 2010 Buick in a northerly direction on Interstate 75 [Id.]. As defendant Bergman attempted to change lanes of traffic, he allegedly struck plaintiff's vehicle, causing her vehicle to spin out of control and strike the median guardrail before coming to rest on the right-hand shoulder of the Interstate [Id.].
Plaintiffs assert that defendant Bergman operated the vehicle without exercising ordinary and due care under the circumstances [Id.]. Plaintiffs further allege defendant Bergman was negligent for failing to keep a proper look out ahead, for failing to keep the vehicle under proper control, and for violating Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 55-8-123
Plaintiff Lynne S. Ridgeway claims she has incurred substantial medical and related expenses, has endured a great deal of pain and suffering, and has been deprived of a portion of her ability to earn an income as well as a portion of her ability to enjoy life in general [Id.]. She asserts her injuries are or may be permanent in nature and seeks one hundred thousand dollars in damages [Id.]. Plaintiff Noah D. Ridgeway, Sr., claims he has suffered and will suffer the loss of companionship, services, and consortium of his wife, plaintiff Lynne S. Ridgeway [Id.]. He seeks seven thousand five hundred dollars in damages [Id.].
Defendants filed an answer, generally denying the allegations contained in the complaint [Doc. 3]. Subsequently, they filed the instant motion, pursuant to Rules 12(b)(6) and 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, seeking to dismiss defendant Carson or granting partial summary judgment in his favor [Doc. 12]. Attached to the motion is the affidavit of Carolyn Carson, defendant Carson's wife, and exhibits pertaining to the ownership of the 2010 Buick [Doc. 12-1]. Because the Court has considered these documents in deciding the instant motion, it treats defendants' motion as one for summary judgment under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d) (providing that, "[i]f on a motion under Rule 12(b)(6) . . ., matters outside the pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion must be treated as one for summary judgment under Rule 56"). The Court finds that plaintiffs, who are represented by counsel, are not likely to be surprised by treating defendants' motion as one for summary judgment as the motion was framed as an alternative motion for summary judgment and because an answer had already been filed by defendants.
Summary judgment under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is proper "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The moving party bears the burden of establishing that no genuine issues of material fact exist. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 330 n.2 (1986); Moore v. Phillip Morris Cos., Inc., 8 F.3d 335, 339 (6th Cir. 1993). All facts and all inferences to be drawn therefrom must be viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986); Burchett v. Kiefer, 301 F.3d 937, 942 (6th Cir. 2002). "Once the moving party presents evidence sufficient to support a motion under Rule 56, the non-moving party is not entitled to a trial merely on the basis of allegations." Curtis Through Curtis v. Universal Match Corp., Inc., 778 F.Supp. 1421, 1423 (E.D. Tenn. 1991) (citing Catrett, 477 U.S. at 317). To establish a genuine issue as to the existence of a particular element, the non-moving party must point to evidence in the record upon which a reasonable finder of fact could find in its favor. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). The genuine issue must also be material; that is, it must involve facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law. Id.
The Court's function at the point of summary judgment is limited to determining whether sufficient evidence has been presented to make the issue of fact a proper question for the factfinder. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250. The Court does not weigh the evidence or determine the truth of the matter. Id. at 249. Nor does the Court search the record "to establish that it is bereft of a genuine issue of material fact." Street v. J.C. Bradford & Co., 886 F.2d 1472, 1479-80 (6th Cir. 1989). Thus, "the inquiry performed is the threshold inquiry of determining whether there is a need for a trial—whether, in other words, there are any genuine factual issues that properly can be resolved only by a finder of fact because they may reasonably be resolved in favor of either party." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250.
The Court notes again that plaintiffs have not responded to defendants' motion. Non-response standing alone, however, is not determinative of whether summary judgment is appropriate. Aquent, LLC v. United States, No. 08-15275, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 40132, at *1 (E.D. Mich. Apr. 13, 2011) (discussing the former version of Rule 56 and noting that "the non-movant's failure to respond does not relieve the movant of its burden to establish that `the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law'" (citation omitted)). Relevant to a party's failure to respond is Rule 56(e), which provides:
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)(2); 56(e)(3).
Defendants assert that plaintiffs have erroneously alleged that defendant Carson was the owner of the 2010 Buick, which was being operated by defendant Bergman at the time of the accident [Doc. 14]. They submit evidence that the 2010 Buick was instead owned solely by defendant Bergman's sister and defendant Carson's wife, Carolyn Carson [Doc. 14; Doc. 12-1]. They further submit evidence that although defendant Bergman was operating the 2010 Buick at the time of the accident with Mrs. Carson's permission, he was not a resident of the Carson household [Id.]. Defendants claim these facts preclude imputing liability to defendant Carson as well as application of the family purpose doctrine, and that defendant Carson should be dismissed [Doc. 14].
It is undisputed that defendant Carson did not own the 2010 Buick. Defendants submit the Ohio Certificate of Title and the Ohio Certificate of Registration for the 2010 Buick, both of which indicate that the vehicle was owned solely by "M. Carolyn Carson" [Doc. 12-1].
Under the family purpose doctrine,
The Court agrees with defendants that the family purpose doctrine does not apply here. At the time of the accident, defendant Bergman, defendant Carson, and Mrs. Carson were returning from a trip they had taken together [Doc. 14]. While defendants assert that the doctrine does not apply because defendant Bergman did not reside with the Carsons, that fact is not dispositive. See Starr v. Hill, 353 S.W.3d 478 (Tenn. 2011) (noting that "the identification of a family member as a head of the household is primarily based on his or her family relationship and duty to support the driver rather than place of residency"). Nevertheless, it appears from the record before the Court that defendant Bergman did not rely upon defendant Carson for support. Thus, defendant Carson cannot be liable for any negligence of defendant Bergman under this doctrine. See id. (discussing cases where the family purpose doctrine did not apply because the owners did not owe the drivers, even though family members, any duty to provide for the drivers' support). The Court finds this conclusion most appropriate in light of the Supreme Court of Tennessee's recent explanation that one of the rationales for the family purpose doctrine is "to create an incentive for a parent to exercise control over a child's use of the vehicle. . . ." Id. (citation omitted). Such purpose would not be served by applying the doctrine here.
In sum, the Court finds the undisputed material facts demonstrate that there is no legal basis for imposing vicarious liability upon defendant Carson and that he should be dismissed from this case.
For the reasons stated above, defendants' Motion to Dismiss or in the Alternative, for Partial Summary Judgment [Doc. 12] will be
ORDER ACCORDINGLY.
Tenn. Code Ann. § 55-8-123.
Tenn. Code Ann. § 55-10-205.
